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Over the course of the years I have been engaged in this project, I have accrued so 
massive an intellectual and personal debt that I cannot but despair giving credit 
wherever credit is due. I shall follow my intellectual hero Immanuel Kant, however, in 
his conviction that the unrealizability of an ideal does not absolve one of acting in 
accordance with it, and accept that many will find this attempt at acknowledgement 
inadequate. Like Kant, also, I will attempt to attain completeness through a 
systematization, a division into categories of people to whom I feel indebted. The list 
such an approach generates does not, as will be clear to any reader, follow the order of a 
degree or amount of debt, for that is in most cases impossible to measure and to compare, 
and in some cases immeasurable and incomparable.  
The first person to thank is, of course, my supervisor, Gertrudis Van de Vijver, for her 
continuing faith in my project and my capacity to bring it to fruition, and her 
continuing support even in times when my academic future and present were unclear. I 
have learned more from her than the surface of this text can reveal, and than our 
possible disagreements may show. I hope therefore that I have in some way met up to 
her expectations of me and my work, and that I have succeeded in repaying her by 
learning her a few things myself. 
Besides in my supervisor I have always found a great deal of support and intellectual 
nourishment at the Centre for Critical Philosophy. I owe many of my colleagues there 
considerably, not just for what they taught me, but also for the constructive and 
generous way in which they forced me to submit my blossoming conceptions and my 
manner of expression to careful scrutiny. I feel that this crucial dialogical dimension 
typical of intellectual encounters at the Centre has found its way in the general style 
and method of this text. My particular gratitude goes to Emiliano Acosta and Joris Van 
Poucke. Both of these men has, in his own way, functioned as a mentor of sorts in stages 
of my development, and I feel grateful for their ultimate willingness to let go of the 
asymmetry that once characterized our relationships. 
It was unfortunately late that I found a way of communicating and exchanging 
intellectually with members of other research units at the department of Philosophy at 
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Ghent University. Nevertheless, in the relatively short period that I have had the 
occasion to work with them in various contexts, these people have left an indelible 
impression on my thought, my intellectual practice and my moral character. They have 
also kindly allowed, encouraged and helped me to pursue research that was necessary to 
this project, but hard to complete given my own training. Of these many intellectual 
friends, I cannot but specifically thank Laura Georgescu, Barnaby Hutchins and Violi 
Sahaj for their particular generosity in friendship towards me. 
Perhaps special thanks is also due to Eric Schliesser and Charles Wolfe. For several 
years, they managed to make Ghent an exciting place to do graduate research by 
frequently organizing workshops, conferences and lectures with scholars from many 
countries and even more philosophical inclinations. Simply being able to attend such 
events with such frequency is a continuous source of knowledge and intellectual 
challenge. 
One of the most beneficial aspects of my period of research was, however, that 
besides my dealings with academic peers and superiors, I had the opportunity to engage 
with students in the context of various classes. We are tempted to underestimate the 
value for the development of an idea of having to put it clearly, or of having to get clear 
on the informational basis on which it is constructed, in order to communicate it to 
people who do not have, or feel no need to feign, the necessary background.  
But it is not just within the once again increasingly fortified walls of academia that I 
have found intellectual and personal support. I have been blessed with a circle of close 
friends who have miraculously encouraged me in pursuing this enterprise which should 
otherwise be alien to them. Given the fact that they are hardly in the position to 
appreciate the inner workings and dealings of philosophy as a discipline, they have 
shown remarkable understanding for my passion for and faith in it. As a society, we 
underestimate the near indispensability of expectations of those close to us to our 
determination in ambitious enterprises. Of these people, I would like to explicitly thank 
Pauline Groen, Sebastien Helsmoortel, Maarten Puype, Kevin Schoonooghe en Jonas Van 
Braeckeveldt, for reasons known to them. 
Finally, I need to thank my family, starting with those that irreparable time has 
swept away from me. This project has been instrumental in my process of mourning for 
my grandparents. Each of the three grandparents that lived to help (or meddle) in 
raising me, Hendrik Demarest, Cecilia Hillewaert and Eugenie Dewinter, has been more 
important in my development as an aficionado of intellectual and cultural activity than 
I could realize when they were still alive. They have done much to supply the child that 
I once was with means for further development. I can imagine no better way of 
honouring their memory than by trying to prove them right in their faith in me, and by 
not allowing their loving efforts to have been in vain. 
I have not walked the arduous path of maturation alone, of course, nor do I find 
myself bereft of all family now. That is why I feel the need to express my gratitude to my 
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sisters, Leila and Senta Demarest, here. They too have shown much faith in me, and 
offered me more support at times of distress than my delusions of autonomy allow me 
to recall. It is in all likelihood what we share that has allowed us to bring up the mutual 
understanding that is often so hard to come by. Moreover, it is not unimportant that my 
sister Leila has chosen a similar lifestyle to my own, which offered occasions for us to 
exchange on the joys and pains of academic labour. 
Above all, however, I need to express my massive indebtedness to my parents, Peter 
Demarest and Elisabeth Janssens. I have the firm conviction that, in bringing a child 
onto this world, we charge ourselves with an enormous asymmetrical duty towards it – 
asymmetrical because we do not also charge that child with duties towards us. What is 
traditionally taken as the “respect” children owe their parents, is no more than a 
pragmatic duty: in teaching a child, in bringing it up, we need some authority over it in 
order to cultivate in it the sense of internal limitation that is essential to all autonomy. 
We can never lay claim, however, to duties of that child towards us beyond these: it does 
not build up debt to us by being in our charge: we incur a debt when we fail to fulfil our 
parental duties, and we absolve ourselves of duty only by allowing the child to be an 
autonomous individual. In light of my endorsement of this radical doctrine, the reader 
will undoubtedly realize just how far the effort and support of my parents, both 
emotional and financial, must have reached in order for me to actually believe I have 
incurred a massive debt towards them. Because of the magnitude of my gratefulness, I 




Dans les sciences qui sont difficiles par elles-mêmes, je ne mesure pas la longueur 
d’un Livre par le nombre de ses pages, mais par la longueur du tems qu’il faut 
employer pour l’entendre. En ce sens il est assez souvent arrive que l’ouvrage 
rendu un peu plus long, auroit été beaucoup plus court. (Terrasson 1754: 146) 
This saying of Jean Terrasson is famously invoked by Kant in the preface to the first 
edition of his magnum opus, the Critique of Pure Reason. In spite of the fact that Kant goes 
on to adapt it into a saying of his own, he seems to always have been aware of it, and to 
have realized just to what extent it was applicable to the work he finally laid before the 
public after his so-called “silent decade”, for the Critique of Pure Reason would have been 
a much shorter book, had it not been quite so short. 
It seems odd to call the Critique of Pure Reason a short book, given that it numbered 
almost 900 pages in its first edition version. Nevertheless, it is safe to say that few of 
these 900 pages contain no sentence or paragraph on which readers would like Kant to 
have expanded a bit. The desire to keep the length of the book manageable may thus 
have ended up thwarting readers’ efforts to understand it.  
I would like to think I have learned from this error of judgment of Kant’s – which is 
why I have ended up writing a dissertation that is admittedly somewhat too lengthy. 
The choice was deliberate, for I feared that a concise treatment of the issue would have 
limited the ease of reading and of appreciating the point I sought to make. The usual 
style of contemporary philosophy, which is particularly adapted to short journal 
articles, and monographs consisting essentially of a collage of such articles, would not 
have been appropriate for my present argument. In this preface, I would like to offer a 
defense of form, style and method of this dissertation. 
One of the reasons why this dissertation has ended up as long as it is, is the constant 
effort at historical situation. I expect this will be puzzling to some, since the work is not 
recognizably an effort in antiquarian history of philosophy. I even expect many to 
charge it with being blatantly anachronistic in the views it ascribes to Kant. This 




The maxim to read a work historically, and not anachronistically, postulates that we 
have ready access to the historic context of a work to use as a background for our 
interpretative practice. The problem with many historicizations is that it is naïve 
precisely in its picture of such a stable background of interpretation, for an obvious 
hermeneutic circle occurs: the historical context of the work is usually regarded as the 
body of texts, the tradition, in which it occurs. But each work in this tradition itself 
belongs to that body of work. Consequently, a revision in our picture of a work in our 
tradition implies a revision in our picture of that tradition, which in turn prompts a 
revision of the individual works composing that tradition. The antiquarian belief 
consists in the insistence that such holistic reframing is strongly constrained by the 
historical data, and that historians usually have a solid grasp of the background of a 
text. I find this belief naïve, especially in the case of a figure such as Kant. 
The historic background against which Kant is usually historicized, I submit, is itself 
highly anachronistic, in two ways. First of all, in our antiquarianism, we take Kant to be 
responding to what we have made of his contemporaries, not to what he himself made 
of their texts and views. Second, we read his arguments against the background of his 
successors, thereby tacitly agreeing with their interpretations of the problems he was 
dealing with, and with their identification of the merits and demerits of the critical 
philosophy. In this way, we are reading Kant against our historical reconstruction of his 
background, not against a stable background. The hermeneutic effort implies that we 
may have to revise our image of the background in order to understand Kant’s place in 
it. 
In this dissertation, I attempt to present the history of debates in which Kant 
subsequently intervened in the form in which I believe Kant viewed them. In other 
words, I do not attempt to reconstruct an objective background, but rather a 
background against which Kant put himself. I usually argue that what contemporary 
historians of philosophy, of ideas and of science take this background to be makes no 
sense of Kant’s place in it. For example, I try to show in chapter 1 that the challenge of 
understanding Kant’s position towards mechanicism is the result of reading a later, 
positivistic evaluation of Newton into Kant. In chapter 2, I blame the difficulties in 
interpreting Kantian epigenesis partly on the false assumption that Kant believed there 
to be only two options: epigenesis and preformation. This is again a legacy from the late 
19th century and its debatable, because incontrovertibly ideological, image of its 
scientific past. In chapter 3, I suggest that there has been a rather complex and heinous 
dialectic between the interpretation of early modern philosophy through the lens of the 
empiricism and rationalism-opposition. The dialectic is complex because we usually 
point to Kant for this image of early modern epistemology. Here, a problematic 
interpretation of Kant feeds back into a problematic interpretation of the debate in 
which he was intervening. In chapter 4, I argue that the later emphasis on the 
banishment of teleology from mechanicism is disingenuous, and that Kant was in all 
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likelihood not fooled by it. Aristotelianism and Mechanicism do not differ in that they 
take recourse to teleology somehow; they differ in their interpretation and integration 
of teleology and teleological explanation. In chapter 5, I suggest that we have read 
Kant’s comments on systematicity as if Leibnizianism was obvious to him, and as if he 
had not read the major challenges to systematicity in the Enlightenment, even though 
he was at least aware of those offered by Locke and Buffon. As a result, we have 
overemphasized his recuperation of rationalism, and underappreciated his concessions 
to what he regarded as empiricism. In chapter 6, I suggest Kant’s attack on rational 
psychology was motivated by a desire to maintain the disunity of the faculties, or rather 
change the image of how they unite and relate. This contrasts with readings that want 
to read him as ultimately seeking the unity of the faculties. 
In all these reconstructions, one might find inaccuracies and inadequacies. But 
although I am certainly open to debating them and learning from others regarding 
these issues, I believe their ultimate adequacy matters less than the light they shed on 
the problems Kant set himself and how he went about in solving them. It also opens the 
route to showing that his answers are more original, and less irrevocably time-bound, 
than is sometimes assumed. For this is the central sin of historicization: it reads our 
philosophical predecessors as if they were trying to solve issues about which we now no 
longer care, of which we have been happily rid by the subsequent progress of human 
knowledge. The problem, thus, is that many so-called antiquarian, historicizing readings 
evade wiggishness, i.e. reading our past in the light of the present, only by explaining 
what Hasok Chang (2009) has chastised as “triumphalism”, i.e. reading the past as 
rightfully overcome by subsequent evolutions. And we are rarely more triumphalist 
than in the history of philosophy. 
The triumphalism in Kant scholarship consists in the second anachronistic feature I 
identified above, namely that of reading his arguments against the background of his 
successors. This background stems mostly from three sources, all of which are 
importantly entangled, namely German Idealism, Neo-Kantianism and Phenomenology. 
We often read Kant through the lens of the appropriations of Kant effected by each of 
these traditions, and then blame him either for not yet reaching their stage or for 
sharing their failings. The German Idealists placed great stress on systematicity and 
unity, and blamed Kant for stopping short of this unity. When French philosophers in 
the 1960s came to criticize this quest for unity in Hegel, they immediately assumed Kant 
was equally guilty for having necessarily led to Hegel. They usually did not come to 
question whether this from Kant to Hegel narrative had any legitimacy outside of the 
philosophical historiography of philosophy specific to – Hegel. Husserl, on the other 
hand, attempted to develop phenomenology as a science of transcendental 
consciousness. This committed him to a form of Cartesianism about consciousness, 
whilst rejecting psychologism, which, for Husserl, meant embracing Platonism. When 
critics of phenomenology like Foucault and Derrida ultimately came to attack the 
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peculiar nexus of the transcendental and the psychological, the ideal and the concrete, 
in Husserlian phenomenology, they equally assumed that Husserl was somehow entitled 
to claim that he derived this “transcendental motif” from Kant. Finally, like Husserl, the 
Neo-Kantians of the Marburger Schule assumed that the only defense against 
psychologism was Platonism, and therefore chose to defend Kant from the 
psychologistic recuparation by stressing those elements of his philosophy that are 
platonistic and rationalistic. As a result, they systematically underestimated the 
empiricist side of Kant’s thought, as well as his fundamental criticism of the incarnation 
of Platonism he recognized in Leibniz and his followers. By constructing a false 
dichotomy between Aristotle and Plato, between rationalism and empiricism and 
between psychologism and platonism, they lost sight of Kant’s attempt to evade this 
dichotomy. Moreover, their platonism led them to overemphasize Kant’s fascination 
with mathematics and mathematical physics, thereby constructing the stubborn myth 
that Kant was mostly an apologist of Newtonian mechanics and a philosopher of science 
in a postivist vein. 
This explains another way in which this dissertation is perhaps too long, for it is not 
just a commentary on Kant – it is also a commentary on the practice of commenting on 
Kant. I have often tried to unveil the philosophical rationale behind what I identify as 
misinterpretations of Kant, not to pretend that I am free of these philosophical biases, 
but rather to show that it is always a matter of philosophical argument, and never just 
one of historical adequacy. My question is of course the following: “how should we read 
Kant”;  but what the precise modality of that “should” is, is precisely the issue at stake. I 
am trying to reveal the philosophical stakes at work in the history of philosophy, and 
show that they not only can, but should, figure in our arguments. I prefer to read Kant 
in such a way that I can still learn from him, still be surprised by him, and be confronted 
with all the peculiar contingencies of our philosophical history. I am not interested in 
reading him in order to find there what I have been taught to expect, and in such a 
manner that he exhibits his correct place in the indomitable progress of philosophical 
thought that has led us to its provisional apex in the currently most cited articles. Nor 
am I interested in holding fast to a lost era in which the old interpretation of Kant was 
held as truth, which is a nostalgia to a time that never was. 
The dissertation is both too long and too short in yet another way, because of its 
holistic manner of argument. In the course of the seven chapters, I offer a variety of 
interpretations of Kantian doctrines which I admit to be controversial. My hope has 
been to support these interpretations not only by showing how they figure into a 
revised picture of the “historical” background, but also to show how they harmonize 
with the text and with each other. I have relied heavily on detailed analyses of whole 
passages, rather than on paraphrases. This is because I have often found the precise 
wording surprising and puzzling. There are many passages in Kant which even non-
experts know well, to the extent we no longer seem to need to read them to know what 
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they say. I have drawn attention to these passages to show that, on closer inspection, 
they do not quite say what we have been taught to say, and that their phrasing and 
terminology often reveal resonances that we would not otherwise have expected. 
Paraphrasis glosses over these specificities, thereby precipitously equating terms and 
overlooking connections and disconnections. 
Moreover, I have tried to show that the various peculiar passages resonate with each 
other, rather than form a series of exceptions. A major reason for the misinterpretation 
of Kantian arguments is that we read them not only against a supposedly stable 
historical background, but also against a supposedly stable background that is the rest of 
Kant’s doctrines. I have tried to show that, here as elsewhere, holistic revisions are a 
real option. Some valuable interpretations might be rejected all too readily because they 
conflict with what we suppose to be Kant’s official doctrine. On closer inspection, 
however, the fact that this background is Kant’s official doctrine is itself questionable, 
not just on textual grounds, but also because it is mostly proven by the fact that it 
grounds the former misinterpretation.  
This also reveals what I take to be a manner in which this dissertation is too short, for 
it would be complete only if it offered a comprehensive interpretation of the whole of 
Kant’s theory and its relevant background. The reason why I have not done so is of 
course obvious, for this task would be far beyond the scope of one work, even beyond 
the scope of one oeuvre. The adequate philosophical evualation of the revised picture is 
yet another task that goes beyond this work in several respects. I can only hope that my 
suggestions here and there make intelligible how I would now go about dealing with 
future challenges. In the conclusion, I identify some of these future tasks.  
And yet, in the spirit of honesty I would like to admit that, in its current and final 
form, the dissertation still only fulfills half of the task I had set myself when I first 
conceived it in 2008. Then, I had hoped not just to show that the system of faculties is 
properly understood in analogy with an organic system, and that it therefore has 
importantly dynamical properties – I had also hoped to show how this translates into the 
argument of the transcendental deduction and how it explains the nature of the 
categories. Throughout the present work, you will find hints of this original project, and 
I have also delivered papers which are properly framed in it. Nevertheless, I had to omit 
this part of the research entirely in order to have any hope of ever finishing, for not 
only did the latter half of the assignment prove too daunting, the first half turned out 
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The topic of this dissertation is the possibility of the historicization of the a priori. In 
other words, it is a quest for what has been, for quite some time now, a philosophical 
holy grail. I liken it to the holy grail for two reasons: first of all, it is generally assumed 
that a solid account of historicizing the a priori is capable to perform philosophical 
miracles, such as resolving some of the deepest tensions and struggles underlying the 
field as a whole; secondly, those very miraculous properties raise justifiable doubts 
regarding the possible existence of this philosophical panacea.  
I will not pretend to have found it, but I do believe to have charted a region where 
our search may begin afresh, with more than vague rumours and inarticulate suspicions 
to go on. Or rather, I have recharted a region that has been charted many times before, 
and where we have already sought diligently. But I have reasons to believe we have 
spent that time looking in the wrong way. 
The region I have recharted is the critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Kant is often 
accredited with one of the best possible accounts of the a priori, namely in terms of 
conditions of possibility. This account is powerful and alluring because it does not 
obviously locate the a priori in some transcendent realm of eternal truths, in the mind 
of an omniscient and omnipotent creator or even in the supposed core structure of the 
world – groundings that are dissatisfying to the austere tastes of many of us. Rather, this 
a priori seems to flow directly from the acts of thinking and knowing, and is therefore 
embedded in a finite, dynamic practice of understanding. 
Yet, all of this raises the question as to why these and no other conditions constrain 
our thought. Kant has usually been regarded as having provided only a partial answer to 
this question, for he can at best be read to succeed in showing that these constraints are 
conditions of the possibility of knowledge. But it is far less obvious whether a good 
argument can be extracted from his writings to support the view that they are the 
conditions of possibility, in that there can be no other. Quips concerning the supposed 
arbitrariness of the table of the categories abound in the philosophical literature after 
the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason, as do sneers that Kant is simply elevating 
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the principles of his own, scientifically and philosophically blinkered, epoch to eternal 
truths.  
These charges of arbitrariness and partiality have led many to suspect that there may 
be other systems of categories, and that there may even have been other systems of 
categories. In fact, the idea that Kant’s philosophy is somehow irremediably marred by 
its commitment to the rigidity of the a priori is shared by most of the major movements 
of 19th century German philosophy, which are almost universally either post-Kantian or 
neo-Kantian.  
Dynamizing the A priori 
The first receptions of Kant’s philosophy took issue with the dualisms of his thought, 
which are supposed to be a priori and fixed. Most Post-Kantian German philosophers 
were somehow involved in the project of overcoming Kantian dualism and the 
bruteness of the a priori. To this end, the philosophies of the early Fichte and Schelling 
meant to replace the ready-made, absolute positing of the faculties and the categories 
with a genetic account in terms of an absolute unity coming to differentiate itself in 
specific ways through an internal process of self-limitation. The specificity of the 
categories and the faculties can then be explained by showing how they can come to be 
through a process the form of which is necessitated by the type of original unity 
involved. 
 This genetic method has entered philosophical common sense mostly through its 
elaboration by Hegel. Hegel pointed towards dialectics and the negative as the major 
moments of such a process. In addition, Hegel’s philosophy is widely believed to be 
original because it no longer wishes to justify the specific faculties and categories as 
necessary through a reconstruction of their genesis, but argues instead that the 
faculties and categories are necessary only relative to a certain stage in the self-
development of spirit and its knowledge of itself. In Hegel’s view, the Kantian a priori’s 
are indeed necessary to a certain stage in the development, but the dualisms and 
bruteness they exhibit is also the reason why this stage must end up in a contradiction. 
This contradiction is eventually solved through a dialectical sublation where the 
previous stages are negated, but in such a way that what is true and necessary about 
them is preserved in the new stage. The Hegelian philosophy aims at developing the 
picture of knowledge that would result from the final stage in this dialectical process, 
namely absolute knowledge. 
 Contrary to what the many horribly inadequate historical overviews of philosophy 
of the 20th century would have their readers believe, German Idealism did not reign 
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supreme in German philosophical circles in the 19th century. From relatively early on in 
the century, there was a current of neo-Kantianism that fought against the purported 
attempts of Post-Kantians to reinstate metaphysical speculation as a legitimate, and 
perhaps the proper business of philosophy. Instead, they wanted to keep reflecting on the 
necessary limits of human knowledge insofar as they are expressed in the Kantian a 
priori’s. But like many readers of Kant, they believed that the reasons why these and 
precisely these a priori’s constituted the limits of human knowledge should be 
explicated beyond Kant’s own summary treatment of the issue. Over the first half of the 
19th century, a position developed that we now know as psychological or physiological 
neo-Kantianism. Its proponents held that Kantian a priori is not necessary for being 
logically or metaphysically necessary, but for being the general laws governing human 
perceptual and psychological experience. The a priori is innate and fixed because it is 
ultimately a biological and/or psychological fact about the human species. There may 
also be mixed positions, which borrow from the early German Idealists the idea that the 
a priori is linked to genetic processes, but that maintain that these geneses are not of 
metaphysical entities, but rather of concrete psychological individuals and their store of 
percepts and concepts. 
 By the late 1860s, as physiological neo-Kantianism had risen to dominance in 
German academia and started professing that epistemology or theory of knowledge 
should be the foundation of all philosophy and should be concerned with the 
investigation of how we think, i.e. how our psychological and physiological apparatus 
work, a new movement of neo-Kantianism arose. This movement, whilst sharing their 
predecessors’ reticence towards metaphysics and their preference for theory of 
knowledge, railed against the psychologism of earlier neo-Kantianisms. A crucial figure 
in this movement is Hermann Cohen, who sought to distinguish Kant’s own reflections 
on the a priori from the subsequent psychophysiological projects of Herbart and his 
epigones. He protested that this interpretation of epistemology could only give us 
information about how men tend to think, about the psychological and physiological 
mechanisms that give rise to our beliefs and representations. But this has no bearing on 
the justification of that knowledge. To use Kant’s image, the empiricist accounts of how 
we tend to arrive at knowledge only settles the matter of the facts, not that of rights. 
 Cohen suggested to reform theory of knowledge, which is concerned with the 
principles of our empirical processes of reasoning, as Critique of knowledge, which aims 
at identifying the grounding assumptions of our best scientific theories. He suggested 
that Kant was engaged in the latter enterprise because he intended to identify the 
underlying principles, the conditions of possibility, of Newtonian Science. Theory of 
Knowledge, for Cohen, had both a new target and a new object: it was no longer 
concerned with investigating the general regularities that govern thought, but with the 
fundamental principles that underlie thought; and it was no longer interested in 
knowledge as a psychological phenomenon, but in knowledge as scientific theory and 
 
4 
investigation. In the early Marburger Schule, real knowledge, justified knowledge, came 
to be identical with science, and science with our best theories.  
 As fascinating as this attempt is, it was immediately followed by a criticism. Many 
were tempted to accept Cohen’s interpretation of Kant’s critical philosophy as correctly 
identifying the a priori of Newtonian Mechanics and Euclidean Geometry, but then 
continued to point out that both of these scientific theories were on their way out. Over 
the course of the 19th century, a tendency towards algebraization and formalization had 
changed the practices and theoretical constraints of mathematics irrevocably. A crucial 
consequence of this is that the Euclidean parallel postulate was no longer considered to 
be necessary, but was rather viewed as a characteristic of only one in an infinite number 
of possible alternative geometries. Secondly, the fundamental concepts and methods of 
mathematics were no longer derived from the method of pure construction prescribed 
by Euclid’s Elements. By the early 20th century, moreover, Newtonian Mechanics came 
to be challenged by Special and General Relativity, both of whom denied that Euclidean 
Space is even proper to characterize the spatio-temporal grid of our empirical theories 
(the so-called Einstein-Minkowski space). Some philosophers took this to mean that 
there could be no a priori, and that any and all so-called a priori principles are 
defeasible on empirical grounds. 
 This was not to deter the Marburger Schule, however, since by then it had 
admitted that the changes in our science also bring along changes in our fundamental 
principles, even though they believed that some a priori principles remained in place. 
This theory was most famously articulated by Ernst Cassirer, who admitted that the 
principles of Newtonian Mechanics can be rejected, but maintained that the very fact of 
the revisal of our knowledge entails that there are still more general principles 
governing our thought. The a priori principles of science were now no longer thought to 
be those of our best scientific theories and practices, but those of the continuous and 
dynamic process that is science in general. And yet, there are second-order a priori 
principles that are necessitated by a specific stage of any science – Kant’s categories, for 
instance, correctly grasp the supra-empirical framework of Newtonian mechanics, even 
though they need to be abandoned together with the framework it makes possible. 
Both the German Idealist and the Marburger Schule conceptions of a dynamical a 
priori have influenced many approaches in the 20th century, and the reader will forgive 
me if I abstain from tracing its influence through such varied movements as positivist, 
logical positivist and post-positivist philosophy of science, as well as French historical 
epistemology and the structuralist and post-structuralist philosophies that engage with 
it. I will rather go straight to what I take to be the defects of both accounts, defects that 
they risk passing on to their progeny. 
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Locating the Dynamics of the A Priori 
Although the post-kantians and the neo-kantians essentially agree that a dynamic 
element is required to somehow validate Kant’s list, or rather table, of a priori 
principles, they disagree on how to conceive of this dynamics. Because of its positivist 
strand, the Marburger Schule neo-kantians seem to believe that the locus of dynamics 
lies in science, narrowly conceived as a given epoch’s best theoretical and institutional 
framework of inquiry into nature. Various assumptions lie behind this. First of all, there 
is the belief that there is a distinct, isolable and recognizable subset, a natural kind if 
you will, of human practices that constitutes science. Secondly, there is the conviction 
that this thing called science has a higher epistemic status than non-scientific practices, 
and is thus normatively elevated above the latter, to such an extent that it provides the 
sole standard of the epistemic worth investigating. As a result, theory of knowledge is 
concerned only with the a priori principles governing theories and scientific 
frameworks or traditions, not with cultural practices or epistemic practices the 
scientific status of which is all too disputed. Moreover, the dynamics that epistemology 
must admit is the dynamics of theory-change, of tradition-change, of paradigm-change, 
etc. in science, not the changes of anything more socio-culturally general. 
This science-centrism is typical of much late-19th and early 20th century philosophy, 
and it is a clear shortcoming of it. First of all, its implicit or explicit devaluation of non-
scientific epistemic practices leads to the bizarre result that non-scientists do not 
actually think and have no a priori principles, unless one assumes that they simply 
engage in a lower grade of science, or folk science, or adhere to outdated scientific 
frameworks. The idea that most people will never truly be engaged in “knowing” seems 
to me incredibly arrogant and even preposterous. 
There is a reason for this bizarre result, and it is the legacy of positivism in 20th 
century philosophy. However critical philosophers may position themselves towards 
this tradition, they often continue to work within its general framework, which is that 
philosophy should primarily be engaged with science as the crowning human 
ratiocinative accomplishment. This focus on science persists even when philosophers 
realize, or should realize, that they are engaged with something much broader. As a 
result, our thought about conceptual schemes is usually in terms of scientific theories. 
This science-centrism sets the agenda for the question of the dynamization of the a 
priori as well. For many, it is the question of whether science can have the epistemic 
pride of place credited to it by positivism, and whether it can also be said to progress. 
After all, according to an older conception, science derives its pride of place from its 
high conformity with the a priori principles governing knowledge. But if these 
principles turn out to be relative to science, they can no longer independently justify it. 
The question then becomes that of how science can still lay claim to its epistemic 
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authority. Additionally, many see the virtues of science in the fact that it leads to 
progress in our knowledge. Progress, however, seems to require a continuity of the 
standard with which our body of knowledge is evaluated. This becomes problematic 
once the standard becomes relative to a given stage of science. The challenge then 
becomes to describe the dynamic of science in such a way that the latter framework 
preserves the legitimacy of the former and insures that the latter constitutes a 
recognizable advance on the former. 
This concern over the privilege of science is not mine, for I do not believe we can 
justifiably accord science the pride of place it holds in our society, since there is no 
justifiable way to characterize science such that it is revealed to be a distinct and 
privileged epistemic practice. The many things we call science, and which we have 
called science, do not constitute a more than remotely recognizable natural or even 
social kind, and there is no recognizable general framework governing them all. This is 
not just because science is diverse and plural rather than one and unified, it is also 
because science cannot be clearly delineated from what some would like to call 
unscientific, pre-scientific or even pseudo-scientific practices. Thus, not only is 
scientific understanding not the sole or the highest form of understanding, it is not even 
a recognizably distinct form of understanding. 
The result is that we need a broader conception of understanding, knowing and 
judging than the one for which the positivist legacy allows. This also means that we 
need to look for the conditions of possibility of this broader sense of knowledge, and not 
just for those of the unjustifiably narrow sense of knowledge. At first sight, the German 
Idealist, and specifically the Hegelian route seems more promising for such an 
enterprise. After all, the stages of history examined by Hegel are not just stages in the 
progress of science: they are stages in the progress of human epistemic, moral, 
aesthetic, social and cultural life. 
Nevertheless, I have serious qualms with the Hegelian model as well, qualms which I 
have inherited from the critical reception of Hegelianism in French philosophy in the 
latter half of the previous century. The two major problems are the tendency to simplify 
the motor of the dynamics of the a priori, and the tendency to regard this dynamics as 
predestined, tendencies that I believe to be importantly related. 
The Hegelian conception of dynamics is the process known as the dialectic, and its 
motor is the negation or the contradiction. Each stage of the development of Spirit has a 
principle which constitutes its essence and its legitimacy. This principle, however, 
inevitably includes an essential contradiction. Being essential, this contradiction cannot 
simply be appeased, and must eventually come to the surface and lead to change. This 
change is a dialectical sublation of the contradictory pair in a new principle, which 
becomes the principle of a new epoch. The underlying belief thus seems to be that, for 
every epoch, there is one essence, and one constitutive contradiction, and that it is this 
contradiction that leads to the new stage. 
 
 7 
This unicity of the principle and of the contradiction has deterministic consequences, 
since the eventual change is perfectly determined by the fact that there is only one 
contradiction which can lead to change, and there is only one solution to that 
contradiction. Add to this the further assumption, which one can arguably ascribe to 
Hegel, that there is one and only one starting stage of humanity, and one and only one 
end-stage, then we have a preset course of events, which can change in details, but not 
in respect of the constitutive contradictions. 
The attractive features of this model are clear: it can regard the principles of each 
stage as necessary because they are necessitated by the necessary historical 
development of rationality in a broad sense. Thus, although they have their limitations 
and will be overcome, they are still legitimate within their own time and place. Also, 
although the actual change may be prompted by historical contingencies, these 
historical contingencies only prompt this change because they have the structure that is 
predetermined to prompt change. Finally, the dialectical process guarantees that every 
subsequent change preserves the validity of the previous stage, albeit in a now 
restricted manner. 
My dissatisfaction with this picture, however, stems from my feeling that it is of a 
mock-historical nature. Although reason necessarily goes through temporal changes, 
these changes were all necessitated in advance, and are all directed towards a clear 
identifiable end-stage. If by “historical” one means “temporal”, this is perhaps 
satisfying, but if one means by it “open to historical contingency”, then it is clearly 
dissatisfying. After all, historical contingencies can only occasion predetermined 
changes, which means that the contingent features of the contingency play no role in 
the change – only those features that match the necessity do. 
This charge raises the stakes for a proper account of the historicization of the a 
priori, for it not only demands that the a priori maintains its legitimacy even in the face 
of its temporally evanescent nature, but also that it maintains it in the face of its 
openness to historical contingency. My goal in this dissertation has been to offer a 
reading of Kant that provides the basis for such an account. 
The Organic and the Dynamic 
In this dissertation, I suggest that we can arrive at a historicized and dynamized a priori 
by interpreting the Kantian system of faculties as an organic system. Kant himself uses 
two important metaphors from the life sciences to characterize this system, namely the 
idea of an “epigenesis of reason”, and his likening the system of faculties, and other 
systems, with the living system as organized. These two metaphors relate strangely: the 
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very idea of an epigenesis of reason suggest a developmental and historical dimension 
to the a priori, whereas the organic analogy invokes the kind of closure and intimate 
interrelation of parts that is unlikely to arise from historical contingencies. I therefore 
seek to dispel this apparent contradiction between the dynamic and the systematic 
implications of the organic metaphor by merging them into a coherent picture of the 
dynamic nature of systematicity. 
In part I, I develop my reading of Kantian epigenesis, suggesting that it is both central 
to Kant’s thought and more dynamic than usually presumed. Chapter 1 is meant to show 
that Kant’s concern with dynamic systems and with epigenesis is not an afterthought 
that stands in tension with his mostly mechanical interests. Instead, I argue that the 
issue lay at the heart of Kant’s thought on what we would now characterize as physical 
topics as well. What Kant was most concerned with in these topics, I submit, is exactly 
how dynamical dynamics really is. His conclusion seems to be that Leibniz and Newton 
fail to provide a good basis for a dynamic understanding of nature. 
This tension between mechanics and the dynamic is also at the heart of Kant’s 
reflections on early modern embryology, which form the topic of chapter 2. There, I 
argue against the suggestion of recent commentators that Kant’s version of epigenesis 
was ultimately far less dynamic than its name suggests. I argue instead that Kant 
intended epigenesis to be a genuine alternative to both metamorphosis and 
preformation. The resultant theory insists that the dynamics of an organism is properly 
understood internally to that organism, but that it nonetheless has an internal openness 
to contingency. 
In the third chapter, I tackle Kant’s usage of embryological language in his 
philosophy of history and epistemology. The reading of Kantian epigenesis as ultimately 
preformationist, and therefore non-dynamical, which I attacked in chapter 2, has led 
some commentators to deny real dynamics in Kant’s philosophy of history and 
epistemology as well. I argue against such readings by showing that Kant’s usage of 
embryological metaphors in these other parts of his philosophy are better understood 
in the light of the more dynamical picture of epigenesis I have sketched in chapter 2. 
The result is that, for Kant, the history of human ratiocinative capacities is much like 
the developmental history of an organism in that it is governed by internal dynamics 
that are nevertheless open to external contingencies.  
The result of part I, however, requires that we gain a better understanding in the 
kind of system that Kant believes to be subject to internal dynamics and yet open to 
contingency. In part II, I develop my interpretation of Kant’s conception of such a 
system. 
In Chapter 4, I offer my interpretation of Kant’s concept of a natural purpose. I argue 
that a natural purpose is a normative unity of a diversity rather than a substantial unity, 
and that this unity is autonomous and plastic. I also argue that natural purposes are 
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incomprehensible to us because our cognitive system consists of two distinct functions 
that do not automatically harmonize, namely sensibility and understanding. 
In Chapter 5, I then argue that this potential for disharmony is present in the very 
nature of reason, in the form of an antinomy between two drives of reason. My main 
goal there is to show that the drive for unity is not the sole force behind Kant’s 
conception of the dynamics of our conceptual system: there is a drive towards 
multiplicity as well. The goal is then to harmonize these two drives, not to sacrifice one 
of them to the other. Reason itself thus appears as a normative unity of diverse and even 
possible conflicting drives. 
In Chapter 6, I argue that not just reason, but the system of faculties as a whole 
constitutes a normative unity of the diverse, in the sense in which an organism is 
supposed to be as well. The different faculties are like so many organs, and the proper 
functioning of our cognition depends on their proper allignment and cooperation just 
like the proper functioning of the organism requires its physiological harmony. Thus, 
the system of faculties is open to contingency because it is diverse – after all, whether 
the harmony obtains or not can only appear in every new cognitive situation. 
In chapter 7, I argue that it is even possible to read Kant as allowing for the plasticity 
of the system of faculties. Just like an organism can reconstitute itself in the face of 
historical contingency, so the cognitive system can adapt to new situations upon the 
realization that its unity systematically fails to obtain. I argue that the motor behind 
this plasticity is reflective judgment, and that the feelings of the beautiful and the 
sublime play the role in the system of faculties that pain and pleasure play in organisms. 
I conclude, then, by sketching the picture of the system of faculties as a dynamic and 
plastic system open to contingency, and listing some consequences. One consequence is 
that the categories may be determined not just by the laws of logic, but by the relation 
of the faculties. If this is true, a change in the relation of the faculties or in the nature of 
the faculties itself (which often comes down to the same thing), would imply a change in 
the categories. We can thus have a theory of why the categories have their specific form 
and how they could come to acquire a different form. It is also important that we can 
understand the normative force of the categories in spite of their dynamic and 
somewhat contingent nature, for this normative force derives from the fact that the 
unity of the faculties is a normative unity. 
Another is that it is reflective judgment that forms the motor of dynamics, and that 
we should therefore acquire a better understanding of Kant’s theory of judgement, and 
of the notion of judgment in general. By linking the a priori to a general notion of 
judgement, which can be cognitive, moral, aesthetic or even legal, rather than to 
science or scientific theories, we can transcend science-centrism. Our task is then to 
understand judgment, in the many different forms it takes both synchronically and 
diachronically, rather than knowledge, in the form it has taken since the dawn of 
Modernity in Europe. 
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I also list some vistas of research opened up by arguments that have popped up in the 
course of the main argument of the dissertation, and finally comment upon the proper 
modality of its claim. I will not do so here, partly in fear of eventually repeating myself 
later on, and partly because I feel that the introduction can only offer a general sketch 
of the problem and of the course of argument. No substantial claim I would make here 
would be properly intelligible until after the work itself has been read. For this reason, I 











Chapter 1  
Extending Science: The Dynamic in the Pre-
Critical Period 
Die Tradition der Unterdrückten belehrt uns 
darüber, daß der “Ausnahmezustand”, in 
dem wir leben, die Regel ist. Wir müssen zu 
einem Begriff der Geschichte kommen, der 
dem entspricht. […] Das Staunen darüber, 
daß die Dinge, die wir erleben, im 
zwanzigsten Jahrhundert ‘noch’ möglich sind, 
ist kein philosophisches. Es steht nich am 
Anfang einer Erkenntnis, es sei denn der, daß 
der Vorstellung von Geschichte, aus der es 
stammt, nicht zu halten ist. 
- Walter Benjamin 
 
In this chapter, I will argue that Kant’s engagement with and project for physics centres 
on the problem of teleology. This goes squarely against the wide-spread view of Kant as 
torn between his enthusiasm for modern (positive) science, with its prohibition on 
teleology, and his allegiance to the teleological picture suggested by theology and the 
(at the time) less well-grounded sciences. My argument involves a negative and a 
positive phase. The negative phase consists in a sustained criticism of the traditional 
picture of Kant’s attitude to physics, and the role its exemplar, (Newtonian) mechanics, 
fulfills within the transcendental philosophy. In order to do this, I will identify, in 
section 1.1, the four main pillars on which this traditional picture rests, subject each of 
these pillars to criticism (in subsections 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.1.3 and 1.1.4) and draw from this 
(in subsection 1.1.5) the conclusion that an alternative picture of Kant’s position 
towards physics is suggested by his specific interest in the physical subdomains of 
dynamics and cosmogony. The next two sections of the chapter are devoted to 
developing such an alternative picture from an interpretation of Kant’s earliest 
engagements with both dynamics and cosmogony. In section 1.2, I argue that Kant’s 
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interest in dynamics was prompted by the realization that it is in tension with 
mechanics and the mathematical approach it countenances because of the irreducible 
involvement of time and temporal development in its framing of causality. In order to 
make this plausible, I first sketch some important features of Leibnizian dynamics that 
could have suggested this puzzle to Kant (in subsection 1.2.1) and then offer an 
interpretation of his treatment of dynamics in the 1740s and 1750s, which yields the 
conclusion that Kant was struggling to uphold the causal link in dynamic interactions, 
without thereby eliminating genuine change and evolution from our descriptions and 
explanations of natural systems (in subsection 1.2.2). In section 1.3, I propose that a 
similar concern can be discerned in Kant’s theory of cosmogony from the 1750s. I first 
offer (in subsection 1.3.1) some background to the problematic status of cosmogony in 
early modernity, in order to identify the expectations and worries that lay behind Kant’s 
reasoning on the subject. Next, I submit (in subsection 1.3.2) that Kant was inspired, in 
this early work, not only by the content and ambition of Georges Buffon’s attempt a 
theory of the formation of the solar system, but also by the great French Natural 
Historian’s antimathematicism and analogy-driven reasoning. Finally, I argue (in 
subsection 1.3.3) that his work on cosmogony led Kant to a hesitant position towards 
teleology, and a first attempt to distinguish different kinds of teleogical reasoning and 
explanation. 
 
1.1 “Nothing in Kant makes Sense except in the Light of 
Newton”? 
It is hardly a bold conjecture that modern Kant scholarship started with Hermann 
Cohen’s brilliant reinterpretation of the transcendental philosophy, expressed 
programmatically in his 1883 Lecture Von Kants Einfluß auf die deutsche Kultur:  
The kantian philosophy is indeed, in its theoretical part, first and foremost 
nothing else than the legitimation of these physical exemplars, the proof of their 
cognitive value in connection with natural science that rests on mathematics. Such a 
proof is the deed of philosophical genius. In this only has philosophical genius 
proven itself everywhere, in Plato and Descartes, in Leibniz and Kant, that it has 
asked the question: What is Science? Kant’s philosophical advantage over his 
predecessors can be determined as follows: that whilst Descartes and Leibniz were 
simultaneously contributing to the establishment of science, his force was 
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concentrated on that one philosophical question. For since Newton science had 
become an articulated reality. (Cohen 1883: 7-8; original stress; my translation) 
In this interpretation, which Cohen had advanced 13 years before in his monumental 
Kants Theorie der Erfahrung, Kant surfaces as the champion of a scientifically informed 
but theoretically autonomous epistemology, rather than as a predecessor to the great 
idealist systems of the early nineteenth century and the psychologistic and 
physiologistic enterprises of the middle of the nineteenth century. He does so, however, 
only insofar as he is engaged in legitimating natural science, and a particular system of 
natural science at that: “Kant’s task is hence first and foremost the scrutiny of and 
characterization of the cognitive value and foundation of certainty of Newton’s natural 
science, that he grasped through the thread of Experience. […] The transcendental 
method originated in the reflection on the Philosophiae naturalis Principia mathematica.” 
(Cohen 1885: 66-67; my translation). As a result of the efforts of Cohen and his followers, 
the so-called Marburger Schule of neokantianism, the names Newton and Kant, that of 
the British epitome of stern scientific enquiry and that of the German herald of stern 
philosophical critique, would become intimately intertwined. In spite of the many 
criticisms of and deep dissatisfactions with the Marburger rendition of the critical 
philosophy, hardly anyone has sought to cast doubt on Kant’s alliance with and 
allegiance to the Newtonian paradigm that had arduously acquired supremacy during 
his lifetime1. In fact, Cohen’s approach was given new impetus at the end of the 20th 
century when Michael Friedman picked up on the Marburger account and modernized it 
in a fascinating manner. Much like Cohen, Friedman thoroughly distinguished Kant’s 
epistemological project from the scientific one, as is evident from the statement that he 
does 
not mean to suggest, however, that the Kantian philosophy can be thereby seen as 
wholly parasitic on the exact sciences-so that, for example, one can simply read 
off the content of that philosophy from the scientific developments in question. 
On the contrary, Kant’s achievement consists rather in adapting and radically 
 
                                                     
1 To reinforce this claim, one can for instance point out that Robert Butts was hardly abusing his licence as 
editor of the major volume on Kant’s Philosophy of Physical Science when he wrote that “[a]ll of the papers 
provide clear emphasis on the fact that throughout his career-from the publication of NTH in 1755 to the 
appearance of MAN in 1786-Kant regarded the physical synthesis worked out by Newton as the best example 
we have of reliable theoretical knowledge, and at the same time as the best example we have of justified 
method in science and metaphysics. And so there seems no disagreement over the fact that the actual physical 
science for which Kant attempts to provide additional philosophical credentials is Newtonian science.” (Butts 
1986: 20) Moreover, Butts is hardly tacit on the source for this view: “We must look to one of the rescue boats 
put afloat by the Marburg neo-Kantians about one hundred years following Kant’s death for a balanced 
statement of the content of MAN […] it would be difficult to find a better short statement of the main contents 
of MAN than this one by Cassirer” (Butts 1986: 12).  
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transforming independently given philosophical and metaphysical ideas-ideas 
stemming largely from the Leibnizian philosophical tradition he inherited-within 
the essentially new scientific context wrought by Newton. (Friedman 1992b: xiii) 
Still, it is clear that the Kantian project is presented as essentially rather humble, as 
being in line with John Locke’s self-characterization from the Epistle to the Reader the 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding: “in an age that produces such masters as the great 
Huygenius, and the incomparably Mr. Newton, with some other of that strain, it is 
ambition enough to be employed as an under-labourer in clearing ground a little, and 
removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way” (Locke 1975: 10). The “rubbish” that 
Kant is seeking to clear away is then the metaphysical objections that obstruct scientific 
advance. Indeed, to many German readers, Newton wedded the most brilliant and 
rigorous of scientific deductions to the sloppiest and most untenable metaphysical 
conceptualizations (Cf. Ahnert 2004). It would not be surprising, therefore, that the 
topics of Newton’s Metaphysics –“[Newton’s] discussions are largely limited to 
questions about the ontology of space and time, the laws of motion and the forces that 
cause motion, our knowledge of matter within physics, and God’s relation to the 
physical world” (Janiak 2008: 7) – are considered to be the main topics of Kant’s 
precritical –and in a way his critical – metaphysics. 
As valuable as this position has been for recognizing Kant’s acuity as a connoisseur of 
18th century science, it is also, in my opinion, deeply misleading on the subject of his 
relation to natural science, and to Newtonian science in particular. In particular, It is 
based on four main pillars, each of which is doubtful in light of more recent scholarship 
in the history of science and Kant-exegesis. These pillars are easily identifiable in the 
passages quoted above: 
The first pillar is the idea that Kant was taking account of the “Factum” of positive 
Newtonian science. It consists in the claim that in the formative years of Kant’s 
intellectual development, Newton’s work had resulted in a rift between natural science 
and philosophy, at least as far as their methods and research focus are concerned, and 
that Kant acknowledged this gap. I will argue against this claim by showing that it reads 
much later developments (those of analytical mechanics) back into earlier ones, and 
that it fails to account for Kant’s interests and comments concerning Newton. 
The second pillar is the central assumption that Kant differs from important 
predecessors like Descartes and Leibniz because in contrast to the latter, he is not also a 
scientist but merely a philosopher, at least in spirit, because he lacks their quantitative 
and experimental focus. I argue against this view by advancing that neither Descartes 
nor Leibniz were as unambiguously “scientific” in that sense of the word, and that, 
moreover, ascribing this interpretation of “scientific” to Kant is implausible. 
The third pillar is the claim that Kant’s transcendental analytic is meant to directly 
provide the basis for Newtonian science in particular. I will respond to this by defending 
Buchdahl’s thesis that there is an irreducible “looseness of fit” between the principles of 
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the understanding and the laws of nature against Friedman’s more recent attack on it, 
and thereby arguing that Kant’s transcendental philosophy does not privilege any 
particular scientific theory in that manner. 
The fourth pillar is the claim that Kant clearly preferred physics over other sciences. 
I challenge this claim by showing that Kant was clearly engaged in these other sciences, 
and as such had to provide some legitimation for them, albeit a different kind of 
legitimation than we would initially expect. 
1.1.1 The Emergence of Positive Science 
The first aspect of the Marburger picture of Kant’s philosophical enterprise that I wish to 
discuss is the claim that Kant departed from the “Factum” of (Newtonian) Science 
(Cohen 1883: 7), i.e. from the establishment of an autonomous scientific practice that 
had divorced itself from metaphysics to wed itself to mathematics, a much more 
enabling and less obstructing partner. This view finds its origin mainly in the 
Prolegomena, where Kant states emphatically that “There is then in fact a purely natural 
science, and now the question is: How is it possible” (AA IV: 295; original stress), and 
moreover admits further on that 
Pure mathematics and pure natural science would not have needed, for the purpose 
of their own security and certainty, a deduction of the sort that we have hitherto 
accomplished for them both; for the first is supported by its own evidence, 
whereas the second, though arising from pure sources of the understanding, is 
nonetheless supported from experience and thoroughgoing confirmation by it. 
(AA IV: 327; original stress) 
These passages are certainly telling of Kant’s attitude to take Science seriously in its 
own domain, and show clearly that he believed the sciences to be well-developed by the 
1780s. Nonetheless, what is not clear here is that Kant is speaking of Newtonian Science. 
The name Newton is remarkably absent from these passages, and although Kant makes 
mention of “truly universal laws of nature, that exist fully a priori”, the examples he 
gives are “that substance remains and persists, that everything that happens always 
previously is determined by a cause according to constant laws, and so on.” (AA IV: 327). 
These are not obviously Newtonian principles, as they are intended to be more general. 
The first one implies merely that all change has to be understood against the 
background of something that remains stable, and the second that every change is 
caused by some other occurrence. Together, these principles at best imply that there 
must be some conservation principle. This assumption, however, is common to many 
rival-theories of Newtonian mechanics as well, and can thus hardly be interpreted as a 
clear reference to the Principia’s Laws of Motion.  
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One could counter that, whereas the characterization given here is certainly 
underdetermined between different strands of early modern natural science, it is 
obvious from the historical context that by “science”, Kant means “Newtonian Science”. 
Now this is precisely where the story goes wrong: there seems to be a definite problem 
in regarding the established scientific practice of Kant’s era as Newtonian. Indeed, as 
Andrew Janiak states, “In the hands of figures like Laplace and Lagrange, Newton’s work 
led to the progressive development of Newtonian mechanics, and its practitioners 
embraced a conception of their discipline in which philosophical matters played little 
role” (Janiak 2008: 4). But the earliest efforts of Laplace and Lagrange for developing 
such an analytical mechanics date from the 1770s and the 1780s, well after Kant’s 
“conversion to Newton”.2 Before this time, Newton’s ideas were still struggling to find 
foothold on the European mainland, and found themselves bound up with metaphysical 
(or apologetical anti-metaphysical) issues3. Friedman’s treatment of Kant’s precritical 
development is interesting precisely because he nuanced the traditional Marburger 
notion that Kant was reflecting on a well-established and largely unproblematic 
scientific program, and situated his ideas in the debates amongst continental 
Newtonians and anti-Newtonians in the mid-18th century. Whilst more historically 
plausible, this thesis remains problematic in the light of recent research on this debate.  
The most important objection one could raise is that there was no single one 
tradition of “Newtonianism” at work on the continent at the time of Kant’s conversion. 
As it turns out, Kant’s position differs as markedly from the two figures usually cited as 
 
                                                     
2 There are even good reasons to doubt the “independence” of Laplace’s picture of mechanics from 
philosophy:  indeed, Marij van Strien has convincingly argued that “Laplace’s determinism was based on a re-
interpretation of Leibniz’s principle of continuity, rather than on his mechanics” (Van Strien 2014: 30). 
3 The history of the reception of Newton on the continent is a curious one indeed. Many authors have noted 
the time-lapse between the publication of the Principia and its acceptance by scientists accross the continent. 
Jonathan Israel’s position is characteristic of this: “until the 1730s the European reception of both Locke and 
Newton was so hesitant and slow as to constitute a meaningful historical problem of its own. Far from 
advancing triumphantly, Newtonianism was scarcely known in France before the later 1720s” (Israel 2001: 
523). Of course, Israel embraces this account because it helps him show that the earlier Enlightenment could 
not have been Newtonian-Lockean in character, and was thus philosophically distinct from the philosophes 
High Enlightenment. J.B. Shank has recently cast doubt on this story, however, by advancing that “Partisan 
warfare for and against Newton’s work in the Principia was especially rare in the first two decades of the book’s 
reception, and without it the text was instead absorbed comfortably, if not always calmly, into the preexisting 
structures of French science” (Shank 2008: 49). This insight serves to distinguish many different ways of and 
motives for relating to Newton in continental science and philosophy in the early 18th century, and suggests 
moreover that an interest in Newton does not necessarily bring along adherence to the High Enlightenment 
picture of his function for the progress of science. In many ways, Kant’s relation towards Newton bears 
witness to the different strata of reception, and focusing exclusively on one such stratum will impede rather 
than deepen our understanding of it. 
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his main influences in these matters, Leonhard Euler and Pierre-Louis Moreau de 
Maupertuis, as the positions of these two differed from each other.  
Many authors have referred to Euler as a major source of Kant’s early thought, if not 
through his scientific and metaphysical views (Riehl 1908: 334; Timmerding 1918), then 
at least through his ideas on the relation between metaphysics and physics (Friedman 
1992b; Speiser 1934: 9). This is certainly suggested by Kant’s frequent approving 
references to them, but it cannot be accepted without some important caveats. 
The first is that Euler is hardly an unambiguous representative of the turn to 
“positive” science, autonomous from metaphysical speculation. Of course, we find 
passages in his work that suggest such a picture, such as the following one: 
Even if we would not be capable of proving them [i.e. the principles of mechanics] 
by means of the general principles of metaphysics, the marvelous conformity of 
all the conclusions that we can draw from them through mathematics4, with all 
the movements of both solid and fluid bodies on earth, and even with the 
movements of the celestial bodies, would suffice to put their truth beyond all 
doubt. (Euler 1748: 324; my translation)  
But in fact, Euler seems to have adopted and discarded this attittude as it fitted him. 
This surfaces in his diatribe against the realist interpretation of Newtonian attraction in 
his Lettres a une princesse d’Allemagne. There, he obviously does agree with the physical 
givenness of attraction: “Since it is certain that, in considering any two bodies, the one 
is attracted to the other, people inquire into the cause of this mutual affinity; it is on 
this topic that opinions are very divided” (Euler 1842: 266; my translation); but he 
doesn’t believe it can be accepted on metaphysical grounds: 
The ancient philosophers have contented themselves with explaining the 
phenomena of the world by means of these kinds of qualities that they have 
named occult, saying for instance, that opium makes one sleep in virtue of an 
occult quality that makes it specific for inducing sleep; which is saying nothing at 
all, or rather wanting to hide one’s ignorance. We should therefore also regard 
attraction as an occult quality, in as far as we take it to be an essential property of 
bodies; but since today we seek to ban all occult qualities from philosophy, 
attraction taken in this sense should also be banned. ” (Euler 1842: 267-268; my 
translation) 
 
                                                     
4 Euler speaks here of “le calcul”, which could mean either mathematics in general or calculus in particular. I 
believe there is little reason to suppose that he is speaking specifically of calculus in this passage, and that it is 
more natural to take him as making a point about the use of mathematics in physics in general. I therefore 
chose to translate “calcul” as “mathematics”. 
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His insisting on the reality of (absolute) space and time whilst denying the dynamical 
properties of matter is the result of Euler’s double allegiance: to science on the one hand 
and to religion on the other5. As Breidert (2007: 100) puts it: “In philosophy Euler takes 
up the pen only in cases where he is convinced that he has to protect the Holy Bible or 
the sciences against philosophers’ attacks or against their false doctrines.”  
This brings us directly to the second caveat: Kant cannot be straightforwardly 
regarded as embracing Euler’s reflections for the rather mundane reason that he took 
exactly the opposite position with respect to what was acceptable in Newton’s picture 
and what was clearly in violation of the most basic tenets of modern science. As Giorgio 
Tonelli (1959: 16; my translation) expressed it: “Kant inverted the Newtonian relation 
between space and attraction, metaphysically putting the latter before the former”; at 
several instances, even during his Newtonian period, Kant expressed doubts regarding 
the status of Newtonian absolute space and time, and argued that the latter was in fact 
purely relational and the effect of the real physical interaction that he often identified 
with attraction. Indicative of the strain on any interpretation that stresses the relation 
between Kant and Euler is the following statement from Peter Harman: “While Kant did 
not accept Euler’s views uncritically, Euler’s writings on the conceptual foundations of 
mechanics were clearly instrumental in deepening his understanding of the problems of 
natural philosophy, bringing about a re-structuring of the relations between the 
concepts of ‘force’, ‘inertia’ and ‘impenetrability’ in the Metaphysical Foundations” 
(Harman 1983: 240). There is, of course, a considerable difference between the claim 
that Kant changed his views upon reading Euler and the claim that Kant adopted Euler’s 
views upon reading Euler. The latter claim is the stronger one, suggesting a deep 
agreement between Kant and Euler on many themes, whereas the former is much 
weaker, and simply indicates that Kant took Euler seriously. This passage from Harman 
reveals that there is only evidence for the weaker claim, and should hence make us wary 
of positions that seem to require the stronger (which are more common). 
The case of that other paragon of Newtonianism in the Prussian Academy of Science, 
Maupertuis, is at least as puzzling as Euler’s. Much like Euler, Maupertuis undertook the 
the task of legitimating Newton’s scientific enterprise to the metaphysically reticent 
continental literati. There is, however, an important difference between their defensive 
 
                                                     
5 I discern two ways in which Euler’s rejection of dynamical properties of matter was informed by religious 
concerns. On the one hand, he feared that the Wolffian tendency to regard forces as principles of change 
internal to the body that undergoes that change would lead to the denial of causal efficacy to not only all 
created substances (in fact advocated by the Wolffians) but ultimately to God as well (Euler 1842: 311-315). On 
the other, he saw that materialists sought to defend the claim that a material structure can be endowed with 
thought and sensation through the internal forces of matter, and wished to cut off this path to (vital) 




strategies: whereas Euler argued that the mathematical concept of attraction could be 
completely covered by an impulsionist interpretation by invoking the aether 
hypothesis, Maupertuis argued against the possibility of excluding attraction a priori as 
a property of matter on the basis that it is contradictory to the most basic properties of 
matter: 
I only intended to examine whether attraction, even when considered as an 
inherent property of matter, was metaphysically impossible. If it is such, even the 
most pressing phenomena couldn’t make it accepted, but if she involves neither 
impossibility nor contradiction, we can examine whether the phenomena prove it 
or not at liberty. Attraction is no more, so to say, than a matter of fact; it is in the 
system of the universe that we must go look whether it is a principle that in fact 
occurs in nature, to what extent it is necessary in order to explain the 
phenomena, or finally whether it is introduced uselessly in order to explain facts 
that we explain well without it. (Maupertuis 1768a: 103-104; my translation)  
What is remarkable about Maupertuis’ account is, however, that it does not serve to 
separate metaphysics from physics, as is indicated by two peculiar features of this 
passage from the Discours sur les différentes figures des astres. First of all, the issue of 
attraction can be settled by metaphysics, if the notion can be proven to be a priori 
impossible; it is just the case that it doesn’t settle it. Secondly, physics could reveal 
whether attraction is to be taken as a genuine property of matter. On the whole, then, I 
must concur with Lisa Downing’s (2012: 298) assessment that “The Discours, in the end, 
veers closer to a genuine dynamicism or realism about attraction than at first appears. 
And, while it maintains that physics can function separately from metaphysics, it 
suggests that each may still have implications for the other.” 
It would be dishonest, however, to claim that these points are completely overlooked 
by the traditional interpretation. Indeed, Michael Friedman (1986: 28) attempted to 
refute the idea that Kant’s disagreement with Newton is over matter theory. In his 
opinion, the “mathematical-mechanical” conception of matter which Kant rejects is not 
a Newtonian conception of matter, but an essentially Cartesian one. This assessment, 
however, overlooks the ambiguity present in Newton’s matter theory itself. As Zvi 
Biener and Chris Smeenk (2012) have convincingly argued, Newton’s account of matter 
in the (earlier editions of the) Principia combines, in a problematic way, the older 
“geometrical” conception of matter, i.e. in terms of extension, with the “dynamical” 
conception, i.e. in terms of force, for which the work is famous. This problem was 
pointed out to Newton by Roger Cotes, whose criticisms and conclusions show clear 
similarities to Kant’s: Both Cotes and Kant believed Newton to be mistaken in his 
metaphysical hesitance towards gravitation as an intrinsic property of matter, and both 
believed that the step of Newton’s argument for universal gravitation in Proposition VI 
of Book 3 essentially committed him to the dynamical conception (Cf. AA IV: 515). We 
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can therefore plausibly assume that Kant had a similar intuition about the ambiguity of 
Newton’s conception of matter in mind.6 Although Friedman (1992b: 156-157) 
acknowledges this strong parallel between Cotes’ and Kant’s point he points out that 
here, “Newton is criticized for not daring to be ‘Newtonian’ enough”. What is peculiar 
about this assessment is that it criticizes Newton for not being more metaphysically 
daring, i.e. for adopting the anti-metaphysical humility that is characteristic of most 
early 18th century Newtonianism. As a result, we cannot have Kant both as an apologist 
of non-metaphysical, positive Newtonian Science and as the champion of a 
revolutionary Newton-inspired matter theory. More generally, if Kant is a Newtonian, 
he is so only in some respects; but then again, given the absence of a single unified 
Newtonian Science during his formative years, this should hardly come as a surprise. 
 
                                                     
6 This criticism of Friedman of course fits well with the one voiced by Gordon Brittan (1986: 75-76). Brittan 
remarks that Kant’s “mathematical-mechanical” conception of matter seems to be the one offered in 
Definition 1 of the Principia (“Quantity of matter is a measure of matter that arises from density and volume 
jointly” (Newton 1999: 403)), which does have a Cartesian overtone. Biener and Smeenk (2012: 114-115), of 
course, point out that 1) in his further reasoning, Newton uses instead the measure of matter offered in 
Definition 3 (“Inherent force of matter is the power of resisting by which every body, so far as it is able, 
perseveres in its state either of resting or of moving uniformly straight forward” (Newton 1999: 404) rather 
than that of Definition 1 throughout the Principia; and 2) in the clarification of definition 1 Newton ends up 
nearly equating the quantity of matter with the more dynamical measure of weight. Yet, there is an essential 
agreement over the fact that it is Newton’s third regula philosophandi, and in particular the conclusion that 
impenetrability is a universal property of matter that reveals Newton’s lingering commitment to the 
“geometrical” conception of matter. It is important to note here that Kant takes issue not only with Newton’s 
listing impenetrability as an essential property of matter, but also with the problem of regarding inertia as a 
force, even though this forms the core of what Biener and Smeenk regard as Newton’s dynamical conception of 
matter (Biener & Smeenk 2012). This problem has been noted by most commentators (e.g. Cohen 1999: 96), 
and has been regarded as a (perhaps unintended) analogue of the Leibnizian notion of vis inertiae (Garber 
2009: 176-178). Moreover, it was already alerted by Euler, who sought to eliminate it from proper physical 
discourse because “inertia marks rather something completely opposed to the idea of forces” (Euler 1752: 423; 
my translation). It is important to note that Kant would, throughout most of his career, continue to regard 
inertia as a force, until he changed his mind in the Metaphysische Anfängsgründe, where he separated dynamics 
and mechanics. The characterization of forces, in casu attractive and repulsive force, are the proper domain of 
dynamics, whereas the determination of the laws of motion is that of mechanics. The repulsive force, which is 
meant to underlie an object’s resistence to impressed force, is no longer the principle of inertia, but the 
metaphysical ground of elasticity (AA IV: 500). Inertia, on the other hand, is denied the status of force for the 
reason that it would imply an internal principle of change, something which violates the general principle of 
Kantian Mechanics (AA IV: 544). In this later work, then, Kant seems to have offered a reconciliation of 
Leibnizian and Eulerian positions by disentangling the notion of force from that of a law by assigning them to 
different subdisciplines of natural science. 
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1.1.2 Kant as Scientist 
Perhaps most representative of the received view of Kant’s own activities and 
credentials as a scientist is Erich Adickes massive two-volume study Kant als 
Naturforscher – representative because its title soon turns out to be a contradictio in 
adjecto, since it advances at the very beginning that Kant was not a scientist, but a 
philosopher who was ultimately a dilletant in scientific matters (Adickes 1924 I: 5). This 
idea was suggested, undoubtedly, by the Marburger Schule idea that Kant differed from 
major predecessors of his such as Descartes or Leibniz in not having made any real 
contributions to properly scientific progress. This idea runs into the expected prima 
facie objection that Kant wrote several works that seem to be intended as scientific 
papers, not reflections on scientific theory or practice. One of Adickes great 
contributions has been that he clearly indicated in what sense Kant differed, even in his 
patently “scientific” works, from the two aforementioned thinkers:  
These two philosophers were in their full cast of mind real natural scientists and 
mathematicians as well. Not Kant. He never knew how to use the two important 
instruments because of which modern natural science became great: the 
experiment and mathematics. (Adickes 1924 I: 6; my translation) 
Adickes goes on to indicate what we may regard as the standard view on Kant and his 
scientific writings: 
The new great ideas that he contributed rested on intuitions and aperçus, with 
which he was endowed not as natural scientist in the strict sense, but as a 
generally richly talented mind and scientific genius. Intuitions and aperçus, 
however, cannot be commanded or regulated or compressed into a method; on 
their basis alone a continuous development of science will never be possible. That 
can only exist when they are prepared and completed by methodical investigation 
that further develops the problems organically; if they result, time and time again, 
in faithful, never exhausting careful work, in which it is imperative to 
experimentally validate, elaborate individually and when possible exactly 
calculate what was seen in general outlines in intuition. (Adickes 1924 I: 16; my 
translation) 
Adickes’ claim here seems to be that Kant was not scientifically minded because he 
consistently limited himself to the formulation of ideas on the basis of a general insight, 
but never cared to test these ideas experimentally and through exact measurement and 
calculation. He also claims that this latter enterprise is the proper scientific one, and 
marks it off from other types of human inquiry, something which he believes Kant 
himself fully realized. But when spelled out in this manner, it becomes possible to 
identify, in this smooth and rhetorically somewhat inflated orientation of Kant in the 
history of modern science, the two implausible assumptions on which it rests. On the 
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one hand, Adickes’ claim that Descartes and Leibniz were representatives of the kind of 
science he is portraying here has lost much of its lustre over the course of the twentieth 
century. On the other, it seems to ascribe a practical contradiction to Kant. 
The first assumption is the idea that Descartes and Leibniz were scientists in the way 
that figures such as Huygens or Hooker were, and that they relied on experiment and 
strict mathematical demonstration to advance their views. It is, I believe, a fair 
assessment that this image of early modern science has undergone crucial changes over 
the course of the century that divides us from Adickes’ epoch. In this picture, there is an 
important distinction between the kind of scientific enterprises that philosophers like 
Descartes and Leibniz were pursuing, and the more Baconian-inspired style of science 
promoted by and through the royal society. In the Principia Philosophiae and the Essay de 
Dynamique, experiment and strict demonstration often give way to (at times strained) 
analogies, qualitative assessments and metaphysically grounded derivations. In  
Descartes’s case, one need but think of his crucial error in the formulation of the law of 
uniform acceleration in free-fall7, the implausibility of his rules for the impact of 
moving bodies8 and the bold conjecture that is his theory of vortices. In Leibniz’ case, an 
analogous situation occurs with respect to his rather restricted use of the law of free-fall 
in Galilean kinematics, his largely qualitative account of perfectly elastic impact9 and his 
unflinching use of harmonic proportions in cosmology (Cf. Westfall 1971: 306).  
 
                                                     
7 Cf. Koyré (1966: 115) and additionally his lack of desire in continuing Galileo’s enterprise, as expressed in his 
letter to Mersenne of October 11 1638 (AT VI: 380). 
8 There is some debate over the absence of a mathematical treatment of the laws of motion in Descartes. The 
best known position is the one advanced by Koyré (1966: 134-135), who maintains that there are two reasons 
for the absence of a mathematical physics in Descartes. The first one is that Descartes could not reason with 
idealized cases like Galileo could: given the fact that motion is always in a plenum and determined by the 
plenum, abstracting from the surrounding bodies does not give us an idealized case of movement, but an 
inconceivable case. The other bar to mathematization is that of “excessive geometrization”, which led 
Descartes to overlook the mechanically relevant factor of time. At least the first reason is still usually 
appreciated (cf. Nelson 1996). Daniel Garber (2000:126) has proposed an alternative explanation by suggesting 
that the doctrine of the plenum makes it impossible for Descartes to draw conclusions on measures from 
empirical cases – that is to say: cartesian science does not allow for experiments like Galilean science does. In 
spite of the differences, however, both readings suggest that Cartesian science has trouble with at least one of 
the main traits ascribed to it by the Marburger Schule: mathematical treatment and experiment. 
9 The most consciously quantitative assessment of the rules of impact in Leibniz work is to be found in the 
manuscript De corporum concursu, a manuscript that has come under the broad attention of scholars only due 
to Michel Fichant’s efforts. In this early work (from 1678), Leibniz develops his earliest conception of “vis 
viva” by contrasting and systematically assessing the estimations of impact according to the older Cartesian 
theory and the more recent account offered by Huygens, Mariotte, Wren and Wallis. In future developments, 
Leibniz would insist rather on the more general conceptual and metaphysical benefits of his account than on 
its empirical and mathematical virtues. 
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It is true, of course, that in contradistinction with Kant, both Descartes and Leibniz 
made considerable contributions to mathematics, and that the Marburger-Schule-
reading relies heavily on this fact. Ernst Cassirer, for instance, said of Descartes that his 
entire foundations of mathematical physics derived from his introduction of analytical 
geometry (Cassirer 1922: 440-441), and regarded Leibniz to be the proper heir to this 
project, since he too derived his whole philosophy from his logical and mathematical 
inventions (Cassirer 1902: 102). In this way, he evokes the picture of two thinkers of 
idealistic temperament who were instrumental in providing mathematics as the core of 
proper scientific reason: their major contributions, analytic geometry and differential 
calculus respectively, constitute two of the most important moments in the process of 
mathematization (which is also one of arithmetization (Cf. Demarest 2013a)) and hence 
the autonomization of science as a positive enterprise from natural philosophy and 
metaphysics. But this reading is dissatisfying because Descartes’s and Leibniz’s 
mathematical innovations did not translate that obviously to their physical work.  For 
instance, Descartes’s introduction of analytical geometry did not stop him from failing 
to take the vectorial aspect of motion into account by leaving “determination” out of his 
“quantity of motion”.10 Similarly, Leibniz did not use his great contribution to 
mathematics, infinitesimal calculus, to quantify the perfectly elastic impacts that he 
invoked in his dynamics. As a result, the physics of Descartes and Leibniz is less 
intimately related to their mathematics than the Marburger reading suggests.11  
The updated view appears clearly in Daniel Garber’s distinction between Descartes 
and Leibniz on the one hand, and Galileo and Newton on the other: 
 
                                                     
10 This fact has puzzled many a commentator, mostly since Descartes came very close to the formulation of the 
vectorial aspect of motion in his Dioptrique. The analysis of refraction offered there distinguishes between the 
force of impact and the determination of the direction of movement, a distinction that Abdelhamid Sabra has 
mapped onto that of scalar and vectorial quantity (Sabra 1981: 121). Interestingly, though, this distinction has 
not served to observe the two aspects of motion in force, but rather to prevent their proper integration; for 
although Descartes regarded them both as distinct aspects of the one primary mode of extension that is 
movement, he clearly regarded them as modally distinct, i.e. different secondary modes of movement (Cf. AT 
XI : 8-9 ; AT IV: 185). I tend to agree with Alan Gabbey’s (1980:255-261) judgment that speed and determination 
are two distinct, though equally quantifiable modes of motion. Descartes’s peculiar rules of impact then state 
that in impact, the incompatible modes of the two bodies must be changed, and that this change must be the 
least possible (AT IV: 185), so that the inversion of direction in the case of impact between bodies moving with 
the same quantity of motion (volume times speed (appropriately expressed, in modern notation, not by mv, 
but by V|v|)) is a change in determination only (and in one composite determination of total determination at 
that (as is clear from the treatments of Gabbey 1980 and McLaughlin 2000), not in speed (which never has a 
vectorial component). The reason for this seems to me that the determination of motion is determined by the 
shape of the moving body and the surrounding bodies, whereas its speed is determined by its size. 
11 Martial Gueroult (1967) already protested against the dissociation between the physical and the 
metaphysical in Leibniz’ philosophy in 1934. 
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Descartes is working in a broadly Aristotelian tradition of natural philosophy. His 
aim is ultimately to give a view of the world that includes an account of the 
behavior of bodies as such, but grounded in an understanding of the true first 
causes: the nature of bodies, the causes of their motion, the way in which the laws 
that govern their behavior are grounded in the first cause, i.e. God. A different 
strand was the Galilean project. Galileo’s project was within the domain of mixed 
mathematics, as it was called, a quantitative account of the world that favored 
mathematical description over an account of the ultimate first causes. I would 
claim that Leibniz is an inheritor of the natural philosophical tradition of 
Descartes, and Newton is an inheritor of the mathematical tradition that Galileo 
followed. (Garber 2009: 179) 
Although Garber’s account is not without its problems (it fails to make sense, for 
instance, of “how the Principia got its name”, i.e. of how the Principia could have 
merited the name Principia Mathematica Philosophiae Naturalis, which implies that its 
author deliberately sought to situate it in the tradition that Garber takes to run counter 
to the tradition of which Newton was the culmination (Cf. Cunningham 1991)), it is 
indicative of the distance that separates the early 21st century picture of the 17th 
century from that advanced by Marburger-Schule neo-Kantians like Ernst Cassirer.  
But besides this problematic assumption regarding Descartes’ and Leibniz’ 
engagements with science, a second, more vexing implausibility mars the Adickes-style 
assessment. In fact, it ascribes to Kant, whom it otherwise portrays as a philosophical 
champion of positive science, a scientific procedure that he himself would condemn as 
gruesomely misguided: a groping, analogical, unrigorous one. I would like to invoke a 
methodological principle of the scientific enterprise I am currently engaged in and 
suggest that such a blatant inconsistency should only be ascribed to so great a thinker if 
there is no satisfactory alternative explanation at our disposal. I will offer such an 
alternative interpretation in this chapter, arguing that Kant is more concerned with 
pointing out the limitations of early 18th century physics and making room for the kind 
of analogical reasoning that could emend these limitations.  
1.1.3 The Looseness of Fit between Transcendental Philosophy and 
Natural Science 
The two premisses of the Marburger-reading that I criticized in the previous 
subsections both pertained Kant’s place in the history of science. I have attempted to 
show, there, that the image of early modern science governing the Kant-literature has 
lost much of its plausibility in light of more recent studies of that particular enterprise. 
Nevertheless, none of this counts as an argument if it can be shown that, however 
wrong this view of science and its progress may be, it is in fact the one to which Kant 
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himself adhered. As evidence for this thesis, interpreters often invoke Kant’s alleged 
bias towards physics – specifically, Newtonian mechanics. This bias, many believe, can 
be discerned in his cavalier attitude towards the other sciences (if they deserve this title 
of honor at all) and the close association between his transcendental principles and the 
Newtonian “Laws of Motion”. In this subsection, I will focus on the latter pillar, and 
reserve discussion of the former for the next subsection. 
The locus classicus for any Marburger-style interpretation is the analysis of the 
analogies of experience from the Critique of Pure Reason in relation to the three 
fundamental laws of mechanics as they appear in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural 
Science. This analogy is suggested by Kant himself, since he clearly states that the 
division of the Metaphysische Anfängsgründe is to follow the table of the categories closely 
(AA IV: 473-474). Nonetheless, I believe it is a mistake to overstretch this particular 
analogy, as Hermann Cohen, for instance, has famously done, in exclaiming 
triumphantly of the second analogy: “And wherein consists, then, the form of change? 
In nothing else than the succession of intensive magnitudes. In this succession, 
however, substance already acts, is force, namely inertia” (Cohen 1885: 463-464; my 
translation). In this seminal analysis, the foundations for Newtonian Mechanics 
allegedly provided by the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science is already the core of 
the argument from the first Critique. 
This argument has lost most of its appeal over the almost 150 years since it first 
surfaced, although it still guides many contemporary readings of Kant. A first objection 
to it is that Kant’s employment of the table of the categories as an organizing scheme 
for the discussion of the metaphysical principles of philosophy of nature is hardly a 
reason to believe these two tables are connected in a privileged manner. Indeed, Kant 
uses the same scheme throughout his entire Critical period to organize discussions of 
the most disparate topics, to the dismay of many interpreters, who believe Kant’s 
architectonic usually obscures rather than reinforces his accounts. Taking Kant at his 
word in this one instance seems warranted only because of the preexisting bias towards 
Kant’s philosophy of physical science, and the concommitant neglect of the other, more 
exotic occurences of the table. This point is more vexing since the main reason Kant 
adduces for following the table of the categories in this instance is that, to him, it 
guarantees exhaustiveness (AA IV: 473-474). It is thus at least as plausible that in this 
instance as in all others, Kant, for better or for worse, relies on the architectonic features 
of the table of categories rather than on its specific content. 
 Besides this concern, a deeper concern saps the foundations of the Marburger 
rendition of the analogies, a problem that is known in the literature as the attribution to 
Kant of a “non-sequitur of numbing grossness”. This diagnosis of the failings of Kant’s 
arguments was made twice, the first time by Arthur Lovejoy in 1906, where it appears in 
the following form: 
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If, says Kant, I am to regard a series of changes as constituting a perception of 
change, eine Begebenheit, I must ascribe to any such change in der Zeit eine 
gewisse bestimmte Stelle. This, however, I remark, is equally true of changes in 
representations that I do not attribute “to the object” at all. (Lovejoy 1967: 302-
303)  
And again, in almost similar wording, but strangely lacking reference to the fifty years 
older paper by Lovejoy12, in Strawson’s seminal The Bounds of Sense: 
Kant is under the impression that he is dealing with a single application of a single 
notion of necessity. In fact, he not only shifts the application of the word 
“necessary”, but also changes its sense, substituting one type of necessity for 
another. It is conceptually necessary, given that what is observed is in fact a 
change from A to B, and that there is no such difference in the causal conditions of 
the perception of these two states as to introduce a differential time-lag into the 
perception of A, that the observer’s perceptions should have the order: perception 
of A, perception of B – and not the reverse order. But the necessity invoked in the 
conclusion of the argument is not a conceptual necessity at all; it is the causal 
necessity of the change occurring, given some antecedent state of affairs. It is a 
very curious contortion indeed whereby a conceptual necessity based on the fact 
of a change is equated with the causal necessity of that very change. (Strawson 
1966: 137-138; original italics)  
Strawson’s version of the argument has become the more famous one, mostly because it 
figures in a seminal attempt to introduce transcendental arguments, and hence involves 
a considerable amount of theoretical refinement. For this reason, it is also the position 
that is usually targeted by those who seek to salvage Kant’s response to Hume from the 
charge of non-sequitur, petitio principii, or even blatant contradiction. This non-
sequitur is the idea that “the irreversibility of the order of our representations in 
apprehension might be taken as a criterion that indicates the presence of a cause” 
(Watkins 2010: 163). 
A discussion of the problem of the second analogy goes, of course, well beyond the 
scope of this chapter, and even this book, so I will focus on one important response that 
has tied the question in with the issue of the relation between the categories and the 
laws of nature. This response is usually ascribed to Gerd Buchdahl, who assumed that 
there is a “looseness of fit” between the transcendental and the empirical levels of 
causality. Buchdahl (1969: 651-652) starts off by conceding the grounds for the Lovejoy-
Strawson thesis, referring to an ambiguity in Kant’s wording that “seems to suggest that 
 
                                                     
12 Henry Allison (2004: 254) is equally surprised by the seemingly independent similarities between Lovejoy’s 
and Strawson’s criticisms of the argument for the second analogy. 
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he believes himself to have shown nature to be in principle law-like, in a sense different 
from that so far ‘proved’; as though he was implying that he had shown every empirical 
sequence to be subject to some empirical causal law or other”, which would seem to 
imply that “Kant is actually claiming that the law of causality, so far proved only 
transcendentally, may be employed directly, by simply resorting to experience, to 
indicate which empirical sequences are real” (Buchdahl 1969: 652; original italics). This 
is a clear analysis of the concerns behind the non-sequitur-charge, an analysis, 
furthermore, that shows how it bears upon the Marburger reading: 
It is however easy to see why the mistaken interpretation of Kant should so 
spontaneously insinuate itself with many of his readers. For, in the case of 
Euclidean geometry, there is […] a possible interpretation according to which the 
specific character (i.e. Euclidean) of the transcendental concept (extensive 
magnitude) is balanced by the character of that geometry. And again, in the case 
of the foundations of ‘pure natural science’ […] it may be said that to the 
transcendental (‘metaphysical’) principles there corresponds the synthetic a priori 
character of the laws of Newtonian dynamics (laws of motion). But even if these 
two cases were accepted at their face-value (and I argue that they need not be), 
they would constitute no more than applications of the transcendental principles. 
(Buchdahl 1969: 660; original italics)  
It is worth lingering on the major features of Buchdahl’s account. He claims that the 
charge of non-sequitur can only be made if one assumes Kant to be, in the second 
analogy, in the business of showing why nature is law-like. This assumption is often 
made due to 1) Kant’s momentary lapses into carelesness with terminology; and 2) the 
background belief that Kant wishes to ground the principles of Newtonian Science in 
the Critique. Against this, Buchdahl advances that Kant is not engaged in providing the 
basis for causal laws, let alone the Newtonian ones, in the Transcendental Analytic. The 
issue of laws only surfaces later in the text, in the Appendix to the Transcendental 
Analytic, where Kant discusses the conditions and functions of induction in scientific 
reasoning. This kind of reading has been dubbed, by Henry Allison, the “weak 
interpretation” of the second analogy, “since it insists that the argument shows (and is 
intended to show) merely that every event falls under the schema of causality rather 
than under particular causal laws13. In Allison’s opinion 
 
                                                     
13 Allison contrasts the “weak interpretation” with a strong interpretation that seeks to uphold the link 
between the principle of causality and that of a causal law in the second analogy. One important such reading 
that seeks to counter the Lovejoy-Strawson thesis is Paul Guyer’s, an explicit target of Allison’s. Guyer claims 
that Strawson’s criticism begs the question against Kant, because it assumes something to hold that he reads 
Kant as arguing against: the fact that we can determine the subjective sequence of events independently from 




this approach has at least two significant advantages. First, by weakening the 
connection between the causal principle and the basic principles of Newtonian 
physics, it allows for the possibility of finding in the Second Analogy a 
transcendental argument that is independent of an appeal to the science of Kant's 
time. Second, it makes it easy to offer a concise and definitive counter to the 
familiar Lovejoy-Strawson objection that by moving from the determinacy or 
necessity of the sequence of perceptions in a single instance of event-perception 
to the existence of a general law covering all sequences of that type, Kant is guilty 
of a non sequitur of colossal proportions. Since on this reading there is no such 
inference, there is no non sequitur. (Allison 1996: 81)  
Allison made this comment in the course of presenting his criticism of a recent capable 
criticism of the looseness of fit by Michael Friedman. In his frontal attack on the 
Buchdahlian attempt to loosen the fit between Newtonian Science and Kantian Critique, 
Friedman makes the following plausible point: it makes little sense to conceive of 
anything as subsumed under the general principle of causality without thereby 
committing oneself to it being subsumed under a general causal law or uniformity 
(Friedman 1992a: 170), at least in so far as one is still committed to a nomological 
picture of causality. He goes on, however, to offer a theory that seems rather untenable 
as an interpretation of Kant. I will first offer my reasons for the latter diagnosis, which 
will also be my argument against this strategy in Friedman’s revival of the Marburger 
story, and then comment briefly on the more plausible point raised by Friedman. 
The following passage may serve as a summary of Friedman’s thesis in his own words: 
Particular causal laws, for Kant, have a peculiar kind of mixed status: They result 
from a combination of inductively observed regularities or uniformities with the a 
priori concept (and principle) of causality. Insofar as particular causal laws merely 
record observed regularities they are contingent and a posteriori; insofar as they 
subsume such regularities under the a priori principle of causality, however, they 
are necessary – and even, in a sense, a priori. (Friedman 1992a: 174) 
As sensible as this may sound, the crucial passages on which Friedman builds his 
reading complicate matters substantially. The first passage he adduces as evidence is 
the following Reflexion: 
Empirically, one can of course bring rules to the fore, but not laws; like Kepler in 
comparison to Newton; for to the latter [i.e. laws] belongs necessity. Therefore, 
they are known a priori. Nonetheless, people always assume that rules of nature 
are necessary, because that is why it is nature, and that they can be intuited a 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      




priori; which is why people call them laws anticipando. The understanding is the 
ground of empirical laws, hence of an empirical necessity, where the ground of 
lawfulness can perhaps be intuited a priori e.g. the law of causality, but not the 
ground of the determinate law. All metaphysical principles of nature are merely 
grounds of lawfulness. (R. 5414; AA XVIII: 176; my translation) 
In this Reflexion, Kant draws a distinction between what the empirical can yield, i.e. 
regularities, and what causal laws yield, i.e. necessity. Besides that, he points out that, 
contrary to what the charge of non-sequitur involves, no empirical laws of nature can 
be arrived at a priori. The problem is therefore that of seeing how empirical regularities 
can be elevated to the rank of laws of nature. Friedman tries to make sense of this by 
focusing on the specific example Kant uses: the contrast between Kepler’s and Newton’s 
accounts of the relations between the periods of the planetary orbits. Friedman (rightly) 
believes he can make further sense of the point Kant is trying to make by relating this 
Reflexion to some passages from the Opus Postumum, which repay quotation in full: 
It is namely a peculiar appearance in the field of the sciences that there was a 
point in time when their progress seemed completed, when the ship lay anchored, 
and when there was nothing left for philosophy to do in a certain occupation. —
Kepler’s three analogies had completely yet merely empirically measured and 
mathematically described the phenomena of the circular motion of the planets, 
without however having the slightest idea of the moving forces that, together with 
their law, could be the causes belonging to them. Instead of the aggregation  of 
motions of Kepler, which contained empirically collected rules, Newton made a 
principle of the system of moving forces from efficient causes. Unity. (AA XXII: 
521; my translation) 
The laws of motion were sufficiently exposited by Keplers three analogies. They 
were all mechanical. Huyghens had also [explained] the composite but derivative 
movement through centrifugal force and the forces that continuously drive it (vis 
centrifuga et centripeta) […] but everything that was realized remained empiricism 
of the doctrine of motion and still lacked a general and proper principle, i.e. a 
concept of reason from which one can infer a priori a law of the determination of 
forces as one would infer from a cause to an effect, and Newton gave this 
explanation by calling the moving force Attraction. Because of this it became 
noticeable that this cause derived immediately from the bodies themselves and 
not from the communication of motion to other bodies and thus was not effected 
mechanically but purely dynamically. (AA XXII: 528-529; my translation) 
What Friedman overlooks in these passages, in my opinion, is first and foremost the 
evidence it provides for the “weak interpretation”. For, as Kant makes clear, Newton’s 
merit is to have provided not (primarily) an explanation of the planetory motions, but a 
systematization. But systematization is the proper business of reason, not of the 
understanding. In this way, Buchdahl’s claim that the proper search for empirical laws 
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is constituted, in Kant’s philosophy, by the regulative principles of reason rather than 
the constitutive principles of the understanding, is vindicated by the very passage 
Friedman adduces to discredit it. All the evidence is still in favour of the “weak 
interpretation”, however troubling its philosophical status may itself be; for indeed, 
remitting Friedman’s reading does nothing to answer the genuine philosophical 
concerns that lay behind it. 
The most important problem with the “weak interpretation” of the second analogy is 
that it seems to render the link between causality and nomology, if not nonexistent, at 
least opaque. As Friedman understandably pointed out, it seems difficult to see what it 
would mean for a principle of causality not to bring along commitment to the existence 
of laws. The problem discerned in the passages above is, then, of course, the familiar one 
that no generalization, no empirical regularity, can yield the necessity and strict 
universality characteristic of laws. As Kant points out, regularities fail as bases for 
prediction (and, notoriously, for counterfactuals14), whereas laws are generally supposed 
to provide for this. But I believe that, beyond this, Friedman has erred (along with many 
interpreters) in reading back the debates on laws of nature in 20th century philosophy 
of science into Kant’s text. The problem there is, however, the result of a generally 
nominalist and, quite frankly, Humean consensus15. As a result, many believe that the 
difference between a law and other kinds of universal propositions is that the former 
have a further property over and above the universality which yields the kind of 
necessity that allows for predictibility and counterfactuality16. That this is Friedman’s 
picture, is clear from the question he poses for (what he takes to be) Kant’s account:  
How do the transcendental principles inject necessity into empirical laws of nature 
so as to secure them a more than merely inductive status? How do judgments that 
merely record observed regularities or uniformities become truly and “strictly” 
universal via the addition of the concept of causality? (Friedman 1992a: 175) 
“Injection”, “Addition”, the very metaphors Friedman invokes provide ample proof that 
logical positivism still lurks in the back of his mind, or that he is still marked by the 
fallout that followed its fateful collapse. As a result, he is blind to the more promising 
answer that glistens through the passages he brings under our attention: passages that 
suggest that laws and regularities are of a distinct logical kind. For what Kepler provided 
 
                                                     
14 Cf. Chisholm 1946; Goodman 1947.  
15 That twentieth-century philosophy of science is thoroughly inspired by Hume, is hardly an outrageous or 
even original claim. This does not mean that there is nothing to be said about the possible differences between 
Hume and his logical-empiricist enthusiasts (Cf. Rosenberg 1993).  
16 The Humean thesis then states “that there is no difference between a law-like or nomological generalization 
and a universal truth drawn from exceptionless accidental regularities” (Rosenberg 1993: 75).  
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us were mathematical expressions for the relations between the behaviours of a class of 
objects, i.e. defined extensionally17. On the contrary, Newton showed us that the 
relations between the planetary orbits are the way they are because planets have mass, 
and because mass relates to other mass in a certain (empirically scrutible) manner: 
through attraction. The other major feature is that “planet” is a sortal, whereas “mass” 
is not (it is, quite trivially, a mass-term). Even though I cannot (and should not) expand 
in this reading here, not just because it goes beyond the scope of this work18, I would 
still like to advance the following hypothesis: for Kant, laws express categorical, 
synthetical relations between the intensions of two (preferrably non-sortal) concepts.19 
 
                                                     
17 Kant tellingly added a footnote to his reference to Kepler in Reflexion 5414: “Planetae omnes etc.” the two 
words that sufficed for him were those that stood in for the extensional characterization. 
18 In 5.4.1, I will return briefly to this thesis, because it will allow me to make sense of what is otherwise a 
systematic conflation in Kant and his contemporaries, namely the conflation between a hierarchy of concepts 
and a hierarchy of laws. Philip Kitcher (1984: 191-194) rightly insists on the fact that a scientific theory, for 
Kant, is concerned with how the properties of things relate. However, he seems to take for granted that talk of 
properties (intensions) and talk of entities (extensions) is either interchangeable or at least straightforwardly 
related in Kant, a supposition that I of course wish to deny. I also dissent, as will become clear in chapter 5, 
from the ascription to Kant of a straightforwardly hierarchically taxonomical (i.e. Porphyrian) conception of 
systematic order. Lastly, I want to alert the reader to the fact that Kitcher seems ultimately to read in Kant a 
conception of a law of nature that builds on the Humean consensus of 20th century philosophy of science, in 
stating that ‘‘for Kant, the laws of nature are just the generalizations that would figure in the best unifying 
system in the limit of rational inquiry” (Kitcher 1996: 412). To Friedman’s interpretation, then, which 
characterizes laws as generalizations with a certain place in a system of knowledge (deduced from basic 
principles),  Kitcher opposes one that characterizes them as generalizations with a place in a certain system 
(the best system). That both these interpretations are tailored to a Humean picture, becomes clear once we see 
that together, the two alleged criteria yield David Lewis Conception of a Natural Law: “a contingent generalization 
is a law of nature if and only if it appears as a theorem (or an axiom) in each of the true deductive systems that 
achieves a best combination of simplicity and strength” (Lewis 1973: 73; original italics) (mind that the sole 
difference of note in this definition, namely the insistence that it must figure in all best systems, is simply due 
to the fact that Lewis doubts, as he indicates in a footnote, that we can choose one system as the best). 
19 The account I ascribe to Kant here has obvious affinities to the one offered by Fred Dretske, who does not 
unambiguously endorse it, but does express its implications for analytic metaphysics: “These are inflationary 
times, and the cost of nominalism has just gone up” (Dretske 1977: 268). Luckily for Kant, his transcendental 
idealism may allow him to uncouple the epistemological and metaphysical costs and so avoid hyperinflation of 
his ontology. Additionally, I do not think Kant consciously offers this picture as an alternative to existing 
theories (as Dretske does), but rather assumes it in his response to Hume. Indeed, much of our problems in 
understanding the relation between Kant and Hume is that the former adhered to a form of intensionalism, 
whereas the latter was more of a nominalist (or at least had nominalist intuitions), and an extensionalist (for 
Hume, what we mistakenly believe to be general idea, is in fact a particular idea (an idea of a particular) joined 
with a linguistic sign (general term) that signals the warrant for unrestricted subsitution of that idea with any 
other idea belonging to the same resemblance-class (a class of particulars between which a certain transitive, 
reflexive and symmetrical relation of resemblance holds ) (Hume 2009: 20)). As a result, we look in Kant for a 
way of importing the nomic into the Humean “mosaic of local matters of particular fact” (Lewis 1986: viii), 




The proper business of science is, then, to discover these relations on the basis of the 
empirical regularities that we can establish.  
1.1.4 Kant and the Inexact Sciences 
The final important pillar on which the Marburger edifice rests is the constatation that 
Kant deems physics an exemplary science – in fact, we may even read him as stating 
that it is the only proper science. This physics-centrism is something that we commonly 
read back into our modern ancestors, but in Kant’s case there is of course textual 
motivation for it. He writes, after all, in the Metaphysical Foundations: “I assert, 
however, that in any special doctrine of nature there can be only as much proper 
science as there is mathematics therein.” (AA IV: 470); and this criterion allows him to 
dismiss various scientific enterprises as proper sciences, such as Chemistry20 and of 
course, notoriously, psychology21. When he states that “what can be called proper 
science is only that whose certainty is apodictic; cognition that can contain mere 
empirical certainty is only knowledge improperly so-called” (AA IV: 468), he places only 
theoretical physics in the class of proper sciences, and relegates all the rest to the rabble 
of false pretenders. Such a picture seems to decide the issue of Kant’s predilection for 
physics quite conclusively. But here, as elsewhere, first impressions can be deceiving. 
 First of all, we should take into account the reasons Kant adduced for denying the 
status of proper science to so many academic enterprises pursued even in his own time. 
As becomes clear from the quoted passages, Kant holds proper science to 1) contain, or 
depend on, a pure part that furnishes its a priori principles; and 2) apply (apparently by 
grace of the pure foundation) mathematical methods to its object of study. As many 
authors have noted, this two-pronged criterion is extremely strong. Philip Kitcher 
(1996: 408) has interestingly castigated the criterion by pointing out that “consideration 
of the sciences as they were actually developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
through their local instantiations. As Earman and Roberts (2005: 2) put it: “The Humean base may be 
characterized - very roughly - as the complete set of basic facts not offensive to those who are skeptical of 
non-logical, necessary connections in nature. The base includes particular facts about the existence of 
physical objects and their occurrent properties and spatiotemporal relations to one another. Excluded from 
the base are irreducibly general facts (e.g., that all electrons are negatively charged, that there exists at least 
one electron), and facts that involve laws of nature or other non-logical, natural modalities (e.g., facts about 
causal relations, counterfactuals, and irreducible dispositions)”. For Kant, particulars are deeply entangled 
through their physical properties, and an event constitutes some such entangled state.  
20 “chemistry can be nothing more than a systematic art or experimental doctrine, but never a proper science, 
because its principles are merely empirical, and allow of no a priori presentation in intuition.” (AA IV: 471) 
21 “Yet the empirical doctrine of the soul must remain even further from the rank of a properly so-called 
natural science than chemistry.” (AA IV: 471) 
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centuries, and, even more, as they have evolved since, reveals Newtonian mechanics as 
a rare exception”. Behind this judgment lie two major considerations. 
The first is that concerning the ideal standard of science. This surfaces from Kitcher’s 
criticism of the position he ascribes to Kant, and which he believes Friedman to be 
complicit in, namely that which views 
real sciences as organized bodies of knowledge with clearly-articulated concepts 
and general principles, mathematically formulated in axiomatic form. After the 
demise of Aristotelianism, a number of prominent seventeenth century figures, 
most notably Descartes, seem to have retained the idea of a system of the world, 
and to have endeavored to construct one based on sounder principles. Kant is heir 
to this tradition, and sees in Newton's Principia an approximation to the desired 
system. Thus he presents an ideal of scientific knowledge, which Friedman 
appears to accept, that demands complete conceptual clarification and removal of 
all residual conceptual and empirical problems before a scientific theory can be 
considered fully justified. (Kitcher 1996: 408)  
Kitcher undoubtedly feels the urge to criticize this picture because he sees it as 
forming the backdrop to many 20th century theories of science, most notably the 
notoriously physics-centered seminal theories of Ernest Nagel and Carl Hempel. Such a 
picture can prompt two distinct responses from the defenders of sciences other than 
theoretical physics. The first option is, of course, to reject this standard (as Kitcher 
seems to do in his response to Friedman). This might take the form of an argument that 
the structure of physical explanation may be adequate for the objects of physics, but 
that other objects require other methodologies. Interestingly, such a line of reasoning 
was pursued by a school of neo-kantianism that rivaled with Cohen’s Marburger Schule, 
namely the Southwestern School led by Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert.22 
The other option is to point out that at least some other sciences have, albeit belatedly, 
adjusted themselves to the standard. The history of post-kantian science and philosophy 
is replete with examples of the latter strategy, perhaps most notably concerning 
 
                                                     
22 Windelband (1924) basically agrees with the Marburger Schule on the idea that Kant’s philosophy was 
fashioned after the mold of Newtonian Science. It adds, however, that, while some sciences have acquired, 
since Kant’s time, a method analogous to that of Physics (most importantly chemistry), another evolution in 
recent science is more important: that of the emergence of history, and with it the Geisteswissenschaften as a 
methodologically well-founded scientific enterprise. History, however is not and cannot be a science based on 
laws and generalizations, like physics. It is more focused on understanding individual and particular wholes in 
there “value” (Wert). Windelband is, moreover, emphatic in the idea that this outlook requires us to put the 
Critique of Judgment on centre stage. This strategy has recently taken up again by Rudolf Makkreel (1990), who 
tries to extract a theory of the Geisteswissenschaften from the Critique of Judgment, but interestingly criticizes 
Windelband for overlooking the import of the third Critique and focusing instead on the Critique of Practical 
Reason (Makkreel 1990: 168). 
 
36 
chemistry, biology23 and psychology24. Those taking the latter course then often mock 
Kant for his misplaced denial of the very possibility of something that was subsequently 
realized. 
The second consideration lying behind Kitcher’s comment is that Kant somehow 
disregards the scientific practice in his own time. The qualification “somehow” is in 
place because most authors go on to express some bewilderment over the fact that Kant 
seemed peculiarly interested in those enterprises that he seemingly derogated. In fact, 
the puzzle of Kant’s knowledge of and interest in the practices of the non-physical 
sciences is as old as the Marburger  interpretation itself, since it surfaces, uncomfortably 
late of course, in Hermann Cohen’s Kants Theorie der Erfahrung: 
Is mathematical physics actually the whole of natural science? May we adopt the 
perspective that takes partem pro toto, that takes the system of mechanical 
causality to indeed encompass the whole of nature? 
[…] 
Besides mathematical, there had traditionally been another kind of natural 
science, the pursuit of which not even the founders of dynamics Galilei and 
Newton had disdained, and in which Kant too had taken an interest in his old age 
as well as in his youth – and not just critical but also descriptive natural science, 
which Kant had distinguished from the Theory of Nature as Description of Nature. 
The transcendental conception of laws of nature is conditional upon a clear 
observation of the distinction between both these methods and aims of inquiry 
into nature. (Cohen 1885: 508-509; my translation) 
The essential problem is this: if Kant does not regard the non-physical sciences as 
proper sciences, the methods of which are warranted by the transcendental deduction, 
then how can he still regard them as meaningful enterprises? The solution is usually 
sought in two directions: firstly, it seems that Kant’s association of non-physical 
sciences with reflective judgment points in the direction that they are somehow 
important to systematization; secondly, they may be linked to that other meaningful 
human enterprise that seems to elude the bounds of sense: ethics and morality. The 
 
                                                     
23 The Modern Evolutionary Synthesis is, in many ways, an attempt to 1) clear the ground conceptually for the 
life sciences by clarifying and unifying the basic concepts of (Darwinian) Evolutionary Theory and (Mendelian) 
Population Genetics; and 2) make them amenable to quantitative analysis through statistical means. In the 
earliest phase, of course, these two tasks went hand in hand (in the works of Ronald Aylmer Fisher (1918, 
1930), John Burdon Sanderson Haldane (1924) and Sewall Wright (1932). In the second phase, the 
mathematical aspect was less pursued, and attention shifted almost integrally to the conceptual core of 
evolutionary-genetical theory (Cf. Gould 2002). 
24 Gustav Fechner’s idea of psychometrics was obviously inspired by the (neo-Kantian) idea that a proper 
psychological science should be able to quantify its object in a manner analogous to the quantification 
involved in measurement in physics (Fechner 1860: v). 
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latter option is more attractive to those who wish to embrace the idea that Kant is and 
remains a physics-centrist25, undoubtedly because it allows for a scheme for 
“compatibility” of contradictories. Nevertheless, I think taking Kant at his word 
requires us to focus more on the former option – and as I will try to make clear 
throughout this book, at the level of systematization the sharp boundaries between 
physics and the other sciences tend to blur. This is at least suggested by the Buchdahl-
style “weak interpretation”, which holds that physical theorizing is a competence of 
reason, the capacity for systematization, not understanding, in its constitutive capacity. 
If so we may need to reverse the traditional question: we should attempt to think 
theoretical physics as a borderline case of Kantian science rather than as its normal 
form.  
1.1.5 The Exception as Rule 
In this Section, I have been engaged in undermining, one by one, the main pillars of the 
thesis that Kant’s philosophy is essentially linked to the fate of Newtonianism, or at 
least to (theoretical) physics. I have done so by offering a criticism of each of the major 
pillars of the Marburger interpretation. 
The first pillar is the idea that Kant was taking account of the “Factum” of positive 
Newtonian science. I have responded to this by alerting the reader to the fact that, in 
Kant’s own time, it was not obvious that such a positive science had emerged as 
autonomous of metaphysics, and if it did, Kant’s enterprise seems to overstress the 
metaphysical problems26. 
The second pillar is the central assumption that Kant differs from important 
predecessors like Descartes and Leibniz in his being a philosopher of science rather than 
a philosopher who practices science as well. I have tried to show that this assumption 
rests on a mistake about the relation between science and philosophy in Descartes and 
Leibniz, and a mistake about Kant’s own engagement with science. 
The third pillar is the claim that Kant’s transcendental analytic is meant to directly 
provide the basis for Newtonian science in particular. I have responded to this by 
 
                                                     
25 An important recent example of this is Alix Cohen (2009: xi-xii).  
26 It is important to note that my criticism differs from the one offered by Gordon Brittan (1978: 119), who 
states that “[o]ne of the difficulties for the claim that Kant’s project is to provide metaphysical foundations for 
Newtonian science, and thereby prove its validity, is that, to my knowledge, Kant himself never characterizes 
it in that way. Far from guaranteeing physics from skeptical attack, the task is to say how metaphysics can 
become, like physics, a science”. I do not take for granted the idea that, for Kant, physics does not stand in 
need of defense. 
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defending Buchdahl’s thesis that there is an irreducible “looseness of fit” between the 
principles of the understanding and the laws of nature. 
The fourth pillar is the claim that Kant clearly preferred physics over other sciences. 
I have challenged this by showing that Kant was clearly engaged in other sciences, and 
as such had to provide some legitimation for them, albeit a different kind of legitimation 
than we would initially expect. 
All of this is an essential via negativa intended to clear the way for my revised picture, 
which, I believe, in part draws its strength from the fact that it responds to the internal 
problems of settled interpretations. Moreover, I believe it is necessary to combat the 
entrenched picture we have of science, a picture that largely derives from late 19th 
century narratives, and that describes the gradual emergence of a positive scientific 
enterprise. For all its drawbacks, this picture is still read into Kant, even if it is often 
immediately conceded that he was mistaken in this. As opposed to this, I believe Kant 
was more responsive to two other features of physical science, namely 1) its relation 
towards, and ultimate embedment in, the tradition of natural philosophy; and 2) its 
usage of conceptual means in getting at results. This is suggested by a key passage from 
the preface to the second edition of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, where Kant writes the 
following: 
When Galileo rolled balls of a weight chosen by himself down an inclined plane, or 
when Torricelli made the air bear a weight that he had previously thought to be 
equal to that of a known column of water, or when in a later time Stahl changed 
metals into calx and then changed the latter back into metal by first removing 
something and then putting it back again, a light dawned on all those who studies 
nature. They comprehended that reason has insight only into what it itself 
produces according to its own design; that it must take the lead with principles for 
its judgments according to its constant laws and compel nature to answer its 
questions, rather than letting nature guide its movements by keeping reason, as it 
were, in leading-strings; for otherwise accidental observations, made according to 
no previously designed plan, can never connect up into a necessary law, which is 
yet what reason seeks and requires. Reason, in order to be taught by nature, must 
approach nature with its principles in one hand, according to which alone the 
agreement among appearances can count as laws, and, in the other hand, the 
experiments thought out in accordance with these principles - yet in order to be 
instructed by nature not like a pupil, who has recited to him whatever the teacher 
wants to say, but like an appointed judge who compels witnesses to answer the 
questions he puts to them. Thus even physics owes the advantageous revolution 
in its way of thinking to the inspiration that what reason would not be able to 
know of itself and has to learn from nature, it has to seek in the latter (though not 
merely ascribe to it) in accordance with what reason itself puts into nature. This is 
how natural science was first brought to the secure course of a science after 
groping about for so many centuries. (CPR B xiv) 
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The Science with which we find Kant engaged here is not the positive science alleged to 
have developed in the wake of Newton’s groundbreaking Principia, but the natural 
philosophy that constituted an ongoing project from the late 16th to the mid-18th 
century. Instead of  Newton, we find much earlier theorists like Galileo and Toricelli, 
and instead of a “respectable” recent mathematical physicist like d’Alembert, we find a 
mention of Georg Ernst Stahl, a radically “vitalist”27 opponent of the mechanical 
approach in natural history. Finally, what Kant focuses on in these passages is the 
amount of background assumptions researchers consciously make in order to let 
phenomena be meaningful and instructive. In physics, interesting results come up only 
because of crucial abstractions and conscious conceptual decisions, in experimentally 
highly contrived circumstances. It is the exceptional role of physics in staging 
exceptions that drew Kant’s attention – and it is the harrowing backlash this has for the 
understanding of all that resists such practice by which he is touched. Specifically, I will 
argue in the next two sections that Kant took issue with the radical determinism of both 
Leibnizian and Newtonian mechanics, which he believed to be contradicted by the 
specifically dynamic nature of some systems. In the next chapters, we will see how this 
is relevant to his views on the temporal evolution of biological systems, human nature 
and even our cognitive apparatus.  
1.2 Finding the Dynamical in Dynamics 
1.2.1 Sufficiency and Continuity in Leibnizian Dynamics 
In order to understand Kant’s earliest engagements with physics, we need to first take a 
closer look at Leibniz’s dynamics. This development was a major topic of discussion 
among continental European natural philosophers, both for its scientific and its 
philosophical implications. One major question here was whether the basic assumptions 
of the new science of dynamics squared with those of the previously dominant 
mechanical outlook and, if not, which was preferable. Another was whether the 
assumptions of the Leibnizian and the Newtonian versions of mechanics squared with 
 
                                                     
27 My use of scare quotes here is meant to indicate my general unease with this term. As Charles Wolfe (2011) 
has shown extensively, not only is it marred by the connotations it acquired over the course of the 20th 
century, but it is also a much more versatile and diverse position than is traditionally suggested. I still use the 
term here, however, because even Wolfe seems to regard Stahl as a rather typical representative of the 
position most widely understood under it. 
 
40 
each other and, if not, which was preferable. As we will see, Kant preferred dynamics to 
mechanics, and incorporated both recognizably Leibnizian, i.e. anti-Newtonian, and 
Newtonian, i.e. anti-Leibnizian, elements in his own account. 
Leibniz greatest contributions to physics are usually regarded to be his criticisms of 
the (according to some moribund) Cartesian mechanics of the likes of Malebranche, 
Cordemoy, de la Forge and Régis. With enormous penetration, he saw through the fatal 
flaws of Descartes’s conception of motion and was able to synthesize an underlying 
conceptual, even metaphysical disagreement out of what was already, due to the efforts 
of Christiaan Huygens (1669), Edme Mariotte (1673), Christopher Wren (1668) and John 
Wallis (1668), a scientific challenge to the reigning orthodoxy. In presenting this 
criticism of Descartes, he relied on substantial philosophical commitments. As a result, 
for the educated 18th century German readership, the new science of “dynamics” came 
to be associated as much with these underlying commitments as with its empirical 
upshot. 
The first challenge Leibniz raised to the Cartesians is by far the most famous and 
most highly publicized one, because it resulted in the infamous vis viva dispute that 
would rekindle time and again amongst continental physicists, even after D’Alembert 
provided his triumphant dissolution of the difficulty in his Traité de Dynamique28. For the 
purposes of the present argument, it is not necessary to plough through the morass of 
vague or confused concepts that characterized this debate, mostly because Leibniz 
himself seems to have mostly been concerned with the metaphysical and 
methodological lessons to be drawn from his demonstration of the errors of the 
Cartesians (cf. Iltis 1971: 26-27). 
Although the evidence suggests that Leibniz had formed the idea as early as 167829, it 
is only in the correspondence with Arnauld and the infamous paper “Brevis 
demonstratio erroris Cartesii et aliorum circa legem naturalem, secundum quam volunt 
a deo eandem semper quantitatem motus conservari, qua et in re mechanica 
abutuntur”, published in the Acta Eruditorum in 1686, that Leibniz first voiced his 
criticism of the Cartesian measure of force. In that paper, Leibniz contrasts his own vis 
motrix (motive force), measured through the height to which it can elevate a body (GM 
VI: 118), with the Cartesian quantity of motion, which is measured as V|v|30. According to 
 
                                                     
28 The case of this book is interesting in itself because of the self-professed inadequacy of its title; for 
D’Alembert knows full well that the term was coined by Leibniz as “Science of forces and motive causes” 
(D’Alembert 1758: xxxi; my translation), whereas D’Alembert’s solution to the vis viva dispute consisted 
precisely in the claim that we should focus on effects rather than on causes in physics. Hence, D’Alembert 
denied the possibility or desirability of a proper science of dynamics beyond the study of motion (mechanics).  
29 See footnote 9 of this chapter. 
30 I use this formula to avoid the confusion, common to late 17th and early 18th century science, of what we 
would regard as momentum (mv) and Cartesian Quantity of Motion. See also footnote 10 of this chapter. 
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Leibniz, the metaphysical import of this is that forces are to be considered as basic to 
nature. He argues for this in two distinct ways. 
The first strategy is the better known of the two, at least among students of early 
modern science and philosophy. It is patently not Leibniz’s primary intention to offer 
this criticism of Descartes in order to show how we should go about measuring 
mechanical interactions, but rather to show the insufficiency of the Cartesian picture of 
nature. Descartes famously argued that 1) nature is to be understood in terms of 
extension and its modes alone31 (AT VIII: 42); 2) the universe is subject to a conservation 
law, stating that God always preserves the same quantity of motion (and rest) in the 
universe (AT VIII: 61); and 3) motion is a mode of extension (AT VIII: 25). Taken 
together, these imply that we can grasp the world solely through its geometrical 
properties. Leibniz combats this picture by showing that it leads to trouble for the 
second assumption. While he agrees with Descartes that the universe should be subject 
to a conservation law, and that from this it follows that in every mechanical interaction 
something must be conserved completely, he denies that what is conserved is quantity 
of motion. 
He argues for this in the following manner: take two objects, one of 1 unit of weight 
falling at the rate of 4 units of speed, and another of 4 units of weight falling at the rate 
of one unit of speed. According to the Cartesian measurement, these two bodies will fall 
with the same “force” (i.e. quantity of motion. Because of Galileo’s principle of the lever 
(mv²), however, the force generated in this way would be able to elevate the body of 4 
units of weight to an altitude of 1 unit of distance, whereas it would elevate the body of 
1 unit of weight to an altitude of a whopping 16 units of distance. We could thus in 
principle construct a machine that generates a given amount of force by dropping a big 
object, uses the generated force to lift a small object, and then drops the small object in 
order to generate a much greater force. Such a machine could in principle generate an 
unrestricted amount of force using only a restricted initial force, and would constitute a 
perpetuum mobile. But as Leibniz notes, the idea of a perpetuum mobile is an absurdity, 
and Descartes will admit this as well (GM VI: 124-125). For Leibniz, the conclusion is 
absurd because it violates one of the many versions of his infamous principle of sufficient 
reason, namely that of the equality of cause and effect.32 Leibniz seems to conclude from 
 
                                                     
31 Some qualification of this thesis is required, as has been shown by Daniel Garber (1992: 66-67), for 
Descartes’s body is of course subject to a set of attribute-transcending “general notions”, such as, importantly, 
duration. Without the latter notion, Cartesian science would not get off the ground, and yet it is not clearly a 
mode of extension. However, this does not seem to complicate things for the argument I am trying to develop 
here. 
32 This is one of the earliest incarnations of the principle of sufficient reason, first formulated in the 1676 
manuscript De Arcanis motus et Mechanica ad puram Geometriam reducenda (cf. Hess 1978: 203-204). 
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this that the proper metaphysical substrate of physical reality cannot be geometrical 
extension, but is rather dynamical force. 
A decade later, in the Specimen Dynamicum, Leibniz offered a second line of argument 
in favour of his dynamics and against the merely mechanical outlook of the Cartesians: 
Strictly speaking, motion (and likewise time) never really exists, since the whole 
never exists, inasmuch as it lacks coexistent parts. And furthermore, there is 
nothing real in motion but a momentary something which must consist in a force 
striving toward change. (GM VI: 235; Leibniz 1989: 118) 
In order to understand what Leibniz is arguing here, it is important to note that the 
Specimen Dynamicum is the text where he introduces his distinction between living force 
and dead force: 
One force is elementary, which I also call dead force, since motion does not yet 
exist in it, but only a solicitation to motion, as with [..] a stone in a sling while it is 
still being held in by a rope. The other force is ordinary force, joined with actual 
motion, which I call living force […] which arises from an infinity of continual 
impressions of dead force. (GM VI: 235; Leibniz 1989: 121-122) 
If we read these two passages in tandem, and relate Leibniz’s argument against 
Descartes’s geometrical conception of nature to his distinction between dead and living 
force, the following picture arises: motion cannot be conceived as actualized in a single 
instance of time, since it is defined as translation of place over time. But if it is to be 
considered as real, it must somehow have parts which themselves allow for the specific 
time-relation that it requires. Leibniz believes the properties of velocity and direction, 
both of which are essential to motion, can only be instantiated at an instant in the form 
of a somehow finalistic force. In the unpublished Essay de Dynamique of 1692, the analogy 
is even clearer, since Leibniz surmises there that dead and living force relate to each 
other as point to line (Costabel 1973: 127). I read Leibniz’s point here as follows: just as 
no single point can have length or direction, so too no single instant of motion can have 
velocity or direction. But points needn’t be regarded as non-entities; for calculus allows 
us to regard them as infinitely small rather than as unextended. To Leibniz, the idea of 
an infinitesimal seems only to make sense in a force ontology, where the infinitesimal 
parts of a force can themselves have the properties required of them, i.e. both a scalar 
and a vectorial quantity. But, importantly, this means that a motion is already 
determined before it is actualized, namely by the solicitation to motion.33 Here again, 
 
                                                     
33 As evidence for ascribing this view to Leibniz, Robert Sleigh (1990: 118) has adduced the following passage 
from a 1687 letter to Bayle: “I would like to add a remark of consequence for metaphysics. I have shown that 




the principle of sufficient reason rears its head, this time in the form of the relation 
between dead force and living force – for whence come direction and velocity if they are 
not already contained somehow in the first instance of motion? How can they emerge 
simply through the passing of time? As I will argue in the next section, these were the 
questions Kant would ask. 
Before passing on to Kant’s discussion of Dynamics, however, we must first take a 
closer look at Leibniz’s challenge to Descartes’s rules of impact, which stated that when 
two bodies with equal quantity of motion collide, they both rebound (reverse their 
direction) with their speed before impact, but that when bodies with unequal quantities 
of motion collide, only the one with the smaller quantity of motion is reflected. Many 
readers had already supposed that there was a problem with this account, and several 
authors had provided alternative solutions, most importantly Huygens, Mariotte, Wren 
and Wallis. But contrary to these authors, who had a more mathematical and less 
metaphysical agenda, Leibniz pushed a more general point, as he did in this passage 
from a letter to Bayle: 
This difference of events in the two cases is not reasonable; for the inequality of 
the two bodies can be as small as you would like, and the difference between the 
suppositions in the two cases, that is to say the difference between such an 
inequality and a perfect equality could be smaller than any given [quantity]. In 
that case, in virtue of our principle, the difference between the results or events 
should be smaller than any given [quantity]. However, if the second rule were as 
true as the first, the contrary would occur, since according to the former rule, an 
increase, however small, of the body B that was previously equal to C, produces an 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
that force or power is something real at present, while the future effect is not. From which it follows that we 
must admit in bodies something different from size and speed, at least unless one wants to refuse bodies all power of 
acting” (G III: 48; Sleigh 1990: 118). Daniel Garber subsequently adduced a further passage that clarifies 
Leibniz’s point: “The notion of force is as clear as that of action and passion, because it is that from which 
action follows when nothing prevents it….On the other hand, motion is a successive thing, which, 
consequently, never exists, any more than time does, since all of its parts never exist together. Unlike that, I 
say, force or effort exists completely at each moment, and must be something true and real. And since nature 
takes account of that which is true rather than that which exists only entirely in our mind, one finds (as I have 
demonstrated) that it is also the same quantity of force, and not the same quantity of motion (as Descartes 
thought) that is conserved in nature. And it is from this principle alone that I draw everything that experience 
has taught about motion and about the impact of bodies, against Descartes’s rules, and that I have established 
a new science which I call dynamics, whose elements I have set out.” (Garber 2009: 154-155). The point of these 
passages seems to me that since motion is never given fully at an instant, neither can its characteristic 
features (speed and direction), unless these are somehow contained in something that can exist at an instant. 
Force, to Leibniz, is precisely something that can exist fully at a given point in time whilst still having 
properties that are only exhibited over a period of time. The consequence of this I believe Kant to have been 
worried about is that the eventual motion of a body is already contained in its initial state, since it is contained 
in the force fully existing at the initial state. 
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extremely great difference in effect, since it alters the absolute reflection into 
absolute continuation, which is a leap from one extreme to the other. (G III: 53; my 
translation) 
What Leibniz is trying to convey here is that Descartes’s rules of impact violate a basic 
principle of metaphysics, and are therefore certainly false. This principle is the law of 
continuity, which he consistently formulates as “if the arguments are ordered then the 
values are orderered as well” (G III: 52; GM VI: 250). Ultimately, this principle reflects 
Leibniz demand (not just belief) that “whenever one physical quantity or state is a 
function of another, that function is continuous […] and everywhere differentiable” 
(Mates 1986: 166). There is, of course, a way in which it reflects the principle of 
sufficient reason as well, because it demands that every difference in the value is 
warranted by an equivalent difference in the argument. 
Another consequence Leibniz draws from the law of continuity is just as important, 
for he believes it to prove conclusively that all situations of impact should be regarded 
as cases of elastic collision. As he puts it in the second part of the Specimen Dynamicum: 
From this follows something Descartes opposed in his letters, something many 
gentlemen of great reputation are even now unwilling to admit, that all rebound 
arises from elasticity, which explains many elegant experiments that show that a 
body is deformed before it is impelled, as Mariotte nicely demonstrated. And finally, a 
most wonderful conclusion follows from this, that no body is so small that it is 
without elasticity, and furthermore, each body is permeated by a fluid even 
subtler than it is. And thus, there are no elements of bodies, nor is there maximally 
fluid matter, nor are there little solid globes (unintelligible to me) of the second 
element, both determinate in shape and hard. Rather, the analysis proceeds to 
infinity. (GM VI: 249; Leibniz 1989: 132-133) 
This passage reveals a major reason for Leibniz’s resistance towards the idea of 
(physical) atoms:  he feels that the assumption of atoms, and hence of the occurrence in 
nature of cases of perfectly hard collision, would dislocate the causal links in reality. 
For, in the case of perfectly hard collision, the state at the instant just before impact and 
the state at the instant just after impact are radically different. Such an assumption, 
Leibniz fears, makes the causal link between the two instances unintelligible. Of course, 
he may very well have been right in this, because it is a reflection on perfectly hard 
collision that prompted Hume’s infamous skeptical arguments regarding causation: 
“Motion in one body is regarded upon impulse as the cause of motion in another. When 
we consider these objects with the utmost attention, we find only that the one body 
approaches the other; and that the motion of it precedes that of the other, but without 
any sensible interval” (Hume 2009: 54; italics added). Hume thus assumes that causality is 
a relation that holds between two successive events and that their succession is 
discontinuous. One can respond to this by either denying that causality is a relation 
 
 45 
between two events rather than a feature of a single (causal) event34, or by conceding 
that it is a relation between two successive events, but counter that the succession is 
perfectly continuous. Leibniz, and all those following him in his predilection for 
elasticity (such as Kant35) may very well have had, if not an explicit appreciation, then at 
least an important inkling of the looming threat of this conundrum. 
In order to appreciate just how important these two metaphysical reflections on the 
foundations of Cartesian physics are, one need but point out that they function as the 
core of the discussions of the first and second parts of the Specimen Dynamicum 
respectively. This shows to what extent Leibnizian Dynamics was imbued with the 
metaphysical principle of sufficient reason. But it is also this principle which seems to 
bind the universe together in the strictest of determinations, and to make temporal 
development a mere formality after the done deal of the initial condition. As we will see 
in the remainder of this chapter, Kant would continue to appreciate the principle of 
sufficient reason for its efficacy in ensuring the causal and intelligible structure of the 
world, but remain equally vexed by the fact that it makes this causal and intelligible link 
between all things too strong. 
1.2.2 The True Estimation of Leibnizian Dynamics 
The first work Kant sought to submit to the reading public was, not coincidentally, an 
essay on the vis viva debate: the Thoughts on the true estimation of living forces and 
assessment of the demonstrations that Leibniz and other scholars of mechanics have made use of 
in this controversial subject, together with some prefatory considerations pertaining to the force 
of bodies in general from 174936. In the eyes of many commentators, however, it was a 
premature publication, riddled with misconceptions and hopelessly outdated when it 
finally hit the press. As Martin Schönfeld put it: 
Kant’s philosophical debut was a false start. He later considered the True Estimation 
of Living Forces a thorough embarrassment, which, for all practical purposes, it was. 
Not only was Kant incapable of resolving the problem of force, but also 
unbeknownst to him, Jean Le Rond d’Alembert had already published a theory 
that effectively settled the debate three years before Kant turned his mind to it. 
(Schönfeld 2000: 18)  
 
                                                     
34 This position is traditionally associated with Aristotle, and has been taken up again more recently by Nancy 
Cartwright (1994). Eric Watkins (2005: 398-399) ascribes this position to Kant, but, as my treatment should 
make clear, I do not agree with him in this. 
35 See footnote 6 of this chapter. 
36
 Although the title page suggests that it was printed in 1746, the book was not published until 1749. 
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Although this judgement is largely correct, it does call for some caveats. First of all, 
Schönfeld suggests that we can see just how little control Kant had of the technical 
aspects of the debate if we appreciate that it had already been solved, by D’Alembert in 
the first edition of his Traité de Dynamique from 1743, and by Roger Boscovich in his De 
Viribus Vivis from 1745. Since these books contained a solution that required a serious 
technical grasp in order to be understood, Schönfeld surmises, the young and 
insufficiently educated Kant could not have picked up on them. There are difficulties 
with this argument, however. The first is that it seems far from obvious that D’Alembert 
had already solved the issue in the first edition of the Traité de Dynamique. Carolyn Iltis 
(1970) has suggested that only in an addendum to the second edition of 1758 can we find 
a proper response to the problem. Secondly, however, both D’Alembert (Hankins: 284) 
and Boscovich (1745: 30) expressed a preference for the estimation in terms of the 
(revised) Cartesian measure, which means that they can both be read as embracing one 
side of the debate. Finally and most importantly, the reservations both authors had 
towards vires vivae is that the latter are only conserved in elastic collision. For 
D’Alembert, then, the assumption that nature consists of perfectly hard solid atoms 
played and important role in his resistance towards vires vivae. Boscovich, on the other 
hand, would ultimately go on to provide an important template for the Leibnizian image 
of nature as exhibiting only elastic collisions through his idea of point-masses. It is well 
known that Kant would later develop a more than superficial sympathy for that view. In 
sum, I believe we should not decide the issue over vis viva as an outdated one at this 
point, and keep in mind that important philosophical issues remained even in the wake 
of D’Alembert’s and Boscovich’s treatments. 
Secondly, Schönfeld’s judgement evokes a picture of Kant as a pitiful figure: a 
“technical philosopher” out of control of his technicalities, taken in by a fallacious proof 
of an absurd conclusion. This image may seem to keep us from discerning the major 
points Kant is trying to make here, and read into it instead the classic concerns that we 
are sure must play in, which is exactly what Schönfeld goes on to do: 
Nonetheless, the Living Forces is fascinating. It reveals how the mind of the 
budding philosopher worked. Echoes of thoughts that had been formulated here 
first reverberate through the whole critical period, despite Kant’s quick rejection 
of the treatise. Attitudes emerged here that were later transformed into the 
dominant motives of his philosophizing. Assumptions that Kant boldly introduced 
in the Living Forces later returned as problems requiring solution or claims 
needing explicitation, and as a result, many themes of the Living Forces-the 
beauty and perfection of nature, the tension between physical influx and 
preestablished harmony, the concepts of substance and world, the idea that force 
generates space-blossomed into the topics of the major precritical treatises in the 
next decade, the Universal Natural History (1755), the New Elucidation (1755), and 
the Physical Monadology (1756). (Schönfeld 2000: 38)  
 
 47 
Later on he interestingly adds that “[b]ecause the Living Forces were in need of further 
clarification, the book became for Kant a list of things to do. Sections I and III generated 
the items on this list” (Schönfeld 2000: 54). There is an obvious reason why authors 
choose to focus on these two sections: they are more philosophical and conceptual in 
nature, distinct from the (misplaced) technicalities of the second section. But marred as 
the latter section is, it repays a closer look, especially the passages which Kant initially 
intended as a conclusion to the section. There he clearly alerts the reader to the general 
aim of the work: “Hence we do not have any dynamic principles at present from which 
we could justifiably proceed. Our work, which promises to present the true estimation 
of living forces, should make amends for this defect.” (AA I: 117) Kant thus seems clearly 
concerned with the basis for a dynamics, not with the proper measurement of force. 
This suggests indeed that, despite his enormous route through technical debates, he 
may ultimately have had mainly philosophical concerns here. I believe we can find out 
which these philosophical concerns are from his comments on Leibniz’s mathematical 
estimates of force. Indeed, Kant seems to push the point that the conception of nature in 
terms of vis viva violates precisely the two basic principles of Leibnizian science: the 
principle of equality of cause and effect (AA I: 104) and the law of continuity (AA I: 105). 
He therefore suggests that it is through the principle of the best (yet another 
manifestation of the principle of sufficient reason) alone that Leibniz can harmonize his 
estimation of force with his own fundamental principles. But this, Kant believes, is not 
the way to go: 
But even this minor defense is flimsy. We are speaking only of the mathematical 
estimation of forces and it is no surprise if it does not match God’s wisdom 
perfectly. Mathematics is a science isolated from the medium of genuine 
knowledge, it does not sufficiently meet the rules of decorum and appropriateness 
if taken alone, and it must be combined with the tenets of metaphysics if it is to be 
perfectly applied to nature. The harmony present among truths is like the 
agreement found in a painting. If one takes one specific part away, then decorum, 
beauty, and design will disappear; all parts have rather to be seen together in 
order to perceive these same features. The Cartesian estimation is contrary to the 
designs of nature; it is accordingly not the true estimation of forces in nature, but 
this does not prevent it from being the true and justified measure of force in 
mathematics. For the mathematical concepts of the properties and forces of 
bodies are quite different from the concepts encountered in nature, and it is 
enough to have seen that the Cartesian estimation is not contrary to mathematical 
concepts. But in order to determine the true estimation of force in nature, we 
must connect the laws of metaphysics with the rules of mathematics; doing so will 
fill in the gap and better meet the designs of God’s wisdom.  (AA I: 108) 
The following reading of Kant’s intentions in the True Estimation suggests itself through 
these passages: Kant focused on an unfortunate tension between two major aspects of 
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Leibnizian Dynamics: the role the principle of sufficient reason played in it on the one 
hand, and the temporal evolution that it was supposed to ground on the other. As I tried 
to indicate in the previous section, Leibniz had two motives for asserting the reality of 
underlying forces: the fact that they and they alone allow for a measure that does not 
violate the basic principles of intelligibility (and, for Leibniz at least, ipso facto 
possibility), and the fact that they allowed us to understand how a state at an instant 
can have properties that only manifest over time (typically, velocity and direction). 
Kant suggests that there is a tension between these two arguments: the first seems to 
understand the initial state as a full determination of the consequent states, the latter 
seems to conceive of an initial state as something that is but one, underdetermining 
moment in a time series. Such a reading of Kant’s argument is further strengthened by 
the fact that it explains the peculiarities of his theory of vivification. 
In the third section of the True Estimation, Kant develops a theory of vivification 
which states that an object starts off with a vis mortua, and then gradually acquires a vis 
viva through the finite process of vivification: 
This also implies, by the law of continuity, that the same body that possesses dead 
force in an initial moment and acquires living force in the next, a force that is to 
the former like an area is to the generating line, gains this force only in a finite 
time interval. For suppose we posited that it acquired this latter force not in a 
finite time interval after the initial moment, but instead instantly, in the infinitely 
short period after the initial moment, then this would be like saying that it already 
had this living force in the initial moment itself. For the law of continuity, and 
even mathematics as such, demonstrate that it does not make any difference 
whether I say that the body happens to be in the initial moment of its motion, or 
in the infinitely short period following it. But in the initial moment of motion 
itself the force is dead, and so we cannot say without contradiction that the force 
is therefore living if we also stated that this living force can be encountered in 
motion only after a finite interval, after the action of the external cause. 
The body’s natural force actually maintains within itself the externally received 
impression and since through its continuous striving it accumulates in itself the 
formerly point-like intension until it becomes like a line, which is proportional to 
the velocity-like force caused in it from without, it accumulates, on its own, the 
force obtained from the outside, which was previously only like a line too, until it 
is eventually like a plane whose one side represents the externally imparted 
velocity and force, while the other side models the intension, which is 
proportional to this externally imparted velocity and force, which has grown, on 
its own, from the body’s interior. (AA I: 145-146) 
Thus, according to the Leibnizian picture, there is a distinction between the dead force 
as it operates in the initial state of the system, and the living force as it appears after a 
finite time. But since the force is not already “alive” during the initial stage, it only 
becomes alive, vivifies, through a period in which an external force acts upon the body. 
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Kant describes this process of vivification as one where the internal force preserves, 
integrates and accumulates the externally received impressions of force. The difference 
here seems to be that, whereas for Leibniz the internal force is important because it 
already “contains” the later developments, for Kant it is important because it can come 
to internalize external influences over time and thereby acquire a force that is not 
reducible to the mere communication of external mechanical forces. Only over time can 
we speak of a proper living force, and only because of this time-factor do we need to 
take recourse to the metaphysical. In the realm of the mathematical, the principle of 
sufficient reason and its radical determinacy reigns supreme, and only in the natural, 
properly grasped through metaphysics, can time be a productive factor. That this is the 
view of the young Kant is clear from the second paragraph of the third section: 
Mathematics does not permit its body to have a force unless it is wholly produced 
by the external cause of its motion. Accordingly, mathematics admits force in the 
body only insofar as force was caused in it from the outside, and hence one will 
always find its force to the same degree in the causes of its motion. This is a basic law of 
mechanics, whose presupposition, however, does not admit any estimation other 
than the Cartesian. But, as we shall soon show, the body in nature is of an 
altogether different constitution. That body has the capacity to increase, by itself and 
in itself, the force awakened externally by the cause of its motion, which means there can be 
units of force in it that did not originate from the external cause of motion, that may be 
larger than this cause, that therefore cannot be measured with the same yardstick 
as the one used for Cartesian force, and that accordingly involve another 
estimation. (AA I: 140) 
Kant argues that the old mechanical perspective of Descartes, which regards all forces as 
externally caused and communicated, is proper only in the domain of mathematics and 
extension, but that the true estimation of real interactions requires that we shift to the 
Leibnizian, i.e. dynamic perspective, which speaks of internal forces, and is based on 
metaphysical concerns. He argues for this, however, by showing that mechanics and 
dynamics differ not just in their admission of intrinsic forces, but also in the fact that 
only the latter can understand the specific productive contribution of time to the 
development of force. The internal force of which Kant speaks is that which allows for 
an internal production of force that is not already contained in, and therefore reducible 
to, the antecedent motive causes of the system. In this manner, the consideration of 
evolution over time dissolves the strong link between the mathematical and the 
metaphysical, the quantitative and the qualitative, the external and the internal, the 
instantaneous and the temporal that held Leibnizian Dynamics together, but that 
equally became the noose around its neck. The young Kant, for all his 
misunderstandings, his misgivings, his misspeakings, at least attempted to dissolve this 
link, not to save the sanctity of the internal (towards which he will always take a 
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hesitant stand), but to save the importance of becoming (towards which he frequently 
turned his attention). 
It seems that, in spite of all the refinements and the important new respect for 
Newton, Kant’s project in the 1750s lies along the same lines: it seeks to make way for 
proper becoming in dynamics. This surfaces, for instance, in both of his major 1755 
works, the Universal Natural History and the Nova Dilucidatio, and in his 1756 Physical 
Mondology. I will briefly comment on the contents of the latter two works in the 
remainder of this subsection, and look to the Universal Natural History in more detail in 
the following section. 
In many ways, the Principiorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicae nova dilucidatio does 
exactly what we would expect of Kant on the basis of the True Estimation: an analysis of 
the precise implications of the principle of sufficient reason. Such an analysis is 
obviously meant as a criticism of  the doctrines of German Schulphilosophie, which was 
based on this principle. In the tradition of philosophy inaugurated by Leibniz and 
Christian Wolff, substances do not really causally interact, and all the changes that 
occur in them are entirely due to the internal striving of their living force. According to 
such a view, all latter stages are already included in the essence of a thing, and only the 
temporal striving of the system also brings to the fore these pre-established features of 
the entity. The problem with this view is that  it becomes unclear how there could be 
change, since the principle of sufficient reason requires that the change in internal 
state, however predetermined, be grounded in another change of conditions. For 
Leibnizians, these conditions would itself have to be internal, which means that the 
change of internal states is itself caused by an already effected change of internal states, 
which is an internal contradiction (AA I 410).  
Kant seems to have been dissatisfied with a view that makes change and time a mere 
epiphenomenon of the independent, completely determined essences of things. Against 
it, he proposes a different the view that change is both basic and causally relevant. For 
him, the internal changes to substances are due to the external changes in their 
situations, and not the other way around. Sure, substances can contain internal 
determinations that are then brought forth on occasion of a change in external 
circumstances, but they cannot themselves contain the ground of the change. Eric 
Watkins has raised a possible “charge of vacuity” to Kant’s argument of succession in 
the Nova Dilucidatio: “it might seem that explaining the change of internal 
determinations on the basis of changing external grounds is vacuous insofar as one is 
still invoking change in order to explain change” (Watkins 2005: 132). I believe this 
charge can be resolved by interpreting Kant as stating that change and temporal 
evolution is fundamental to the universe, and not an epiphenomenon of the internal, 
determinations of things. On such a reading, Kant interpreted the Wolffians as stating 
that the principle of change is itself an internal determination of things, and as such 
itself a determination rather than a ground of determination. His criticism would then 
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be that change is a ground of determinations and of the possibility of mutual 
determination, rather than itself a determination/determined aspect. Prior to the actual 
course of the universe and the interactions occurring in it, the dynamics of individual 
entities cannot be determined. 
There seems to be an important difference between this account and that of the True 
Estimation for our present purposes. The True Estimation argued that merely external 
determinations cannot account for the dynamic features of the real behaviour of bodies, 
and that there therefore need to be internal principles as well. In the Nova Dilucidatio, 
the stress goes the other way around: he argues that the internal principle of change 
does not of itself suffice to explain the dynamic features of the world. Of course, these 
two positions do not directly contradict each other. They may instead be taken as a shift 
of stress that reveals Kant’s commitment to the need of both internal and external 
principles to have a truly dynamical universe. Neither suffices to ground change on its 
own, but together they allow for genuine change and mutual determination. Kant’s 
discussions reveal as much, since in the True Estimation he argued that an internal force 
cannot be vivified unless it takes in external forces, and that the internal force which 
has accumulated external force can then produce novel results. The importance of this 
will become clear over the course of this dissertation. 
The 1756 paper Metaphysicae cum geometria iunctae usus in philosophia naturali, cuius 
specimen I. continet monadologiam physicam, generally known as the Monadologia Physica,  
concentrates on the other aspect of the True Estimation, i.e. the metaphysical substrate of 
a genuine dynamics. One of the important goals of this essay is to reestablish the pan-
elastic conception of nature (AA I: 486-487), this time on the basis of the two core 
powers of impenetrability (later repulsion) and gravity (attraction). Kant may have 
picked up on the fact that Boscovich’s theory allowed for a reintroduction of Leibnizian 
elasticity in nature, thereby allowing for the beneficial aspect of the law of continuity 
that strengthened the causal links within nature. It also provides for a picture of the 
world that is more in line with that of the Nova Dilucidatio, namely of a universe of really 
interacting entities the intrinsic properties of which their responsiveness and resistance 
to external determination and change.  
My concern here has not been to develop a full picture of Kant’s early metaphysical 
physics, but rather to stress a central theme in it that is not often clearly discerned, 
namely that of change. But this theme relates problematically with some other concerns 
of Kant’s. As we saw, Kant was interested in Leibnizian dynamics both for being 
dynamic, and therefore allowing for a contribution of time to physical processes, 
whereas he believed mechanics abstracted from this. On the other hand, he saw that the 
principle of sufficient reason has distinct benefits in guaranteeing the causal and 
intelligible closure of the world. Unfortunately, there is a deep tension between these 
two commitments, because the principle of sufficient reason is often so strong that it no 
longer allows the temporal evolution of a system to make a distinct contribution to the 
 
52 
system and the processes occurring in it, and instead predetermines all states in the 
initial conditions. In the Leibnizian framework, the principle of sufficient reason 
requires all change is fully determined by pre-existing determinations, and not itself a 
source of determinations, which makes it overly deterministic. In considerations on the 
laws of motion, this tension could not really come to the fore. It was rather in Kant’s 
reflections on the genesis of the cosmos and of living systems that it would become 
pertinent. In the next section, I will discuss the tension as it appears in Kant’s 
cosmology, while I will devote the whole of chapter two to the genesis of life. 
1.3 From Cosmogony to Chaosmogony 
1.3.1 The Problem of Cosmogony in Early Modern Science 
In spite of the major role played by astronomy in the formation of what we would now 
be tempted to call modern science, one important aspect of the structure of the 
universe and the heavenly (and terrestrial) bodies remained for ever problematic. 
Indeed, amidst all the debates on the structure of the universe, scientists and 
philosophers rarely touched upon the matter of the genesis of the universe. This is often 
ascribed to the limits imposed by the religious context in Early Modern Europe, namely 
Christian adherence to the narrative of the book Genesis. Any rival account of genesis 
faced the inevitable calumnious charges of heresy. Yet, this explanation, which is firmly 
built on the concept of the Science Wars, overlooks the important philosophical and 
metaphysical challenges this science faced; for on many accounts, genesis was not so 
much heretical as unintelligible. 
This makes it all the more important to take a look at the major exeptions to this 
flawed rule. In fact, the earliest phases of modernity did offer alternative narratives of 
the generation of the universe, in the form of Descartes’s Le Monde and a discussion in 
Pierre Gassendi’s Syntagma Philosophicum. The work by Descartes is the better known and 
more influential, even though it appeared only after his death (in 1662 in a Latin 
translation, in 1664 in the original French), probably at least in part because Descartes 
briefly commented on it in the fifth part of his Discours de la Méthode. There, he 
mentioned the book in which he attempted to present his first reasonably 
comprehensive alternative physics, and said the following of its method of treating its 
great variety of  controversial topics: 
I did not want to bring these matters too much into the open, for I wished to be 
free to say what I thought about them without having either to follow or to refute 
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the accepted opinions of the learned. So I decided to leave our world wholly for 
them to argue about, and to speak solely of what would happen in a new world. I 
therefore supposed that God now created, somewhere in imaginary spaces, 
enough matter to compose such a world; that he variously and randomly agitated 
the different parts of this matter so as to form a chaos as confused as any the 
poets could invent; and that he then did nothing but lend his regular concurrence 
to nature, leaving it to act according to the laws he established. (AA VI: 42; 
Descartes 1985: 132) 
Descartes here presents his account of the construction of the world in Le Monde, a work 
he would never publish himself, as a thought experiment in order to convince people of 
the explanatory potential of his theory. This presentation has often been suggested to 
be disingenuous, and merely an attempt to evade condemnation by the church. In a 
letter of from April 1634 (AT I: 284-289), Descartes intimated to his Paris correspondent 
that he was afraid to publish his Le Monde upon hearing of the condemnation of Galileo, 
with whom he agreed on the validity of Copernicanism. Given this general fear of 
persecution, Descartes is believed to have made an enormous amount of concessions in 
his work to religious authority, thereby frequently hiding his own views behind veils of 
implausible methodology.37 This could lead us to believe that the presentation of the 
narrative of the genesis of the world as but a methodological or literary tool, is merely 
an attempt to mitigate the heretical connotations an alternative to Genesis carries with 
it. I do not find this plausible, however, and want to suggest that there are internal 
reasons why Descartes would not actually want to present his history of the universe as 
a real description. 
First of all, if Descartes seriously believed his thesis to be heretical, he may have 
wanted to surpress it altogether from the Discours de la Méthode as well. On the other 
hand, if he believed presenting it as a mere methodological stance was enough to 
counter the charges of heresy, he could have believed his endorsement of 
Copernicanism could hide under the same shield. It is therefore likely that Descartes did 
not hold his claim regarding the Copernican structure of the universe and the Non-
Biblical Genesis of the universe to be on a par.  
If this is so, we may want to take Descartes at his word when he presents his own 
reasons for adopting this narrative in Le Monde. In particular, it allows him to introduce 
an important picture of the initial state of the universe, of the initial Chaos that reigned 
in it, namely that of an infinite continuous, purely extended matter devoid of the forms 
and qualities postulated by the scholastics, and hence containing “nothing which you do 
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not know so perfectly that you could not even pretend to be ignorant of it.” (AA XI: 35; 
Descartes 1985: 91). In other words, the assumption of a new beginning allows Descartes 
to abstract from the complexities, the formations, the structures upon structures that 
many of his contemporaries considered to be the proper explananda of natural 
philosophy.  
But besides this initial chaos, Descartes assumes two more aspects in the initial state: 
the totality of general laws of physics postulated by God and the articulation of the 
whole of extension in particular bodies through a certain division of motion and rest. 
Descartes then famously seeks to present a picture where the whole order of the visible 
universe arises through the behavior of mere extension as restricted only by the general 
laws of physics. Two important aspects of his narrative are how materials of different 
degrees of rarification are separated into distinct bodies of comparable density, and how 
the solar system is formed through the vortices constituted by the centrifugal forces 
acting upon the circling distinct bodies. Through these steps, Descartes hopes to explain 
primarily how planets are held together despite centrifugal force, and how the relative 
trajectories of heavenly bodies are possible only on assumption of mechanical effects. 
There is however, here as elsewhere, a problem with Descartes’s genetical narrative, 
namely that it either asks too much of the initial conditions, or that it smuggles further 
determinations into them. The first problem is that Descartes seems to allow his general 
laws to do much more structuring work than seems warranted, for it is unclear why the 
world would not have evolved to a giant vortex where all the solid matter revolves 
around the centre and all the aether spirals around it. Moreover, he does not give a 
quantitative account to back up his rather vague fable. The second problem is that 
Descartes’s ordered universe is only possible on the basis of a specific set of initial 
conditions. Thus, God would have had to order the chaos in such a manner that 
specifically this universe and no other (with other planets, and for instance no 
inhabitable ones) resulted from it. We may want to conclude, therefore, that Descartes’s 
fable is more about the legitimacy of mechanical reasoning – which is analogical 
reasoning – than about the origin of the universe, and that its author admits as much by 
stressing that it is merely a fable. Indeed, for Descartes, all we need in order to explain 
reality is a specific geometrical structure and a specific set of general laws – but we 
cannot go about with only a random geometrical structure and a specific set of general 
laws, and hope that the latter will do all the structuring required. 
The implausibility of the Cartesian narrative would soon reveal itself to the learned 
public upon the publication of the third part of Newton’s Principia. In the seminal 
general scholium to his monumental study, Newton attacked once more Descartes 
hypothesis of vortices, and in one and the same move ruled out the possibility of order 
arising out of chaos: 
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The hypothesis of vortices is beset with many difficulties. If, by a radius drawn to 
the sun, each and every planet is to describe areas proportional to the time, the 
periodic times of the parts of the vortex must be as the squares of the distances 
from the sun. If the periodic times of the planets are to be as the 3/2 powers of the 
distances from the sun, the periodic times of the parts of the vortex must be as the 
3/2 powers of the distances. If the smaller vortices revolving about Saturn, 
Jupiter, and the other planets are to be preserved and are to float without 
agitation in the vortex of the sun, the periodic times of the parts of the solar 
vortex must be the same. The axial revolutions of the sun and planets, which 
would have to agree with the motions of their vortices, differ from all these 
proportions. The motions of comets are extremely regular, observe the same laws 
as the eccentric motions into all parts of the heavens, which cannot happen unless 
vortices are eliminated. 
The only resistance which projectiles encounter in our air is from the air. With the 
air removed, as it is in Boyle’s vacuum, resistance ceases, since a tenuous feather 
and solid gold fall with equal velocity in such a vacuum. And the case is the same 
for the celestial spaces, which are above the atmosphere of the earth. All bodies 
must move very freely in these spaces, and therefore plates and comets must 
revolve continually in orbits given in kind and in position, according to the laws 
set forth above. They will indeed persevere in their orbits by the laws of gravity, 
but they certainly could not originally have acquired the regular position of the 
orbits by these laws. (Newton 1999: 939-940) 
Here, Newton argues that the general laws of nature alone could not, contrary to what 
Descartes seems to have argued, brought forth the current harmonic and equilibriated 
celestial system from just any initial configuration of matter. This suggests according to 
him that the configuration of matter (or at the very least the initial conditions of the 
current configuration of matter) need to have been selected specifically for the purpose 
of this harmony of the celestial system. Such a claim crippled the feasibility of a 
scientific treatment of the genesis of the universe, since it is only from highly specific 
initial conditions that the specific structure of the solar system can arise. In making 
astronomy a “proper” science at last, Newton had also relegated cosmology to the status 
of empty theorizing or mere storytelling. 
1.3.2 Newtonian Cosmology? Nomology and Analogy 
Despite Newton’s authoritative dissuasion of rational cosmology, several thinkers of the 
High Enlightenment would venture into this hazardous discipline, undeterred by the 
warnings of one of the major Lumières. The reason for this is undoubtedly the context of 
the Scholium Generale, which starts off with a sustained piece of natural theology. From 
the constatation that the order of the universe could not have arisen otherwise than in 
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a single moment, Newton inferred that: “This most elegant system of the sun, planets 
and comets could not have arisen without the design and dominion of an intelligent and 
powerful being” (Newton 1999: 940). This pairing of the argument for constancy with 
that for intelligent creation would become an important force on the continent, for 
instance in Voltaire’s 1738 Élémens de la Philosophie de Newton: 
The whole of Newton’s philosophy leads necessarily to the knowledge of a 
supreme being, who has created and arranged everything freely. For, if the world 
is finite, if there is a void, then matter does not exist necessarily, and has 
therefore received its existence from a free cause. If matter gravitates, as has been 
demonstrated, it does not seem to gravitate of itself, since it is extended of itself. 
Therefore, it has received gravity from God. If the planets revolve in one sense 
rather than another, in non-resistant space, the hand of the creator has thus 
directed their paths with absolute liberty. (Voltaire 1782 : 18; my translation) 
Voltaire does not hesitate to indicate that Newton’s resistence to Descartes’s conception 
of the universe is invaluable in the battle against atheism, specifically Spinozism. Even 
though he believes Descartes himself to be  innocent of this charge, he notes that 
[t]he Cartesian system has produced that of Spinoza . […] I have known many 
whom Cartesianism has led to admit no other God than the immensity of things, 
and I have on the contrary seen no Newtonian who was not theist in the most 
rigourous sense. 
From the moment on that one is persuaded, with Descartes, that it is impossible 
that the world be finite, that motion is always preserved in the same quantity ; 
from the moment on that one dares say, give me movement and matter and I’ll 
give you a world; then these ideas seem to exclude, by valid inferences, the idea of 
a sole infinite being, a sole author of movement, a sole author of the organization 
of substances. (Voltaire 1782: 18-19; my translation) 
It is the threat of Deism, of Materialism, of Mechanicism, of Spinozism, of Atheism, 
terms which turn out to be curiously equipollent in the mouths of many, that Voltaire 
seeks to combat by invoking Newton’s great scientific achievement. This achievement, 
Voltaire seems to say, implies that God is both the source of movement and the source 
of the organization, of the arrangement of matter in the universe. He contrasts this with 
the view he ascribes to Descartes, namely that God need only be the source of 
movement in the universe, and that the universal laws of the translation of movement 
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would suffice to bring about, from any initial arrangement of manner, the current 
harmonious structure of the world.38 
Yet, Voltaire’s idea that the belief in the productive force of the laws of nature leads 
automatically to Deism and Atheism, would draw the criticism of his rival in the 
divulgence of continental Newtonianism: Maupertuis. In spite of his championship of 
Newton in many things, Maupertuis does not hesitate to discount Newton’s infamous 
proof in his 1750 Essai de Cosmologie: 
The alternative of a choice or an extreme coincidence is founded only on 
Newton’s impotence to give a physical cause for this uniformity. For other 
philosophers who let planets move in a fluid that drags them along, or that merely 
moderates their movement, the uniformity of their paths does not appear 
inexplicable at all. It no longer presupposes this singular coincidence or this 
choice, and no longer proves the existence of God any more than any other 
movement imprinted upon matter would. (Maupertuis 1768a: 9; my translation) 
This is not to say that Maupertuis regards himself any less warranted to assume the 
existence of a higher being than the orthodox Newtonian. But instead of seeing the 
proof for his existence in the complex phenomena that result from the laws of nature, 
he sees it in the simplicity and the universality of the laws themselves (Maupertuis 
1768a: 23). The difference here is between two conceptions of the hand of God. 
According to Voltaire, the existence and power of God is proved by the impotence of 
nature to produce the variety of harmonious effects occurring in it. According to 
Maupertuis, God’s wisdom and power is instead proved by his ability to create a world 
that is itself productive and can produce complex and harmonious effects merely 
through general principles and laws, without having to interfere in the specific 
configuration of matter. 
Maupertuis’ more radical perspective on the productivity of nature, and therefore on 
the possibility of a scientific cosmogony, was shared by Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon. 
In the first discourses of his monumental Histoire Naturelle, Buffon presented both an 
iconoclastic methodology and an audacious theory on the evolution and formation of 
the solar system and the physical geography of the world. He ventured to formulate a 
theory of these controversial theories, however, only because he believed himself to be 
in the possession of an epistemology that allowed for qualifications. Indeed, instead of 
extolling the great synthesis of mathematics and physics that characterized the course 
of 17th century science, Buffon pointed towards the dangers of extending this method 
beyond its original domain, and separated mathematical and physical “truth”: 
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There are several species of truth, and it is customary to place the truths of 
mathematics in the highest order. However, these are but definitional truths 
which pertain to simple, though abstract, axioms, and all truths of this kind are 
but composite, yet always abstract, consequences of these definitions. […] There is 
therefore nothing in this science other than that which we have placed in it 
ourselves, and the truths which we draw from it cannot be anything other than 
different expressions of the axioms that we have employed  - so mathematical 
truths are but exact repetitions of its definitions or axioms. […] 
Physical truths, on the other hand, are never arbitrary and never depend on us. 
Instead of being grounded in the axioms we laid down, they rest only on facts. A 
sequence of similar facts, or, if you will, a frequent repetition and uninterrupted 
succession of the same events, is the essence of physical truth : that which we call 
a physical truth is therefore but a probability, but a probability so great that it 
equals a certainty. (Buffon 1749a: 54-55 ; my translation) 
In these passages and those that follow them, Buffon sketches an anti-mathematical 
empiricism that believes mathematics to be certain but trivial and hence barren, and 
physics to be essentially association through resemblences and analogies that ultimately 
fails to yield actual causes, and hence gives us at best probabilities, however great these 
probabilities may be. Nonetheless, Buffon believes the two can be fruitfully applied to 
each other, albeit only in very limited cases. His sole example of such a limiting case 
should not come as a surprise: 
The most beautiful and fortunate such application that anyone has ever made, is 
to the system of the world; and it has to be admitted that, if Newton had given us 
only the physical ideas of his system, without having supported them with precise 
evaluations and mathematics, they would not have had nearly the same force. But 
at the same time we must realize that there are very few subjects so simple, that is 
to say, so bereft of physical qualities, than that one, since the distance between 
planets is so great that we can consider them with regard to each other as simply 
being points. We can also, at the same time, without erring, abstract from all 
physical qualities of the planets, and consider only their force of attraction. 
Furthermore, their movements are the most regular that we know, and exhibit no 
slowing due to resistance. All this taken together makes the explanation of the 
system of the world a mathematical problem, which requires only a fortunate 
physical idea to be realized. This idea is that the force that makes thing fall 
towards the surface of the earth, could very well be the same as that which keeps 
the moon in its orbit. (Buffon 1749a : 58-60) 
Buffon seems convinced that for most inquiries into nature, the approach typical of 
mathematical physics will prove unfruitful or unpracticable or both. He explains the 
success of mathematical physics not by the universal applicability and desirability of its 
method, but rather by the physical and theoretical simplicity of the systems it 
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considers. Here we see a first version of the idea that classical mechanics is tailored to 
an overly simple universe, and fails from the moment we seek to apply it to more 
complicated problems. Buffon makes these claims in the preliminary discourse to a 
work that is mainly on natural history, that is to say, the study of what we would now 
call biological systems and their closest analogues in nature. He thereby submits that, in 
the case of these latter systems, mathematical physics will only lead us astray, and cause 
us to overlook the complexity of the phenomenon in our quest for abstraction. For him, 
a proper method must seek to grasp this complexity, and reason through actual effects 
and causes in order to acquire a theory, the probability of which can then he estimated 
mathematically. 
But the first discourses of the Histoire Naturelle are not on living systems, but on the 
genesis of the celestial system and of the geological and geographical composition of the 
world. Buffon justifies his theorizing in those tracts by noting that, in the former 
problem, we are dealing with a very limited amount of basic forces exerted on simple 
mechanical systems (Buffon 1749a: 131), and in the latter, we have an abundance of 
evidence at our disposal (Buffon 1749a: 68). Even then, however, complications 
inevitably arise, such as the complexity of the solar system, and the origin of the 
original velocity of the planets used to explain their velocity. In spite of, or perhaps 
because of their boldness, the major cosmogonies of the mid-eighteenth century 
remained vague and sketchy in their conjectures. They failed to show how exactly such 
general forces would give rise to a harmonic world system, thereby seeming to beg the 
question against those who remained skeptical until the vagueness was completely 
dispelled. 
1.3.3 Time and Teleology 
It is far from a coincidence that, in the 1750s, Kant wrote a work of conjectural 
cosmogony titled Universal natural history and theory of the heavens or essay on the 
constitution and the mechanical origin of the whole universe according to Newtonian principles. 
In this essay, published in 1755, he attempted, like Buffon, to present a scientific 
explanation of the structure and origin of the solar system, and, like Buffon, he remarks 
that it is because of the generality of the laws of physics and the simplicity of spherical 
bodies like planets as a guarantee that such an attempt has a chance at succeeding (AA I: 
229). The parallels with Buffon are far from coincidental, since the work of the French 
natural historian has been noted as a major influence on Kant throughout his life, 
especially in the 1750s (Mensch 2013: 59). 
Like Buffon and Maupertuis, moreover, the overt Newtonianism is balanced by a 
more Cartesian conception of a decent cosmology. As William Shay (1986: 105) noted, 
“Kant's cosmology is more in the spirit of Descartes' Principia Philosophica [sic] than 
 
60 
Newton's Principia Mathematica. The chain of reasoning is not held together by rigorous 
mathematical links but by appeals to analogies”. This should not be a surprise, since we 
already saw in 1.1.2. that Kant is more properly understood within the tradition of 
natural philosophy in which Descartes and Leibniz figured than as placed in the more 
straightforwardly scientific tradition in which we can place Newton. Thus, Kant is not so 
much in the business of providing a mathematical cosmology rivalling that of Newton, 
as of showing, like Maupertuis and Buffon, that on Newtonian principles, the genesis of 
the universe according to general laws, could occur, contrary to Newton’s own 
insistence. 
There are several reasons why Kant believes, or could have believed, himself to be 
entitled to analogical reasoning in such an account. First, like Buffon, Kant seems to 
have believed that mathematical infallibility can never be demanded of a treatise of this 
kind. If the system is based on analogies and harmonies in accordance with the rules of 
credibility and a correct way of thinking, it has satisfied all the requirements of its 
object. (AA I: 235) Second, the reasoning from analogy seems justified, as Shay (1986: 
106) has stressed, by the principle of continuity, which allows us to regard otherwise 
distinct phenomena as sharing important properties.39 Finally, Kant’s analogical 
argument can suffice for the present purpose because, as Eric Schliesser (2013: 426) has 
indicated, he needn’t show how Newtonian principles give rise to the current world, but 
only that they can do so. Like Descartes, and like Buffon and Maupertuis, all Kant 
requires is a “how plausibly” account, not a real account, to weaken Newton’s radical 
conclusion of divine design. 
If we want to assess Kant’s approach here, we must turn to his account in the work 
itself, the explanandum of which is the “systematic constitution of the universe”: 
Actually, all the planets and comets that belong to our universe constitute a 
system simply because they orbit around a common central body. But I take this 
term in a narrower meaning in that I consider the more precise relationships that 
have made their connection to one another regular and uniform. The orbits of the 
planets relate as closely as possible to a common plane, namely to the extended 
equatorial plane of the Sun; the deviation from this rule occurs only at the 
outermost border of the system, where all motions gradually cease. If, therefore, a 
certain number of heavenly bodies that are arranged around a common central 
point and move around this, are simultaneously restricted to a certain plane in 
such a way that they have the freedom to deviate from it to either side only as 
little as possible; if such a deviation occurs gradually only in those that are most 
remote from the centre point and thus participate less in the relationships than 
 
                                                     
39
 In 5.4.1, we will see this connection of the principle of continuity with that of analogy, and the necessity of 
analogy, resurface in Kant’s discussion of the principle of reflective judgment. 
 
 61 
the others: then, I say, that these bodies are related to each other in a systematic 
constitution. (AA I: 246) 
In the first part of the Universal Natural History, Kant attempts to show, by reasoning 
from analogy with the available astronomical data, that “[t]he fixed stars, as we know, 
all relate to a common plane and thus constitute an orderly whole, which is a world of 
worlds. One can see that in the immeasurable distances, there are more such star 
systems, and that creation in the entire infinite scope of its size is everywhere 
systematic and interrelated”, and speculates “that these higher orders of worlds are not 
without connection to one another and that, through this mutual relationship, they 
constitute in turn an even more immeasurable system” (AA I: 255). But besides 
reasoning through analogy, there is another principle which allows him to entertain 
this hypothesis: “[i]f the parts of nature are observed according to intentions and a 
discovered plan, certain properties are revealed that would otherwise be overlooked 
and remain hidden if our observation is spread over all other objects without any 
guidance” (AA I: 255). This additional guiding principle is teleological, in that it states 
that we must look to the universe with an eye for systematicity in order to appreciate 
its constitution. Besides systematicity, however, Kant points towards infinity as a 
feature brought to light by a teleological perspective on nature: 
The theory we have put forward opens a perspective onto the infinite field of 
creation for us and presents some inkling of God’s work that is appropriate to the 
infinitude of the great architect. […] We see the first members of a progressive 
relationship of worlds and systems, and the first part of this infinite progression 
already gives us to understand what we can suppose about the whole. There is no 
end here but rather an abyss of a true immeasurability into which all capacity of 
human concepts sinks even if it is raised with the help of mathematics. The 
wisdom, goodness, the power that has revealed itself, is infinite and in the same 
measure fruitful and industrious; the plan of its revelation must for that reason be 
as infinite and without limits as it is. (AA I 255-256) 
The universe is characterized, besides by its systematicity, by an immeasurability that 
challenges our conceptual grasp. In chapter 7, I will show that this tension between the 
systematicity and the immeasurableness of nature are fundamental to the doctrine of 
the sublime in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. But now we must first see how Kant 
believes such an orderly yet immeasurable universe to be able to come into existence at 
all. 
Like Descartes before him, Kant begins by assuming that the universe was chaotic at 
its inception, and that the materials out of which the heavenly bodies exist were 
distributed evenly over the space now occupied by the systems in which they are 
organized. But just as Kant has described this initial state, where the universe is “as raw, 
as unformed as possible” (AA I: 263), he goes on to add a non-trivial caveat: 
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However, even in the essential properties of the elements that make up chaos, the 
characteristic of that perfection can be felt that they have from their origin, in 
that their essence is a consequence of the eternal idea of divine reason. The 
simplest, the most universal properties that appear to have been designed without 
any intention, matter that seems to be merely passive and in need of forms and 
arrangement, has, in its simplest state, an endeavour to form itself into a more 
perfect state by a natural development. However, the difference in the kinds of 
elements contributes the greatest part to the regulation of nature and the 
formation from chaos by which the state of rest that would prevail under a 
universal equality among the dispersed elements, is eliminated and the chaos in 
the points of the more strongly attracting particles begin to form. (AA I: 263-264) 
In this passage, Kant admits that two additional elements are needed to get order out of 
chaos, i.e. to have a universe evolve from a different configuration to its current 
harmonious and systematic one. The first of these elements is that matter cannot be 
merely passive, but must instead be admitted to have an internal endeavor to form and 
articulate itself even in its most simple state. This first suggestion echoes the True 
Estimation, where Kant suggested that we must postulate some internal force in the body 
undergoing change in order to understand how, over time, it comes to acquire 
properties that were not fully in its initial conditions. Initially, we might take Kant’s talk 
of essential forces and sources of life as merely metaphorical, given that he may very 
well be talking about the force of attraction, since he passes to a description of the 
formation of lumps of matter around the more dense elements. But these lumps “would, 
after they had completed their formation, remain at rest and eternally unmoving 
because of the equality of attraction” (AA I: 264). Kant resolves this problem by 
attributing, besides the attractive force, a repulsive force to nature, which “by [its] 
conflict with the attractive force, bring[s] about that motion that is, as it were, a 
continuous life in nature” (AA I: 265). He suggests, then, that the universe can be 
understood to be dynamic and genetically productive if we understand matter as subject 
to two opposing internal forces, and not just as a ragdoll being tossed about by external, 
mechanical forces. 
But Kant adds that another thing is needed for the emergence of order of out of 
chaos, and thereby reveals that his initial state of chaos of passive matter is not quite as 
chaotic as it appeared to be. In fact, Kant denies that the universe could be, in its initial 
state, homogeneous, since this would make it impossible for any motion to occur. If 
matter were homogeneous and evenly distributed in an infinite space, the mutual 
attraction between all elements would keep the whole universe in a static equilibrium. 
The initial state of Kant’s universe, however, is one of heterogeneous matter, whereby a 
variety of kinds of elements each have different intensional properties: “[i]n a space 
filled in such a way, universal rest lasts only a moment. The elements have essential 
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forces to put each other into motion and they are a source of life for themselves” (AA I: 
264).  
In his stipulation of the initial state of the universe, Kant shows himself very 
sensitive to the challenges to any physical cosmogony, understood as a theory of the 
genesis of a universe that is orderly rather than chaotic. One of these challenges is that 
a homogeneous initial state will never of itself become dynamic: it will remain forever 
in a state of static equilibrium. The other is that the principle of change invoked should 
not have as effect an evolution towards a state of static equilibrium. In order to get 
systematicity and dynamics into our universe, we have to stipulate it as somehow 
already present in the initial state. On second thought, then, Kant’s initial chaos is not 
all that chaotic: it is already replete with the orderliness and productive force that it 
should itself give rise to.  
There is also another way in which the universe presented here is not homogeneous: 
it has a center, in casu a center of gravity. As Kant himself writes:  
It is certainly true that in an infinite space, no point can properly have the 
prerogative of being called the centre point; but by means of a certain relationship 
that is based on the essential degrees of the density of the original material, 
according to which, at its creation, this is initially more densely concentrated at a 
particular place and increases in its dispersion with distance from that place, such 
a point can have the prerogative of being called the centre point and it actually 
becomes through the formation of the central mass of the strongest attraction 
therein, to which all the remaining elementary matter that is in the process of 
coalescing into particular formations descends and thereby, however far the 
evolution of nature might extend, makes just a single system out of the whole of 
the universe in the infinite sphere of creation. (AA I: 312) 
As this picture progresses, the Kantian universe slowly loses its chaotic, homogeneous, 
random nature, and becomes one which was structured, in advance, to yield the kind of 
orderly universe in which we live. It is topologically heterogeneous, since it has a 
common centre of gravity. It is chemically heterogenous, because it consists of a wide 
variety of elements with different properties (most importantly, different specific 
masses). Finally, it is characterized by a duality of general principles that counteract 
each other’s homogenizing and equilibriating effects. With these stipulations, Kant 
shows himself eminently aware of the fact that physics itself leads us to marvel over the 
specificity of the universe, such that it could have led to the dynamic orderly pattern 
that it is today. In this realization, he agrees with Albert Einstein, for whom the 
cosmological problem was so vexing.  
This raises the following question: does Kant’s account of the genesis of the universe 
still invoke teleology, or is it another species of the atheism, spinozism and 
epicureanism that Voltaire identified as the logical outcome of the idea of mechanical 
genesis? That Kant was aware of this difficulty is evinced by the fact that Kant repeats, 
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at two occasions in the preface, Voltaire’s phrase “give me motion and matter, and I’ll 
make you a world”, and that he presented it as a possible charge of epicureanism on 
each of those occasions. Against this charge, he advances two arguments that are to be 
expected in the light of Maupertuis’ Essai de Cosmologie. The first is that he believes 
himself to be expressing great esteem for the omnipotence of God in stating that with 
mere matter and motion he can allow order to arise out of initial chaos (AA I: 228). The 
idea is that Newton and Voltaire commit lèse-majesté when they suggest that God could 
not have created a genuinely productive nature. The other is that he merely adopts a 
different picture of teleology. Recently, Martin Schönfeld (2000: 98) has argued against 
the wide-spread view that the Universal Natural History is an anti-teleological work. His 
basic claim is that Kant’s teleology is of a radically different nature from that of many of 
his predecessors and contemporaries, since it is anti-anthropocentric, but that it is 
nonetheless a form of teleology, and Huneman (2008: 93) has equally noted that Kant’s 
early teleology is of a different kind than Newton’s. This argument, however, does not 
yet figure importantly in the Universal Natural History, and becomes apparent only in the 
passage of a 1763 paper where he revisits the teleological implications of his own earlier 
work: 
If we discover an arrangement in nature, which seems to have been instituted for 
a special purpose, since the general properties of matter on their own could not 
have produced such an order, then we regard this provision as contingent and as 
the product of choice. Now, if new harmony, order and usefulness should make 
their appearance, along with mediating causes especially instituted to produce 
these effects, then we judge them in the same way to be contingent and the 
product of choice. This connection is quite alien to the nature of the things of 
themselves. They stand in this harmonious relation simply because someone has 
chosen to connect them in this way. No general cause can be adduced to explain 
the sheathed character, that is to say, the retractability of the claws of the cat, the 
lion and the so on. The only explanation which can be given is that a Creator has 
ordered them in this way, with a view to protecting them from wear, for these 
animals must have implements suitable for seizing and retaining their prey. But 
suppose that matter has certain properties of a more general character, which in 
addition to producing certain benefits which may be construed as their raison 
d’être, are also particularly suited to producing even more harmony, and doing so 
without the least provision being made to bring it about. Suppose that a simple 
law, which is universally agreed to be necessary for the production of a certain 
good, also produces fruitful effects in many other ways as well. Suppose that a 
simple law was the source of further usefulness and harmoniousness, not by art, 
but rather of necessity. And suppose, finally, that this should hold throughout the 
whole of material nature. If all this were supposed, then there would obviously 
inhere in the very essence of things themselves universal relations to unity and 
cohesiveness, and a universal harmony would extend throughout the realm of 
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possibility itself. Such a state of affairs would fill us with admiration for such 
extensive adaptedness and natural harmony. Adaptedness and natural harmony 
such as this, although rendering punctilious and forced art superfluous, can 
nonetheless never themselves be ascribed to chance. It rather indicates that there 
is a unity to be found in the possibilities of things themselves: it suggests that the 
essences of all things are without exception dependent upon one single ground. 
(AA II: 96-97) 
Kant suggests here that the real opposition is not between teleology and chance or 
necessity, but rather between the anthropocentric or anthropomorphic teleology that 
expects all harmonious arrangement to be directly intentionally designed, for instance 
by the hand of God, and a natural teleology which regards nature as such a unity and 
productive structure that it can give rise to harmony. In chapter 4, we will see that this 
contrast between intentional and non-intentional teleology emerges as well in the 
Critique of the Power of Judgment¸and in chapter 5 we will see why Kant still insists on 
calling “purposive” the unitary structure of nature and its various laws. 
But the passage just quoted differs from Kant’s position in the Universal Natural History 
in suggesting that the structure of organisms too might be the product of such a 
productive nature. In the Universal Natural History, Kant still denied that more complex 
entities, organisms in particular, can be explained on the mechanical grounds posited 
here (AA I: 230). In the next chapter, we will see how Kant’s views on the genesis and 
generation of animals evolved such that he could regard them as genuinely naturally 
generated and produced rather than intentionally designed by God. 
1.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that in Kant’s early engagement with the natural sciences, 
he was already concerned with the limitations of Newtonian mechanics and Leibnizian 
dynamics rather than with celebrating the victory of either of these evolutions in the 
natural sciences. In this conclusion, I will try to spell out more explicitly what these 
limitations are. Both the True Estimation and the Universal Natural History seem concerned 
with the following problem: how can we attribute a genuine dynamic nature to the 
universe given the constraints of physical interaction. The problem can be elaborated as 
follows: the rigour of both Newtonian mechanics and Leibnizian dynamics seems to lie 
in the strict connection they postulate between the initial state and the subsequent 
state. I have tried to show that Kant was dissatisfied with Leibnizian dynamics because it 
did not allow for actual change in the universe, and pushed instead for an account that 
could allow for genuine change to occur in a universe that is physically intelligible. I 
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have also argued that a similar problem arose in the Universal Natural History, where 
Kant sought to demonstrate that a Newtonian system need not be made of one piece, 
but can form itself over time from another system. It is important, however, that Kant 
remained aware of the rationale behind both Leibniz’ and Newton’s ideas. This rationale 
was that in fact, there are substantial constraints on the creative power of physical 
nature. It remains impossible to get order to arise from chaos. If it seems as if Kant is 
denying this latter statement, it is because his chaos is not ours: it is a very structured 
chaos indeed. In the Universal Natural History, it becomes clear that the problem of the 
constraints on the productive force of nature relates to the problem of teleology. After 
all, if the universe can give rise to order, to complexity, only if it already contains a 
great deal of order complexity, then its productive capacities are already highly 
determined at its inception. Secondly, Kant argues, in both works, that we must ascribe 
more powers to nature if we want to understand how it can be genuinely productive. In 
the True Estimation, he postulates an internal force that is capable of internalizing 
externally impressed forces in order to produce effects that were not already fully 
included in the causes. In the Universal Natural History, he stresses that matter cannot be 
merely passive, and must be endowed with internal striving forces in order to be 
capable of generating harmony out of chaos. These reflections must remain vague until 
they are applied to a domain where they can become clear-cut. This domain is that of 
the genesis of living beings, where the problem is pushed to its extremes in the idea of 
equifinality. An equifinal process is a process that leads to the same outcome in spite of 
(a specific range of) differences to the initial state. It should not come as a surprise, 
therefore, that in subsequent phases of Kant’s thought, the problem of animal 
generation became more and more central. 
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Chapter 2  
Epigenesis  and the Dynamic Nature of Life: 
Kant’s Theory of Generation 
L'emblème antique qui représente la vie par un cercle 
formé par un serpent qui se mord la queue donne une 
image assez juste des choses. En effet, dans les 
organismes complexes, l'organisme de la vie forme bien 
un cercle fermé, mais un cercle qui a une tête et une 
queue 
- Claude Bernard 
In the previous chapter, I have argued that even in Kant’s engagement with physics, the 
problem of teleology was of central importance, mostly insofar as it is connected with 
the problem of the genesis and development of structured systems. This problem for 
early modern science has been usually discussed not in connection with physics, but 
with the life sciences, more specifically the theory of generation. In this chapter, I will 
argue that Kant developed, over the course of several decades, his own version of the 
theory of epigenesis in response to the problem of the genesis of structured systems. I 
will be arguing against the now wide-spread assessment that Kant was ultimately 
committed more to a mitigated form of preformationism rather than epigenesis, and 
that he therefore denied the epigenesist stress on historical development as truly 
productive of novelty rather than merely a series of occasions for the expression, of 
preestablished, innate principles. In section 2.1, I present the view against which I will 
be arguing. My argument takes two phases. In section 2.2, I argue against the idea that 
Kant faced a dilemma between epigenesis and preformation, and for the idea that he 
was faced with three options rather than two. I present these three options in 
subsections 2.2.1, 2.2.2 and 2.2.3. In subsection 2.2.4, I present the revival of epigenesis 
in Kant’s own time. In section 2.3, I argue that Kant is already best understood as an 
epigenesist in his pre-critical period, both in his 1763 book (2.3.1) and his 1770s essays 
(2.3.2), and that his preformationist language there is subservient to the idea of 
epigenesis as that of the natural productivity of life. In section 2.4, I argue that this 
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position remained stable throughout the critical period. In 2.4.1, I argue that we cannot 
take Kant’s rejection of Herder’s version of epigenesis to be a refusal of epigenesis 
altogether, because Kant believed that some internal constraints must be placed on the 
genetic force. This position also allows us to explain, in 2.4.2, Kant’s endorsement of 
epigenesis in the Critique of the Power of Judgment and its description there as “generic 
preformationism” . I conclude by listing the main features of the Kantian theory of 
epigenesis. 
2.1 Kant and Early Modern Theories of Generation 
The early modern debate between proponents of the rival theories of generation 
commonly known as preformationism and epigenesis has usually been viewed as a 
species of the larger recurrent debate between mechanist and vitalist approaches to life. 
This assumption appears, amongst others, in the image of Canguilhem’s pendulum: 
biological theory reveals itself to be a thinking that throughout its history has 
been divided and oscillating. Mechanism and Vitalism confront one another on 
the problem of structures and functions; Discontinuity and Continuity on the 
problem of the succession of forms; Preformation and Epigenesis on the problem 
of the development of a being; Atomicity and Totality on the problem of 
individuality. (Canguilhem, 2008, p. 61) 
It is unclear from this passage whether Canguilhem himself believes these different 
dichotomies to map neatly onto each other.1 But the enumeration and the parallelism 
suggests that he at least realizes many have thought this to be so. In the more recent 
literature, the assimilation of the preformationism-epigenesis debate to the mechanism-
vitalism debate has only become more apparent. Shirley Roe (1981) and Jane 
 
                                                     
1 The main reason for my doubt here is the position of the dichotomy between discontinuity and continuity, 
since it is far from obvious that continuity is always on the side totality and vitality. In fact, throughout 
history, continuity and discontinuity have been associated, in different periods and even in different theories 
of the same period, with opposite implications and characteristics. In early modernity, continuity suggested 
panorganicism to some, whereas it was proof for materialism to others. I suspect, however, that Canguilhem 
might be thinking primarily of the debate between mutationism and Darwinism around the turn of the 19th 
and 20th centuries, where mutationism was regarded as defending sudden formal change whereas Darwinism 
stressed the primacy of functional restrictions. But the choice between structure and function as the major 
motor of speciation does not necessarily prejudice one towards either continuity or discontinuity. 
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Maienschein (2000) have offered such an interpretation, the outline of which is the 
following: 
The structure of a living system is deemed, by most early modern thinkers, too 
complex to be formable through mechanical means alone - “through mechanical means 
alone” meaning, of course, through mechanical processes involving essentially inert 
matter. Resolving the problem of generation subsequently prompts a choice between 
two positions: 
 
1) Epigenesis, which maintains that the complex structure is formed gradually from 
more homogeneous matter, but that this process of formation is guided by a 
certain principle that may be either immaterial (as in vitalism as classically 
construed) or a property of the matter employed in generation (which is 
therefore no longer taken to be inert – this position amounts to hylozoism or vital 
materialism). 
 
2) Preformationism, which holds fast to mechanical principles, and denies instead 
that the structure of the living system is genuinely formed during generation. It is 
important to realize that Preformationism does not necessarily require the 
preexisting structure to be a miniature of the generated structure. It does, 
however, require the preexisting structure to be as complex as the generated 
structure and to be able to yield the latter through mechanical transformations 
alone. 
 
The early modern theorist of life must therefore either deny genuine formation and 
accept preformation, or abandon mechanist materialism and accept epigenesis. 
This picture is distorted because it takes both positions to agree essentially on the 
fact that the generated structure must in some sense be pregiven, and to disagree only 
on whether and in what sense it must be pregiven materially. Its advocates may be 
motivated by the much later discovery of a material element – an acid, to be precise – 
believed to be endowed with a guiding structural property – the “information” of the 
“sequence” – to lie at the basis of the process of generation. This discovery is believed to 
resolve the ancient dilemma by doing justice to the core intuitions of both positions: the 
fact of genuine generation and the material preexistence of structure. Jason Scott 
Robert (2004: 37-38) has called the view that the discovery of DNA yielded a synthesis of 
sorts between epigenesis and preformationism the “modern consensus”. It can be 
discerned in authors as diverse and divergent as Jacques Monod (1970: 117), Ernst Mayr 
(Mayr 1977: 157-158) and Stephen J. Gould (1977: 8-19).  
The idea that epigenesis and preformation ultimately converge is also nourished by 
the fact that some have taken them to address distinct concerns, with epigenesis 
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seeking to offer a description of the perceivable formation of a living structure, and 
preformationism seeking to explain this formation. Detlefsen (2006), for instance, claims 
that in the paradigmatic case of the Haller-Wolff-debate, Wolff’s epigenesis moves 
considerably towards a preformationist position the moment it seeks to accommodate 
the desire for an explanation rather than a mere description of formation. 
It is not clear, however, that the modern synthesis is a genuine compromise between 
the opposing positions. First of all, many authors are only tempted to regard it as non-
preformationist because they identify preformationism with its naivest versions. As 
noted above, it need not be the case that the preformed structure is a miniature of the 
end-product, since most preformationists allow for transformations to occur during the 
process of development. Secondly, one can be tempted to regard the information of the 
DNA as the guiding principle, but this is notoriously problematic, since it tends to 
overstretch the proper meaning of the physical and mathematical notion of 
information, and give it quasi-intentional connotations.  
I believe, along with for instance Susan Oyama (2000: 28-35), that the modern 
consensus is merely a mitigated preformationism. This explains, for instance, the fact 
that preformationism has been rehabilitated in recent years, and even regarded as an 
adumbration2 of our current best theories, for instance by Clara Pinto-Correia, who 
writes: 
The belief in the preprogrammed encasement of successive generations was the 
centerpiece of preformation. However, the organization of that encasement 
underwent several revisions. In the course of a century (from the mid-1600s to the 
mid-1700s), preformationist theories evolved from totally preformed persons to 
pre-existing fundamental parts. In its final forms, the theory came one step shy of our 
current models in developmental biology. But that step, in the context of the time, was 
impossible to take. (Pinto-Correia 1997: 8)  
That this view has, in turn, determined our reading of Kant, is clear from the following 
passage from the end of Pinto-Correia’s book: 
Newly found systems such as the wnt and TRK pathways certainly show the ‘truth’ 
of epigenetic interactions on a more than descriptive level. But no one doubts that 
these molecules are genetically determined and placed in the appropriate cells 
through interactions of enhancers and transcription factors encoded by the 
 
                                                     
2 The pun here is intended: throughout her book, Pinto-Correia uses a preformationist theory of the history of 
ideas to analyze the history of preformationism. In her own words: “human ideas are always the children of 
pre-existing ideas […] whenever a new thought surfaces in someone’s mind, it has to be a metamorphic form; a 
result of the continual rearranging and reconfiguring always going on deep within our mental subsoil, upon 
layer upon layer of sediment.” (Pinto-Correia 1997: 5) 
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‘preformed’ genome. Kant and Blumenbach had already foreseen something like 
this, but we are still unpacking Wilson's 1925 notion that ontogenesis is a 
cytoplasmatic epigenesis underlain by a nuclear preformationism. (Pinto-Correia 
1997: 310) 
Pinto-Correia is not alone in this assessment of Kant as endorsing a middle way between 
preformation and epigenesis. In the early 2000s, Philip Sloan (2002) and John Zammito 
(2003) argued that Kant’s usage of the term epigenesis to describe his own theory of 
generation should not be taken at face value. Instead, they believe Kant evolved from an 
unequivocally preformationist position, which he held in the 1760s, 1770s and early 
1780s, to a position which was a middle way between epigenesis and preformation from 
the mid-1780s onwards. This reading is consequential because it has serious 
implications for the interpretation of Kant’s use of terminology from the theory of 
generation in his philosophy of history and his epistemology, as we will see in chapter 3. 
In this chapter, I will argue against Sloan and Zammito that Kant is best understood 
as endorsing epigenesis from the early 1760s onwards, and to view all later texts and 
elaborations on the topic as a further development of the position he envisaged early on 
in his career. I will do so by arguing that Kant is badly understood as having to choose 
between epigenesis and preformation, because, as I will show in section 2.2., to Kant and 
his contemporaries there were three major alternative groups of theories available to 
them: epigenesis, preformation and metamorphosis. This will allow me to identify the 
proper targets of Kant’s criticism and praise in matters of embryology.  I will also show 
that Kant’s allegedly unambiguous endorsement of preformation in his early career is 
nothing of the kind, by developing, in section 2.3., a reading of these early works 
according to which they are thoroughly epigenesist. Finally, I will show, in section 2.4. 
that Kant’s critical version of epigenesis is precisely that: a critical version of epigenesis. 
I will argue there that what Sloan and Zammito have taken to be an ambiguous 
endorsement of epigenesis is in fact meant to be a sensible version of epigenesis, the 
only reticence being that required by the epistemological stance that is transcendental 
idealism. 
2.2 Structure and Genesis in Early Modern Theories of 
Generation 
In this section, I will sketch an alternative picture of the Early Modern debate on animal 
generation. In the first place, I will argue that is inadequate to present the debate as 
between two positions, namely epigenesis and preformationism. This idea of a 
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dichotomy between the two positions has led many authors to identify a variety of 
alternative forms of either theory. It is, for instance, common to argue that there is a 
distinction between mechanicist and more vitalist or vital materialist versions of 
epigenesis. On the other hand, some authors distinguish between two versions of 
preformation, one according to which the living system has been structured from all 
times, and one according to which it is merely rapidly formed directly before or directly 
after conception. The peculiarity is that, according to such a schema, there are theories 
of generation that are epigenesist in some respects and preformationist in others. I will 
argue that this problem can be resolved by recognizing that these so-called 
intermediate positions are actually an autonomous third position, which I call, after 
William Harvey, metamorphosis.  
Second, I will present this triad of preformation-metamorphosis-epigenesis as a 
trichotomy because each position entails a different answer to the problem of animal 
generation. This problem is that of explaining, or making intelligible, how the highly 
complex and (in the language of the time) contrived structure of living systems can 
come into being, given that any such account seems to involve a regress to a structure 
explaining such a structure. We will see that epigenesists respond to this regress by 
proposing that generation involves circularity, that preformationism takes recourse to a 
linear infinite regress, and that metamorphosists attempt to find a level at which the 
explanation can reasonably bottom out. In the course of explaining this, I hope to also 
explain why these positions can sometimes be mistaken for each other. 
Third, I will show that each of these positions are refined and theoretically powerful. 
For all their shortcomings, they cannot be identified with the caricatures that we find in 
some textbooks and outdated overviews of the history of science. This is important 
because it will provide better access to Kant’s own position. First of all, it will become 
clear that some of his comments that have been taken as criticisms of epigenesis are 
actually directed at metamorphosis. Second, it will become hard to argue, as Sloan and 
Zammito have, that Kant’s criticisms were directed at an earlier, unrefined version of 
preformation, and meant to be in favor of a later, more refined version, once we realise 
that the unrefined version did not exist in the eyes of the 17th and 18th century. What we 
see as the unrefined version is a caricature developed later in history, in the narratives 
of developmental biology from the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Third, we will be 
able to see that Kant’s characterization of epigenesis as generic preformationism is not a 
concession to preformationism, but instead precisely what it seems to be at face value, 
namely an insight into what kind of structural constraints are required by all 
epigenesist theories. With this comment, Kant is indeed distancing himself from the 




2.2.1 Epigenesis and the Circular Paradigm 
Although the theory of epigenesis goes back to Aristotle, who proposed, in the 
Generation of Animals, the idea that living beings are formed (at least in the case of sexual 
production) from relatively homogeneous matter (e.g. menstrual blood) by an active 
principle (contained in the male semen), its seminal Early Modern version was 
formulated by William Harvey in his 1651 Exercitationes de Generatione Animalium. In that 
work, the man usually credited with the discovery of pulmonary circulation in the West 
set out to attack those anatomists who theorize "as if generation were nothing more than 
a separation, or aggregation, or disposition of things" (Harvey 1847: 207). This position, 
which he ascribes to most authors who worked in a broadly Hippocratic tradition, he 
named metamorphosis, and contrasted with his own proposal, or rather his own 
reappraisal of Aristotle’s proposal, namely epigenesis. It is instrumental to my argument 
that I briefly linger on the precise distinction between these two positions, beginning 
with Harvey’s interesting characterization of metamorphosis. 
In the 45th of his Exercitationes, Harvey introduces metamorphosis as follows:  
Some [animals], out of a material previously concocted, and that has already 
attained its bulk, receive their forms and transfigurations ; and all their parts are 
fashioned simultaneously, each with its distinctive characteristic, by the process 
called metamorphosis, and in this way a perfect animal is at once born. (Harvey 
1847: 334)  
The distinctive mark of metamorphosis is then the fact that it allows for the generation 
of animals, not as a gradual process, but rather as a instaneous one, whereby the 
organism is instantaneously, or precipitately, formed out of its bare matter. In an earlier 
exercitatio, Harvey claimed that the proponents of such a theory assign the causes for 
this process mainly to the underlying matter: “they who philosophize in this way, assign a 
material cause [for generation], and deduce the causes of natural things either from the 
elements concurring spontaneously or accidentally, or from atoms variously arranged”  
(Harvey 1847: 207). Although he finds such an approach highly problematic for higher 
animals, he does not rule out that in this way,  
The generation of insects is effected where by metamorphosis a worm is born 
from an egg; or out of a putrescent material, the drying of a moist substance or 
the moistening of a dry one, rudiments are created, from which, as from a 
caterpillar grown to its full size, or from an aurelia, springs a butterfly or fly 
already of a proper size, which never attains to any larger growth after it is first 
born; this is called metamorphosis[, wherein] chance or hazard seems the 
principal promoter of generation, and there, the form is due to the potency of a 
preexisting material ; and the first cause of generation is ‘matter’, rather than ‘an 
external efficient’. (Harvey 1847: 334-335)  
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What we gather from this passage is that Harvey regards the theory of metamorphosis, 
which focuses on the material cause of generation, as an illegitimate extension of the 
process of spontaneous generation (not yet an inadmissable notion at that time) of 
relatively simple animals to higher orders of natural beings.  
Against the defenders of metamorphosis, Harvey maintained that 
There are some [animals] in which one part is made before another, and then 
from the same material, afterwards receive at once at once nutrition, bulk and 
form: that is to say, they have some parts made before, some after others, and 
these are at the same time increased in size and altered in form. The structure of 
these animals commences from some one part as its nucleus and origin, by the 
instrumentality of which the rest of the limbs are joined on, and this we say takes 
place by the method of epigenesis, namely, by degrees, part after part, and this is, 
in preference to the other mode, generation properly so called. (Harvey 1847: 
334)   
In contradistinction to metamorphosis, then, the process of epigenesis is gradual and 
ordered: it creates the different parts of the organism one after the other, starting with 
a specific part as origin, which then allows for the creation of further parts, which in 
turn allow for the generation of the specificity of yet more parts, until a fully articulated 
organism is formed. Also, it is not driven by the specific properties of the underlying 
matter: 
An animal which is created by epigenesis attracts, prepares, elaborates, and makes 
use of the material, all at the same time: the process of formation and growth are 
simultaneous. [W]hile it creates in succession parts which are differently and 
variously distributed, it requires and makes a material which is also various in its 
nature, and variously distributed, and such as is now adapted to the formation of 
one part, now of another. (Harvey 1847: 335-336) 
It is only during the process of generation itself that the generic matter from which the 
organism is formed is attracted and transformed into various specific materials required 
for the formation of various specific parts. This does, however, raise the following 
questions: from what matter is the organism formed thene, and what is the cause of its 
transformation. To this question, Harvey gives the peculiar response that the cause of 
generation is the egg, which  is "not only […] the matter or that from which, but the 
efficient or that by which the pullet is engendered. In which finally no part of the future 
offspring exists de facto, but in which all parts inhere in potentia” (Harvey 1847: 272). This 
identification of the egg as the nucleus of animal generation has three consequences 
that are important for the current discussion. 
The first consequence is that Harvey is able to generalize his findings on the basis of 
his observations of chicken-eggs and deer-embryos to animal generation as such. This 
 
 75 
was far from obvious in his time, since most anatomists and medical authors were 
highly skeptical of comparisons between different animals, or at least between higher 
and lower animals (cf. Schmitt & Webster 1989: 60)3. Moreover, this generalization goes 
against Aristotle’s central division of animals (In History of Animals), as far as their mode 
of generation is concerned, into vivipara, ovipara and vermipara, and its concomitant 
distinction between three products of engenderment: the egg, which the stagirite 
describes as “a certain completed result of conception out of which the animal that is to 
be develops-from a part of it at first, while the rest serves for food as it develops”, the 
grub (“a thing out of which in its entirety the animal in its entirety develops, by 
differentiation and growth of the embryo”), and the living creature itself (489a-489b). It 
is clear, however, that Harvey nevertheless seeks to harmonize his own theory with 
Aristotle’s (cf. Pagel 1967: 45), obviously inspired by such remarks from the History of 
Animals as: “Of viviparous animals, some hatch eggs in their own interior, as the 
selachia; others engender in their interior, as man and the horse” (489a). Such a peculiar 
violation of the distinction between these two modes of generation soon leads Harvey to 
claim (after abolishing, again allegedly on Aristotle’s own authority; the distinction 
between the egg and the grub (Harvey 1847: 457-458)): 
Generation in both is one and identical in kind: the origin of either is from an egg, 
or at least from something that by analogy is held to be so. An egg is, as already 
said, a conception exposed beyond the body of the parent, whence the embryo is 
produced; a conception is an egg remaining within the body of the parent until 
the foetus has acquired the requisite perfection. […] Wherefore, the same 
theorems and conclusions, though they may appear paradoxical, which we drew 
from the history of the egg, turn out to be equally true with regard to the 
generation of animals generally. (Harvey 1847: 462-463)  
In this way, Harvey reduces the three modes of generation to one species, which allows 
him to generalize or draw consequences for other cases than the one under direct 
examination through reasoning through analogy (Harvey 1847: 462).  James Lennox 
(2006) has argued that this move is, in itself, prefectly in line with Aristotelian 
epistemology, for Aristotle regarded processes in individuals in as far as they 
exemplified behaviour of their kinds (species). By extending and unifying the species, 
Harvey is able to claim wider scope for his findings and explanations. But there is 
 
                                                     
3 In the second response to Riolan, Harvey responds to critics who opposed his alleged “vainglorious love of 
vivisections, and who scoff at and deride the introduction of frogs and serpents, flies, and others of the lower 
animals upon the scene” (Harvey 1847: 109), and advises them: “If for the sake of studying the meaner animals 
you should even enter the bakehouse with Heraclitus, as related in Aristotle, I bid you approach; for neither 
are the immortal Gods absent here, and the great and almighty Father is sometimes most visible in His lesser, 
and  to the eye least considerable works” (Harvey 1847: 110). 
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another aspect to Harvey’s operation, for it not only generalizes his consequences, but 
also unifies the problem: there is henceforth one problem of animal generation, 
concerning the process of generation as such, not a set of distinct though related 
problems concerning distinct though related processes of generation. 
A second consequence of Harvey’s focus on the egg as a material and an efficient 
cause is that the distinction of the sexes now no longer coincides with the distinction of 
form and matter, for which Aristotle had provided an ingenious though highly 
questionable proof in Generation of Animals: 
The female does not contribute semen to generation, but does contribute 
something, and […] this is the matter of the menstrual flow, or that which is 
analogous to it in bloodless animals […]. For there must needs be that which 
generates and that from which it generates; even if these be one, still they must be 
distinct in form and their essence must be different; and in those animals that 
have these powers separate in the two sexes the body and nature of the active and 
the passive sex must also differ. If, then, the male stands for the effective and 
active, and the female for the passive, it follows that what the female would 
contribute to the semen of the male would not be semen but the material for the 
semen to work upon. This is just what we find to be the case, for the menstrual 
blood has in its nature an affinity to the primitive matter. (729a) 
This proof runs essentially on the purported distinction between activity and passivity 
and between form and matter, and the idea that in the higher animals, these distinct 
roles are really separated. Although Harvey maintains much of Aristotle’s insights and 
framework, he does present the egg as something which violates the metaphysical 
division of labour that the latter sees at work in the more perfect products of nature. 
This is important because it shows that the theory of epigenesis is not necessarily 
commited to the division between an active (efficient) and passive (material) role in 
generation, and a distinctness of the form and the matter of generation, let alone the 
arguably sexist connotations of these principles (as has been claimed by Helmut Müller-
Sievers 1997). 
A third consequence of Harvey’s conception of the egg is that the egg is now not only 
an autonomous entity, but also the nexus of a whole series of oppositions, and the locus 
of mediation and perpetuation: 
The egg also seems to be a certain mean; not merely in so far as it is beginning and 
end, but as it is the common work of the two sexes and is compounded by both; 
containing within itself the matter and the plastic power, it has the virtue of both, 
by which it produces a foetus that resembles the one as well as the other. It is 
farther a mean between the animate and the inanimate world; for neither is it 
wholly endowed with life, nor is it entirely without vitality. It is still farther the 
mid-passage or transition stage between parents and offspring, between those 
who are, or were, and those who are about to be; it is the hinge and pivot upon 
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which the whole generation of the bird revolves. The egg is the terminus from 
which all fowls, male and female, have sprung, and to which all their lives tend, -it 
is the result which nature has proposed to herself in their being. And thus it 
comes that individuals in procreating their like for the sake of their species, 
endure for ever. The egg, I say, is a period or portion of this eternity; for it were 
hard to say whether an egg exists for the sake of the chick that it engenders, or 
the pullet exists for the sake of the egg which it is to engender. Which of these was 
the prior, whether with reference to time or nature, - the egg or the pullet? 
(Harvey 1847: 271)  
Here, we meet one of the many forms of the motif of circularity that permeates Harvey’s 
work. This motif has also been recognized in his account of pulmonary circulation, 
which has been traced back to Aristotle’s analysis of the weather cycle (Gregory 2001). 
More important, however, is the underlying Aristotelian idea that “circular motion [...] 
is the only motion which is continuous. That, too, is why all the other things- the things, 
I mean which are reciprocally transformed  in virtue of their qualities and powers, e.g. 
the simple bodies-imitate circular motion” (337a) (Cf. Pagel 1967: 83).4 In Harvey, the 
sublunary circularities of pulmonary circulation and animal generation are such 
perishable analogues of eternal motions: they perpetuate what is otherwise fragile and 
ephemeral: living structure. 
It is for this reason that Harvey regarded the circulatory system to be the first part of 
the body that was formed. Any other organ fulfils its specific function only within the 
whole of the anatomical structure, and for that very reason cannot exist in itself. The 
circulatory system, on the other hand, is precisely the anatomical backbone and basis of 
the closure that characterizes complex organization. The egg, too, fulfils its role in 
generation because it forms the mediation between the otherwise inexplicable 
opposites. Harvey thus embraces circularity as central in both his anatomy and his 
theory of generation: In anatomy, he argues that the animal is a semi-self-perpetuating 
function built around a circular, closed system, namely the circulatory system; in 
embryology, he tries to show that the structure of the animal is both prior and posterior 
to its matter, since it is both its cause and its effect.  
The centrality of the assumption of circularity in Harvey has often been overlooked 
because we expect a solution to the problem of animal generation in terms of 
mechanisms, vital properties or intentional steering of the process. Since it is hard to 
read Harvey’s account of generation as mechanist, it is natural to view it as vitalist. 
 
                                                     
4 In Aristotle, circular movement is the movement of the fifth essence, the only natural movement that is 
stable and perpetual, and is therefore strongly associated with eternity. In the sublunary realm, however, 
there is constant generation and corruption. Nevertheless, as Aristotle himself advances in Meteorology, “This 
world necessarily has a certain continuity with the upper motions” (339a). 
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James Bono (1990), for instance, argues that, although Harvey rebuked renaissance 
theories of medicine for invoking transcendent “spirits” that “animate” the otherwise 
inert or insufficient biological matter, he proposed instead another kind of “vitalism” 
that makes activity “immanent” to biological matter. I object that, according to Harvey, 
it is only in the circulation that blood is vital:  
The blood considered absolutely and by itself, without the veins, in so far as it is 
an elementary fluid, and composed of several parts-of thin and serous particles, 
and of thick and concrete particles called cruor-possesses but few, and these not 
very obvious virtues. Contained within the veins, however, inasmuch as it is an 
integral part of the body, and is animated, regenerative, and the immediate 
instrument and principal seat of the soul, inasmuch, moreover, as it seems to 
partake of the nature of another more divine body, and is transfused by divine 
animal heat, it obtains remarkable and most excellent powers, and is analogous to 
the essence of the stars. (Harvey 1847: 510)  
This suggest that vitality is due to the closure in which life figures, not to an internal 
property of the matter involved. 
Similarly, Harvey’s use of analogies with intentionality cannot be taken at face value. 
As Benjamin Goldberg has pointed out with respect to Harvey’s use of the analogy with 
intentional agency:  
it is not an opposition between natural causation and creativity that is 
fundamental, but rather a mismatch between natural causation and the orderly 
specificity and functional complexity of generation. The sorts of efficient and 
material causes Harvey could rely on, heat, movement, and so on, were far from 
being able to account for the product of generation: such causes could not create 
something that happened in a regular manner (first this part, then this, in all 
kinds of animals observed) nor something that was made up of many individual 
complicated parts and yet was functionally integrated towards the well being of 
the animal. (Goldberg 2013: 430) 
It appears that for Harvey, the circularity exhibited by living systems is not something 
that can be done away with by mechanicist, vitalist or animist assumptions. As a result, 
his theory of epigenesis leads us to embrace circularity in accounting for animal 
generation. 
2.2.2 The Disunity of Preformationism 
Harvey’s attempt to revive Aristotelian epigenesis did not find much following in the 
following half of the 17th century. The explanation for this has traditionally been 
Harvey’s overdependence on Aristotelianism, which could not charm the many 
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philosophers and men of medicine who had started to embrace the mechanical 
philosophy, and the flimsiness of his observational resources due to his reliance on his 
own eyes and single lenses. Buffon’s (1749b: 118-119) initial judgment that Harvey was 
unfortunate in not having a microscope at his disposal, therefore having to rely on 
images of extremely low resolution in order to find out the minute origins of biological 
form, was followed not only by early 20th century historians of embryology such as 
Francis Cole (1930: 143-144) and Joseph Needham (1959: 148-149), but equally by 
contemporary philosophers (Press & Tanur 2001: 73) and historians (Goldber 2013: 427) 
of science. But this judgment may say less of the failings of Harvey’s approach than of 
our willingness to get carried away by the rhetoric surrounding early modern 
microscopy - which was immense, as is evident from the preface to Robert Hooke’s both 
scientifically and commercially successful Micrographia: 
By the additions of such artificial Instruments and methods, there may be, in some 
manner, a reparation made for the mischiefs, and imperfection, mankind has 
drawn upon it self […] The next care to be taken in respect of the Senses, us a 
supplying of their infirmities with Instruments, and, as it were, the adding of 
artificial Organs to the natural; this in one of them has been of late years accomplish 
with prodigious benefit to all sorts of useful knowledge, by the invention of 
Optical Glasses. By the means of Telescopes, there is nothing so far distant but may 
be represented to our view; and by the help of Microscopes, there is nothing so 
small, as to escape our inquiry; hence there is a new visible World discovered to 
the understanding. (Hooke 1667)  
Of course, Hooke does not tarry to confess which philosophical enterprise and world 
view is supported by this new regimentation and expansion of the senses: 
It seems not improbable, but that by these helps the subtilty of the composition of 
Bodies, the structure of their parts, the various texture of their matter, the 
instruments and manner of their inward motions, and all the other possible 
appearances of things, may come to be more fully discovered; all which the 
antient Peripateticks were content to comprehend in two genera land (unless 
further explain’d) useless words of Matter and Form. From whence there may arise 
many admirable advantages towards the increase of the Operative, and the 
Mechanick Knowledge, to which this Age seems to much inclined, because we may 
perhaps be inabled to discern all the secret workings of Nature, almost in the same 
manner as we do those that are the productions of Art, and are manag’d by 
Wheels, and Engines, and Springs, that were devised by humane Wit. (Hooke 1667) 
Jordynn Jack (2009) has pointed out that the language of the Micrographia follows a 
rhetoric that is intended to aid both the readers and other microscopists to figure out 
what exactly they are seeing through the lense of the microscope. On the one hand, 
Hooke systematically suggested that microscopic bodies were analogous to macroscopic 
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bodies, and on the other he presented them as mechanical in structure. The importance of 
this is that it facilitated the spread of the idea that the microscope reveals worlds of 
similar levels of complexity at lower levels of magnitude, and that it unveils the 
mechanical structure and substructure of reality.  
Both of these ideas are clearly present in the early microscopists responsible for the 
alleged evidential basis of the theory of preformation, namely Jan Swammerdam, 
Marcello Malpighi, Antoni van Leeuwenhoek and Nicolaas Hartsoeker. Swammerdam’s 
main contribution is twofold, since he delivered both an argument against the 
distinction between the generation of perfect and imperfect animals, and a paradigm 
for the “unfolding” of pre-formed structure, the chrysalis. Whereas Harvey had denied 
that metamorphosis could account for the higher animals, but still believed it to be 
possible for lower animals, Swammerdam revolted against this distinction between 
higher and lower animals as a distinction between levels of complexity, and therefore 
ruled out the metamorphosis and spontaneous generation of even the lower animals 
(Swammerdam 1737: 2) He instead argued that we can already find, in the chrysalis, the 
full-formed butterfly, and that it becomes the butterfly not through any change of its 
limbs, but through mere growth of its pre-existent parts (Cf. Swammerdam 1737: 6-7). 
Marcello Malpighi too gave an important impetus to the development of 
preformationist embryology with his 1673 Dissertatio epistolica de formatione pulli in ovo. In 
this dissertation, addressed to the Royal Society of England, Malpighi meant to advance 
on Harvey’s discoveries by offering his own, microscope-assisted, observations. The 
most fateful of his corrections is his claim that a relatively articulated form of the fetus 
can be found in the egg even prior to incubation. This was taken to disconfirm Harvey’s 
view that the embryo started from very simple beginnings, and only later acquired the 
features now seen in it from the start (Malpighi 1687: 53-54). Besides this alleged 
observational evidence, we find in Malpighi’s work a clear framework in which to fit it, 
namely that of a new development in mechanicism where the living being is seen as a 
conglomerate of an enormous amount of minute machines, as a mechanism consisting 
of mechanisms (Malpighi 1697: 104; cf. also Giglioni 1997: 162-163). 
Whereas Malpighi’s observations suggested that the animal somehow preexists in the 
ovum, two Dutch microsopists were conducting microscopical observations of animal 
seminal fluid. In spite of a claim to originality by Hartsoeker, it is mostly the name of 
Leeuwenhoek that remained associated with the discovery of the animalcules. Over the 
course of several years, Leeuwenhoek addressed to the Royal Society several letters in 
which he claimed to have seen, in the seminal fluid of male animals, an enormous 
amount of tiny animals, “animalcula” (Dierkens), each of which seemed to move of its 
own accord. He maintained that these animalcules could not have been formed by 
spontaneous generation, nor could they be inorganic in nature, given that they “are 
made out of so great a multitude of parts as […] the multitude of parts out of which our 
bodies are composed” (Leeuwenhoek 1686: 10; my translation). 
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For many readers today, it seems obvious that the reports of the early microscopists 
do not yield the preformationist theory as we now know it. For this, two other elements 
were required, as Margaret Wilson has seen. The first is that there were already 
anticipations of these discoveries in the speculations of Gassendi and Descartes, who 
may not themselves have endorsed preformation, but in any case prepared its 
theoretical discourse (Wilson 1995: 121). The second is that it required the theoretical 
perspectives of the likes of Malebranche and Leibniz to make preformationism into a 
coherent theory (Wilson 1995: 128). 
It is telling, first of all, that Malebranche’s famous discussion of preformation 
appeared first in the course of a discussion of the reliability of the senses in the quest 
for truth. Our senses, he tells us, are designed for our practical dealings, our direct 
utility, not for theoretical knowledge, as the newest developments in observation, i.e. 
the turn to the microscope, reveal. What appears to the naked eye as homogeneous, and 
sterile, the microscope shows to be heterogeneous and teeming with life. Our own 
perception, focused as it is on our own order of magnitude, is oblivious to the 
complexity at other levels. 
In offering the theory of preformation as an illustration of the errors we may incur 
when we fail to assess the limitations of the senses, Malebranche also seems to be 
indicating that he was aware of the gap between the observational data offered by early 
microscopy and the theory of preformation and preexistence. That may be why he 
argues that reason allows us to use imagination in extending sense beyond its current 
boundaries. He believes this to be warranted by his doctrine that space is infinitely 
divisible and hence does not bottom out mereologically (OC I: 81). Since we know from 
observation that below the order of magnitude revealed to our senses lie several orders 
of magnitude that are equally complex and structured, and since reason tells us that 
there are can be no lower bound to orders of magnitude, there is no reason to suppose 
that complexity decreases along with the magnitude of things. This argument provides 
Malebranche with a possible justification of what many have since taken to be an 
outrageous fiction, namely that each organism came into the world fully formed at 
creation, was embedded in its parent (in casu the mother) and from then on merely 
awaits the process of growth through orders of magnitude until it reaches our own size: 
Nor does it seem unreasonable to believe even that there is an infinite number of 
trees in a single seed, since it contains not only the tree of which it is the seed but 
also a great number of other seeds that might contain other trees and other seeds, 
which will perhaps have on an incomprehensibly small scale other trees and other 
seeds and so to infinity. So that according to this view, which will appear strange 
and incongruous only to those who measure the marvels of God’s infinite power 
by the ideas of sense and imagination, it might be said that in a single apple seed 
there are apple trees, apples, and apple seeds, standing in the proportion of a fully 
grown tree to the tree in its seed, for an infinite, or nearly infinite number of 
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centuries; that nature’s role is only to unfold these tiny trees by providing 
perceptible growth for that outside its seed, and imperceptible yet very real 
growth in proportion to their size, for those thought to be in their seed… 
Likewise, a chicken that is perhaps entirely formed is seen in the seed of a fresh 
egg that has not been hatched. Frogs are to be seen in frogs’ eggs, and still other 
animals will be seen in their seed when we have sufficient skill and experience to 
discover them. But the mind need not stop with the eyes, for the mind’s vision is 
much more extensive than the body’s. We ought to accept, in addition, that the 
body of every man and beast born till the end of time was perhaps produced at the 
creation of the world. My thought is that the females of the original animals may 
have been created along with all those of the same species that they have 
begotten and that are to be begotten in the future. (OC I: 82-83; Pyle 2003: 169) 
Like Malebranche, Leibniz too referred approvingly to the findings of the microscopists 
as an occasion for rethinking the nature of organic form: 
this is where the transformations of Swammerdam, Malpighi, and Leeuwenhoek, 
the best observers of our time, have come to my aid, and have made it easier for 
me to admit that animals and all other organized substances have no beginning, 
although we think they do, and that their apparent generation is only a 
development, a kind of augmentation. I have also noticed that the author of the 
Search after Truth [i.e. Malebranche], Régis, Hartsoeker and other able persons 
have held opinions not far removed from this. (G IV: 480; Leibniz 1989: 140) 
Justin Smith (2011) has argued that the encounter with the early microscopists was a 
major cause of the shift in Leibniz’s thinking on living form from the macroscopic level 
to the microscopic, and the concomittant shift from a conception of an organic body as 
a hydraulico-pneumatico-pyrotechnical machine to a nested individual composed of 
other biological individuals (Smith 2011: Chapter 5). He has also advanced that we 
should therefore take the doctrine of preformation expressed throughout Leibniz’s 
published and unpublished writings alike to be more central to his metaphysics than 
has traditionally been conceded. Most importantly, he suggests that it reveals a close 
analogy between preformation and preestablished harmony. Leibniz sometimes 
presents the theory of preformation as the embryological analogue of the doctrine of 
preestablished harmony. Smith (2011: 194-195) has argued that this may have been 
connected with some more philosophical and theological reasons Leeuwenhoek 
adduced for embracing preformation.  
However, it has been remarked that Leibniz’s ideas cannot be based entirely on the 
microscopic discoveries to which he alludes, since these hardly show the infinite 
composition of extension. Like Malebranche, he needs a further element to go from that 
which can reasonably be taken to be the observational data (the observation that 
organisms do not bottom out in the macroscopic), to the idea they are meant to ground 
(the idea that organisms do not bottom out at all). The additional element is, as Ohad 
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Nachtomy (2014) has convincingly argued, that of the actual infinite. Leibniz is 
commited to the idea that everything in nature is mechanical, but that some 
mechanically structured entities are of a complexity that transcends our capacity of 
understanding absolutely: they are divine machines. He thus seems to be committed to 
the idea that organic bodies do not differ qualitatively from artefacts, and to the idea 
that they differ not merely in degree from artefacts. These two seemingly contradictory 
ideas are brought together by the assumption that organisms are machines within 
machines to infinity, and therefore infinitely complex, whereas artefacts bottom out in 
a lowest level of relevant mechanical structure: 
Thus each organized body of a living being is a kind of divine machine or natural 
automaton, which infinitely surpasses all artificial automata. For a machine 
constructed by man's art is not a machine in each of its parts. For example, the 
tooth of a brass wheel has parts or fragments which, for us, are no longer artificial 
things, and no longer have any marks to indicate the machine for whose use the 
wheel was intended. But natural machines, that is, living bodies, are still machines 
in their least parts, to infinity. That is the difference between nature and art, that 
is, between divine art and our art. (G VI: 618; Leibniz 1989: 221) 
The distinction is not one of degree because, for the rationalists at leasts, the infinite 
may be quantitative, but it is radically distinct from any determinate quantity (it is at 
once somehow situated in the progression of the series of natural numbers and yet not 
any member of that series). They thus need the notion of a positive infinite to arrive at a 
mechanical theory of organic complexity. This reveals that, in thinking of the structure 
of life, they too admit a regression, but that they and higher than every member of that 
series. Like Malebranche, Leibniz needs to have replaced Harvey’s circularities with a 
linear regression of machines within machines within machines… 
Another problem faced once we accept Smith’s general reading is that of the relation 
between occasionalism and pre-established harmony. Smith argues that Leibniz would 
agree with the general idea that preformation is the better theory because it has the 
same benefits that the theory of preestablished harmony has. After all, if one agrees 
that organisms cannot come into existence through mere mechanical processes, than 
one would have to believe that the coming to be of a new organism would require a 
miraculous intervention. The latter position, however, is analogous to what Leibniz 
made of the occasionalist position, namely the requirement of constant divine 
miraculous intervention in the natural order. It seems better, therefore, to assume that 
God made all the organisms that would ever exist in the world at the moment of 
creation, which then go on to develop through merely mechanical means. This is 
analogous to the theory of preestablished harmony, according to which God made all 
substances at the moment of creation and then let these internally develop according to 
the general principles of nature. 
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It is interesting to note here that the parallel between theories of causation and 
mind-body interaction on the hand and theories of generation is best known from the 
works of Kant. As we shall see, Kant will refer to it on two important occasions of his 
career. This has led Karen Detlefsen (2003) to inquire into the reason for the peculiarity 
that Malebrache embraced both preformation and occasionalism, and to conclude that 
the difference resides in Malebranche’s and Leibniz’s conceptions of occasionalism. 
Leibniz regarded generation in nature as only possible through an immediate particular 
volition of God, namely a supernatural, miraculous intervention in the regular order of 
nature, and occasionalism as the doctrine that all causal interactions are of this kind. 
This analogy is likely to be be false, since Malebranche’s occasionalism does not imply 
that all causal interactions are exceptional, supernatural interventions, but merely that 
all causal powers ultimately reside in God, and that causal interactions depend on the 
powers and volitions of God, be they general or particular. On such a reading, many 
distinctive differences between occasionalism an preestablished harmony start to blur. 
As we will see in subsection 2.3.1, Kant will use this fading boundary to argue against 
preformationism’s claim to theoretical and doctrinal superiority. 
A third implication of Smith’s analysis is that it renders inoperative, to a certain 
extent, the traditional distinction between two forms of preformation, namely 
animalculism and ovism. Smith (2011: 183-184) notes that Leibniz seems to have 
preferred the spermist or animalculist alternative, but agrees with e.g. Pinto-Correia 
(1997: 93) that Leibniz ultimately never made a final decision between the two 
alternatives. This distinction was important, however, not only because it reflects the 
decision on which sex holds the key to procreation and on similar ethico-theological 
questions, but also because they lead to preferences between the two distinct versions 
of preformationism listed by Charles Bonnet in his 1762 Considérations sur les corps 
organisés: “emboîtement” and “dissémination”. The first theory is that all generations 
are embedded in one another, whereas the latter is that germs are disseminated 
throughout the whole of nature and develop only once they have found a suitable body 
in which to develop (Bonnet 1779: 2-3). Bonnet decides in favour of neither theory, but 
the fact that he notes the distinction may already be useful to contrast the theories of 
Malebranche and Leibniz. Whereas the former seems to prefer an account where our 
genealogical lineage is traced by the individuals in which we have been mereologically 
embedded for all time, the latter sees biological individuals as independent from this 
and capable of entering into all kinds of organic composites throughout their histories. 
In order to properly understand preformationism we must dispel one final 
misunderstanding, namely the persistent idea that the preformed individual is a mere 
miniature, however minuscule, of the full-grown form. Almost none of the 
preformationist theorists I have discussed here hold this view; in fact, almost all of them 
stressed the great degree of complexity of the process of unfolding required to bring out 
the eventual form and maintained that, although the preformed structures were of such 
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a kind as to be empirically almost unrecognizable as the adumbrations of their adult 
forms, they did contain all the necessary elements for these forms, and could yield them 
through mechanical means alone. Preformationist theories could thus differ on 1) the 
degree of surface similarity between the preformed and the developed form, and 2) the 
means admissible in our explanations of how these adult forms come about. This 
flexibility constituted one of the great strengths of preformationist theory, but may also 
ultimately have led to its downfall as it was stretched beyond its usefulness as an 
umbrella-term. 
2.2.3 Metamorphogenesis 
In the literature on early modern theories of generation, it is customary to treat the 
debates raging in that era as between the two rival theories of epigenesis and 
preformation, and to categorize all other theories as peculiar variants of the former two. 
I believe this to be mistaken, since it overlooks the extent to which both alternatives 
reacted against an older alternative that continued to resurface over the course of 
history: the theory of metamorphosis. I have already pointed out that both Harvey and 
Swammerdam saw themselves as reacting against theories that understood generation 
as spontaneous generation or a process similar to it. In this subsection, I will argue that 
the theory of metamorphosis and its associated theory of spontaneous generation is 
broader than what we now understand under it, and that it captures elements of what 
we have come to see as borderline cases of preformation and epigenesis. Allowing for a 
third category makes better sense of what scholars have previously tried to grasp 
through awkward distinctions between forms of preformation or epigenesis. 
Many authors have found it necessary to distinguish between mechanical and non-
mechanical theories of epigenesis. Mechanical theories describe the process of 
epigenesis as involving only the matter and the processes allowed for by classical 
mechanicism. They are contrasted with animist or vitalist theories of epigenesis, which 
regard the process of epigenesis as involving vital matter and/or vital forces. The 
problem with this distinction is that it usually forces us into allowing that the more 
mechanical brands of epigenesis assume a greater degree of preformation than the 
more vitalist variations. This is then often accounted for by distinguishing, within 
preformation, between preformationism proper, the theory that the structure is formed 
before conception, and preexistence, the theory that the structure is not even formed 
by the genitor before conception, but by God at moment of the creation of the universe 
(Roger 1963: 326; Bowler 1973: 259). This allows for a third position, according to which 
the structure is already very heterogeneous at the moment of conception. Once this 
heterogeneous structure is formed relatively unintentional forces suffice to finish the 
work of generation. I will contend here that a variety of theories that have been 
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classified as “preformation but not preexistence” and “mechanical epigenesis” are in 
fact a species of the oldest dominant theory in the tradition of embryology, and stems 
from the works of Hippocrates and Galen. Further on in this chapter, I will show that 
Kant was attentive to this distinction, although we, his readers, are usually not, and that 
this leads to misinterpretations. 
The oldest version of the theory of metamorphosis, as I will call it here, following 
Harvey, is that of Hippocrates. It is also known as the theory of the two semina, since it 
assumes that both parents contribute seminal material to the foetus, and that this 
seminal material carries information about the body of the parent. For Hippocrates 
(2012: 6-23), the surplus of humours used by the different organs is sent to the 
reproductive organs as seminal material, and is composed of the correct mixtures 
required to (re)constitute those organs. Once the two semina are brought together, the 
materials rapidly align and cohere in such a manner as to form the first rudiments of 
the embryo. Since the semina contain the material of all the organs, however, these first 
rudiments are already a very highly articulated structure. Mind that this structure is, in 
an important way, already present in the semina, because it already contains all the 
materials required to make the foetus. Metamorphosis theories usually face the 
challenge of explaining why, in higher animals, spontaneous generation only occurs 
after conception, and not within the reproductive organs of the parents, given that 
these already contain all the required elements.   
The Galenic theory is related, but it is important to note how it employs the idea of a 
natural faculty. For Galen, a central problem of physiology and anatomy is that of 
explaining how organs and organisms attract the specific foodstuffs they need and 
adapt them to their own structures. He rails against the systems of two rivals, which 
argue that only mechanical processes need be involved in these processes. They assume, 
for instance, that the foodstuffs are corpuscles of a specific kind and that the tissues of 
the organs contain pores suited to these and only these corpuscles. Galen (1916: 43-49) 
finds such accounts wanting since they deny rather than explain the selectiveness of 
living tissues. He postulates in organs non-mechanical properties that select, attract, 
adapt and employ their nutritients.5 On his account, we pass on to our offspring both 
the specific mixtures we have prepared and the faculties required to maintain and 
augment them(1916: 19-27). 
 
                                                     
5 It is unclear whether these natural faculties are well understood as intentional-teleological. I believe they are 
not, given the care with which Galen distinguishes them from the faculties of the soul. Galen criticizes 
Aristotle for glossing over the differences between the natural faculties associated with organic structure or 
tissue, and the psychological faculties associated with a soul. He feels no need to assume any such thing as a 
vegetative soul, and therefore the associated functions cannot truly be understood as soul-like. 
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This theory remained dominant until the sixteenth century in a variety of versions. 
The most important one is arguably the canonical version presented by Fernel in his 
monumental Physiologia. It is important not just because it was highly influential, but 
also because it was one of the primary targets of the early mechanical philosophies like 
that of Descartes. Descartes probably knew of Fernel through his endorsement by the 
Jesuit scholastic textbooks that were a major ingredient of his intellectual formation at 
La Flèche. For this reason, one could argue that what Descartes offered us in his 
physiology, and specifically in his theory of generation, was an attempt to salvage the 
corpuscularian-mechanicist positions criticized by Galen by offering a mechanistic 
account of the Galenic theory. In doing so, he did not really offer a new theory, but 
rather a new foundation for an old one. This picture fits neatly into the view of 
Descartes’s physiology advanced by Thomas Hall (1970: 64): “what Descartes had to offer 
were not explanations of fact. They were explanations, rather, of other peoples' 
explanations (often dismembered and reassembled with various additions and 
deletions)”. 
Descartes’s theory of generation has been regarded by many, perhaps even by 
Descartes himself (Cf. Des Chene 2001: 32) as overly sketchy and implausible. It seeks to 
derive the form of an organic body from the mechanical interactions of the corpuscles 
of fluids without admixture of any teleological or intentional aspects that allow for the 
proper differentation and allocation of parts. This is undoubtedly why many have 
thought Descartes’s model to be epigenesist: it shows how structure is articulated 
through the differentiation of homogeneous matter. Nevertheless, there are reasons to 
doubt such an interpretation; after all, Descartes does need to locate the reasons why 
the seminal fluid gives rise to the specific structure it yields somewhere. The hint may 
come from a comment made by Dennis Des Chene in his presentation of the Cartesian 
account of generation: 
A particle of blood is merely a bounded region of stuff. The only “information” it 
carries is its present quantity of motion and the determination or direction of that 
motion. These two properties entirely determine the outcome of any collision the 
particle enters into; collisions, moreover, are the only interactions of particles. 
Particles therefore exhibit neither memory nor foresight. (Des Chene 2001: 41) 
What Des Chene reveals in this passage is the only place where Descartes can locate the 
information thay will yield the future structure: the specific motions and directions of 
these motions in the seminal fluid. In this way, he repeats the problem I addressed in 
the previous chapter concerning his cosmogony: he cannot account for the specific 
structure of the end-process of generation except by somehow locating its full structure 
in the initial state. By refusing any finality to generative processes and any non-
mechanical properties to matter, he is forced to admit either that the initial structure 
fully determines the outcome through its mechanical features alone or that his theory 
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fails to account for the specificity exhibited by living processes. For a long time, 
Cartesians assumed that Descartes succumbed to the latter failure and that it was best 
remediated by simply admitting that the initial state contains all the required 
information, taking this view to its preformationist extreme. It is only in the eighteenth 
century that natural philosophers inspired by Newton would once more begin to 
seriously consider alternatives. 
The two main figures associated with the revival of metamorphosis in the early to 
mid-eighteenth century are Maupertuis and Buffon. I have already discussed their 
importance for Kant in the first chapter of this dissertation. Here, I will focus on their 
fateful interventions in the debate on animal generation and their attacks on the then-
dominant theory of preformation. Both authors have been read as epigenesist, with the 
debate ultimately turning on the degree of their adherence to some version of 
preformation without preexistence, and to their preference for either mechanicism or 
some form of vitalism. I will argue that Buffon and the early Maupertuis are best read as 
seeking to provide, like Descartes, a mechanical theory of metamorphosis. Unlike 
Descartes, however, they believe themselves to be entitled to a wider variety of basic 
properties in mechanical explanation because of their Newtonianism. One of the major 
benefits of radical Newtonianism is that it allows only empirical research and nature to 
dictate which the basic properties of matter and motion are in terms of which we should 
explain everything natural. Much like Newton showed that we could not account for 
even the most basic mechanical interactions without assuming gravity or solidity, 
however metaphysically problematic these notions may be to a die-hard mechanicist, so 
too Buffon attempted to demonstrate the indispensability of his own theory for any 
account of the phenomena of life: 
I have admitted in my explanation of development and reproduction, first of all 
the received mechanical principles, then those of the penetrating force of gravity 
that we are obliged to admit, and through analogy I believed myself capable of 
saying that there are other penetrating forces at work in organized bodies, as 
experience assures us. I have proved through facts that matter tends to organize 
itself, and that there are an infinite number of organic parts. I have thus done 
nothing but generalize the observations, without advancing anything at odds with 
the mechanical principles, if one understands by that word what we should 
understand by it, i.e., the general effects of Nature. (Buffon 1749b : 52-53; my 
translation) 
From this starting point, Buffon’s theory differs greatly from that of his preformationist 
predecessors. He denies the infinite divisibility of matter, and thereby prohibits 
recourse to the infinite envelopment as an account of the complexity of organisms 
(Buffon 1749b: 27). Instead, he advances that we have been mistaken in believing that 
because the world bottoms out, it bottoms out in particles of a geometrically simple 
shape (typically spheres and its eccentric variants or platonic polyhedra) (Buffon 1749b: 
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22). If we let go of this bias, we can hypothesize that the world contains an infinite 
variety of organic molecules, which are the rule in nature rather than the exception, 
and which can produce the less complex ones through degenerations (Buffon 1749b: 39). 
The same bias towards traditional mechanical properties in terms of extension has 
caused us to overlook the idea of a moule intérieur: 
In the same way that we can make molds by means of which we give to the 
exterior of a body the shape that we please, let us suppose that nature can make 
molds through which she gives, not only external shape, but also the internal 
form; would this be a way through which reproduction could operate? (Buffon 
1747b: 34; my translation) 
The concept of an interior mold allows Buffon to set in place his nutritional theory of 
generation, which is clearly reminiscent of the Hippocratic-Galenic theory:  
In order to properly understand this manner of reproduction, it suffices to picture 
that in the nutriments that these organized beings attract, there are organic 
molecules of different species, that by a force similar to that which produces 
gravity, these organical molecules penetrate all the parts of the organized body, 
which produces the development and makes the nutrition, that each part of the 
organized body, each interior mold admits only the organical molecules that are 
proper to it, and finally that when development and growth are almost finished, 
the surplus of organical molecules that served it previously are sent from each 
part of the individual to one or more places, where gathered together they form 
through their union one or several little organized bodies, that have to be 
completely similar to the first individual, since each of the parts of this individual 
has sent the organic molecules that are most analogous to it, those which would 
have served in its development, if it had not been completed, those which through 
their similarity could serve for nutrition, those finally that have nearly the same 
organic form as the parts themselves. In such a way, in all species where a single 
individual produces its like, it is easy to draw the explanation of reproduction 
from that of development and nutrition. (Buffon 1749b: 54; my translation) 
Like in the Hippocratic-Galenic theory, the fœtus is formed through the rapid 
association and alignment of thoroughly prepared materials that are direct products of 
the organs of he parents. On such an account, organisms could also spontaneously 
generate out of present organic materials, even though this would be highly unlikely. 
Again, the theory of metamorphosis seeks to fend off epigenesis by assuming a 
mitigated form of preformation without preexistence, and again it needs to dissociate 
itself from preformation by exaggerating the specificity of the processes involved in 
generation. 
A similar account is to be found in Maupertuis’ somewhat earlier theory. In the 
earlier phases of his thought, Maupertuis, like Buffon, believed that by adding to the 
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restricted list of mechanical forces the broader but not terribly exotic list of chemical 
forces, we could account for the specificity and selectivity involved in the phenomena of 
life without having to reinstate Galenic faculties (Maupertuis 1768b: 88-89). In his case, 
however, this optimism was more short-lived: later in his life, he admitted that not even 
the extended list of mechanical properties could account for the phenomena of interest 
to him: generation and heredity (Cf. Roger 1963: 483). It is at that point that he 
introduced a notion of material particles that could have memory of states in which 
they had previously found themselves and desires for and aversion towards specific 
other (kinds of) particles (Maupertuis 1768b: 146-147). Throughout his career then, 
Maupertuis moved from a Newtonian extended mechanicist position to a position best 
described as “vital materialist”6. We will see that, for Kant, these two options were 
always dangerously close to each other in any case. 
The position I called metamorphosis amounts to the following: the idea that the 
specificity of organic form is due to a precipitate association of a thoroughly prepared 
material through mechanical or quasi-mechanical processes. The difference between 
this position and that of either epigenesis or preformation has often been observed and 
taken to be puzzle. McLaughlin (1990, 20), for instance, contrasts epigenesis with 
pangenesis, the latter being the Hippocratic theory I just sketched. Bowler (1971: 223) 
adopts Harvey’s term, like I have done here. Joseph Needham (1959, 183-184) 
characterizes it as precipitation followed by preformation. All these names reveal the 
peculiar position of this theory amidst the otherwise clean-cut opposition between 
preformation and epigenesis.  
2.2.4 Epigenesis and the observability of structure and genesis 
As a conclusion to this section, I will briefly discuss the revival of epigenesis in the 
hands of Caspar Friedrich Wolff and Johann Friedrich Blumenbach. My intention here is 
not to give detailed accounts of their theories, but to indicate the issues important for 
my presentation of Kant’s theory. The first issue is that of the status given to 
observation in debates over preformation, and the second that concerning the guiding 
principle of development. These two themes resonate with the main issues involved in 
Harvey’s account, leading us to the updated version of the latter’s theory of epigenesis.  
 
                                                     
6 This term was advanced by Lenoir to denote a position originally advanced by Friedrich Blumenbach and 
diffused through German scientific culture through the approval of Immanuel Kant (Cf. Lenoir 1982). The 
position is thoroughly materialist, but ascribes to matter an activity and a vitality that traditional 
mechanicism denied to it. More recently, Charles Wolfe (2011) has suggested that a similar position was 
endorsed by Enlightenment Materialists like Diderot and La Mettrie. 
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In my discussion of preformationism, I already indicated that this theory required its 
proponents to go beyond the observational data with which microscopy had furnished 
them. As microscopes, or at least researchers’ skill with them, improved, no advance 
was made on these discoveries. On the contrary: the idea of straightforward 
preformation became less plausible as the rudiments of organisms more and more 
turned out to be different from the adult structures. For Buffon and Maupertuis, this 
suggested that we need to return to metamorphosis, according to which it is not the 
structure that is present in the rudiments, but the elements, which are then assembled 
through natural processes. But to others, it suggested that we had given up on Harvey’s 
theory of epigenesis too soon. One such figure was Caspar Friedrich Wolff, who dared 
react against the leading consensus by advancing an epigenesist position, and thereby 
attracting the criticism of the leading Swiss physiologist and recent convert to 
preformation Albrecht von Haller. Wolff’s position was primarily directed at version of 
preformation advanced by Haller, who held that 
the essential parts of the foetus are found fully formed at all times; not, of course, 
such as they appear in the adult animal: they are structured in a such a manner 
that certain and prepared causes, precipitating the growths of some of these parts, 
impeding that of others, changing their relative positions, rendering visible 
organs once diaphanous, giving consistency to fluids and to mucosity, eventually 
form an animal very different from the embryo, and in which there is 
nevertheless not a single part that did not exist essentially in the embryo. (Haller 
1758: 186; my translation) 
The specific feature of Haller’s account is that it explained why the rudiments of the 
embryo could be markedly different from the full form, and more importantly, why 
earlier stages of the embryo could appear less articulated and therefore more 
homogeneous to the observer. For Haller, this is due to several parts of the organism 
being diaphanous and fluid at first, and acquiring solidity only later. It is this insight 
which lay behind his objections to Wolff’s theory. Indeed, as Wolff himself would 
remark, Haller objected to him the usage of the axiom that “what I cannot see, is not 
there”(Wolff 1764: 74) – that is to say, there are no such things as invisible parts. Wolff 
of course denied that he ever took recourse to such a maxim, and merely stressed that 
his refusal to admit the existence of these preformed parts was due to his being 
incapable of ascertaining their presence by any means (not just visible means, but 
through any kind of intervention) and squaring their existence with any of the 
phenomena that he was able to ascertain. As far as the fluidity is concerned, Wolff 
remarks that the property of fluidity is opposed to the structural features of an 
organism (the precise interrelation of its parts) that preformation is meant to account 
for (Wolff 1764: 133-134). 
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There may be, however, a further disagreement that divides the two authors, namely 
their assumptions on the meaning of generation as differentiation. For Wolff, 
generation is a process whereby an initially largely homogeneous material is 
differentiated into different kinds of materials, which are simultaneously or 
subsequently employed in the formation of organs. For Haller, the very idea that one 
can differentiate what is not already differentiated may have been ludicrous. A similar 
assumption lay behind the metamorphosis theories of Buffon and the early Maupertuis, 
namely that all the requisite materials for the organic form must be present at the start 
in the semina, and that these are just sorted out and arranged by the forces working on 
them. Such an assumption is not outrageous; it lay behind the great demonstration of 
Newton’s Opticks as well: 
Newton was an atomist who believed that matter is composed of hard and 
permanent particles which are endowed with various properties from the 
beginning of creation. The properties of natural things, on this conception, 
depend on the connate properties of the ultimate particles which go into their 
constitution. Natural changes consist, not in the creation or annulment of 
properties, but in the separating and combining of the particles. These operations 
merely result in making manifest or concealing the original properties. From this 
point of view the dispersion of light by a prism simply separates the mixed 
corpuscles and, a sa result, colours appear. (Sabra 1967: 296) 
It is this assumption that epigenesists cannot share: they must assume that nature is 
truly creative, in that it can bring about new properties that are not actually (though 
they may be contained virtually) in the initial material. The processes responsible for 
generation cannot therefore be mere sorting out of the material. The question then 
becomes what in nature can effectuate such processes. For the major proponents of 
epigenesis in the second half of the eighteenth century, the fact of genuine formation 
requires us to assume the existence of formative forces. For Wolff, this is a vis essentialis 
responsible for guiding the process of formation.  
The major figure we now associate with late eighteenth century epigenesis is, 
perhaps to no small extent due to the efforts of Timothy Lenoir (1982), Johann Friedrich 
Blumenbach, whose theory is perhaps expressed in the following passage from his 
institutions of physiology: 
The matter of which organized bodies, and therefore the human frame, is 
composed, differs from all other matter in this, that it alone is subject to the 
influence of the vital powers. 
Among the orders of vital powers, one is eminently remarkable and the least 
disputable of all,-which, while it acts upon that matter hitherto shapeless but 
mature, imparts to it a form  regular and definite, although varying according to 
the particular nature of the matter. To distinguish this vital power from the rest, 
permit us to designate it by the term,-nisus formativus. 
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The nisus formativus occurs to the genital matter, when this is mature and 
committed to the uterus in a proper condition and under proper circumstances, 
lays in it the rudiments of conception, and gradually forms organs fitted for 
particular purposes; preserves this structure during life, by nourishing the body; 
and reproduces, as far as it can, any part accidentally mutilated. (Blumenbach 
1817: 335) 
The specificity of Blumenbach’s position lies in its insistence on the tie between the 
vital powers and the matter on which they operate. As Lenoir has expressed it: 
In spite of his decision to support the epigenetic theory, Blumenbach did not want 
to abandon what he considered to be desirable features of the preformationist 
account. In particular, he wanted to retain the idea fundamental to Haller's 
preformationism, that the fact of biological organization could not be accounted 
for in terms of physico-mechanical causes, but had to be treated as primary. On 
the other hand, he wanted to avoid treating biological organization as a result of 
the super-imposition upon inorganic matter of a separate force, a Lebenskraft, or a 
soul, which exists independently of a material substrate. In attempting to steer a 
course between the Scylla of materialistic reductionism and the Charybdis of 
vitalism, Blumenbach treated the agent responsible for organic structure as a kind 
of Newtonian force for the biological realm, which he called the Bildungstrieb. 
(Lenoir 1982: 20) 
Like so many eighteenth-century life-scientists, and not coincidentally like Buffon and 
Maupertuis before him, Blumenbach took his cue from Newtonianism in order to 
postulate this special and specific force and that for him 
the word Formative Drive [Bildungstrieb], to the same extent as the words 
attraction, gravity, etc. is to serve as nothing more or nothing less than to denote 
a certain force, the constant effect of which can be recognized in experience, but 
the cause of which is, for us, to the same extent as that of the aforementioned, 
however universally recognized, forces of nature, a qualitas occulta. (Blumenbach 
1789: 25-26; my translation) 
As we will see, Kant would come to appreciate this position, although I fear we may have 
misunderstood his reasons for doing so. What is clear at this point, however, is that 
Blumenbach’s version of epigenesis did not resolve the issues around the theory of 
epigenesis, but merely brought them to the surface. Firstly, he made it clear that any 
valuable theory of epigenesis must postulate a teleological principle guiding the process 
of generation. Secondly, and more importantly, he revealed that however homogeneous 
epigenesis might take the initial matter on which generation draws to be, it needs to 
regard it as being sufficiently specific in order for it to allow for these processes of 
generation at all. It is the latter constraint that proved to be the biggest puzzle, and that 
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many now see as Blumenbach’s fateful concession to preformationism – a concession 
believed to be made by Kant as well. 
2.3 Epigenesis in the pre-critical period 
In the previous section, I have offered a lengthy historical overview of the early modern 
debate on animal generation. I have done so because I fear that in relying on the 
historical categories as we have inherited them from the history of science, we are 
bound to misunderstand the specific difficulties Kant intended to tackle in his own 
ventures into biological theory. For a long time, Kant has been taken to be a proponent 
of epigenesis because of his explicit adoption of the term to describe his own biological 
views and in analogies meant to clarify some of his positions in epistemology, 
philosophy of history (of philosophy) etc… Recently, however, a shift occurred in our 
reading of Kant. In 2002, Philip Sloan argued that Kant in fact sought to develop a more 
mitigated preformationist theory throughout his career, and that only in the mid-1780s 
did the term epigenesis find its way into his work. When it did, however, it did not take 
the form of the kind of unrestricted epigenesis that had begun to take hold of German 
Early Romanticism. Sloan’s reading was later endorsed by John Zammito (2003), and 
soon became the received opinion among Kant scholars. 
The merit of Sloan and Zammito is certainly to have shown that we need to be careful 
when speaking of Kant’s alleged epigenesis. I believe that they are wrong, however, in 
their identification of the kind of view that Kant ultimately adopted, and more 
importantly of the innatism they end up ascribing to the transcendental philosophy. In 
fact, their view comes down to the idea that Kant’s generic preformationism is more 
preformation than epigenesis, and that Kant never truly embraced epigenesis as a 
theory of development. Against this, I will argue that Kant’s view is a kind of epigenesis, 
or at least more of an epigenesist theory than the current view admits it to be, although 
it is meant also to address the difficulties with epigenesis. 
2.3.1 The Only Possible Account of Animal Generation 
Kant’s earliest explicit dealings with embryology were in his 1763 book The Only Possible 
Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God. This work is peculiar because 
of the several goals it sets itself. It starts off by criticizing traditional ontological proofs 
for the existence of God on the ground that existence is not a predicate, and then goes 
on to offer a proof of the existence of God of Kant’s own making. This technical proof, 
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however, interesting, does not concern us here, but it is important to see that many of 
the discussions Kant offers in this work are attempts to show the usefulness or 
uselessness of certain theological and/or teleological reasonings in natural philosophy. 
Most importantly, Kant claims that his proof of God, or the God whose existence he 
proved, allows us to assume that nature constitutes a harmonious and unified order. 
This means, amongst others, that in nature, a great diversity of effects must be regarded 
as due to a limited number of principles. Kant uses this argument not only to indicate 
that nature would be less perfect if it required frequent miraculous intervention (AA II: 
108-109) (an argument that we also saw in the Universal Natural History in Chapter 1), but 
also that we should be hesitant towards postulating further explanatory principles: 
In the procedure of purified philosophy there prevails a rule which, even if it is 
not formally stated, is nonetheless always observed in practice. The rule 
maintains that in investigating the causes of certain effects one must pay careful 
attention to maintaining the unity of nature as far as possible. In other words, the 
rule maintains that one must derive a variety of effects from a single cause which 
is already known, and not immediately suppose the existence of new and diverse 
operative causes to explain different effects because of some seemingly important 
dissimilarity between them. Accordingly, it is presumed that there exists a great 
unity in nature, in respect of the adequacy of a single cause to account for many 
different kinds of consequences. […] And if one finds oneself constrained to 
postulate a new principle to explain a type of effect, one feels a sense of thorough 
dissatisfaction. Even when a very precise symmetry seems to require the 
postulation of a specially instituted and artificially devised arrangement, one is 
still inclined to regard it as the necessary result of more general laws and to 
continue to observe the rule of unity, before resorting to an explanation in terms 
of an artificial provision. (AA II: 113) 
For many kinds of natural formations, Kant is willing to allow for their dependence on a 
limited set of natural causes and principles alone. He realizes, however, that the matter 
is somewhat more complicated in the case of organic form: 
[I]t would be absurd to regard the initial generation of a plant or animal as a 
mechanical effect incidentally arising from the universal laws of nature; 
nonetheless, there is a two-fold question, which has remained unanswered for the 
reason mentioned. Is each individual member of the plant- and animal-kingdoms 
directly formed by God, and thus of supernatural origin, with only propagation, 
that is to say, only the periodic transmission for the purposes of development, 
being entrusted to a natural law? Or do some individual members of the plant- 
and animal-kingdoms, although immediately formed by God and thus of divine 
origin, possess the capacity, which we cannot understand, actually to generate 
their own kind in accordance with a regular law of nature, and not merely to 
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unfold them? There are difficulties on both sides, and it is perhaps impossible to 
make out which difficulty is the greatest. (AA II: 114) 
The dilemma Kant construes here is: do we violate the order of nature by allowing a 
variety of phenomena to be unexplainable by the principles of nature or do we violate it 
by postulating new principles of nature? In other words: do we add the surplus of 
information for which we cannot account by postulating it in the initial state of the 
thing (its origin), or do we add it by allowing for new transformative capacities in 
nature (the process of development)? This dilemma is forced upon us by the specific 
mechanical unintelligibility of organic generation: 
in the light of everything we know, it is utterly unintelligible to us that a tree 
should be able, in virtue of an internal mechanical constitution, to form and 
process its sap in such a way that there should arise in the bud or the seed 
something containing a tree like itself in miniature, or something from which 
such a tree could develop. The internal forms proposed by Buffon, and the 
elements of organic matter which, in the opinion of Maupertuis, join together as 
their memories dictate and in accordance with the laws of desire and aversion, are 
either as incomprehensible as the thing itself, or they are entirely arbitrary 
inventions. (AA II: 115) 
Kant here criticizes Buffon and Maupertuis for failing to offer a really mechanical 
theory of generation. As I explained in section 2.2.3 of this chapter, Buffon and at least 
the early Maupertuis intended to offer a mechanicist theory by expanding the all-too 
restricted set of mechanical principles employed by the followers of Descartes. Kant 
seems to be saying, however, that the analogy with Newton fails. Indeed, mechanicists 
were reticent towards allowing new forces and principles in their austere ontology and 
explanatory apparatus. They could, however, be forced to admit gravity because gravity 
is utterly general and reinforces mechanical explanations. The same does not seem to 
hold for Buffon’s and Maupertuis’s principles, which are, in Kant’s appraisal, 
incomprehensible and/or arbitrary. The internal forms would be incomprehensible 
because they refer to a kind of non-extended structuring, and whilst gravity can be 
regarded as a penetrating force, working on the interior of matter, it is exhausted by its 
extensive effects (motions, accelerations, etc.). However, even if one were to allow for 
such interior properties, they would still be arbitrary, because unlike gravity, they do 
not operate generally, but are specific to species or individuals, and are selective in their 
operations. This selectivity in effect, however, is precisely what is in need of 
explanation. 
But this does not mean that Kant therefore embraces preformation:  
In this case, the origin of all such organic products is regarded as completely 
supernatural; it is, nonetheless, supposed that the natural philosophers have been 
left with something when they are permitted to toy with the problem of the 
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manner of gradual propagation. But consider: the supernatural is not thereby 
diminished, for whether the supernatural generation occurs at the moment of 
creation, or whether it takes place gradually, at different times, the degree of the 
supernatural is no greater in the second case than it is in the first. The only 
difference between them relates not to the degree of the immediate divine action 
but merely to the when. As for the natural order of unfolding mentioned above: it 
is not a rule of the fruitfulness of nature, but a futile method of evading the issue. 
For not the least degree of the immediate divine action is thereby spared. (AA II: 
115) 
I believe this passage is best interpreted as a criticism of the arguments in favor of 
preformation that led Justin Smith to postulate a parallel between preformation and 
pre-established harmony (cf. 2.2.2). Remember that authors such as Leeuwenhoek 
argued that, if the mechanical generation of living systems is unintelligible, this means 
that we must admit that all organisms are created directly by God. The theory of 
preformation is more attractive because it does not require constant miraculous 
intervention by God in order to explain how organisms occur in the world. It just 
assumes that all organisms were created at the moment when God created the universe. 
Kant was dissatisfied with this argument because he regarded it as a mere sleight of 
hand. To see why this is so, we need to elaborate the parallel between occasionalism and 
pre-established harmony on the one hand and continuous creation and preformation on 
the other. 
Leibniz often stresses the superiority of pre-established harmony over occasionalism. 
The reasoning behind this assumption of superiority is unclear, however, for a reason 
that was noted by Antoine Arnauld in his correspondence between Leibniz:  
With regard to that which you say, namely that even though my arm lifts when I 
want to lift it, this is not because my soul causes this movement in my arm; but 
that this is because when I want to lift it, this is precisely at the moment at which 
everything in the body is disposed for this effect, such that the body moves in 
virtue of its proper laws, even though it comes to pass through the admirable but 
unwavering agreement of things amongst each other, that this law conspire to 
this effect at exactly the moment when the will is brought to it. God having taken 
it into account in advance, when he resolved to this sequence of all things in the 
universe. It seems to me that this is saying the same thing in other words as is said 
by those who pretend that my will is the occasional cause of the movement of my 
arm, and that God is its occasional cause. For they do not pretend that God does 
that within time by a new volition, which he has every time I want to move my arm; 
but by this sole act of eternal volition, through which he has willed to do 
everything that he has foreseen as necessary in order that the universe be thus as 
he has judged that it had to be. (G II :84; my translation and stress) 
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Arnauld protests that Leibniz has no right to claim the superiority of pre-established 
harmony over occasionalism because it requires less intervention in the order of nature 
on God’s part, since the occasionalists agree with Leibniz that the occasioning of causes 
is always due to general volitions, and not particular interventions. As the terms in 
italics indicate, Arnauld denies that occasionalism is commited to the fact that God 
intervenes within time, that all his interventions are contemporary, i.e. at the moment of 
the miracle of creation. In his response to this criticism, Leibniz concedes that 
occasionalism is not inferior because it requires more volitions and creations on God’s 
part, but because it requires that all powers reside in God: 
If I properly understand the views of the authors of the occasional causes, they 
introduce a miracle which is no less miraculous for being continual. For it seems 
to me that the notion of miracle does not consist in rarity. One might say in this 
matter God acts only according to a general rule, and consequently he acts 
without miracle. But I do not grant that consequence, and I believe that God can 
make general rules for himself even with respect to miracles. For example, if God 
had resolved to give his grace immediately or perform some other action of this 
nature every time a certain condition was satisfied, this action, though ordinary, 
would nevertheless still be a miracle. I admit that the authors of occasional causes 
might give another definition of the term, but, according to common usage, it 
seems that a miracle differs internally and substantively from the performance of 
an ordinary action, and not by the external accident of frequent repetition; 
properly speaking, God performs a miracle when he does something that 
surpasses the forces he has given to creatures and conserves in them. (G II: 92-93; 
Leibniz 1989: 82-83) 
This passage reveals that the distinction Leibniz sees between pre-established harmony 
and occasionalism is not that the latter is less economical than the former, but that the 
former preserves a sense in which nature itself is dynamic. Leibniz advances, against 
Malebranche and other occasionalists, that the superior position is still the Thomist 
orthodoxy that God creates and sustains creatures with their causal powers, even 
though he claims that these causal powers only truly operate within these creatures. 
Occasionalism robs nature of this autonomous power by stating that creatures do not 
have causal powers, and that all causal powers reside in God. For Leibniz, then, 
creatures have causal powers, and these are not exerted on each other, but do 
harmonize with each other, whereas for occasionalists (according to Leibniz), creatures 
lack causal powers and the harmony between causes and effects is due to God’s general 
volitions. 
This gives us an important clue as to what Kant is trying to argue in the above-quoted 
passage. He is, I believe, arguing that preformation is better than continuous creation 
only on the equivocation of the concept of a miracle noted by Leibniz. After all, 
preformationists are ultimately equally committed to the fact that the creation of a 
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living system requires a distinct act of creation by God. They only disagree over the fact 
whether this distinct act of creation takes place in time, or at the moment of creation. 
And at this point the analogies between occasionalism and continuous creation and pre-
established harmony and preformation break down. On the occasionalists notion of a 
miracle, the degree of supernaturalism could be decreased only if not every single 
generation required a separate creation, but could instead take place through a general 
principle. But this is of course exactly what preformation denies: no generation can take 
place according to a general principle. On the Leibnizian version of a miracle, on the 
other hand, the parallel comes out little better. Leibniz would agree that every organism 
is individually preformed by God, but argue that the subsequent development of the 
organism could be due to proper powers of that organism. This, however, arguably 
makes development less of a miracle, but not generation. In order for generation to cease 
to be a miracle on either of these accounts, it would require that God endow upon his 
creatures their own proper powers to produce their like, and thereby establish through 
a general volition the possibility of all future generations. Again, this is precisely what 
Leibniz wants to deny. 
That this analysis is what Kant had in mind is supported by the fact that he concludes 
the passage with a description of the position, rejected by all supernaturalists, that I just 
described: “[t]he purpose of these considerations has simply been to show that one must 
concede to the things of nature a possibility, greater than that which is commonly 
conceded, of producing their effects in accordance with universal laws.” (AA II: 115). 
This position is less supernaturalist on both notions of a miracle, because it allows for a 
general volition for each species, and for every individual of this species to truly have 
the natural power to propagate. Moreover, this position gives rise, further on in the Only 
Possible Argument, to a rule of Kant’s revised version of physico-theology, which stresses 
both the unity and the causal autonomy of nature: 
One will presume that the necessary unity to be found in nature is greater than 
strikes the eye. And that presumption will be made not only in the case of 
inorganic nature but also in the case of organic nature as well. For even in the case 
of the structure of an animal, it can be assumed that there is a single disposition 
[Anlage], which has the fruitful adaptedness to produce many different 
advantageous consequences. Initially, we may have supposed that a variety of 
special provisions must have been necessary to produce such effects. Careful 
attention to the necessary unity of nature is both consonant with philosophy and 
advantageous to the physic-theological method of inference. (AA II: 126) 
By themselves, none of these passages point towards the concrete nature of Kant’s own 
theory of generation. In fact, the only positive comments he makes are restrictions on 
the kind of theory that he would want to accept. Nevertheless, Kant reveals himself to 
be clearly dissatisfied with both metamorphosis and preformation because of their 
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inability to account for natural change and generation without stretching the meaning 
of “natural” beyond the bounds of plausibility. He also introduces a core term of his own 
approach: that of disposition or Anlage. Here, it is important to indicate that he speaks 
only of disposition, and that the structure of animal can be accounted for by a single 
disposition, since the evidence for Kant’s preformationism rests on the fact that this 
term is to be understood in tandem with that of germ (Keim) (Cf. Sloan 2002 239-240). It 
is telling, in this respect, that the term first appears autonomously in the early 1760s, 
and that the talk of “germs” is a later development, one from the 1770s. In the next 
section, I will argue that, although it is true that the term germ is to be understood in its 
systematic connection with that of a disposition, it is the latter term, and its origin in an 
explitly anti-preformationist theory of generation, that maintains the upper hand. 
2.3.2 Races and Dispositions 
Between the Inaugural Dissertation of 1770 and the Critique of Pure Reason of 1781 lie 
what we are now used to calling Kant’s silent decade. This term is somewhat of a 
misnomer, since Kant did publish some papers in this period, although none of them 
have even remotely attained the status of the works of the 1780s and the 1790s, the so-
called critical period. These texts offer several interpretative difficulties, not in the least 
because it is unclear whether they are to be understood as pre-critical or as already 
critical. We may be tempted to regard them as pre-critical because they continue a 
project in which Kant was engaged since the late 1750s, that of physical geography and 
anthropology. On the other hand, their themes persist into works from the critical 
period. This gives us the additional task of ascertaining whether the ideas expressed in 
them underwent any changes due to the critical turn. 
Phillip Sloan and John Zammito have argued that the works of the 1770s are 
continuous not with the critical writings as a whole, but with the early critical period. 
They regard them as expressive of Kant’s endorsement of preformationism, which 
allegedly continued until the mid 1780s, when, under the influence of his confrontations 
with Johann Gottfried Herder’s and Johann Friedrich Blumenbach’s writings, he was 
forced to develop the theory now known as generic preformationism, which is a more 
mitigated form of preformation than the earlier one. As we will see, this assumption is 
certainly not outrageous, but it does face serious difficulties. 
The most important element of Kant’s turn to preformation in the 1770s is, according 
to Sloan and Zammito, his usage of the term Germ (Keim) along that of Disposition 
(Anlage). The former term appears explicitly for the first time in the 1771 review of 
Moscati’s work Of the Corporeal Essential Differences between the Structure of Humans and 
Animals. Kant’s review opened with the following sentences:  
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Here we have again the natural human being on all fours, to which he is returned 
by an astute anatomist, which Rousseau as a philosopher did not succeed in doing. 
Dr. Moscati proves that the upright gait of the human being is contrived and 
against nature; that he is indeed built to maintain himself and move about in this 
position; but that, if he makes this his necessity and constant habit, discomforts 
and maladies result which demonstrate sufficiently that he was enticed by reason 
and imitation to deviate from the first, animal set-up. (AA II: 423) 
This passage already reveals the specific interest with which Kant read this work: that of 
the origin of man.7 The reference to Rousseau shows the concern with this issue and the 
extent to which rationality is natural or unnatural to man. The term germ pops up in 
the closing passages of the review as a response to precisely this question: 
The first foresight of nature was that the human being as an animal be preserved 
for himself and his kind; and for that the position which is most suited to his internal 
build, the situation of the fetus and the preservation in dangers is the four-footed 
one; but that there also has been placed in him a germ of reason through which, if 
the latter develops, he is destined for society, and by means of which he assumes 
permanently the most suitable position for society, viz., the two-footed one. 
Thereby he gains, on one side, infinitely much over the animals, but he has also to 
live with the discomforts which result for him from the fact that he has raised his 
head so proudly above his old comrades. (AA II: 425) 
This passage seems to ascribe to man a natural origin as an animal amongst animals, and 
seems to speak of this origin as if it had occurred at some point in history. Yet, Kant 
here also ascribes to man a germ of reason, through which he is destined for unnatural 
life, for a life that is at odds with the natural way of living. In the next chapter, it will 
become clear that we are dealing here with the first formulation of Kant’s distinct 
philosophy of history as it will be developed in the critical period. 
More important for our present purposes, however, is the paper Of the different Races 
of Human Beings, published first as an announcement of his lectures on physical 
geography in 1775, and again in a revised version as an article in 1777. In this paper, the 
distinction between germs and dispositions appears explicitly, although here again it is 
useful to address the specific content of the paper in more detail in order to avoid 
misunderstandings. 
The opening passages of the paper are clearly reminiscent of several themes from the 
Only Possible Argument: 
 
                                                     
7 In this quote, we can already see the tendency towards a recapitulation theory, which maintains that the 
same sequence governs the development of the species and that of the individual. Here, Kant does not address 
this, but it will work on in his philosophy of history (cf. chapter 3). 
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The natural division into species and kinds in the animal kingdom is grounded on 
the common law of propagation, and the unity of the species is nothing other than 
the unity of the generative power [zeugenden Kraft] that is universally valid for a 
certain manifoldness of animals. For this reason, Buffon’s rule, that animals which 
produce fertile young with one another (whatever difference in shape there may 
be) still belong to one and the same physical species, must properly be regarded 
only as the definition of a natural species of animals in general in contrast to all 
school species of the latter. The school division concerns classes, which divide the 
animals according to resemblances, the natural division concerns phyla, which 
divide the animals according to relationships in terms of generation. The former 
provides a school system for memory; the latter provides a natural system for the 
understanding. The first only aims at bringing creatures under titles; the second 
aims at bringing them under laws. 
According to this concept, all human beings on the wide earth belong to one and 
the same natural species because they consistently beget fertile children with one 
another, no matter what great differences may otherwise be encountered in their 
shape. One can adduce only a single natural cause for this unity of the natural 
species, which unity is tantamount to the unity of the generative power that they 
have in common: namely, that they all belong to a single phylum, from which, 
notwithstanding, their differences, they originated, or at least could have 
originated. In the first case, human beings beings belong not merely to one and 
the same species, but also to one family; in the second case they are similar to one 
another but not related, and many local creations would have to be assumed – an 
opinion which needlessly multiplies the number of causes. (AA II: 329-330) 
Here we find the same call for unity in explanation in nature as in the Only Possible 
Argument: Kant argues that we must understand all human races as being of the same 
natural species, because it is undesirable to postulate specific further causes merely in 
order to account for the minor differences between them. Kant endorses, then, a 
monogeneticism based on the genealogy of man that could be regarded as a standard 
creationist story, much as Leibniz did before him (Cf. Smith 2011: 269-274). His way of 
dealing with this monogeneticism, however, cannot be the same as that of Leibniz, 
because of the rationale lying behind his arguments.  
As we saw, in the Only Possible Argument, Kant protested against preformation because 
it had to postulate a distinct creation, a distinct cause or principle, for each biological 
individidual. Given Kant’s unwillingness to admit multiple causes to account for 
multiple human races, I think it is fair to assume he would still have been reticent 
towards the idea of individual preformation. This is further attested to by the main 
focus of this passage: the unity of the generative force. Recall that already in the 1763 
writing, he indicated that “one must concede to the things of nature a possibility, 
greater than that which is commonly conceded, of producing their effects in accordance 
with universal laws” (AA II: 115) and that in the case of the structure of living beings, 
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“there is a single disposition [Anlage], which has the fruitful adaptedness to produce 
many different advantageous consequences” (AA II: 126). What he seems to be 
concerned with here is to show that “some individual members of the plant- and 
animal-kingdoms, although immediately formed by God and thus of divine origin, 
possess the capacity, which we cannot understand, actually to generate their own kind 
in accordance with a regular law of nature, and not merely to unfold them” (AA II: 114). 
In contradistinction to preformationism, this account does not imply that individuals 
are preformed, but rather that species have the capacity to regularly produce offspring 
sharing their specific marks and their specific generative force. But this leaves Kant 
with the task of explaining from where the specific differences and the specific range of 
differences within species come. It is only for this task that he introduces the notions of 
germs and dispositions: 
The grounds of a determinate unfolding which are lying in the nature of an 
organic body (plant or animal) are called germs¸ if this unfolding concerns 
particular parts; if however, it concerns only the size or the relation of the parts to 
one another, then I call them natural predispositions. […] In the migration and 
transplanting of animals and plants it creates the semblance of new kinds; yet 
they are nothing other than variations and races of the same species the germs 
and natural predispositions of which have merely developed on occasion in 
various ways over long periods of time. 
Chance or the universal mechanical laws could not produce such agreement. 
Therefore we must consider such occasional unfoldings as preformed. Yet even 
where nothing purposive shows itself, the mere faculty to propagate its adopted 
character is already proof enough that a particular germ or natural predisposition 
for it was to be found in the organic creature. For outer things can well be 
occasioning causes but not producing ones of what is inherited necessarily and 
regenerates. As little as chance or physical-mechanical causes can produce an 
organic body, just as little as chance or physical-mechanical causes can produce 
an organic body, just as little will they add something to its generative power, i.e., 
bring about something that propagates itself, if it concerns a special shape or 
relation of the parts. (AA II: 434-435) 
This passage is very important, even if it were only for the misconceptions that it may 
bring about. Sloan (2002: 233-235) goes through great pains to show that the term 
“germs” stems unambiguously from classical preformationism, which would explain 
why Kant believed that “we must consider such occasional unfoldings as preformed”. 
Zammito (2003: 83) has concluded from this analysis that “[t]he specific form of 
preformation that Kant endorsed was the sophisticated version developed by Bonnet and 
Haller in the early 1760s in response to the challenge first of Maupertuis and Buffon and 
then, more fundamentally, of Caspar Friedrich Wolff”. I believe this is mistaken, since it 
cannot be made to square with the text. 
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 As argued in section 2.2.3., the preformationism of Haller and Bonnet was indeed 
sophisticated, but no less a preformation. All preformationists believed that 
environmental and sometimes even hereditary effects could influence the outcome of 
the process of unfolding. But they also believed that these effects were extraneous to 
the individual germ itself, which had been preformed at creation. Secondly, they 
obviously made no distinction between the germ and something like a disposition. In 
fact, they believed there to be a single germ which was then unfolded on occasion of 
incubation and appropriate conception and nutrition. This is certainly not what Kant is 
talking about here. 
Kant’s concern in this passage is more with the unity and constancy of the generative 
force. He suggests that this unity and constancy is required in order to account for the 
reproductive and restorative (and probably nutritive) properties of living beings. But he 
equally wants to account for the adaptive nature of this property, and the inheritability 
of this adaptedness. As a result, he postulates that there are two kinds of internal 
constraints on the generative force that determine the outcome of the developmental 
process. The first kind he calls germs, and he considers to be the factors determining 
the development of the animal through the generative force. The second kind are not as 
determinate, but instead determine which possible changes can occur to the constraints 
of the generative force. The most original aspect of his position is that he believes that 
not just the stabilities, but also the changes in form, are due to internal constraints 
rather than due to outside occasions. This is a major shift away from preformation, 
which suggests that the preformed structure is fully determined, and all real variations 
are due to outside influences. What is “preformed”, according to Kant, is not a fixed 
structure, but a constraint on the forces and processes of generation and development. 
We will see in the course of this chapter and in the course of this dissertation which 
kinds of constraints Kant has in mind. 
This is related to another major aspect of the position Kant advances in Of the different 
Races of Human Being, namely its departure from classical systematics. As Kant notes in 
the opening paragraph of the essay:  
The school division concerns classes, which divide the animals according to 
resemblances, the natural division concerns phyla, which divide the animals 
according to relationships in terms of generation. The former provides a school 
system for memory; the latter provides a natural system for the understanding. 
The first only aims at bringing creatures under titles; the second aims at bringing 
them under laws. (AA II: 329) 
Kant announces here that he intends the account of species in terms of a generative 
force to be a departure from the traditional account. I believe this passage continues the 
criticism of preformationism offered in the Only Possible Argument. To see why this is so, 
we need to briefly return to the preformationist account of genealogy. It is clear that 
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preformationism cannot maintain that one creature is a parent of the other if the 
former has produced the latter through its natural capacities, since it denies that 
creatures are naturally produced, and can be naturally produced. This brings up the 
following question: in what sense can we then say that one creature engendered 
another, if both creatures are strictly speaking co-originary? I know of two 
preformationist answers to this question. The first answer is that of the theory Charles 
Bonnet called emboîtement, namely that God placed, at the moment of creation, all 
children in the reproductive organs of their parents, to develop there on the occasion of 
fertilization. The reason for placing a creature in another creature is that they resemble 
one another at least to the extent that they are of the same species. The other answer is 
due to the theory Bonnet called dissémination. According to this theory, the preformed 
organisms are dispersed throughout nature, and develop only when 1) they happen to 
enter a creature that sufficiently resembles it and 2) the latter creature is fertilized by a 
creature that sufficiently resembles it. 
The upshot of both of these answers is that we are not of the same species as our 
parents because we were engendered by them, but that we are engendered by our 
parents because we are of the same species as them. The notion of a species is therefore 
exhausted by a degree of resemblance between otherwise independently generated, co-
originary entities. Any further resemblance, such as the typical constancy of traits in 
families that we now tend to regard as hereditary, are purely external influences on the 
embryo due to the specific physiological (most importantly nutritional) context in 
which it happens to develop (i.e. the body of the mother). 
It is now easy to see how Kant’s account is a criticism of preformationism. For Kant, 
preformation can never found a species concept based on a natural kind, since it cannot 
find a principle for the similarities between members of a different species. In absence 
of such a principle, we can never know which degree of similarity is required to speak of 
the same species, and we can never know which similarities are required for a specific 
identity. In absence of this, we will always be forced to classify natural entities on the 
basis of their surface similarities, realizing that these surface similarities can always be 
challenged by another choice of criterion.  
Kant would therefore regard his own account as superior because it postulates a 
general principle responsible for the specific identity, namely the formative force. This 
formative force is specified and specifies by means of the germs and dispositions. On the 
basis of the assumption of such a species identity, we can identify which degree of 
similarity and which similarities are required to speak of an identity between species. 
We can also reject the idea that similarities are required to speak of species identity; all 
that is required is the continuity of production, and no specified amount of dissimilarity 
can lead one to reject the idea that the same productive force was at work. Finally, as we 
already saw, Kant’s account entails that the changes in the productive force are internal 
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changes, not external accidents. The productive force is therefore characteristically 
plastic.8 
2.4 Epigenesis in the Critical Period 
2.4.1 Germs and Dispositions as Internal Limitations 
John Zammito is famed for addressing the great importance of Kant’s confrontation 
with Johann Gottfried Herder’s Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, the first 
volume of which appeared in 1784. According to Zammito (1992: 181) “Herder’s grand 
project in the Ideen was to find how man as a creature of nature figured in man as an 
artifice of culture, to read these two dimensions of man as in continuity”. In his efforts 
to situate man within the totality of nature, Herder interprets organic nature as a 
continuity of organizational forms, where (anticipating Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire and 
Cuvier) the various morphologies are considered as variations on a single basic 
prototype (Herder 1869 : 49). From this he considers himself entitled to conclude “that 
Nature, in the infinite variety that she loves, seems to have formed all life on our earth 
according to one main plasma” (Herder 1869: 49; my translation). A bit further in the 
work, Herder boldly states that this process of formation (Bildung) is epigenesist rather 
than a mere unfolding of preformed germs (Keime):  
The theory of germs, that has been adopted in order to explain vegetation, doesn’t 
really explain anything at all; for the germ is already in the product, and where 
that is, there must already be an organic force that produces it. No analyst would 
have discovered all future germs in the first grain of creation; they do not become 
visible until the plant has reached its full force; and from all our experiences we 
do not have the right to attribute it to anything else than an organic force of the 
plant itself, working on it with quiet intensity. (Herder 1869: 63; my translation) 
Herder’s version of epigenesis stresses the organizational power over the actual 
structure, the process of formation (Bildung) over the form itself. This power is identical 
behind the many forms that it produces and constitutes the single organizational nexus 
that suffices to engender and understand the whole of nature: it is nature considered as 
active, as natura naturans rather than natura naturata. 
 
                                                     
8 We will return to the topic of plasticity in 4.2.2 
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Zammito has made much of Kant’s resistance towards these ideas, and interpreted it 
as an indication of Kant’s refusal of epigenesis altogether. But this is not so clear from 
Kant’s actual objections in his 1785 review of the first two parts of Herder’s work: 
[Herder] calls the cause of the climatic difference of human beings a genetic force. 
The reviewer has the following concept of the meaning of this expression, in the 
author’s mind. He wants to dismiss on the one side the system of evolution and 
yet also on the other side the merely mechanical influences of external causes as 
providing unworkable grounds of elucidation, and he assumes as its cause a 
principle of life, which appropriately modifies itself internally in accordance with 
differences of the external circumstances; with this the reviewer fully concurs, 
only with this reservation, that if the cause organizing itself from within were 
limited by its nature only perhaps to a certain number and degree of differences 
in the formation of a creature (so that after the institution of which it were not 
further free to form yet another type under altered circumstances), then one 
could call this natural vocation of the forming nature also “germs” [Keime] or 
“original predispositions” [ursprüngliche Anlage], without thereby regarding the 
former as primordially implanted (as in the system of evolution), but merely as 
limitations, not further explicable, of a self-forming faculty, which latter we can 
just as little explain or make comprehensible. (AA VIII: 62-63). 
Mind that Kant’s hesitance is directed not to the idea of a genetic force, which is similar 
to Kant’s own generative force, nor to the fact that this generative force is plastic and 
can modify itself internally. Like Kant, Herder refuses the preformationist system and 
the system of metamorphosis. The distinction only comes in once this genetic force 
needs to be qualified. Herder attributes to it an almost unlimited plasticity, which allows 
it to give rise to all kinds of structures over time. It is this latter assumption with which 
Kant disagrees: according to him, the generative force must be internally constrained in 
order to be explanatory at all. It is in this context that he revisits the preformationist-
sounding terminology of the 1770s and the early 1780s, interpreting them “merely as 
limitations, not further explicable, of a self-forming faculty, which latter we can just as 
little explain or make comprehensible”. I submit here that this view of germs may very 
well have been the one he held all along: in all previous passages, the germs and 
predispositions failed to match up with classical preformationist notions, and appeared 
only as qualifications and internal limits on Kant’s central concept: that of the unitary 
generative force.9 The question remains why Kant then continued to use this deceptive 
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 Peter McLaughlin (2007: 287) commented on Kant’s use of the notions of germs and predispositions as 
follows: “[Kant’s] germs and predispositions do still fit the determinist eighteenth-century model of pre-given 




terminology.10 This is a question that I will not be able to answer until the end of the 
next chapter. 
2.4.2 Generic Preformationism and Transcendental Epigenesis 
The final text to which I would like to draw attention in this chapter is the one in which 
Kant coins his term “generic preformationism” and in which he approvingly refers to 
Blumenbach’s recently advanced concept of Formative Drive (Bildungstrieb). This text is 
§81 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment, where Kant tackles the teleological principle 
as it is applied to the case of generation. He discerns two distinct ways of accounting for 
this principle:  
If the teleological principle of the generation of these beings (i.e. natural 
purposes) is assumed (as cannot but be the case), then the cause of their internally 
purposive form can be grounded in either occasionalism or prestabilism. According 
to the former, the supreme world-cause, in accordance with its idea, would 
immediately provide the organic formation to the matter commingling in every 
impregnation; according to the latter, it would only have placed in the initial 
products of its wisdom the predisposition by means of which an organic being 
produces more of its kind and constantly preserves the species itself, in which a 
nature that continuously works at their destruction simultaneously makes good 
the loss of the individuals. (AA V: 422) 
Kant here assumes that the specificity of organic form cannot be produced by the most 
general of mechanical principles alone, a thesis for which he argued in the preceding 
paragraphs of his Critique of Teleological Judgment. Additionally, he assumes that 
hylozoism or vital materialism is not an option. These two assumptions echo those of 
the 1763 discussion, where Kant rejects not only classical mechanicist accounts of 
generation, but also the attempts of theorists like Buffon and Maupertuis to account for 
complexity by making (in Kant’s opinion) ad hoc additions to the principles and causes 
at work in nature. For this reason, he is bound to accept either the occasionalist version 
or the prestabilist one. Kant understandably immediately rejects the occasionalist 
account (AA V: 422), because it would make generation fully miraculous and unnatural. 
This leaves him with what he calls prestabilism: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
eighteenth-century model of determining factors, and there is surely a great difference between a preformed 
element and a determining factor. 
10 Actually, it is not as deceptive as we would initially think. Johannes Nikolaus Tetens had already written in 
1777 that the term “germ” or “keim” is neutral with respect to preformationism or epigenesis, since both 
theories have to admit of some organization (Tetens 1777, II: 455; cf. also further on in 6.2.3). 
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Now prestabilism can in turn proceed in two ways. Namely, it considers each 
organic being generated from its own kind as either the educt or the product of the 
latter. The system of generatings as mere educts is called that of individual 
preformation or the theory of evolution; the system of generatings is called the 
system of epigenesis. The latter can also be called the system of generic preformation, 
since the productive capacity of the progenitor is still preformed in accordance 
with the internally purposive predispositions that were imparted to its stock, and 
thus the specific form was preformed virtualiter. Given this, the opposing theory of 
individual preformation might better be called the theory of involution (or that of 
encapsulation). (AA V: 422-423) 
At last we see Kant explaining the remnants of preformationist language in his own 
theory of epigenesis. He has been assuming that the productive capacity that accounts 
for epigenetic production has a specific structure, and that this structure is to be 
understood as expressing a virtual preformation rather than an actual one. The process 
of epigenesis is then one that articulates and differentiates organic form that is in itself 
homogeneous, but that must be considered as virtually containing the articulations and 
differentiations required to yield its full-formed structure. Here, I would like to remind 
the reader that the assumption of virtual rather than actual initial differentiation was 
exactly the position that both preformationists and metamorphosists rejected, and that 
epigenesists endorsed. For neither Harvey nor Wolff, epigenesis meant an unrestricted 
or blind force: they believed instead that the required restrictions were not pre-existing 
structures, but rather proper to the process and the circular causality (cf. 2.2.1) of 
generation. Here, Kant coins the term “virtual” in order to assign a status to the specific 
way in which the guiding idea of the whole pre-exists the parts of that whole. 
It is within the context of such a position that Kant offers the following praise of 
Blumenbach: 
He [Blumenbach] begins all physical explanation of these formations with 
organized matter. For he rightly declares it to be contrary to reason that raw 
matter should originally have formed itself in accordance with mechanical laws, 
that life should have arisen from the nature of the lifeless, and that matter should 
have been able to assemble itself into the form of a self-preserving purposiveness 
by itself; at the same time, however, he leaves natural mechanism an 
indeterminable but at the same time also unmistakable role under this inscrutable 
principle of an original organization, on account of which he calls the faculty in the 
matter in an organized body (in distinction from the merely mechanical formative 
power [Bildungskraft] that is present in all matter) a formative drive [Bildungstrieb] 
(standing, as it were, under the guidance and direction of that former principle). 
(AA V: 424) 
Kant’s respect for Blumenbach’s position centers on several interesting features of this 
account. For one, Blumenbach always starts from organized matter. This means that he 
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takes the original matter of the living being to be not a mere chaotic mixture of 
elements, nor a homogeneous material, but to be in some way already organized. This 
organization is not characterized in terms of its resemblance to the later stage of that 
organization, and therefore not as its preformed version, but rather as the organization 
giving rise to the latter through a genuinely productive force: the Bildungstrieb. The 
benefit of such an analysis is that it allows us to admit that order does not arise out of 
chaos, whilst still maintaining that the order that arises is not fully predetermined by 
the order out of which it arises. 
In addressing the question whether this position of Kant’s is preformationist or 
epigenesist, we need to note that it may not be far removed from Aristotle’s position 
after all, as is revealed by the following comment by Balme: 
Aristotle, like Plato and probably all the ancients, sees the primary actions of the 
elements as quantitatively indeterminate until limit is imposed upon them. If limit 
is naturally imposed, not at random but regularly and usually, it must come from a 
pre-existing source; this he interprets as an enclosed system of movements in air 
earth fire and water; and the only place where it can be is in the parent. […] It is 
summed up in the cardinal principle that ‘a man begets a man’. (Balme 1987: 283) 
Balme describes Aristotle’s theory as implying that the development of the fetus 
through an ordered process is due to the fact that there are limits or constraints placed 
upon the material processes that make up the process of generation. These limits or 
constraints are themselves due to the pre-existence of an organic structure with similar 
features (i.e. of the same kind). It would be disingenuous to take the word “pre-
existence” here in a way that suggests any of the pre-existence of preformation theories 
of Early Modernity. Rather, it means that the specific (i.e. species-) constraints are 
operative because reproduction is always to be understood as a power of a living system, 
the parent. 
It is not difficult to see the parallels between this view and Kant’s. Kant too 
emphasizes that what we should regard as pre-existing is not the individual, but the 
species. This can easily be understood as the claim that in order for a living system to be 
generated, it is required that there already exist another living system which embodies 
the specific constraints of that species. Moreover, as I have argued, the notions of germs 
and predispositions are best understood as constraints on the developmental process, 
and the developmental process as the exercise of the formative force. The formative 
force, then, acquires its specificity because it is subject to, and incorporates, the specific 
constraints exemplified by the generating structure (the parent).  
This brings us to the real meaning of Kant’s decried species fixism. The point behind 
this is not that God has ordained and maintained the number of species. It is rather that 
removing the stability of species-characteristics in development would make 
development unintelligible. In stressing the plasticity and changeability of living form, 
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we should not lose out of sight the idea of specification and speciation, which require 
that we explain this change by invoking the relations between specific structures. A 
general, unrestricted generative force like that hypothesized by Herder is not capable to 
give rise to all the species – because it fails to account for the specification and the 
specificity, it is in fact incapable of giving rise to any species. Additionally, Kant is not 
optimistic about origin of life theorizing, because he is commited to the fact that every 
living being requires a pre-existing living being. Hence, life requires either an eternal 
regress or a moment of brute creation. But neither of these options need to be endorsed 
by the father of transcendental idealism, since he has shown both alternatives to be 
avoidable. 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that Kant maintained, throughout the whole of his career, 
a characteristically epigenesist theory of generation, and have argued against the idea 
that Kant was ever tempted by preformationism. I have done this by showing that much 
of the considerations that have been taken as concessions to preformationism are best 
understood as attempts to refine his own picture of epigenesis, and do not constitute 
major divergences from the epigenesist tradition. This is important because Kant also 
employed the language of his epigenesist theory of development in his philosophy of 
history and in his epistemology. I will discuss the meaning of this employment of 
embryological metaphors in the following chapter. In order to set the stage for my 
discussion there, however, I believe it is appropriate to conclude here by indicating 
some of the crucial characteristics of Kantian epigenesis that are invoked in his 
philosophy of history and epistemology. 
First of all, Kant’s version of epigenesis is meant to account for the continuity of 
species. Along with Buffon, Kant insisted that species are determined by interfertility, 
and by heredity. Two living beings are of the same species when they somehow share a 
genealogy. By invoking this idea, Kant is stressing the continuity of living form, namely 
the idea that living beings are always brought forth by other living beings from the 
same kind.  
Second, Kant stresses that this continuity expresses itself in the operation of the 
living force and the process of development, not in the internal connection with the 
previous structure. He is dissatisfied by preformationism because it assumes that the 
structure required for explaining a later structure need be both numerically and 
structurally identical with it and similar to it. For Kant, all that is required is that a 
previous structure constrains the production of the latter structure, and that these 
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constraints are virtually present in the productive force rather than actually present in 
the producing structure. 
Third, Kant’s theory of predispositions is not only meant to account for the 
continuities, but also for the changes. The concept of a predisposition serves to do this 
in two ways. On the one hand, it stresses that, although an earlier structure is for a 
second structure of the same kind to arise, the similarity between the two structures 
can be rather low. All that need to be shared are the basic germs and predispositions. 
For Kant, then, two structures relate not as an enveloped preformed structure and a 
developed formed structure would, but as parent and child – sure, they share species 
traits, but the individuality is not the same, and hence not everything is determined. 
The capacity of parents to bring forth children is not, for him, the capacity to occasion 
preexisting individuals – it is the capacity to bring forth new individuals, with their own 
individual traits. This capacity is due to a fundamentally plastic generative force. 
Finally, the idea of germs and predispositions makes room for the contingent without 
thereby having to externalize history. In his writings on races, Kant was concerned with 
showing that environmental influences could only effect changes in formative forces if 
they somehow occasioned the predispositions lying within those forces. This means that 
he did believe environmental influences could lead to changes, but that they could not 
do so through direct influence. 
All of these characteristics of the theory are essential to a proper understanding of 
the way in which Kant’s philosophy can integrate the historical, both in his 
philosophical anthropology and his epistemology. To see what they mean in these 
contexts, we must now turn to the discussion of the theory of epigenesis as it appears in 






Chapter 3  
Epigenesis and History 
Ursprung ist das Ziel 
- Karl Kraus 
In this chapter, I argue that Kant’s usage of language from embryology in other 
doctrines of his is best understood on the basis of the version of epigenesis ascribed to 
him in chapter 2. By reading his philosophy of history and his epistemology through 
this epigenesist lense, we see that Kant was indeed open to the historical and the 
dynamic. In section 3.1, I sketch the now dominant view of the implications of Kant’s 
embryology for his philosophy of history and his epistemology, which denies this 
historical and dynamic element. In section 3.2, I argue against this view in the case of 
Kant’s philosophy of history. I start off, in 3.2.1, by sketching what I take to be the target 
of Kant’s views: Rousseau’s theory of human nature. In the next two subsections, I argue 
that Kant’s epigenesis was meant to undermine the Rousseauist picture of man. In 3.2.2, 
I argue that the major difference between Kant and Rousseau is that the former believed 
the essence of man to be plastic, whereas the latter insisted that it is fixed. In  section 
3.2.3, I argue that the germs and dispositions Kant attributes to man are best understood 
as those capacities which make us capable of history and of change, rather than those 
which for ever determine our limits and essences. In section 3.3, I argue that Kant meant 
his epigenesis in epistemology as well. In 3.3.1, I argue against the thesis that the 
embryological language in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason is still 
preformationist, and can instead be read as in harmony with the view ascribed to Kant 
in chapter 2. In 3.3.2, I then argue that the embryological language of the second edition 
is clearly epigenesist, rather than mildly preformationist. Together, these arguments 
show that there are good reasons for ascribing to Kant a more dynamic view of history 




3.1 Epigenesis Beyond Generation 
Kant’s theory of epigenesis is of central importance because he invokes it in the context 
of his writings on philosophy of history, philosophical anthropology and pedagogy, and 
in the Critique of Pure Reason. On my account, this use of embryological metaphors is 
essential because it refers to the capacity of Kant’s philosophy to deal with the historical 
and with historicity. Ironically, then, this very link is now usually denied because of the 
wide-spread view, best expressed in the accounts given by Sloan and Zammito, that 
Kant’s theory of generation was actually more preformationist in nature, and hence like 
preformationism fundamentally ahistorical. In this section, I will indicate the 
implications of this for the interpretation of Kant’s philosophy of history and his 
epistemology. I will then go on to offer an alternative interpretation of the implication 
of the biological metaphors in these two contexts in the next two sections respectively. 
Kant links his philosophy of history to his theory of generation, by stating that man 
must be regarded as engaged in a transgenerational project of self-fulfiment, because of 
the fact that his natural capacities are indefinite and the fact that his life is definite, so 
that it is only as a species, and not as an individual, that he may be regarded as 
developing his inborn potential. This connection between the philosophy of history and 
the philosophy of biology has been regarded as an embarassment by many recent 
commentators. Pauline Kleingeld (1999: 60), for instance, makes a point of the fact that 
we can no longer endorse Kant’s pre-Darwinian teleological model. Allen Wood spelled 
out the reason for this insistence in the following words:  
A more serious problem for Kant’s philosophy of history is that we can no longer 
believe, for instance, in Kant’s heuristically motivated natural teleology as the 
right way for investigating the structure and behavior of living organisms. Since 
Darwin, it has been recognized that the unconscious and unintended purposive 
arrangements in living things have a determinate empirical explanation based on 
natural selection. Moreover, this explanation reveals that Kant’s heuristic 
assumption that the teleology in organisms is maximal is empirically and 
explainably false. When we learn how the organs of a living thing evolved, for 
instance, we sometimes come to understand why they are not optimally suited for 
the function they perform. And it might turn out, for similar reasons, that not 
everything we rightly conceptualize as one of the ‘‘species predispositions’’ of an 
organism would have to be fully developed in the normal course of the organism’s 
development. The biological basis of Kant’s philosophy of history therefore seems 
to have been undermined by scientific developments between his time and ours. 
(Wood 2006: 259-260) 
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Kleingeld and Wood of course do not want to say that Kant’s theory of history is thereby 
completely discredited. Wood admits as much immediately after voicing his reticence 
towards Kantian biology: 
Yet it is not so clear that the methodological considerations motivating Kant’s 
philosophy of history are less applicable today than they were in the eighteenth 
century. Biology may have made advances that undermine the application to it of 
Kant’s heuristically motivated natural teleology, but human history is still an area 
of inquiry to which no similar empirical theory has been applied with success. It 
may be that our best chance of making it intelligible is still the regulative-
teleological one that Kant adopts. (Wood 2006: 260) 
Scholars like Kleingeld and Wood are therefore forced to take an ambiguous stance 
towards Kant’s philosophy of history, in which it is seen, on the hand, to rely on 
untenable biological assumptions, and on the other hand, to have the clear benefits of 
giving us a basis for theoretical inquiry into history and of harmonizing the noumenal 
and phenomenal aspects of man. The first problem it is believed to solve by stating that, 
although individual intentional actions by free individuals cannot be the subject of a 
science, the underlying non-intentional processes driving human history can provide a 
foothold for a scientific historiography. The second solution is considered to consist in 
the idea that, even though the predispositions of man, and therefore his rationality, is 
fixed, atemporal and universal, these predispositions can be regarded as requiring 
history to develop themselves. 
Authors tend to diverge on which question they regard as essential. Allen Wood 
focuses on the problem of a theoretical approach to history and Alix Cohen (2007) has 
developed a richer account of how Kant can be read as giving a basis for not just 
historiography, but for the human sciences in general. For these authors, the problem is 
mostly how the freedom of individual intentional acts can be squared with the question 
of causes, laws or trends in history or in culture. As a result, this problem is more 
concerned with the status of the social sciences and the humanities.1 
 
                                                     
1 I also suspect that Allen Wood may be interested in Kant’s theory because it is the basis of the idea of a non-
intentional course of history with an internal mechanism or driving force. This idea is important to all those 
interested in for instance the Marxian idea of historical materialism, in which history is approached as subject 
to general historical tendencies. Allen Wood himself made great efforts in trying to show how Marxian 
historical materialism can be compatible with the ideas of agency and free will. In his book on Karl Marx, he 
wrote the following on the topic: “Historical materialism seeks to explain political events or socially prevalent 
ideologies teleologically by showing how they contribute to basic social or historical tendencies. Explanations 
of this sort are in general not deterministic. They do not imply that the tendency in question had to be 
manifested in just that way, or that it required the contribution of that particular explanandum in order to 
exist at all. In fact, a ‘basic historical tendency’ which required (that is, depended on) certain particular events 




Other authors are more concerned with the ethical dimension of Kant’s thought. 
Here, the concern is that Kantian ethics is dependent on the universality of the moral 
law, which is believed to imply not only the universality of reason, but also that of the 
other faculties. If this is so, however, allowing for a truly historical and developmental 
aspect to the a priori would destroy this claim to universality. This is why many 
interpretations are so invested in proving that ultimately, there is little genetic to 
Kant’s conception of genesis, little historical about his conception of history, little 
development to his conception of development. And this is precisely the conclusion that 
the talk of natural predispositions yields according to, for instance, Karl Ameriks: 
It turns out that Kant’s conception of his own view as epigenetic involves genesis 
or development only in a very restricted sense. As interpreters such as Zammito 
and Zoeller have argued in different ways, Kant’s denial of specific versions of a 
preformation account of our ideas is still compatible with an emphasis on the 
strict a priori nature of some of them, and even with an allowance that we are 
dependent on something that is preformed. Even though Kant does not want to 
call any of our ideas innate, he does insist that our a priori ideas are very unlike 
empirical ones because they are “originally” rather than derivatively “acquired.” 
Kant still takes the “ground” of the possibility of pure representations to be innate 
in us, although not the representations themselves, because he wants to avoid the 
odd notion of a kind of actual mental picture slumbering within the mind without 
any epistemological activity. (Ameriks 2009: 63) 
Here, Ameriks is using the Sloan-Zammito interpretation of Kant’s developmental 
theory as ultimately preformationist to deny that Kant’s philosophy can allow for 
historicity at all, except through an equivocation of the word “historical”. He is 
specifically doing so by referring to the fact that Sloan and Zammito have inferred, from 
Kant’s purported allegiance to some form of preformationism, that Kant’s epistemology 
does not allow for the dynamic and historical element that we now regard as a virtue of 
a theory of knowledge. There appears to be some disagreement over the degree of 
fixism to which Kant is committed by his alleged mitigated preformationism, but all 
authors do tend to close the gap between the Kantian and rationalist theories of 
knowledge. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
deserve the name. A materialist explanation of the French Revolution, for example, might show that the 
events of 1789 and the actions of such men as Mirabeau and Sieyes served to bring about political changes 
required by the economic conditions of France and the state of the class struggle. But the explanation need 
not show that economic conditions required these changes to take place at just that time or in just that 
manner, and almost certainly could not show that they had to be effected by just those individuals. To say that 
the Revolution came about on account of a basic historical tendency is precisely not to say that it had to 
happen in just the particular way it did.” (Wood 2004: 114)  
 
 117 
In the following two sections, I will argue that Sloan and Zammito, and those authors 
building on their theses, are mistaken in minimizing the dynamism available to Kant. I 
will show that all the relevant passages can be read as in line with the epigenesist 
theory I ascribed to Kant in the previous two sections. I will also show that an 
epigenesist and dynamic reading makes better sense of Kant’s criticisms of other 
philosophers than the preformationist and fixist reading because the latter makes it 
unclear how Kant differed from his preferred targets. 
3.2 Epigenesis and Transcendental History 
3.2.1 Rousseau’s Pristine Man 
One of the most famous biographical details of Kant’s otherwise unremarkable personal 
life is his daily routine. Ever since Heinrich Heine’s (1861: 186-187) evocative 
interpretation of the connection between this petite histoire and the meaning of Kantian 
philosophy, authors and teachers have relished in recounting the fact that Kant’s daily 
routine, including his morning walk, was obsessively planned and consistently upheld. 
They equally like to point out the sole exception to Kant’s observance of this daily 
routine. One day, so legend has it, Kant was so deeply immersed in his reading of 
Rousseau’s Emile ou de l’éducation that he lost all awareness of his inflexible schedule. 
This legend contains two elements: the idea of a rule and a regularity governing Kant’s 
whole being, and the idea of an exception to that rule that is, of course, a confirmation 
of the rule. But what does it show? It might be regarded as a solid reminder of the fact 
that Kant was so impressed and hence influenced by Rousseau that his love for the latter 
broke through his otherwise unswerving allegiance to his principles. But this is a 
problematic statement, for interest does not track influence¸ and influence does not mean 
agreement. Instead, many readers of Kant and Rousseau insist on the great chasm that 
divides the two authors. Kant may perhaps have been Rousseau’s greatest critic, and 
nowhere is this so evident than in their respective views on Education. 
Rousseau’s Emile is a massive work on education, but not only on education. It 
collects some of the most poignant statements of Rousseau’s philosophy and general 
commitments. One of its most disconcerting features is that this treatise on education is 
just as much a treatise against education. Rousseau believes to have observed that the 
men of his era are subject to two contrary kinds of impulses, those of nature and those 
of society, and that the resulting contradictions doom them to unhappiness:  
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From these contradictions is born the one we constantly experience between 
ourselves. Swept along contrary routes by nature and by men, forced to divide 
ourselves between these different impulses, we follow a composite impulse which 
leads us to neither one goal nor the other. Thus, in conflict and floating during the 
whole course of our life, we end it without having been good either for ourselves 
or for others. (Rousseau 1979: 41) 
The goal of Rousseau’s education is to raise man such as nature would have him 
develop. The hope is that a man raised primarily to be human will be more in harmony 
with himself, that he will become that noble creature which Rousseau calls natural man. 
The challenge of education is then the following: “To form this rare man, what do we 
have to do? Very much, doubtless. What must be done is to prevent anything from being 
done.” (Rousseau 1979: 41). Rousseau’s theory of education is a theory of counteracting 
education, of de-education. It is a theory of counteracting the adverse effects of 
socialization on our capacities and moral fibre, of restoring man to his original virtue. 
The opening line of the first book already announces this through the famous phrase: 
“Everything is good as it leaves the hands of the Author of things; everything 
degenerates in the hands of man.” (Rousseau 1979: 37). 
The meaning of this phrase only becomes clear in the second book of Emile, where 
Rousseau advances his theory of freedom and happiness, which is condensed into what 
he calls his fundamental maxim: “The truly free man wants only what he can do and 
does what he pleases” (Rousseau 1979: 84). This maxim expresses Rousseau’s conviction 
that man is at his best when his faculties and his desires are in harmony. In the state of 
nature, so Rousseau believes, man does not desire anything that is beyond his faculties, 
beyond his power. Furthermore, he advances that “[o]ur hapiness consists […] in the 
disproportion between our desires and our faculties” and that “human wisdom or the 
road to happiness” consists in “diminishing the excess of the desires over the faculties 
and putting the power and the will in perfect equality” (Rousseau 1979: 80).  
There are two aspects of Rousseau’s theory as expounded in the Emile to which we 
need to draw attention at this point. The first aspect is that of faculty rigidity, namely 
the idea that man has a distinct and well-circumscribed set of faculties and desires that 
are naturally present in him and by which he needs to live. The second is the idea of 
decadence, which assumes that man can leave the state of nature and enter into a state 
in which the relation between faculties and desire becomes distorted to such an extent 
that the good life becomes all but impossible. In the remainder of this subsection, I will 
discuss these two features of Rousseau’s theory, so that I can address Kant’s responses to 
them in the following subsections. 
In the Emile, Rousseau advances, or assumes, that man has a determinate place in 
nature. This place is determined by man’s nature, i.e. the faculties of which he disposes 
as a solitary being in an uncultivated world. It is for this reason that Rousseau implores 
us to do the following: 
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O man, draw your existence up within yourself, and you will no longer be 
miserable. Remain in the place which nature assigns to you in the chain of being. 
Nothing will be able to make you leave it. Do not rebel against the hard law of 
necessity; and do not exhaust your strength by your will to resist that law-
strength which heaven gave you not for extending or prolonging your existence 
but only for preserving it as heaven pleases and for as long as heaven pleases. 
Your freedom and your power extend only so far as your natural strength, and not 
beyond. All the rest is only slavery, illusion, and deception. (Rousseau 1979: 83) 
The question raised by this advice is of course why Rousseau feels the need to make it. If 
man has a properly assigned place in nature, then how is he ever led to leave it? How 
can he even go beyond his natural state if this state determines him fully? Rousseau’s 
answer to this is that man’s superbia stems from the superfluousness of some of his 
faculties: “All the animals have exactly the faculties necessary to preserve themselves. 
Man alone has superfluous faculties” (Rousseau 1979: 81). The foremost superfluous 
faculty seems to be that of Imagination: 
It is thus that nature, which does everything for the best, constitutes him [i.e. 
man] in the beginning. It gives him with immediacy only the desires necessary to 
his preservation and the faculties sufficient to satisfy them. It put all the others, as 
it were, in reserve in the depth of his soul, to be developed there when needed. 
Only in this original state are power and desire in equilibrium and man is not 
unhappy. As soon as his potential faculties are put in action, imagination, the most 
active of all, is awakened and outstrips them. It is imagination which extends for 
us the measure of the possible, whether for good or bad, and which consequently 
excites and nourishes the desires by the hope of satisfying them. But the object 
which at first appeared to be at hand flees more quickly than it can be pursued. It 
transforms and reveals itself in the distance ahead of us. No longer seeing the 
country we have already crossed, we count it for nothing; what remains to cross 
ceaselessly grows and extends. Thus one exhausts oneself without getting to the 
end, and the more one gains on enjoyment, the further hapiness gets from us. 
(Rousseau 1979: 80-81) 
This paragraph is, in my opinion, central to understanding the stance Kant will adopt 
against Rousseau’s philosophy of education, philosophical anthropology and philosophy 
of history. It describes man as a creature that has a fixed set of faculties, some of which 
are latent at first and only develop later on in the history of the individual and/or the 
species. One of these faculties is the ability to conceive possibilities that lie beyond one’s 
reach, and to conceive of possible future states. As Rousseau laments: “Foresight! 
Foresight, which takes us ceaselessly beyond ourselves and often places us where we 
shall never arrive. This is the true source of all our miseries.” (Rousseau 1979: 82) The 
most important illusion to which Imagination leads is the idea of extending one’s power, 
of transcending an initial state which is considered to be one of weakness. Against this 
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idea, Rousseau insists that the “word weak indicates a relation, a relation obtaining 
within the being to which one applies it. […] He whose needs surpass his strength, be he 
an elephant or a lion, be he a conqueror or a hero, be he a god, is a weak being.” For 
Rousseau, then, power expresses a relation between the faculties and the desires within 
a certain being. It is for this reason that he believes us to become weaker as we strive to 
go beyond our natural state: 
Man is very strong when he is contented with being what he is; he is very weak 
when he wants to raise himself above humanity. Therefore, do not fancy that in 
extending your faculties you extend your strength. On the contrary, you diminish 
your strength if your pride is extended farther than it. (Rousseau 1979: 81) 
What Rousseau warns against is the idle project of extending the faculties. This must 
necessarily fail, because the power of our faculties is limited, whereas the scope of the 
imagination is infinite.2 I think it likely that Rousseau believes our powers to be rigidly 
fixed, but it is also possible that he simply stresses our powers cannot possibly 
increment proportionately to our desires. On this latter reading, Rousseau would not 
say that striving to extend our faculties is harmful because our faculties cannot be 
extended, but rather that this striving is ill-advised because it would always lead us to 
be dissatisfied with any given expansion of our faculties. The two readings can converge 
if we add the further thesis, which Rousseau seems to hold as well, that the reason why 
any expansion of our faculties will prove dissatisfactory is because the increment of our 
faculties is limited in a way in which the increment of our desires is not. The latter 
thesis is commited to clear preestablished limits on the faculties. 
It appears, then, that Rousseau is commited to the following two doctrines, namely 
the fixity of our faculties, and the idea that there is in man a capacity for decadence. 
This decadence is the capacity to exit the state of nature and enter the state of culture, 
 
                                                     
2 The idea of the mismatch, the disproportion, between our faculties and our imagination, is an echo of the 
common theme of the disproportion between the will and the understanding. In Descartes, and many authors 
after him, this disproportion has been used to explain the possibility of error and sin in man. The problem 
with the capacity to err is that it is incomprehensible why a just God would choose to give us a capacity 
specifically to err, and thereby possibly, by sinning, incur his wrath. The answer to this conundrum is that the 
capacity to err is not a real, positive capacity, but the result of the disproportion between will and intellect, 
the former being unlimited in scope whilst the latter is finite and definite. Thus, although we are always 
capable of knowing the true and doing the good, we at times find ourselves seduced by the possibility of the 
alternatives to the true and the good. Rousseau’s thesis that man can abstain from erring by residing within 
the bounds of his faculties, is a secularized version of this theory. The form in which Rousseau uses it is related 
to the Lockean idea of empiricist humility, which insists that we keep within the scope of the faculties, since 
these are unproblematic as long as we use them in the way God or nature intended us to use them. We will see 
in the rest of this dissertation that Kant’s so-called “humility” is not clearly related to this scheme. 
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enter into society. This passage from nature to culture is, for Rousseau, always one of 
decadence, one of loss rather than gain: 
Society has made man weaker not only in taking from him the right he had over 
his own strength but, above all, in making his strength insufficient for him. That is 
why his desires are multiplied along with his weakness, and that is what 
constitutes the weakness of childhood as compared to manhood. […] We were 
made to be men; laws and society have plunged us once more into childhood. 
(Rousseau 1979: 85) 
For Rousseau, culture is vanity, vanity in the sense of mere pride, hubris, a false feeling 
of power, and vanity in that it is built on emptiness, on vain, impossible desires and 
wishes. If man wants to be happy, he should remain in his original state, and constantly 
fight his ingrained urge to go beyond it. 
3.2.2 Kant’s Pedagogy 
It is hardly controversial or original to stress that Kant’s philosophy of pedagogy, his 
philosophy of history and his philosophical anthropology are to be related to and 
contrasted with Rousseau’s. However, this mundane historiographical insight does not 
in itself yield a precise picture of what exactly Kant took issue with in Rousseau, and 
what the broader implications of the differences between their respective philosophies 
turn out to be. In the remainder of this section, I will advance the thesis that Kant was 
primarily interested in dispelling what I will call the Myth of the Origin, i.e. the myth 
that man can be considered as having an original state that later becomes altered or 
developed through history. I will argue, more specifically, that Kant’s strategy in 
arguing against the Myth of the Origin consists in staging the conflict between the two 
core doctrines of Rousseau that I have identified in the previous section. In this 
subsection, I will show how this is done in the writings on pedagogy and anthropology, 
whereas in the next sections I will focus on the writings on history. In the end, however, 
I believe that this distinction is very artificial indeed, since these writings all advance 
the same point in different ways.  
Recent interpreters have drawn more attention to the fact that Kant employs the talk 
of germs and predispositions, of Keime and Anlage, in his philosophical anthropology as 
much as in his philosophy of biology. Indeed, as we have seen, these terms were largely 
elaborated in Kant’s writings on the very idea of human races. Now, we find Kant 
putting them to use in his theory of education: 
Many germs lie within humanity, and now it is our business to develop the natural 
predispositions proportionally and to unfold humanity from its germs and to 
make it happen that the human being reaches his vocation. Animals fulfill their 
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vocation automatically and unknowingly. The human being must first seek to 
reach his, but this cannot happen if he does not even have a concept of his 
vocation. It is also completely impossible for the individual to reach the vocation. 
Let us assume a fully formed first human couple, and let us see how they educate 
their pupils. The first parents already give the children an example which the 
latter imitate, and that way some natural predispositions are developed. But not 
all predispositions can be developed in this manner, for the children only see 
these examples in occasional circumstances. Formerly, human beings did not even 
have a conception of the perfection which human nature can reach. We ourselves 
are not even yet clear about this concept. But this much is certain, that individual 
human beings, no matter what degree of formation they are able to bring to their 
pupils, cannot make it happen that they reach their vocation. Not individual 
human beings, but rather the human species, shall get there. (AA IX: 445-446) 
At first glance, this paragraph reveals Kant to be committed to a doctrine also held by 
Rousseau, namely that of faculty fixism. In the previous subsection, I argued that 
Rousseau believed man to have a fixed set of capacities, and that these capacities 
determine his place in nature. These faculties cannot be truly altered or expanded, 
although some may be latent at first. Kant’s talk of germs and predispositions seems to 
invoke the same picture here, since it seems to commit him to the idea that man has a 
prefixed nature, which may be merely latently present. The major difference between 
Kant and Rousseau is then that Kant believes it to be desirable that we develop our 
capacities, whereas Rousseau believes this would be detrimental to the individual and to 
the species.  
Here, however, as often, the first glance is deceiving. In fact, the one divergence 
between the two authors that I have indicated ends up affecting their entire theories, 
such that what seem agreements between Kant and Rousseau are actually their 
fundamental differences. In this passage, Kant speaks not of the man’s place in nature, 
as Rousseau would have, but of man’s vocation. Both thinkers offer us the maxim that 
man must, above all, be human. For Rousseau this means that man must remain in his 
alloted place, and not seek to distort his original nature. For Kant, however, this means 
that man is never at place in nature, but is always that which is seeking his place in 
nature. For Rousseau, man is a location, whereas for Kant he is a vocation. 
This is a first reason why Kant adopts the language of germs and predispositions. For 
Rousseau, man’s essential faculties are present in his original state. For Kant, they are 
never truly actualized, and always to be actualized through the process of education. 
Education and culture lead us to develop these germs and predispositions that lie 
hidden in us. But we should be careful not to conclude from this that the germs and 
predispositions are nevertheless on a par with man’s capacities as they are conceived in 
Rousseau’s theory. The crucial difference lies in the fact that, according to Kant, the 
process of education is not just one of seeking to occupy one’s intended place in nature 
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– it is equally the process of seeking out what one’s place in nature might be. This is why 
Kant stresses that man does not know his vocation, which means that he does not know 
his germs and predispositions either, since these only reveal man’s place in nature as 
they reveal themselves: 
The human being can only become human through education. Man is nothing 
except what education makes out of him. It must be noted that the human being is 
educated only by human beings, human beings who likewise have been educated. 
That is also why the lack of discipline and instruction in some people makes them 
in turn bad educators of their pupils. If some day a being of higher kind were to 
look after our education, then one would see what the human being could 
become. But since education partly teaches the human being something and 
partly merely develops something within him, one can never know how far his 
natural dispositions reach. (AA IX: 444) 
Here, Kant identifies part of the problem as our incapacity to ever decide exactly which 
the nature of man is, or which the vocation of man is, and our irremediable ignorance of 
which our natural predispositions are.3 This means that his talk of predispositions is not 
meant to indicate the innate, the ingrained capacities of man, but rather to indicate that 
we must understand man as having an essence, although this essence is not fixed. The 
thesis that “man is nothing except what education makes out of him” is tantamount to 
the idea that there can be no meaningful talk of man as a specific species with specific 
limits. The limits are assumed to be there, but we can never make determinate claims 
about them. Kant’s humanism is thus peculiar for not essentializing the nature of 
humanity. 
But this raises questions of its own, most importantly as to why Kant chooses to 
employ this talk of germs and predispositions. Why would he feel the need to indicate 
that man has ingrained capacities if he does not believe that these capacities are fixed? 
What are we to understand by non-fixed innateness? I believe this problem can be 
solved by closely considering the problem of what it means to see man as that 
paradoxically natural being that somehow only exists as non-natural. Why the status of 
 
                                                     
3 One might object that, in this passage, Kant states that a perfect creature could reveal what could be made of 
man, and that this means that is only accidentally the case that our essence is unknown (namely because we 
have only fallible teachers). But this is dependent on the assumption that he takes this perfect creature in a 
positive sense, and not a negative one. Kant, however, almost always invokes the idea of  perfect being as a 
negative concept. On such a plausible negative reading, the caveat might actually mean the following. Man’s 
nature is potentially infinitely malleable. Since human beings are in principle finite, they could never realize 
this infinite potential. If there were a creature that is capable of actualizing the infinite, i.e. God, he would be 




man as a natural being is paradoxical will become clear when we turn our attention to 
the tension between Rousseau’s theory of original man and his theory of decadence. 
Rousseau assumes that man is an animal like other animals, even though he is 
somehow distinguished by freedom. It would be wise for man to keep this in mind at all 
times, for it would indicate how his faculties are somehow appropriate for a specific 
kind of life, namely the solitary life of the savage. His faculties are not intended to 
function in the artificial context of society and culture, which will therefore end up 
corrupting him.4 This theory requires Rousseau to explain, however, why it is that man 
tends to exit this original state, and how man can ever exit his circumscribed space. 
Rousseau does so by indicating that there is a natural capacity in man, namely 
imagination, which allows him to conceive of a state other than his current one. But this 
raises the further question as to whether this capacity is natural or non-natural, and 
consequently whether the artificial state is a natural one or a non-natural one. If the 
capacity for imagination is a natural one, then any employment of it will be natural, and 
will not take man out of nature. Society will be but one way in which man is in nature, 
i.e. but one way in which man can occupy his place in nature. If this is true, it is not 
clear how Rousseau’s admonition to keep to our nature would be able to withhold us 
from societal life. In order for us to be capable of exiting nature through the 
employment of imagination, imagination must already be non-natural to man, must 
already be decadent. But then it must either be due to an earlier decadence, an earlier 
fall from a natural state, which would then also either be due to a natural or a non-
natural faculty, or the natural state of man would already be decadent. I believe Kant 
saw this problem, and decided therefore that man, as a natural being, is that being that 
is necessarily non-natural. His fundamental faculties are those which automatically 
remove him from the natural order; hence the only properties essential to man are 
those which preclude him from having essential properties. 
What are these properties?  As the second proposition of the Idea for a Universal 
History With a Cosmopolitan Aim reveals, it is reason: 
In the human being (as the only rational creature on earth), those predispositions 
whose goal is the use of his reason were to develop completely in the species, but not in the 
individual. Reason in a creature is a faculty of extending the rules and aims of the 
use of all its powers far beyond natural instinct, and knows no boundaries to its 
projects. But reason itself does not operate instinctively, but rather needs 
 
                                                     
4 It is interesting to note that these ideas are in a way held by contemporary (ultra)darwinist naturalists as 
well, since they insist that our cognition evolved in a situation, or series of situations, in which the selective 
pressures were entirely different from the ones in which we tend to live since the end of our real evolution, 
i.e. cultural states. Perhaps Kant’s criticism of Rousseau will serve equally well to dispel the many non 
sequiturs that invoke the name of Darwin as an argument from authority. 
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attempts, practice, and instruction in order gradually to progress from one stage 
of insight to another. Hence every human being would have to live exceedingly 
long in order to learn how he is to make a complete use of all his natural 
predispositions; or if nature has only set the term of his life as short (as has 
actually happened), then nature perhaps needs an immense series of generations, 
each of which transmits its enlightenment to the next, in order finally to propel 
its germs in our species to that stage of development which is completely suited to 
its aim. And this point in time must be, at least in the idea of the human being the 
goal of his endeavors, because otherwise the natural predispositions would have 
to be regarded for the most part as in vain and purposeless; which would remove 
all practical principles and thereby bring nature, whose wisdom in the judgment 
of all remaining arrangements must otherwise serve as a principle, under the 
suspicion that in the case of the human being alone it is a childish play. (AA VIII: 
18-19) 
This passage presents a great number of interpretative difficulties. In the following 
subsection, I will attempt to provide a better interpretative access through a sustained 
reading of another major, though regularly overlooked, text by Kant on the philosophy 
of history from the 1780s. There, it will become clear that we need to understand reason 
as the capacity for history, rather than as an ahistorical capacity. 
3.2.3 The Myth of the Origin 
In the second section, I already briefly advanced the idea that Kant staged the 
contradiction between Rousseau’s two core doctrines, namely that of natural man and 
that of the decadence of man. It is this staging that has given the impression to some 
(e.g. Philonenko 1972: 43-50) that Kant is often misappropriating or misinterpreting 
Rousseau’s theory in order to let the latter agree with him. In this section, I will show 
that Kant was instead concerned with internally subverting some of the core 
assumptions behind the very theories he seems to appropriate, namely the 
preformationist theory of development and the idea of natural, non-decadent man.  
In order to understand the possibility of an alternative interpretation of the notion of 
a natural predisposition in Kant’s philosophy of history, I believe we should turn to his 
text Conjectural Beginning of Human History, from 1786. In a way, this text serves to 
complete the 1784 essay Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim, most 
importantly the second proposition, in which Kant speaks of natural predispositions. 
The title already suggests that Kant regards his account in this paper as merely 
conjectural. Yet, he does insist that his conjecture here is not on a par with the 
conjectures that one may make in historiography in order to fill in the gaps of the 
historical record. The reason is that his question here is not that concerning the history 
of man, i.e. of the development of freedom and reason, but that concerning the “first 
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development of freedom from its original predisposition in the nature of the human 
being” (AA VIII: 109). 
The most peculiar aspect of Kant’s conjectural history is probably the fact that it 
chooses to roughly follow the strand of the Biblical Myth of the Fall in the book of 
Genesis. Some authors, particularly Arthur Lovejoy (1959: 193-195), have taken issue 
with this choice, believing that it reveals Kant’s enduring commitment to the Biblical 
narrative of history. In Lovejoy’s case, this serves as yet another argument to deny the 
historical and the transformative in Kant’s account, since the book of Genesis precludes 
a Darwinian version of the origin of species mainly through selective pressures on 
biopopulations in which minor inheritable differences between individuals occur. 
Lovejoy is right to claim that the Kantian picture is not very conducive to an 
evolutionary picture of the place of man in nature, but I believe it is wrong to therefore 
dismiss it as merely a testimony to Kant’s lingering commitment to the Christian world-
view. 
What Lovejoy and others overlook, in my opinion, is the fact that the Myth of the Fall 
has always been interesting to philosophers for the philosophical idea that lies behind 
it, not (just) for its literal properties. One of the best explicitations of this philosophical 
content has been offered by Hegel in his Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences. In one of 
the Zusätze of the Encyclopaedia Logic, he states the following: 
It appears appropriate to consider the myth of the Fall at the very beginning of 
the Logic, because the Logic is concerned with cognition, and the myth too deals 
with cognition, with its origin and significance. Philosophy should not shy away 
from religion, and adopt the attitude that it must be content if religion simply 
tolerates it. And, on the other hand, we must equally reject the view that myths 
and religious accounts of this kind are something obsolete, for they have been 
venerated for millenia by the peoples of the world. (Hegel 1991: 61) 
Hegel thus makes the point that the Myth of the Fall is not just an article of faith to be 
held by the religious, nor is it just a historical narrative of an event in our eschatological 
history. He insists instead that it is really about something more general, i.e. cognition: 
When we are comparing the various forms of cognition with one another, it can 
easily appear that the first one, that of immediate knowledge, is the most 
adequate, the finest, and the highest. It includes everything that is called 
innocence in the moral sphere, as well as religious feeling, simple trust, love, 
fidelity, and natural faith. Both of the other forms, first reflective cognition and 
then philosophical cognition too, step out of that immediate natural unity. Insofar 
as they have this in common with one another, the mode of cognition that 
consists in wanting to grasp the truth through thinking can easily appear as the 
human conceit that wants to recognise the true by its own strength. This 
standpoint of universal separation can certainly be looked on as the origin of all 
wickedness and evil, as the original transgression; and on this view it seems that 
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thinking and cognition must be given up in order to return [to unity] and become 
reconciled again. As for the abandonment of natural unity here, this marvellous 
inward schism of the spiritual has been something of which all peoples from time 
immemorial have been conscious. An inner schism like this does not occur in 
nature, and natural things do not do evil. We have an old account of the origin and 
consequences of this schism in the Mosaic myth of the Fall. The content of this 
myth forms the foundation of an essential doctrine of faith, the doctrine of the 
natural sinfulness of man, and his need of help to overcome it. (Hegel 1991: 61) 
Hegel argues that the Myth of the Fall resonates with our tendency to believe that an 
initial state of immediacy is somehow possible and desirable, and that mediation is a 
form of decadence and the first ground of evil, the “original transgression”. There is 
also the belief that the root of this evil is “conceit” in the form of an attempt to use our 
reason. Again, there is the idea that “[a]n inner schism like this does not occur in 
nature, and natural things do not do evil”, namely that it is somehow testimony to the 
unnaturalness of man that he is capable of evil and sin. And lastly, there is the following 
peculiar aspect to the theory: 
In our Mosaic myth, moreover, we find that the occasion for stepping out of the 
unity [of innocence] was provided for humanity by external instigation (by the 
serpent). But in fact, the entry into the antithesis, the awakening of 
consciousness, lies within human beings themselves, and this is the story that 
repeats itself in every human being. (Hegel 1991: 62) 
What Hegel insists on is that, in the Biblical narrative, the serpent is not really the cause 
of the Fall, but merely its occasion. The Fall is essential to man, since his nature is 
determined by a certain non-naturalness, that of reason, which will inevitably lead him 
outside the original state of happiness. 
Hegel’s philosophical analysis of the Myth of the Fall should remind any reader of 
Rousseau’s account of original man. Rousseau too postulates an original state in which 
man is happy and at one with nature. He too believes no creature can naturally go 
beyond its proper station where it is happy. He too believes that man has a peculiar 
faculty, in his case imagination, which causes him to develop vain wishes, and believes 
that these vain wishes lead him out of his original station and into a state of error and 
unhappiness. It is Rousseau’s narrative that is complicit with the Biblical tale, and 
revealing of its philosophical rationale. 
I believe Kant was perfectly aware of this, and that he chose the Biblical narrative as a 
template not to get the approval of the religious, nor because of his own sincere 
religious beliefs, but because it can serve to unveil and deconstruct Rousseau’s ideas of 
origin and decadence. This is why Kant deems it important to explicate the setting of 
the book Genesis as constraints necessary for a kind of thought experiment (AA VIII: 
110). First, the assumption that we are dealing with the first pair of humans is necessary 
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in order to account for the fact that they are not already socialized through their life 
with siblings and parents. By making this abstraction, Kant is already revealing that he 
deems it unlikely that there was ever a state at which man lived solitary and not already 
in social context, albeit a crude one. Second, the assumption that we are dealing with 
adults who have already received certain capacities is meant to waver further 
conjectures on how they came to acquire these. They are of course also meant to meet 
Rousseau’s picture that there are certain capacities that already develop in the state of 
nature and are not themselves detrimental to man. The very setting is thus not meant to 
approach the Biblical situation, but to show that the Biblical situation shares essential 
properties with Rousseau’s state of nature.  
Then Kant specifies that life in his counterfactual garden is natural life because in it 
“[i]nstinct, that voice of God which all animals obey, must alone have guided the novice” 
(AA VIII: 111). It is easy to read Kant as defining instinct as a divine command. I believe 
it is more likely that he is showing that the divine command plays the role in the 
Biblical narrative that instinct plays in the conjectures of more naturalistically inclined 
theorists, namely that of determining the original constraints of the human being.  
Having stipulated his original state in such a way that the parallels between 
Rousseau’s state of nature and the Mosaic Garden of Eden are maximally visible, Kant 
goes on to discuss the fundamental event which we need to explain: 
As long as the inexperienced human being obeyed this call of nature, he did well 
for himself. Yet reason soon began to stir and sought through comparison of that 
which gratified with that which was represented to him by another sense than the 
one to which instinct was bound, such as the sense of sight, as similar to what 
previously was gratifying, to extend his knowledge of the means of his 
nourishment beyond the limits of instinct (Genesis 3:6). This attempt might have 
happened to turn out well enough, although instinct did not recommend it, if only 
it did not contradict it. Yet it is a property of reason that with the assistance of the 
power of imagination it can concoct desires not only without a natural drive 
directed to them but even contrary to it, which desires in the beginning receive the 
name of concupiscence, but through them are hatched bit by bit, under the term 
voluptuousness, a whole swarm of dispensable inclinations, which are even 
contrary to nature. The occasion for deserting the natural drive might have been 
only something trivial; yet the success of the first attempt, namely of becoming 
conscious of one’s reason as a faculty that can extend itself beyond the limits 
within which all animals are held, was very important and decisive for his way of 
living. (AA VIII: 111-112) 
We should pause to ponder the various implications of this passage. First of all, Kant 
already assumes that man has the possibility of reason. This is not an outrageous 
assumption for those targeting Rousseau, since the latter was indeed committed to the 
fact that man does dispose of a faculty that allows him to conceive of possible 
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alternatives. Furthermore, Kant assigns a function in this process of the Fall to 
imagination, the faculty singled out by Rousseau as the malicious counseler whispering 
evil thoughts into our ears. Of course the difference here is that Kant wants to give 
standing to the faculty for leaving the state of nature by calling it reason rather than 
imagination, whereas Rousseau gives it the name of the faculty that has met with 
opprobrium and even hostility in many early modern philosophies. 
Secondly, Kant points out that reason and imagination are responsible for devising 
unnatural desires. Here, unnatural means both counter to instinct and counter to divine 
command. These desires are explained through the same mechanism as that used to 
explain the vain desires in Rousseau’s Emile, namely the consideration of unwise 
alternative ways of life, of alternative possibilities that we were never meant to 
entertain. 
Thirdly, and most importantly, Kant is insistent that the Fall itself would not have 
been a particularly great event. It does not require a particularly great upheaval or 
betrayal to wrench man from his natural, original state. On the contrary, the smallest of 
successes would have set us on the road of culture, would have dislodged our natural 
self-sufficiency. This is important for two reasons. First of all, it speaks against the 
Christian doctrine that the Fall was due to a great transgression on our part, having 
broken the one clear commandment we were given. Second, it challenges the idea that 
we need an external trigger to commit this first and ultimate crime; much like Hegel 
insisted that the serpent’s seduction was not specifically required as a cause since we 
bore within ourselves the fruits of sin, so Kant insists that any small event can provide 
the occasion for the great transgression, since what matters is that the root lies within 
us, not that it is somehow occasioned from without:  
Now the harm might have been as insignificant as you like, yet about this it 
opened the human being’s eyes (Genesis 3:7). He discovered in himself a faculty of 
choosing for himself a way of living and not being bound to a single one, as other 
animals are. Yet upon the momentary delight that this marked superiority might 
have awakened in him, anxiety and fright must have followed right away, 
concerning how he, who still did not know the hidden properties and remote 
effects of any thing, should deal with this newly discovered faculty. He stood, as it 
were, on the brink of an abyss; for instead of the single objects of his desire to 
which instinct had up to now directed him, there opened up an infinity of them, 
and he did not know how to relate to the choice between the; and from this estate 
of freedom, once he had tasted it,  it was nevertheless wholly impossible for him 
to turn back again to that of servitude (under the dominion of instinct). (AA VIII: 
112) 
The reason why the discovery of reason is so transformative an experience is that it is 
also the discovery of freedom. With this discovery, Kant insists, we would have once and 
for all left the domain of nature, left the possibility of guidance by instincts. This new, 
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qualitative switch may be accompanied by a kind of vertigo, as we leave the realm of the 
definite and enter that of the indefinite. But this feeling of disconcertedness may very 
well equally be a feeling of the sublime, of our capacity grasp the infinity of freedom.5 
What is certain is that there is no going back: the realm of freedom has become second 
nature to man. 
But is it only second nature? This is the problem Kant’s analysis pushes on us, for it 
reveals that the Fall was necessary, and was grounded in one of the fundamental 
capacities of man, namely that of reason. It is our nature as rational animals that have 
destined us to never be a definite kind of animal; for it is our reason that prompts us to 
regard ourselves only under the aspect of possibility. It is essential to man that he 
commit the original sin, that he leave the original state, since his essential trait is 
precisely his inability to remain there. This is Kant’s crucial shift with respect to 
Rousseau, namely that the determination of the natural predispositions is meant to 
show how we are always destined to forever make shape our own faculties. That this 
whole idea is meant to solve the problems facing Rousseau is explicit in the Conjectural 
Beginning itself: 
In this manner one can also bring into agreement with themselves and with 
reason the assertions of the famous J.-J. Rousseau, which are often misinterpreted 
and to all appearance in conflict with one another. In his writing on the influence of 
the sciences and on the inequality of human beings, he shows quite correctly the 
unavoidable conflict of culture with the nature of the human species as a physical  
species in which each individual was entirely to reach his vocation; but in his 
Emile, his Social Contract and other writings, he seeks again to solve the harder 
problem of how culture must proceed in order properly to develop the 
predispositions of humanity as a moral species to their vocation, so that the latter 
no longer conflict with humanity as a natural species. From this conflict (since 
culture, according to true principles of education of human being and citizen, has 
perhaps not yet rightly begun, much less having been completed) arise all true ills 
that oppress human life, and vices that dishonor it; nevertheless, the incitements 
to the latter, which one blames for them, are in themselves good and purposive as 
natural predispositions, but these predispositions, since they were aimed at the 
merely natural condition, suffer injury from progressing culture and injure 
culture in turn, until perfect art again becomes nature, which is the ultimate goal 
of the moral vocation of the human species. (AA VIII: 117-188) 
Rousseau’s problem is, then, for Kant, that he postulates a dualism of nature and 
culture, of the realm of instinct and the realm of reason, such that the only correct 
response would be to reject culture or mitigate its effects and live within our natural 
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bounds. For Kant, the idea is rather to have our cultural, moral, rational self become our 
nature.6 The original dispositions of man have one and only one goal: to propel man 
from his original, natural state into an uncertain future that is of his own making. 
All this is yielded by only one decision on Kant’s part, however, namely to regard all 
tendencies of man as equally useful. Remember that the core of Rousseau’s theory is 
that man is naturally born with superfluous capacities. It is these superfluous, unnatural 
elements of our nature that are the cause of our alienation for nature. Kant decides that 
it does not make sense to define a point of origin together with a principle of departure 
from this origin without acknowledging that this principle is included in the origin. It 
makes no sense to think of reason or imagination as an originary supplement. All that it 
reveals is that, in reflecting on origins, we want to specify their nature without 
acknowledging the fact that, because of the fact that the principle of decadence is 
already included in it, the origin has always already passed. It is always a post facto 
mythical reconstruction we use in order to understand our own heading, which is never 
clear to us in its uncertainty. 
This is in my opinion the real meaning of Kant’s talk of natural predispositions: they 
are the necessary assumptions we must make in order to understand our own history as 
teleological, as being guided by some principle, and in order to understand how we 
could have come to have the unnatural nature that we have. The natural predispositions 
are the assumed original correlates of our current capacities, the reasons for our 
current situation. The progress of man can be regarded in two ways: as an idea of reason 
drawing us to the end of our history, or as a vis a tergo, a gust of wind blowing us out of 
paradise as we, with our backs to an unknown future, can see nothing but the ruins of 
the past ammassing at our fleeting feet. For Kant, these two perspectives are equally 
necessary, and Rousseau’s causal Unheilsgeschichte is the chiral of the Enlightenment 
idea of progress. In the Enlightenment project, we can understand ourselves as 
underway to something new, something greater, only if we already acknowledge that 
the possibility for this resides in us. And these possibilities reside in our natural 
predispositions, that will forever remain unknown to us. It is in this way that Kant’s 
epigenesis opens the path to the idea of transcendental history, which we will further 
explore in section 3.4. First, however, we need to investigate the implications of Kant’s 
embryological language in epistemology. 
 
                                                     
6 The phrase “until perfect art again becomes nature” is due to Abbé Jean Terrasson. In fact, the dictum is to be 
found in the same chapter of the same work where Terrasson offers the idea that many books would have 
been much shorter, had they not been so short. It is thus more than likely that Kant picked up both ideas from 
the 1756 German translation of the 1754 book La Philosophie applicable à tous les objets de  l’esprit et de la raison. 
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3.3 Epigenesis and the Transcendental History of Reason 
3.3.1 Kant’s Epistemological Preformationism? 
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant refers to theories of generation on three separate 
occasions, each time to characterize a position in epistemology. Two of these appear in 
both editions, whereas the third makes its appearance only in the second edition of 
1787. The puzzle offered by these various usages of embryological analogies is not only 
the difficulty in determining what exactly they are intended to convey, but also that the 
analogies used in the first edition seem to invoke preformationism, whereas those of the 
second edition refer approvingly to epigenesis. This has led Sloan and Zammito to claim 
that Kant’s thinking changed somewhere around the mid-1780s. 
The first important passage is from the opening of the Transcendental Analytic: 
I understand by an analytic of concepts not their analysis, or the usual procedure 
of philosophical investigations, that of analyzing the content of concepts that 
present themselves and bringing them to distinctness, but rather the much less 
frequently attempted analysis of the faculty of understanding itself, in order to 
research the possibility of a priori concepts by seeking them only in the 
understanding as their birthplace and analyzing its pure use in general; for this is 
the proper business of a transcendental philosophy; the rest is the logical 
treatment of concepts in philosophy in general. We will therefore pursue the pure 
concepts into their first seeds [Keime] and predispositions [Anlage] in the human 
understanding, where they lie ready, until with the opportunity of experience 
they are finally developed and exhibited in their clarity by the very same 
understanding, liberated from the empirical conditions attaching to them. (CPR 
A65-66 / B90-91) 
Zammito offers the following interpretation of this passage, drawing lavishly on Sloan’s 
analyses: 
the 1781 language is unequivocally a preformationist analogy. The concepts lie 
‘predisposed’ in the understanding; they are not produced, they are occasioned. 
As Sloan argues, in terms of the philosophical debate about Kant’s relation to 
innate ideas, this is clearly as ‘nativist’ a Kant as one can find. Moreover, Kant 
meant to suggest an element in the analogy which would be central to his 
thinking throughout, namely that just as Keime and Anlagen were inaccessible to 
ultimate derivation, so too the concepts of the understanding were simply givens 
behind which we could not seek. (Zammito 2003: 84) 
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I believe this interpretation is mistaken, because 1) Kant’s language is not as 
unequivocally preformationist as Zammito assumes, and 2) it reads Kant as suggesting a 
nativism that he himself explicitly repudiated. 
Firstly, Sloan and Zammito base their assumption that these passages are 
unequivocally preformationist on the assumption that Kant’s usage of the terms germs 
and predispositions is unequivocally preformationist. In the previous chapter, I have 
offered reasons to believe that the latter assumption is false: Kant’s usage of these terms 
does not square with classical preformationism, and seems intended rather to clarify his 
own position on the generative force. Contrary to what the preformationist reading 
suggests, Kant is saying here that the pure concepts of the understanding are pregiven 
only in so far as they constitue a constraint on the production of concepts. Zammito’s 
suggestion that “the concepts of the understanding were simply givens behind which 
we could not seek” is misleading, then, because although the concepts might be givens, 
the specific form they take due to the occasioning experience is not. When taken 
seriously, the analogy with the so-called Kantian preformationism of the 1770s suggests 
that the pure concepts are not completely fixed, and can develop differently under 
different circumstances. 
What Kant does stress is that we must take the specific forms that the concepts might 
take to be due not to influence from the outside, but as deriving from internal reasons. 
This too resonates with the 1770s-picture: the constraints on the generative force must 
be regarded as internal to this force, not as externally induced. In these passages, Kant 
therefore seems mainly concerned with showing that the concepts of the understanding 
are adaptable, but that this adaptability is not due to the direct influence of experience. 
This message is certainly different from the fixist and nativist reading that is often 
imposed on it. 
There is another reason why we should be dissatisfied with the reading offered by 
Sloan and Zammito – a reason noted by Sloan himself in a footnote: 
The absence of the Keim-Anlage language in the letter to Marcus Herz of February 
21, 1772 in his important early discussion of the concept of the categories 
suggests that Kant developed his views more deeply on the generation question 
after this date, and possibly as a solution to the problem posed in the letter to 
Herz on how the categories could be brought into conformity with things. In this 
letter he rejects the thesis of Christian Crusius concerning “gewisse eingepflantzte 
Regeln zu urtheilen und Begriffe, die Gott schon so wie sie seyn müssen, um mit 
den Dingen zu Harmoniren, in die Menschliche Seelen pflantzte,” but this 
comment follows his claim that the categories must still be grounded “in der 
Natur der Seele” (AK 10: 125–6). As I would interpret this letter in relation to the 
argument of this paper, the Keim-Anlage theory, in the unusual way Kant 
formulates this in 1775–77, allowed him to solve this problem by claiming that the 
Keime are pre-existent and determinate structures within the soul, but they do 
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not stand in a pre-established harmony with objects of experience, and they are 
only brought into play when activated by experience and the action of 
Naturanlagen. This avoids the problems of the pre-established harmony that he 
interprets as implied in Crusius’s position. (Sloan 2002: 238) 
In this footnote, Sloan brings up, and subsequently dismisses, a major objection to his 
reading, namely that Kant had already rejected nativism concerning the pure concepts 
of the understanding in the letter to Marcus Herz, and did not seem to believe that this 
discounted his preformationist analogy in the first Critique. His solution for this 
objection is unsatisfying, in my opinion, because the revised nativism that he prescribes 
to Kant is not revised at all. In fact, it seems to be precisely the position Leibniz endorses 
in the New Essays on Human Understanding. In that work, Leibniz had his mouthpiece 
Theophilus advance the following rebuttal of Locke’s attack on the notion of innate 
ideas: 
Since an item of acquired knowledge can be hidden there by the memory, as you 
admit that it can, why could not nature also hide there an item of unacquired 
knowledge? Must a self-knowing substance have, straight away, actual knowledge 
of everything which belongs to its nature? Cannot – and should not - substance 
like our soul have various properties and states which could not at all be thought 
about straight away or all at once? […] 
The mind is capable not merely of knowing them [i.e. the necessary truths], but 
also of finding them within itself. If all it had was the mere capacity to receive 
those items of knowledge – a passive power to do so, as indeterminate as the 
power of wax to receive shapes or of a blank page to receive words – it would not 
be the source of necessary truths, as I have just shown that it is. For it cannot be 
denied that the senses are inadequate to show their necessity, and that therefore 
the mind has a disposition (as much active as passive) to draw them from its own 
depths; though the senses are necessary to give the mind the opportunity and the 
attention for this, and to direct it towards certain necessary truths rather than 
others. […] 
So it [i.e. understanding] is not a bare faculty, consisting in a mere possibility of 
understanding those truths [i.e. eternal and necessary truths]: it is rather a 
disposition, an aptitude, a preformation, which determines our soul and brings it 
about that they are derivable from it. (G V: 75-77; Leibniz 1996: 78-80) 
A careful reading of this passage shows that it offers precisely the view that Sloan 
ascribes to Kant in the first Critique. It does not rely on pre-established harmony at this 
point, nor is Leibniz commited here to the idea that all ideas are preformed in the mind 
in this manner. It does claim that the concepts and principles of the understanding that 
allow us to think necessity are and must be innate, and that only their development is 
occasioned by experience. Leibniz explicitly makes the analogy between this view and 
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preformation7. Should this lead us to believe that Kant has adopted this position in the 
first Critique? 
Another passage from the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason has prompted 
some to ascribe an anti-historical Leibnizianism to Kant, namely the following comment 
from  the “architectonic of reason”: 
Nobody attempts to establish a science without grounding it on an idea. But in its 
elaboration the schema, indeed even the definition of the science which is given 
right at the outset, seldom corresponds to the idea; for this lies in reason like a 
seed, all of whose parts still lie very involuted and are hardly recognizable even 
under microscopic observation. For this reason sciences, since they have all been 
thought out from the viewpoint of a certain general interest, must not be 
explained and determined in accordance with the description given by their 
founder, but rather in accordance with the idea, grounded in reason itself, of the 
natural unity of the parts that have been brought together. For the founder and 
even his most recent successors often fumble around with an idea that they have 
not even made distinct to themselves and that therefore cannot determine the 
special content, the articulation (systematic unity) and boundaries of the science. 
(CPR: A 834 / B 862) 
At first sight, this passage is a good candidate for Zammito’s characterization of 
“unequivocally preformationist”. This is also why Yirmiyahu Yovel offers the following 
gloss on the element of history in the “architectonic of reason”: 
The history of philosophy is thus a latent totality, governed by the tension 
between the inherent architectonic of reason and its particular stage of 
manifestation. All philosophical systems expound the self-development of reason, 
from which they get their organizing schema, and they are thus all united in a 
single organic whole. (Yovel 1980: 228) 
Ironically, however, Yovel offers this as a gloss on the alinea following the one quoted 
above: “The systems seem to have been formed, like maggots, by a generatio aequivoca 
from the mere confluence of aggregated concepts, garbled at first but complete in time, 
although they all had their schema, as the original seed, in the mere self-development of 
reason” (CPR A 835 / B 863). In this passage, Kant is contrasting two different accounts of 
animal generation, namely a position obviously similar to that of metamorphosis, and a 
possibly preformationist one. 
But the context of the passage is important here, because Kant is actually making a 
point about the structure of a cognitive system, not about its genesis. He is arguing that 
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 And it may be more than an analogy, if we are to believe Justin Smith: cf. 2.2.2. 
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it is impossible to regard systems as arising through the mere aggregation of knowledge 
or concepts, as is revealed by the following passage: 
The scientific rational concept thus contains the end and the form of the whole 
that is congruent with it. The unity of the end to which all parts are related and in 
the idea of which they are also related to each other, allows the absence of any 
part to be noticed in our knowledge of the rest, and there can be no contingent 
addition or undetermined magnitude of perfection that does not have its 
boundaries determined a priori. The whole is therefore articulated (articulatio) and 
not heaped together (coacervatio); it can, to be sure, grow internally (per intus 
susceptionem) but not externally (per appositionem), like an animal body, whose 
growth does not add a limb but rather makes each limb stronger and fitter for its 
end without any alteration of proportion. (CPR: A 832-833/B 861) 
Here, Kant is suggesting that systems develop through a process parallel to that of 
intussusception. We have encountered this position before in our discussion of Buffon’s 
version of metamorphosis. Buffon postulated that in order to understand the organic 
process of nutrition, we need to postulate a kind of internally fashioning power such as 
intussusception, because mere addition of new parts could not explain the specificity of 
organic form. Buffon likely arrived at the notion of intussusception through his reading 
of Bourguet, who offered it in order to develop a preformationist theory of development 
(cf. Roger 1963: 376-377). The term itself, however, is substantially older, since it appears 
equally in the writings of the Jesuit Scholastics, possibly coined by Rodrigo de Arriaga: 
“plants and other animate things do not grow by juxtaposition: they grow intus-sumptio, 
that is, by attracting to themselves through their pores food divided into tiny particles, 
and converting it into themselves” (Arriaga; translated and quoted in Des Chene 2000: 
61-62). The notion of intussusception therefore corresponds with the recognition that 
an organic whole has to integrate new parts in a different way than an aggregate, since 
it has to adapt these new forms to its own structure. This leads to the idea that in some 
way this structure is presupposed. We can therefore better understand Kant’s comment 
on the metamorphosis theory here if we assume that he is alerting to the fact that even 
metamorphosists like Buffon have been forced to assume some pregiven structuring 
principle in order to allow for specifically organic structure and growth in the form of 
an interior mold. All that Kant needs to be read as saying, then, is that there need to be 
specific structural constraints on the growth of an organism on any account. But this 
can be in line with epigenesis as well, since it too holds that there are constraints, i.e. 
germs and dispositions, on the process of generation. For Kant, however, these 
constraints are determined by an idea of the whole. That the idea of the whole 
determines the process of generation is not a specifically preformationist idea either. 
Finally, the core idea here being that of intussusception suggests that here, like in the 
passage from the “Transcendental Analytic”, Kant is mostly concerned with the idea 
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that the changes to an organic whole must be internally conditioned, and it is for this 
that the talk of dispositions was meant to allow. 
On the whole then, I do not find that any of the adduced passages decide clearly in 
favor of the preformationist reading of Kant’s philosophy, since they can also be read as 
expanding on points from his epigenesist theory. The extent to which one would hold 
the preformationist view as tenable depends therefore on what sense it can make of 
Kant’s own position. I believe the reading of Kant’s position as a mitigated 
preformationism is also flawed in the latter way, because it ends up in difficulties for 
two reasons. The first is that despite its insistence that Kant endorses a mitigated form of 
preformationism and of a priori-fixism, it fails to show how these forms are mitigated at 
all. The second is that it has to ascribe to Kant a consistent misinterpretation of his own 
views, or an inadvertency to the fact that they change, since he never uses the idea of 
preformation positively, and only ever uses the term epigenesis positively. 
All the authors advancing or adopting the thesis want to stress that Kant departs 
from the Leibnizian interpretation of innateness in terms of innately present mental 
states, by advancing an idea of only latently present dispositions that tend to develop in 
one way or another, but are nonetheless somehow fixed and innate. The problem with 
this narrative is that it introduces a difference between Kant and Leibniz only by 
dramatically misconstruing Leibniz’s theory. In fact, Leibniz’s theory is better 
understood as committed to the existence of latent, innate conceptual capacities that 
only develop on occasion of experience and the reflection thereon. But this is precisely 
the account many have taken Kant to offer as an alternative to Leibniz.  
The same goes for the issue of preformationism. The Sloan-Zammito thesis rests on 
the idea that Kant rejects a crude preformationism in favor of the refined version that 
can be found in the works of Albrecht von Haller and Charles Bonnet. As should be clear 
from my previous chapter, the idea of a crude preformationism is a retrograde 
construct, not based on the actual perception of the theory by 18th century theorists. 
Like in the case of Leibnizian innatism, many current readers ironically take Kant to be 
criticizing preformationism just to embrace what is in fact orthodox preformationism. 
If this is true, then we have two major options open to us. The first is to admit that 
Kant’s position is ultimately just one more version of Leibnizianism, just one more 
version of preformationism, and that Kant merely grossly misunderstood his own 
theory as a counterpart to such theories because he was a sloppy and/or malicious 
reader of his contemporaries. This conclusion may be very welcome to many 
philosophers now, since they have always felt difficulty in clarifying their opposition to 
transcendental philosophy’s focus on the a priori and the categorial. Its major flaw is, 
however, that it implies that Kant could succeed in giving, in a work destined to German 
philosophical Academia, an account of Leibnizian philosophy that would immediately be 
recognized as flawed by the very members of German philosophical Academia. 
Moreoever, it would consist in him offering an alternative to a philosophy by offering 
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that philosophy itself. Even for those willing to admit that great philosophers have their 
flaws, their oversights, even their stupidities, it should be outrageous to suggest that so 
big an oversight, so obvious a stupidity, could escape the attention of so many readers.  
I suggest therefore that we take the second option by assuming that Kant was at least 
partly aware of the subtleties of Leibnizianism and preformationism, and wanted to 
develop a position differing from their refined versions. This allows us to entertain the 
idea that his commitment to historicity is real, even though the latter concept does not 
take the forms with which we are familiar from the early romantic and German Idealist 
paragons of historicism. It is perhaps by reading Kantian philosophy of biology through 
the Darwinian lens and Kantian philosophy of history through the Hegelian or 
Herderian lens that we have seen it as rigid. The consequence was probably that, in 
order to make sense of the fact that Kant believed himself to differ from Leibniz, we 
were forced to start substantially misreading the latter. In a peculiar twist of the 
historiography of philosophy, we have ended up reading the terms that Kant used in 
order to account for the developmental, the historical, the genetic aspect of his 
philosophy so that they ended up denying development, history and genesis. I suggest 
we postpone such harsh conclusions until we have examined the matter more fully. 
3.3.2 The Epigenesis of Reason 
For all its talk of unequivocal preformationist language in Kant’s philosophy, the Sloan-
Zammito reading is mostly concerned with explaining away the following sole 
unequivocal passage in the whole of Kant’s epistemology, in which he explicitly asserts 
that his theory of knowledge is analogous to epigenesis, and refuses any account based 
on either metamorphosis or preformation. The passage is to be found in the second 
edition reworking of the Transendental Deduction: 
But this cognition, which is limited merely to objects of experience, is not on that 
account all borrowed from experience; rather, with regard to the pure intuitions 
as well as the pure concepts of the understanding, there are elements of cognition 
that are to be encountered in us a priori. Now there are only two ways in which a 
necessary agreement of experience with the concepts of its objects can be thought: 
either the experience makes these concepts possible or these concepts make 
experience possible. The first is not the case with the categories (nor with pure 
sensible intuition); for they are a priori concepts, hence independent of 
experience (the assertion of an empirical origin would be a sort of generatio 
aequivoca). Consequently only the second way remains (as it were a system of the 
epigenesis of pure reason); namely that the categories contain the grounds of the 
possibility of all experience in general from the side of the understanding. […] 
 If someone still wanted to propose a middle way between the only two, 
already named ways, namely, that the categories were neither selfthought a priori 
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first principles of our cognition nor drawn from experience, but were rather 
subjective predispositions for thinking, implanted in us along with our existence 
by our author in such a way that their use would agree exactly with the laws of 
nature along which experience runs (a kind of preformation-system of pure reason), 
then (besides the fact that on such a hypothesis no end can be seen to how far one 
might drive the presupposition of predetermined predispositions for future 
judgments) this would be decisive against the supposed middle way: that in such a 
case the categories would lack the necessity that is essential to their concept. (CPR 
B166-168). 
This passage has attracted more attention than the allegedly preformationist one from 
the first edition, probably because the phrase “epigenesis of reason” is so suggestive, 
and because it may help us figure out what the specificity of Kant’s position is with 
regard to the alternatives he discerned. These alternatives, I submit, are either Lockean 
empiricism or Leibnizian rationalism. In offering the interpretation that what Kant is 
here calling epigenesis is in fact a form of preformationism, those upholding the Sloan-
Zammito thesis are thereby arguing that Kant’s thesis is nearer to preformation than is 
usually thought. This raises several problems, some of which I have already raised. 
First, it would have to be admitted that Kant moved from a preformationist position 
to one that he mistook to be epigenesist, but which was actually preformationist. But 
even if he mistook his later position to be epigenesist, this does not explain why he did 
not feel the need to change the passages from the first edition that are allegedly 
unambiguously preformationist. I think we can make better sense of these facts if we 
state that Kant was simply always epigenesist, and did not believe the passages from the 
first edition committed him to another position than epigenesis. I have shown, in the 
previous section, how he could have believed this. 
Second, it is problematic to regard Kant as searching for some kind of mitigated, 
middle-way position in this passage in light of the fact that he does not offer his own 
view, that of the epigenesis of reason, as a middle ground between the preformationism-
system of pure reason and the generatio aequivoca system. Instead, he presents Leibniz’ 
preformationist model of thought as the middle way between his own theory and that of 
Locke. Any reading of this passage has to clarify what Kant could have meant by this. I 
will argue that the crucial idea here is one which already appeared, although 
confusedly, in the first edition, namely that of the categories being “self-thought”. In 
this way, we can also explain why Kant took this passage to be a clarification of the first 
edition comments, rather than a retraction; a reading which explains why they appear 
alongside each other in the second edition. I will show first how Leibnizian rationalism 
and preformationism could be regarded as parallel, then how Kant could conceivably 
make a parallel between Locke’s empiricism and metamorphosis and finally what this 
implies for his analogy between transcendental idealism and epigenesis. 
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The first thing required to make the parallel between the two epistemological 
theories of empiricism and rationalism match up with the alternative between 
metamorphosis and preformation is to indicate the origin of Kant’s insistence on the 
empiricist-rationalist divide. If it is obvious to many contemporary readers that Kant is 
entitled to present the early modern debate on theory of knowledge as shaped by this 
fundamental opposition, then this is the result of almost two centuries of 
historiography based on the histories of philosophy proposed by Kantian and post-
Kantian German philosophers. In the course of the late 20th century, however, this 
opposition has lost its obviousness to historians of philosophy. I submit that this is 
because we have all too rarely identified the specific textual basis Kant had for 
proposing the opposition, namely Leibniz’s New Essays Concerning Human Understanding. 
In this work, Leibniz intends to give a section-by-section, chapter-by-chapter response 
to Locke’s original landmark Essay Concerning Human Understanding. For us, it is 
interesting to note that although Leibniz himself wrote this book in 1704, it did not 
appear in print for the larger public until 1765. I will here briefly argue for the fact that 
it was this work, not the works of David Hume, that awoke Kant from his dogmatic 
slumber. This appears first of all from the passage from the prolegomena where Kant 
starts to discuss the idea of a dogmatic slumber: 
Since the Essays of Locke and Leibniz, or rather since the rise of metaphysics as far 
as the history of it reaches, no event has occurred that could have been more 
decisive with respect to the fate of this science than the attack made upon it by 
David Hume. (AA IV: 257) 
In this passage, Kant is indicating two major landmarks in his philosophical landscape. 
The first landmark is made up by the Essays of Locke and Leibniz. The reason why Kant 
can take these together is because the two works are intertwined, the latter being a 
commentary on and response to the former. The other landmark is the work of David 
Hume. The problem is now that there is a problem of temporality occurring here, since 
Leibniz’s Essays appeared only in 1765, around the time when we tend to situate Kant’s 
awakening from dogmatic slumber. Is Kant then misrepresenting the history of 
philosophy in the most basic way, namely by getting the dates wrong? I believe this 
would be a mistaken conclusion, since Kant notes the temporal anomaly in the very 
passage where he introduces the idea of a dogmatic slumber, saying that: “I freely admit 
that the remembrance of David Hume was the very thing that many years ago first 
interrupted my dogmatic slumber and gave a completely different direction to my 
researches in the field of speculative philosophy”. (AA IV: 260) Mind the word that is 
usually fatefully ommitted from references to this passage, namely that of remembrance. 
Kant is not saying that he was first awakened by reading David Hume, but that it was the 
memory of David Hume’s philosophy at a later moment in his career that awakened him. 
I propose the following reading of this passage. 
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When Leibniz’s New Essays finally appeared in 1765, it entered a philosophical 
landscape where the differences between Leibniz’s and Locke’s approaches to 
philosophy were recognized as supremely important. The two philosophers represented 
two different ways of doing Enlightenment philosophy. In many specific debates, the 
Lockean and the Leibnizian options found themselves to be direct opposites. The New 
Essays served to make sense of these oppositions, and offered glosses on how exactly 
Leibniz saw them. When Kant read the book shortly after it appeared (and there is every 
reason to assume that he did), he found it enormously helpful to understand and 
systematize the many debates and tensions in 18th century philosophy.  
The most specific feature of the New Essays, however, is that it contains a much more 
elaborate and refined picture of Leibniz’s epistemology. Until then, Leibniz was read 
more through the lens of his metaphysics, but here, in his dialogue with the more 
metaphysically reticent Locke, the debate focused on more recognizably 
epistemological issues. Part of the task Leibniz seems to have set himself in this book is 
to show how Locke’s theory of knowledge makes it inconceivable how we can ever come 
to acquire knowledge through the mechanisms of association and reflection alone. For 
this reason, he suggests that the admittance of innate ideas and dispositions are 
indispensible, even to Locke. In a lecture on Logic, Kant is explicit in assigning a central 
place to the Locke-Leibniz debate in the history of logic and metaphysics: 
Locke became famous through his Essay Concerning Human Understanding— he 
speaks there of the origin of concepts, <but> this really does not belong to logic, 
but rather to metaphysics. The result of his investigations: Everything derives 
from experience. But it does not follow at all from this that concepts can be 
displayed only in experience. - Then Leibniz entered the picture. Although actually 
having written no logic, he nonetheless did much to illuminate concepts (he wrote 
in defense of his countrymen against the Englishman Locke). In his works he 
expressed ideas which subsequently moved Wolff to his system. (AA XXIV: 701) 
The theme of the possibility of knowledge is recognizable as the major turning point in 
Kant’s career. It also explains how Leibniz’s discussion would cast light, in retrospect, 
upon Hume’s philosophy, for, if Leibniz is right that Locke’s theory of ideas makes it 
impossible to explain knowledge, then David Hume can be read as drawing this radical 
conclusion from it and embracing the resulting skeptical view. Kant’s interest in Hume 
is therefore likely to have been reignited by his reading of the New Essays, which 
explains why he speaks of the remembrance of Hume as having awakened him from his 
dogmatic slumber. 
This account yields the idea that, in reading Kant’s comments on the course of the 
history of philosophy or the lay of the philosophical landscape in his own century, we 
should keep in mind the New Essays, for it is likely this book that has shaped Kant’s 
critical turn more than any other. Further on in this dissertation, we will find other 
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examples of the influence of the New Essays, but for now we will focus on the opposition 
between the Lockean and the Leibnizian theories of knowledge. 
The parallel between Leibniz’s epistemology and the preformationist theory of 
generation is easily made, since Leibniz himself made it in the following manner: “it [i.e. 
understanding] is not a bare faculty, consisting in a mere possibility of understanding 
those truths [i.e. eternal and necessary truths]: it is rather a disposition, an aptitude, a 
preformation, which determines our soul and brings it about that they are derivable 
from it”. (G V: 77; Leibniz 1996: 80) This of course lends further support to the idea that 
Kant is thinking, in the Critique of Pure Reason, primarily of the New Essays as the source 
for his interpretation of  his predecessors in epistemology. Given this passage and its 
context, Kant is entitled to believe that Leibniz sees the parallel as follows. 
Locke argues that no innate ideas are required in order to account for knowledge, 
and that only the bare faculty of knowledge is required in order to extract from a 
manifold of empirical sensations all the concepts which we can claim to have. Leibniz, 
however, insists that no (finite) amount of empirical information can yield that 
indispensible element of knowledge that is necessity. Concretely, the necessary 
principles that structure and guide knowledge cannot be derived from mere experience, 
and must therefore have a different origin if knowledge is to be possible at all. That is 
why Leibniz suggests that we have been furnished with them at the moment of creation, 
and that although we only come to explicitate them on the occasion of experience, they 
do not derive from this experience, but from the internal development of knowledge. 
Similarly, Leibniz wishes to argue that the specific structure of living systems cannot be 
brought forth by the general principles of mechanics alone (or at least by any finite 
series of mechanical operations), which is why he postulates that all organic structures 
are individually preformed at the moment of creation, and that although these 
structures develop on the occasion of fertilization and nutrition in a sufficiently similar 
individual, they are not produced by these processes.  
It is therefore Leibniz, and not Kant, who originally, though tacitly, suggested the 
parallel between Lockean empiricism and metamorphosis. Remember that for Harvey, 
the system of metamorphosis was associated with that of spontaneous generation, 
because in denying the specificity of the organic constraints on development it is 
commited to the idea that, in principle, life might arise out of (appropriately concocted 
or prepared) unliving matter. The view equally led Buffon to allow spontaneous 
generation through his association with Needham. Like metamorphosis, empiricism 
believes that we can get an organized body (in this case of knowledge) simply from the 
given materials (the empirically given) and the simple operations at work in them, like 
association. The idea that Locke saw a parallel between his austere set of ideas and 
mental operations and the mechanicist ideal of a general kind of matter governed by a 
limited set of mechanical principles, could have been suggested by the following 
passage from the Essay Concerning Human Understanding: 
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These simple ideas, the Materials of all our Knowledge, are suggested and 
furnished to the Mind, only by those two ways above mentioned, viz. Sensation and 
Reflection. When the Understanding is once stored with these simple Ideas, it has 
the Power to repeat, compare, and unite them even to an almost infinite Variety, 
and so can make at pleasure new complex Ideas. But it is not in the Power of the 
most exalted Wit, or enlarged Understanding, by any quickness or variety of 
Thought, to invent or frame one new simple Idea in the mind, not taken in by the 
ways before mentioned: nor can any force of the Understanding, destroy those that 
are there. The Dominion of Man, in this little World of his own Understanding, 
being muchwhat the same, as it is in the great World of visible things; wherein his 
Power, however managed by Art and Skill, reaches no farther, than to compound 
and divide the Materials, that are made to his Hand; but can do nothing towards 
the making the least Particle of new Matter, or destroying one Atome of what is 
already in Being. (Locke 1975: 119-120) 
The idea that this picture of knowledge fails to give us the element of necessity required 
to speak of knowledge in any important sense of the word, would be constantly voiced, 
but of course reached its peak when Hume suggested that the Lockean theory could 
indeed not offer any strong connection between ideas: 
As all simple ideas may be separated by the imagination, and may be united again 
in what form it pleases, nothing wou’d be more unaccountable than the 
operations of that faculty, were it not guided by some universal principles, which 
render it, in some measure, uniform with itself in all times and places. Were ideas 
entirely loose and unconnected, chance alone wou’d join them; and ‘tis impossible 
the same simple ideas shou’d fall regularly into complex ones (as they commonly 
do) without some bond of union among them, some associating quality, by which 
one idea naturally introduces another. (Hume 2009: 12) 
Hume objects to Locke’s atomism of the mind because it makes the manner and 
regularity of the association of ideas incomprehensible. This regularity suggests that 
ideas bond more readily with certain ideas than with certain others. Hume submits here 
that we need a principle that can account for the cohesion of ideas and the apparent 
selectivity of that cohesion. He next introduces precisely such a principle, stating that it 
is “a kind of attraction, which in the mental world will be found to have as extraordinary 
effects as in the natural, and to show itself in as many and various forms” (Hume 2009: 
14). A major innovation is that he advanced custom as the principle for the stronger 
connections between ideas that are otherwise mere matter of fact, and that he 
characterized custom as an analogue to the force of attraction in Newtonian Mechanics. 
This would have reinforced the parallel for readers like Kant, since both Hume and 
theories of metamorphosis invoke a force analogous to Newtonian attraction to explain 
that for which the mechanical picture could not account otherwise. Just like Buffon and 
Maupertuis postulated further principles after the example of gravitation in order to 
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explain the emergence of the intricate structure of an organism, so Hume postulated a 
further principle in order to explain the emergence of the kinds of connections we 
consider essential to knowledge. 
It is clear that Kant shared with Leibniz a broad skepticism with regard to the 
potential of Lockean empiricism to account for knowledge. For him, this skepticism was 
enhanced by the fact that Hume seemed to believe, and was widely held to be entitled to 
believe, that this failure should lead the empiricist to embrace skepticism about the 
possibility of knowledge. In §13 of the first Critique, Kant explicitates his criticism of 
Locke in the following manner: 
in the case of these concepts, as in the case of all cognition, we can search in 
experience, if not for the principles of their possibility, then for the occasional 
causes of their generation, where the impressions of the senses provide the first 
occasion for opening the entire power of cognition to them and for bringing about 
experience, which contains two very heterogeneous elements, namely a matter 
for cognition from the senses and a certain form for ordering it from the inner 
source of pure intuiting and thinking, which, on the occasion of the former, are 
first brought into use and bring forth concepts. Such a tracing of the first 
endeavors of our power of cognition to ascend from individual perceptions to 
general concepts is without doubt of great utility, and the famous Locke is to be 
thanked for having first opened the way for this. Yet a deduction of the pure a 
priori concepts can never be achieved in this way; it does not lie down this path at 
all, for in regard to their future use, which should be entirely independent of 
experience, an entirely different birth certificate than that of an ancestry from 
experiences must be produced. I will therefore call this attempted physiological 
derivation, which cannot properly be called a deduction at all because it concerns 
a quaestio facti, the explanation of the possession of a pure cognition. It is therefore 
clear that only a transcendental and never an empirical deduction of them can be 
given, and that in regard to pure a priori concepts empirical deductions are 
nothing but idle attempts, which can occupy only those who have not grasped the 
entirely distinctive nature of these cognitions. (CPR A 86-87 / B 118-119) 
Kant rejects Locke’s empiricist approach to knowledge because it fails to justify the 
concepts it explains. Mind that the point here is not that such an account is worthless, 
nor that it cannot work for some concepts. It is very useful for showing how we come to 
acquire most of our concepts, but it cannot account for those concepts which 
themselves form the necessary capacities for the acquisition of concepts. On Kant’s 
account, all our empirical concepts are of course empirically derived, but they do not 
derive their status of concepts, the role they get to play in knowledge claims, from their 
empirical sources. It is the categories that are responsible for that particular aspect of 
concept acquisition. And if this is true, then of course these categories cannot 
themselves be empirically acquired, on pain of infinite regress. 
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The prima facie similarity between the diagnoses of the failures of Lockean 
empiricism offered by Leibniz and Kant has undoubtedly furthered the idea that the 
latter embraced some form of the theory espoused by the former. The distinction is 
then supposedly that, according to Leibniz, all concepts are innate, whereas for Kant 
only those necessary for concept acquisition are. But there are problems with this 
reading, for it would suggest that Kant took an intermediate position between Locke and 
Leibniz, claiming that some concepts are somehow innate or preformed whereas others 
are not. This fails to explain why Kant describes preformationism as a middle way 
between his own position and that of Locke. In fact, Kant cites an entirely different 
reason for his dissatisfaction with the Leibnizian preformation theory of concepts. First 
of all, he only talks here about those concepts necessary for knowledge, in his 
terminology the categories, and charges Locke with failing to indicate how we would 
come about them. The idea seems to be that, in absence of any prior concepts regulating 
concept formation and acquisition, all concepts would remain merely subjective, and 
lack the objectivity they need. If we were therefore to acquire the concepts that 
correspond, in the Lockean theory, with the categories, these would themselves be 
merely subjective. Lockean empiricism fails, in Kant’s view, to account for the objectivity 
of the categories. 
Whereas the criticism of Locke is fairly easy to identify, given that Kant expands on it 
elsewhere and given its connection to the challenge of Humean skepticism, the criticism 
of Leibniz is more easily misunderstood. Kant offers several objections, but first it is 
important to note that he takes the categories to be, on the preformationist account, 
“subjective predispositions for thinking”. In identifying the Leibnizian version of the 
category as subjective, he is stating that the preformation theory fails to solve the 
problem of the origin of objectivity. I submit that this is so because the bruteness of 
their acquisition is no less reduced. According to Kant, Leibnizian innate ideas of 
necessity have not been arrived at in any way, but are merely factual givens of our 
human or individual nature. Their objectivity (in casu their correspondence with 
reality) would be entirely accidental to them, for they would not actually relate to the 
objects about which they are, and, as a result, “in such a case the categories would lack 
the necessity that is essential to their concept”. Indeed, Leibniz’s preformationism 
suggests that our ideas and concepts of things have no real relation to those things: they 
correspond with them only because God has implanted in us certain ideas and made 
sure that they correspond with their counterparts independent of all interaction. 
Without such a divine warrant, we never have knowledge at all, as our concepts lack 
justification. 
 Kant adds to this another objection, that on this account “no end can be seen to how 
far one might drive the presupposition of predetermined predispositions for future 
judgments”. The idea behind this comment is arguably that, once the concepts 
necessary for concept acquisition have already been admitted as innate and preformed, 
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there is no reason not to expand this to all empirical concepts, as Leibniz in fact did. 
This suggests that Kant identified the preformation theory with the theory that the 
categories are preformed, not with the theory that all concepts are preformed, and 
charged the former theory with its tendency to slip into the latter. It is hard to maintain 
the interpretation according to which opposed to the preformationist theory his own 
theory that the categories are be preformed, whereas empirical concepts are acquired 
through the employment of the categories, since the latter theory is precisely what Kant 
calls preformationism in this passage. 
But then what does Kant mean when is speaking of the epigenesis of reason? As A. C 
Genova (1974) has suggested, Kant seems determined to warrant the autonomy of reason 
in its yielding of the categories. Such an autonomy would not be helped by replacing the 
external imposition on the part of experience to the equally external imposition on the 
part of God or any predetermining factor. This is supported by the fact that Kant 
contrasts the Leibnizian “subjective predispositions for thinking” with his categories as 
“selfthought a priori first principles of our cognition” (Kant’s stress). The importance of 
the epigenesist story is, then, for Kant, that the categories are not given to us by 
experience, nor originally given, but are due to reason itself. Secondly, this is perfectly 
in line with the passages we discussed from the first Critique, all of which could be read 
as stressing the internal origin of the categories rather than the preformation of the 
categories.  
Finally, it allows us to make sense of Kant’s utterance that preformation is a middle 
way between epigenesis and metamorphosis. Epigenesis asserts that the emergence of 
the organism is due to the specifically organic constraints, and so due to the organism 
itself, which, through some form of circular causation, determines its process of genesis. 
Metamorphosis instead suggests that the level of the organic is superfluous in 
explaining the emergence of organic structure, since the materials and the principles 
governing them suffice. Preformation agrees with metamorphosis that the level of the 
organic is not active in the process of generation, and with epigenesis that the organic 
structure cannot be accounted for by the materials and their principles. Hence, it 
suggests that organic form is externally imposed on the matter it structures. In the 
same way, the preformationist account of knowledge does not seek the origin of 
knowledge in the mere materials of knowledge, nor in the form of knowledge itself, but 
claims that the form of knowledge is externally imposed.  
We have here argued that Kant’s epigenesis of reason is meant to be a position that 
greatly differs from Leibniz preformationist theory of knowledge, and that one major 
aspect of difference is that for Kant, the categories must be somehow due to the internal 
structure or force of reason, not due to some external imposition by nature or by God. It 
will only be in the final chapter of this dissertation that we will be able to flesh out this 
theory of epigenesis. Before concluding this first part, however, I want to further 
articulate our results so far by relating transcendental idealism to the idea of historicity. 
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3.4 Transcendental Idealism and Historicity 
In this section, I want to briefly indicate how the idea of history arising through our 
analysis of Kant’s philosophy of history and the idea of epigenesis as it appears in the 
transcendental deduction can relate. I will first set the stage for my comments by 
outlining some of Jacques Derrida’s insights into the relation between transcendental 
idealism and historicity. Then, I will relate the biological theory of epigenesis, the 
philosophy of history and the idea of the epigenesis of reason on the basis of the four 
relevant aspects of Kantian epigenesis identified in the previous chapter. This 
discussion is not meant to be decisive, nor fully enlightening, but it serves to indicate 
what challenges and questions lie ahead of us in the next four chapters. 
The central question in this dissertation is whether we can take Kant’s epigenesis of 
reason as suggesting a theory that allows for the historicity of reason without giving up 
knowledge’s claims to objectivity. Such a theory is very difficult to offer, but, as Jacques 
Derrida has said in the context of his introduction to Edmund Husserl’s Origin of 
Geometry, “If we take for granted the philosophical nonsense of a purely empirical 
history and the impotence of an ahistorical rationalism, then we realize the seriousness 
of what is at stake” (Derrida 1989: 51). 
With this last quotation, we have found an entry point into the idea of transcendental 
history. After all, it was Derrida’s concern to reveal how, in Husserl’s early work, the 
transcendental could be harmonized with the historical. The main move in this idea is, 
of course, that only the transcendental can allow for the historical:  
If the history of geometry were only the development of a purpose wholly present 
from the beginning, we would have to deal only with an explication or a quasi-
creation. We would have on one side a synchronic or timeless uchronique ground 
and, on the other side, a purely empirical diachrony with its indicative function 
but without any proper unity of its own. Neither pure diachrony nor pure 
synchrony make a history. The rejected hypothesis is once more that of a 
complicity between "Platonism" and empiricism. (Derrida 1989: 62) 
The importance of this passage for my discussion is of course immediately obvious, 
since the position described here as “Platonism” is precisely the Leibnizian position, 
which tends to deny that concepts have a history, since they are atemporally preformed 
and therefore come to be instantiated only through a quasi-history, a merely pro forma 
settling of a fully predetermined matter.8 Interestingly, however, Derrida goes on to 
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deny that empiricism can account for history, since it cannot show how the sequence of 
empirical occurrences and experiences can constitute a unity such that it can yield 
specific conceptual results. Later in the essay, Derrida announces that history is made 
such a unity, is made historical, by the Idea, which he himself insists should be taken in 
the Kantian sense. This forces him to respond to the obvious criticism that history is 
now made one by something that is itself ahistorical: the idea, with the following 
pellucid comment: 
Undoubtedly the Idea and the Reason hidden in history and in man as “animal 
rationale" are eternal. Husserl often says this. But this eternity is only a 
historicity. It is the possibility of history itself. Its supratemporality-compared 
with empirical temporality-is only an omnitemporality. The Idea, like Reason, is 
nothing outside the history in which it displays itself, i.e., in which (in one and the 
same movement) it discloses and lets itself be threatened. (Derrida 1989: 142) 
Derrida’s analysis of the role of the idea in Husserl suggests that the idea, which is 
supposed to be untemporal, is not, after all, unhistorical, and is in fact open to 
contingencies. I believe a similar situation holds for Kant’s philosophy, since such a 
situation makes the best sense of what are otherwise overt contradictions in his 
thought. This is brought out well by Derrida’s reference to the idea of reason in history. 
As I have argued in section 3.2., Kant’s philosophy of history presents reason not as 
some fixed, eternal faculty, but as the faculty for historicity. Kant argued that we can 
never know our predispositions, but that we can know reason. Reason, here, is the 
faculty that causes us to leave our initial stage and the fixed confines of our faculties 
and develop ourselves and our potentials through a historical process. Derrida correctly 
saw that for transcendental idealism, reason is “the possibility of history itself”. Reason 
should therefore not be regarded as a preformed faculty, one that is granted by the 
atemporal, but rather as one that inhabits our history as a virtuality, much like the 
germs and predispositions, as internal constraints on the generative faculty, inhabit it 
as virtually preformed elements. 
Secondly, in this analysis, the idea of reason is the “possibility of history itself” 
because it is capable of establishing a continuity in a historical development which ties 
them together as different stages in one history, and not just different disjoint times. 
Such continuity is arguably only possible if there are some constraints on how two 
subsequent phases may relate and may differ to make them importantly different forms 
of the same. In Kant’s philosophy of history, the germs and predispositions are intended 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
intended of course to counter such a reading, and reveal that what is supposed to be original in Husserl’s 
version of the transcendental is already present in Kant’s, and is therefore a fundamental tenet of 
transcendental philosophy as such. 
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to provide precisely not only the fact that we tend to historical development, but also 
that this historical development is tied together as a continuity. 
Reason is not, of course, fully historicized by these two glosses, these two shifts 
between the “Platonic” and the “Transcendental” picture. In order to be genuinely 
historical, reason must be open to contingency, which means that it must be amenable 
to change itself. An important feature of Derrida’s reading is precisely that, in history, 
novelty can arise. In order for this to be possible, reason cannot have a rigorous 
structure such as it is supposed to have on Platonic accounts: its omnitemporality 
means that it, although it is not limited in time, is nonetheless open to the effects of 
time, of history. A similar stress is present in Kant’s theory of predispositions, because it 
entails that our very faculties can change through a historical process, and that it is not 
predetermined to which constraints this change is subjected, much like the theory of 
predispositions is supposed to allow for the plasticity of development and of species in 
Kant’s theory of epigenesis. According to Kant, the very ideas of education and of 
culture suggest such malleability of our faculties. 
Such openess to contingency, however, should not be misconstrued as direct openess 
to external influence. In the quoted passage, Derrida is careful to insist that it is reason 
itself which “lets itself be threatened”. This means that the openess to contingency is 
internal to reason, and that contingency arises in and through the very same process 
whereby reason develops itself. Derrida undoubtedly stipulates this because the 
internality is a condition for reason taking this contingency into account: as long as the 
contingency remains external, it can be dismissed as mere historical accident and 
anecdote. Thus, the place and function of contingency must lie in the heart of reason 
itself. A similar idea can be found in Kant’s theory of epigenesis, where it is the 
generative force itself which bears, within itself, and through its workings, the 
possibility of change. The theory of predispositions, as we saw in the previous chapter, 
entails that contingency should be viewed as merely occasioning the internal capacity 
for change, rather than bringing it about directly. It thus turns out that the criteria 
Derrida identified as prerequisites for a transcendental philosophy that can 
accommodate historicity, are importantly analogous to the main tenets of Kant’s theory 
of epigenesis as identified in the previous chapter. 
3.5 Conclusion 
In chapter, I have dealt with the role of Kant’s talk of epigenesis in his philosophy of 
history and his epistemology, and shown that the four traits of Kant’s theory of 
epigenesis identified in chapter 3 allow us to understand this connection. This has set us 
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on the path for a better appreciation of Kant’s theory of the epigenesis of reason as a 
transcendental epistemology that is open to historicity. Nonetheless, our analyses here 
do not in themselves yield such a picture, for it remains to be seen how Kant’s reason 
can be epigenetical in such a manner. In order to answer this question, we will have to 
turn our attention to the nature of the systems that Kant would have to hold as 









Chapter 4 The Structure of the Organic: 
Natural Purposiveness and Circularity 
The fact that complex systems can be approximated 
(albeit locally and temporarily) by simple ones is a 
crucial one. It explains precisely why the Newtonian 
paradigm has been so successful, and why, to this day, it 
represents the only effective procedure for dealing with 
system behavior. But in general, we can also see that it 
can supply only approximations in general, and in the 
universe of complex systems, it amounts to replacing a 
complex system with a simple subsystem. 
- Robert Rosen 
 
In the previous three chapters, I have argued that Kant’s notion of epigenesis was 
intended to yield an account of why the transcendental, the structural, can be historical 
in the sense of being amenable to change and to contingency. It is now time to turn our 
attention to these dynamic structures. I will begin elaborating Kant’s account of 
dynamic structure with an analysis of Kant’s paradigm instance of such a structure, 
namely the organism. The concept of an organism, we will see, is peculiar in Kant, 
because it is intimately linked to that of a natural purpose, although it would be 
mistaken to identify the two. To show what is at stake in Kant’s theory of natural 
purposiveness, I will begin, in Section 4.1, with a necessarily all too brief historical 
overview meant to indicate the issues surrounding the notion of teleology in Kant’s 
time. In subsection 4.1.1, I will argue that the difference between Platonic and 
Aristotelian teleology is that the former always involves intentionality, whereas the 
latter can be non-intentional and yet non-mechanical. The theistic tradition inherited 
Plato’s concept and rejected Aristotle’s, thereby suggesting that all natural teleology 
derives from a transcendent artificer, i.e. God. In subsection 4.1.2, I will argue that 
mechanicism’s critique of teleology was based on, rather than directed against, the 
theistic position. In section 4.2, I will argue that Kant’s concept of the “natural” in 
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“natural purpose” refers primarily to the non-intentional nature of the purposiveness 
involved. I will also argue that, once we understand this, we will need to let go of the 
idea that the mereological relation exhibited by natural purposes is that of the primacy 
of the whole of the parts, but rather accept that in natural purposes no such priorities 
can be assigned. In subsection 4.2.1, I will show how Kant delineates the kind of 
purposiveness with which he is concerned. I will then discuss, in subsection 4.2.2, Kant’s 
preliminary characterization of the concept of a natural purpose through his example of 
a tree. This discussion will reveal that Kant thinks of natural purposes along Aristotelian 
lines, in that they are entities which need to be judged as somehow bound or obliged to 
maintain themselves as specific individuals of specific kinds, although this specificity is 
subject to some plasticity. In subsection 4.2.3, I will discuss Kant’s determination of the 
concept of natural purpose proper, showing that it cannot simply be understood 
through mechanism alone, nor through an analogy with art or intentional design. 
Natural purposes exhibit a circular causality which obtains between the multiplicity of 
their parts, and which results in the mutual (self)-specification of these parts. Since such 
a concept is incomprehensible to man, having no analogue with any of the two forms of 
causality with which we are familiar, namely mechanical causation and intentional 
action, there is a problem of how we are supposed to put it to use. This problem 
manifests itself in the antinomy of teleological judgment, which I discuss in section 4.3. 
In 4.3.1, I discuss the initial presentation of the antinomy in §§70-71 of the Critique of the 
Power of Judgment, and argue that it does not yet furnish a solution to the antinomy. The 
problem that remains is that, although the antinomy does not lead to a metaphysical 
contradiction, it does result in a conflict between two non-optional maxims for our 
inquiry into nature. In 4.3.2, I present §§72-74 as intended to explore possible solutions 
to the second challenge of the antinomy, and show why Kant ultimately found the 
assumption of design to be most helpful. In 4.3.3, I argue that Kant’s solution to the 
antinomy is the following: although natural purposes suggest a different type of 
causality than those familiar to us, and although this type of causality is not strictly 
impossible, we cannot comprehend anything in this manner. That is why we adopt the 
language of design in our inquiries: not because all teleology is intentional but rather 
because we can only mechanically reason about teleology if we consider it as intentional. I 
also discuss Kant’s reason why we cannot think of teleology otherwise than in this form, 
namely his conviction that humans are irreducibly divided between sensibility and 
understanding. I will conclude by noting some features of Kant’s concept of natural 
purpose that are relevant to the next chapters. 
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4.1 From Natural Teleology to Natural Theology 
It has become an enduring tendency of philosophers to link Aristotle’s philosophy, and 
his philosophy of nature in particular, to the concept of teleology. Like many enduring 
tendencies, however, they have become ingrained through repetition rather than 
through understanding, thereby impeding our understanding of what went on in the 
turn from the Medieval to the Early Modern conception of natural philosophy. An 
important aspect of this turn, we are told from early on in our philosophical 
development, is the banishment of final causation as an irreducible explanatory 
category. For Aristotle, we know, final causation is one of the four basic causes, one 
which is irreducible to the others, and indispensible for any proper explanation. 
Mechanical Philosophy, on the other hand, denies that indication of the final cause is 
indispensible and/or irreducible. It is also often believed that Aristotle’s invocation of 
final causation is mostly motivated by concerns that we now regard as biological. The 
Aristotelian conception of the soul is then regarded as the notion that explains the 
agent behind the teleology purportedly exhibited by organisms. 
In this section, I would like to discuss the ways in which this picture is right and the 
ways in which it is wrong. In the first subsection, I will argue that whereas Aristotle 
believed teleology to be potentially unintentional, Medieval Aristotelianism followed 
Plato in insisting that teleology always involves intentionality. As a result, it became 
increasingly difficult to conceive of final causes at work in processes where no 
intentionality seemed to be involved, except by reffering to divine intentions 
concerning natural processes. This evolution led to the assumption that processes that 
do not involve a soul are only indirectly teleological, whereas those that do involve a 
soul can be directly teleological by referring to the intentions formed in that soul. I will 
argue that this led to the problem of the precise function of the vegetative soul. 
In the second subsection, I will argue that mechanicist philosophers relied on the 
scholastic transformation of teleology in order to eliminate natural teleology altogether 
or defer it completely to considerations of divine intentions. I will focus specifically on 
the contrasting accounts of final causation in Descartes and Boyle. I will argue that 
Boyle’s account was the most important doctrine on final causation from the late 17th to 
the early 19th century because of its continuation in the programme of natural theology 
of the Boyle lectures. This is important because I believe Kant intended his account of 
teleology as an alternative to the particular wedding of teleology and theology in the 
natural theology of the Enlightenment. 
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4.1.1 The Naturality of Teleology 
Aristotle’s focus on teleology and finality in natural philosophy was not a complete 
invention of his, for here as in many other debates, he was influenced by Plato, who had 
already voiced, albeit through his mouthpiece Socrates1, objections against the 
materialist explanations offered by the presocratics. In the Phaedo, Socrates divulges to 
Cebes his one-time interest in the philosophy of Anaxogoras, for the following reason: 
I once heard someone reading from a book, as he said, by Anaxagoras, and 
asserting that it is mind that produces order and is the cause of everything. This 
explanation pleased me. Somehow it seemed right that mind should be the cause 
of everything, and I reflected that if this is so, mind in producing order sets 
everything in order and arranges each individual thing in the way that is best for 
it. Therefore if anyone wished to discover the reason why any given thing came or 
ceased or continued to be, he must find out how it was best for that thing to be, or 
to act or be acted upon in any other way. On this view there was only one thing 
for a man to consider, with regard both to himself and to everything else, namely 
the best and highest good, since both were covered by the same knowledge. (97b-
d) 
Socrates was thus mostly enthusiastic about the fact that Anaxagoras seemed to take 
recourse to teleology in his explanation by allowing for the fact that mind (nous) was 
the primary cause of everything. This form of teleological explanation requires that one 
explains the structure of a thing or the processes which occur in it in terms of how they 
serve that thing, how they envisage the “good” of the thing. But this enthusiasm, 
Socrates continues, was soon dispelled:  
As I read on I discovered that the fellow made no use of mind and assigned to it no 
causality for the order of the world, but adduced causes like air and aether and 
water and many other absurdities. It seemed to me that he was just about as 
inconsistent as if someone were to say, the cause of everything that Socrates does 
is mind – and then, in trying to account for my several actions, said first that the 
reason why I am lying here now is that my body is composed of bones and sinews 
[…] But to call things like that causes is too absurd. If it were said that without 
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 In this section, I will ignore the interpretative issues surrounding the fact that Plato usually advanced ideas 
or arguments through the mouth of characters engaged in a narratively complex dialogue. This fact, indeed, 
requires us to be careful in assessing the dialectical role Plato himself intended for the assertion or argument. 
I believe I can relatively safely bracket these issues here because my concern is more with the influence of the 
Platonic Corpus than with the internal logic of Plato’s theory. The passages I will highlight have often been 




such bones and sinews and all the rest of them I should not be able to do what I 
think is right, it would be true. But to say that it is because of them that I do what I 
am doing, and not through choice of what is best – although my actions are 
controlled by mind – would be a very lax and innacurate form of expression. 
Fancy being unable to distinguish between the cause of a thing and the condition 
without which it could not be the cause! It is this latter, as it seems to me, that 
most people, groping in the dark, call a cause – attaching to it a name to which it 
has no right. (98b-99b) 
What Socrates finds objectionable in the presocratics is their omission of a proper 
explanation for the order exhibited by the processes they intend to describe. In other 
words, they fail to show how mind is operative in nature, and therefore fail to identify 
the proper cause at all.2 What is needed according to Socrates (and arguably Plato) is an 
account of natural processes that shows how the material processes are employed by 
mind in its activity. 
Plato himself would propose such an alternative style of explanation in natural 
philosophy in his Timaeus (cf. Wright 2000: 10-11), which distinguishes between a 
primary and a secondary sense of cause: 
All these [material causes] are to be reckoned among the second and co-operative 
causes which God, carrying into execution the idea of the best as far as possible, 
uses as his ministers. They are thought by most men not to be the second, but the 
prime causes of all things, because they freeze and heat, and contract and dilate, 
and the like. But they are not so, for they are incapable of reason or intellect; the 
only being which can properly have mind is the invisible soul, whereas fire and 
water, and earth and air, are all of them visible bodies. The lover of intellect and 
knowledge ought to explore causes of intelligent nature first of all, and, secondly, 
of those things which, being moved by others, are compelled to move others.  And 
this is what we must do. Both kinds of causes should be acknowledged by us, but a 
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 It is interesting to note that Socrates is not claiming that the presocratics fail to account for or explain Mind. 
Mind itself is not an explanandum here, but an explanans: what they fail to show is how Mind is or gets to be 
explanatory in nature. This brings up the question as to what exactly the explanandum, or the aspect of the 
explanandum, for which they would thereby fail to account, could be. An initial response would be that order 
is that explanans. I believe this is true, but that it is too brief an answer. What Socrates himself advances as the 
explanandum in the quoted passage is “doing what I think is right”. I submit that it is the notions of right, of 
good, and the normative dimensions they employ, that stand in need of explanation. For Socrates, a proper 
explanation of his sitting there in prison would require an explanation of the juridical context of his trial as 
described in the Apology, and the reasons against avoiding execution he adduces in the Crito. I also believe a 
further dimension needs to be taken into account, namely why it is also best for Socrates to be there in prison. 
This is in fact the primary topic of the Phaedo: the idea that Socrates is not harmed by his execution, because of 
the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. In this way, the concept of “right” in these passages from the 
Phaedo (re)collects all the dimensions of normativity for which mind is supposed to account. 
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distinction should be made between those which are endowed with mind and are 
the workers of things fair and good, and those which are deprived of intelligence 
and always produce chance effects without order or design. (46c-e) 
In this passage, Timaeus (arguably Plato’s mouthpiece in this dialogue), distinguishes 
between the primary causes of things, which account for their goodness and fairness, 
and which are due to the action of mind (nous), and the secondary causes, which 
describe the material processes at work and are due to the action of necessity (anankè). 
He stresses that a proper explanation requires both causes to be given, but that the 
relation between the causes must be such that the secondary causes are subservient to 
the primary causes. This distinction therefore coincides, at least roughly, with that from 
the Phaedo “between the cause of a thing and the condition without which it could not 
be the cause”. 
Plato’s account of teleological explanation is fateful both for its account of the 
explanans and for its account of the explanandum. The explanans of teleology, for Plato, 
is mind or intelligence. The Myth of the Timeaus suggests that we take this quite 
literally3, since it refers to the intentional actions of a transcendent creator of the 
universe, the so-called Demiurge, who fashions the visible universe as an icon of an 
intelligible (and, for Plato, therefore invisible) paradigm. 
The explanandum is the beneficial order exhibited by the cosmos and its 
constituents. This order is explainable only because “God desired that all things should 
be good and nothing bad, so far as this was attainable”, and considered that “[order] was 
in every way better than [disorder]” (30a). The cosmos as a whole, Timaeus suggests, 
reveals the hand of the Demiurge for two major reasons, namely its closure and its 
proportionality. The closure is due to the fact “the creator conceived that a being which 
was self-sufficient would be far more excellent than one which lacked anything” (33d). 
The proportionality of the universe, on the other hand, reveals that its cause had an 
advanced knowledge of mathematics. More interesting for our present discussion is, 
however, why Plato believes that the explanation in terms of Mind is required in the 
case of living beings. The Timaeus contains lengthy discussions of the anatomy and 
physiology of living things, offering possible or probable secondary causes employed by 
the Demiurge in fashioning them, and reasons for his choice of these secondary causes. 
Thus, he seems to believe that the intelligence of the Demiurge is primarily responsible 
for the structures of these animals, not the workings of these animals. 
Sarah Broadie has developed in interesting interpretation of Plato as holding that the 
intelligence of the Demiurg only operated at the creation of the universe, but that he 
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withdrew upon the completion of his creative act in order to leave nature to its ordinary 
course: 
[The cosmic animal’s] soul and body were designed and constructed by the 
supreme and invisible Demiurge, but the motions of the celestial system belong to 
the stars that constitute that system, and their astronomical movements manifest 
the activity of the cosmic soul itself. The cosmic animal is a natural being – one 
that has the status of a great god because its life is intelligent, immortal, 
completely self-sufficient and all-containing, but nonetheless natural because 
once it has been made by the Demiurge, being assigned its proper motion by him, 
it works on its own physical and psychological principles. With the mortal animals 
it is even clearer that they have been constructed to live their own lives in 
accordance with their own natures and that of the environment. The ancillary 
gods fashioned their complex respiratory and metabolic systems, but it is clearly 
the mortal animals themselves that will be breathing in and out and undergoing 
the stages in the metabolic cycle.  […] In short, the animals will be living their own 
lives. (Broadie 2011: 258) 
Broadie’s treatment of the issue is interesting because it neatly divides the roles of mind 
and necessity between that of creating the structure of the universe and its 
constituents, and that of the processes in a universe under this structural constraint. 
Once appropriately structured, Nature becomes autonomous from its divine origin, 
although it still bears the mark of intelligence in the aptness, the closure and the 
proportion of its structure. But Broadie also goes on to alert a serious problem for 
Plato’s account in the Timeaus, namely that of reproduction. She indicates that Plato’s 
account is attractive for the anatomical and physiological facts about existing living 
beings, but that it fails when the power of producing new structures through 
reproduction is concerned: 
The activity [or reproduction] is said to be a forming of the unformed, and herein lies 
the philosophical difficulty. There is no place for this sort of mindless formation in 
the great dualistic scheme of Intelligence and Necessity. The domain of Necessity 
can only submit to formation of the organic structures, not initiate or guide it. 
And Intelligence goes to work through intellectual activity such as the divine 
demiurgic thinking that gives itself a goal reflectively, works out ways to meet it, 
takes note (a kind of reflection) of the beauty of the product, makes reasoned 
decisions prioritising one value such as intelligence in mortals over another such 
as longevity; or such as the thinking of the cosmic soul that continuously 
articulates relations of sameness and difference so as to produce in itself 
understanding (nous), knowledge, and firm and true beliefs and convictions; or 
such as the thinking of mortals, whose intelligence too is intended for truth about 
identities and differences, but which keeps staggering into confusion through 
interference by alien impulses, until rescue comes via the deliberate self-care of a 
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learning-regime focused on the ‘harmonies and revolutions of the All’. Moreover, 
all intelligence is immortal. The point is mentioning these features of Timean 
intelligence in different examples is to bring out the fact that in all these ways the 
forces that supposedly shape the embryo could hardly be more different. They are 
mortal psycho-physical forces crafted by the secondary demiurges. So far as 
animals are subject to these forces they are not reflective; they do not deliberate; 
their operation is not spelt out by reference to truth, knowledge, or learning; their 
fulfilment is defined not as self-perfecting assimilation to the cosmic harmonies 
and revolutions of the unique and everlasting cosmos, but as the successful 
procreation of mortal by mortal. Yet in carrying out their work these forces 
presumably do what so far only divine demiurgy guided by the extra-mundane 
paradigm has been shown as able to do, namely persuade material Necessity to 
contribute to their project. (Broadie 2011: 270-271) 
The conclusion thus seems to be that, in order to account for the generation of animals, 
Plato would have to allow either that generation always requires a transcendent 
intervention, thereby losing the idea that nature can take its ordinary course once 
created, or that the structures of animals can arise by material necessity alone, thereby 
losing the explanatory role of intelligence in physiology and anatomy. This is a familiar 
dilemma, since it already came up in my Chapter 2 discussion of the problem of animal 
generation in Early Modern philosophy. Here, we find it prefigured in Plato. As we will 
see, this is not coincidental, since most Medieval and Early Modern thinkers would 
adopt the Platonic dualism of demiurge and nature, of Intelligence and Necessity. In 
doing so, however, they opted against the Aristotelian attempt to escape the dilemma 
by invoking natural teleology. 
Aristotle followed Plato in the assumption that proper explanation in physics 
requires reference to teleology. This is clear, for instance, from his criticism of 
Anaxagoras in Metaphysics A, which clearly echoes the one offered by Socrates/Plato in 
the Phaedo. Like Socrates, Aristotle expresses initial appreciation for Anaxagoras and his 
principle: 
When these men [i.e. the earlier presocratics] and the principles of this kind [i.e. 
the formal, material and efficient causes] had had their day, as the latter were 
found inadequate to generate the nature of things, men were again forced by the 
truth itself, as we said, to inquire into the next kind of cause. For surely it is not 
likely either that fire or earth or any such element should be the reason why 
things manifest goodness and beauty both in their being and in their coming to 
be, or that these thinkers should have supposed it was; nor again could it be right 
to ascribe so great a matter to spontaneity and luck. When one man said, then, 
that reason was present – as in animals, so throughout nature – as the cause of the 
world and of all its order, he seemed like a sober man in contrast with the random 
talk of his predecessors. We know that Anaxagoras certainly adopted these views, 
but Hermotimus of Clazomenae is credited with expressing them earlier. Those 
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who thought thus stated that there is a principle of things which is at the same 
time the cause of beauty, and that sort of cause from which things acquire 
movement. (984b) 
Within pages of this praise, however, Aristotle repeats the Socratic judgement by stating 
that “Anaxagoras uses reason as a deus ex machine for the making of the world, and 
when he is at a loss to tell for what cause something necessarily is, then he drags reason 
in, but in all other cases ascribes events to anything rather than reason” (985a). 
However, he also goes on to suggest that Plato’s response is not satisfactory either, since 
it is confined to the material and the formal causes (988a). I find it plausible that we 
should take Aristotle’s closing judgment on the issue as equally targeted at Plato: 
That for the sake of which actions and changes and movements take place, they 
assert to be a cause in a way, but not in this way, i.e. not in the way in which it is 
its nature to be a cause. For those who speak of reason or friendship class these 
causes as goods; they do not speak, however, as if anything that exists either 
existed or came into being for the sake of these, but as if movements started from 
these. In the same way those who say the One or the existent is the good, say that 
it is the cause of substance, but not that substance either is or comes to be for the 
sake of this. Therefore it turns out that in a sense they both say and do not say the 
good is a cause; for they do not call it a cause qua good but only incidentally. 
(988b) 
This passage is surely a difficult one, but I find it highly plausible that in it, Aristotle is 
claiming that even those among his predecessors who aimed to take final causes into 
account failed to do so because they fashioned it after the model of another cause. For 
Aristotle, it is specific to a final cause that we explain a process by referring to its end 
state. Most thinkers, however, seem to place the good or the rational in the initial state. 
This was, of course, also what Plato did in the Timaeus: the teleology exhibited by the 
universe was due to its being fashioned after the intelligible paradigm intended by the 
divine artisan, the demiurg. By thus equating the intelligent cause with the 
paradigmatic pre-existence, Plato is effectively reducing, in Aristotle’s opinion at least, 
final cause to formal cause.  
D. M. Balme expresses the import of Aristotle’s departure from Plato on the issue of 
teleology excellently in the following passage: 
The novelty in Aristotle's theory was his insistence that finality is within nature: it 
is part of the natural process, not imposed upon it by an independent agent like 
Plato's world soul or Demiourgos. This is what allows him to claim that none of his 
predecessors had recognized the final cause with any clarity. Anaxagoras called 
his primary cosmological cause 'Mind', and for this Aristotle likened him to a lone 
sober man among drunks; Plato offered cosmic teleological causes in the Timaeus, 
Philebus and Laws; Xenophon argued for the popular belief in providential 
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guidance of natural phenomena. But such constructions are not what Aristotle 
meant by the final cause. Nor has his natural teleology anything to do with 
intentionality, the physiology of which in man and animals he explains in MA. 
There is no deliberating or purposing in most animals, he says; and it is by nature 
alone that roots and leaves grow for the sake of fruit. (Balme 1987: 275) 
The major difference that Aristotle saw between his own approach and that of others is 
that he was focused on understanding nature and natural change as opposed to artificial 
change. This is born out well by his famous analysis of the notion of nature in Book II of 
the Physics. His famous definition of nature is there that of the “internal principle of 
motion and rest” (192b). By this, he means that we can and do recognize natural things 
and natural motions because they somehow flow from the fact that this thing is this 
particular kind of thing, and no other. The upshot of this is that nature, for Aristotle, is 
both autonomous or self-moving and strongly linked to the idea of being a specific kind 
of thing. 
When Aristotle stresses the distinction between natural entities and artifacts, he 
insists that they differ in that the former are themselves causes of the changes they 
normally and therefore regularly4 undergo, whereas artifacts do not have such an 
internal principle of change and are entirely dependent on the aid of the artificer. The 
important factor here is that, for Aristotle, change is brought about by and within 
nature, and not (normally or regularly) externally imposed upon it. 
It becomes clear from the concept of nature as it is characterized in Physics II.1 that 
Aristotle is thinking of self-change primarily in terms of self-production, more 
specifically as the self-production exhibited by organisms in their process of genesis: 
Nature [φύσις] in the sense of a coming-to-be [γένεσις] proceeds towards nature. 
For it is not like doctoring, which leads not to the art of doctoring but to health. 
Doctoring must start from the art, not lead to it. But it is not in this way that 
nature is related to nature. What grows qua growing grows from something into 
something. Into what then does it grow? Not into that from which it arose but into 
that to which it tends. The shape then is nature. (193b) 
Aristotle clarifies here what he means when he says that form is nature, a thesis he 
advanced against the materialist thesis that the underlying matter of things is their 
nature, and that natural change should be understood primarily in terms of the changes 
necessitated by the basic elements and material principles. This clarification is 
necessary because there is a familiar sense in which things can be determined by their 
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 Aristotle believes that we can rather easily identify the proper motions of natural kinds by seeing how they 
regularly act in non-contrived situations. The challenge of the natural philosophers consists in identifying the 
natures and the principles that underly these regular motions. (Cf. Waterlow 1982: 33-34) 
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form without this form thereby being something distinctly causally active over and 
above the matter of which it is the form. This familiar sense is that of the artifact, where 
the artificer draws upon the natural properties and behaviours of his materials to bring 
about certain effects. The form itself, however, is not distinctly causally active in such a 
case. If Aristotle wants to defend his idea that the form is distinctly operational apart 
from the matter, he has to reveal a strong disanalogy between the natural and the 
artificial. He tries to do this by insisting that, in natural beings, the form is causally 
active because it leads the process of production, of coming-be. Natural beings are self-
producing because they have an internal tendency to realize in themselves a form that 
they do not yet fully have. This refers of course to the doctrine of final causation: for 
Aristotle, forms are distinctly causally relevant because they serve as final causes. 
To appreciate what this means, we need to look at the case of doctoring mentioned 
by Aristotle. In the case of doctoring, the end of the activity and its principle of change 
are not the same: a doctor’s activity is best described5 as exercizing the art of healing, 
not as becoming-healthy. The generation and growth of a given plant, however, is best 
described as becoming that plant, not as an exercise of plant-making. The difference 
between the two cases, for Aristotle, is that in the first case something other than the 
form is bringing about the form, whereas in the latter case the form is bringing about 
itself. 
Another important aspect of Aristotle’s theory is that the forms of natural things 
refer to the kind of thing. Specifically, they are substantial forms in that they 
characterize that of which they are the form as one substance. Material principles, 
Aristotle believed, cannot make sense of the fact that, in nature, there are things best 
understood as existing and persisting individuals of specific kinds. We would now tend 
to say that this is because materialism explains natural things in mass-terms, which do 
not allow for individuation, and not in terms of sortals, which serve to identify 
individuals.6 For Aristotle, this is problematic mostly because he believes we need to 
admit the individuality and the kind of a thing to be causally active in the world. 
This is not to say that Aristotle leaves no room for necessity and material principles. 
On the contrary, he believes that we need to understand how, in the processes of 
genesis that give rise to natural individuals, the material necessity is employed as a 
means and a constraint. As John Cooper expresses it: 
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 It is a central tenet of Aristotle’s Physics that there are better and worse descriptions for physics, not just for 
convenience sake, but principally. A situation exhibits its causal goings-on only under a relevant description, 
not under an irrelevant, “accidental” one.  
6
 See also 5.4.2. 
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according to Aristotle in Physics II.9, Democritean necessity does play a role in 
nature, i.e. in the formation of natural, living things, but it does so only 
hypothetically - that is, only on the hypothesis that a living thing is to be 
produced. Given that a living thing is to be, certain materials are necessary (i.e. 
these materials are hypothetically necessary); this means that the presence of 
those materials is to be explained by reference to this goal. But once, for that 
reason, they are there, their nature, and the material necessity that belongs to it, 
will cause them to behave in various ways. They will act in those ways by 
necessity, and this necessity is not a hypothetical one.  
[…] [Aristotle] wants to say that Democritean necessity does indeed exist and has a 
role to play in the formation of living things, but that where it does make a 
contribution it only does so because the materials whose necessary action is in 
question are themselves necessitated hypothetically. On this interpretation it 
could be said that Aristotle 'subsumes' Democritean necessity under hypothetical 
necessity, in the explanation of living things. But that does not mean that he 
reduces it to hypothetical necessity. (Cooper 1987: 263-264) 
This position should remind us of Plato’s solution, in the Timaeus, to the allocation of 
roles to mind and necessity. There, mind was considered a primary cause, whereas 
necessity constituted necessary causes. Like Plato, Aristotle also stresses that the more 
important focus of natural philosophy should be on form, not on matter and necessity. 
But these similarities threaten to cover up another important feature of Aristotle’s 
theory. For Plato, forms determined natural things because they were imposed upon 
them by an artificer. On Aristotle’s definition, however, this would make natural beings 
into artifacts, whose proper cause is the art of the artificer, not their own natures. Most 
importantly, it would be impossible for natural things to come about naturally. As we 
discussed above, Plato’s demiurgic approach ran into difficulties in the explanation of 
reproduction, of the tendency of natural things to bring forth natural things of their 
kind naturally and unintentionally. It is revealing that Aristotle seemed to define nature 
precisely as genesis, as this self-production and coming to be with which Plato 
struggled.  
This brings us to the most puzzling and fascinating aspect of Aristotle’s philosophy of 
nature, namely the idea that a final cause in nature is not usually intentional. The final 
cause does not give rise to its end because it is prefigured as a conscious goal of the 
agent. For Aristotle, this is born out perfectly by the case of animals, which often act in 
complex concerted manners without having the rational capacities to plan these 
actions, and more importantly by plants, which reveal, in their growth, nutrition and 
generation, a finality at work without even the semblance of intentionality. 
The doctrine of natural teleology, which holds that the tendency to realise ends is a 
property of nature itself, and not one superimposed by a transcendent function, is 
defining for Aristotle’s biology in one more important sense, namely in the idea of a 
vegetative soul. The vegetative soul is not a soul in any sense familiar to us, because it 
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confers upon its substance neither intention and reason, neither sensation nor 
appetition, but only the capacity for growth, nutrition and generation, i.e. the capacity 
for self-production.  
In subsequent centuries, however, it was Plato’s account, not Aristotle’s, which was to 
define our understanding of final causation. For philosophers from Jewish, Christian or 
Islamic backgrounds, the Timaeus offered a picture of the relation between intelligence 
and necessity that was far more conducive to their religious views, one that showed us a 
world which bore the mark of intelligent design in the purposiveness of its structure 
and its constituents. Aristotle, however, gave us an autonomous world filled with things 
that are responsible for their own natures, depending on nothing else for their 
purposive alignment. This innovative move by the Stagirite smacked of the glorification 
of nature that later authors would identify as idolatry; as Dennis Des Chene remarks 
(commenting on the passage from David Balme I also quoted above: “ [t]hat innovation 
is rescinded in Christian Aristotelianism, no doubt because the Christian God provides a 
counterpart to the Demiurge, and because it was fitting that the nonhuman world 
should depend on God as an instrument on its maker” (Des Chene 1996: 187). 
More telling than the obvious Platonic leanings of Philo or Augustine and those they 
inspired is, however, the fact that the infamous Medieval Aristotelians never adopted 
the doctrine. For many of them, the idea that end states can influence earlier states is 
ludicrous, except in the case of intentionality: 
It is thus generally valid for scholasticism – and it is characteristic that this 
principle is never subjected to doubt – that everything that happens in the world 
is caused by a causa efficiens (proxima or remota), that acts for an end, and 
conversely: that every finis, insofar as it works as a “cause” (and is not simply the 
end [Ziel], the terminus, of an actio) presupposes an agens, that immediately or 
mediately consciously strives after the endpoint [Ziel] as a goal [Zweck]. A direct, 
as it were a fronte working, “attracting” (and not “driving”) causality, through 
which the end determines its means and in a way urges the agens to work by 
means of a kind of reversed efficient causality, is never taken into consideration 
by scholasticism. A finis is always an end strived after by some will, that can only 
work as a cause ut apprehensum. (Maier 1955: 278; my translation)  
The scholastics therefore sought to save Aristotle from this error by developing the idea 
that the finality exhibited by non-intentional natural processes is not to be sought in 
the anticipation of the form by the natural thing, but in the intention God had for the 
activities of that thing (Cf. Maier 1955: 277). On this account, nature itself is not 
teleological – it merely exhibits the intentionality of God. As Aquinas expressed it in his 
commentary on the physics: “From this it is clear that nature is nothing else than some 
form of art, i.e. a divine art, impressed on things, by which these things are moved to a 
determinate end (Aquinas 1954: 268; my translation). In the hands of theologians of 
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various persuasions, nature had become an artifact, impotent to achieve its own 
purposes or even have them. 
4.1.2 The Mechanization of the World-Picture as the Artifactualization 
of the World 
In the standard historiographies of philosophy, we are usually regaled with the tale of 
the heroism of early modern thinkers, who replaced a thoroughly unscientific world-
view, that of the scholastics, which was concerned not with analyzing real causes, but 
with investigating the theological stamp on nature, with a scientific world-view, in 
which men awoke to find the universe bereft of providence and ruled by blind necessity. 
But as usual, the standard historiographies of an epoch say more about the describing 
era than about the described era. If the likes of Descartes were capable of refocusing the 
study of nature on the efficient and material causes rather than on the final causes and 
the (kinds of) formal causes implied by them, this was because scholasticism had already 
thoroughly prepared this shift. As Anneliese Maier has shown, the idea that final causes 
were only causes in a derivative sense, and therefore inadmissable in natural 
philosophy, was already well established and elaborated in the fourteenth century. It is 
on this achievement that Descartes based his notorious and seminal banishment of final 
causes from natural philosophy: 
When dealing with natural causes we will, then, never derive any explanations 
from the purposes which God or nature may have had in view when creating them 
<and we shall entirely banish from our philosophy the search for final causes>. For 
we should not be so arrogant as to suppose that we can share in God’s plans. We 
should, instead, consider him as the efficient cause of all things. (AT VIII.1: 15-16; 
Descartes 1985: 202) 
From one perspective, this passage is not nearly as revolutionary as is usually assumed. 
The idea that the consideration of final causes is improper in natural philosophy was 
shared by many scholastics, even though they of course still chose to understand 
causality in terms of substantial forms. For Descartes, if formal cause could enter into 
considerations of natural philosophy at all, it would take a very different form indeed.  
Don Garett has suggested that Descartes’s rejection of final causation is based on the 
fact that “[w]ill, operating through acts of volition, is the only teleological selection 
process that he acknowledges” (Garett 1999: 326). He goes on to connect this with 
Cartesian dualism: 
In fact, Descartes's ontological dualism of extended and thinking substances 
seems to be reflected in a dualism of types of explanation. Extended substances, 
he implies, cannot themselves produce effects directly through teleological 
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selection, whereas thinking substances cannot directly produce effects 
mechanistically. Because thinking substances and extended substances can 
interact causally, in Descartes's view, a given state of matter may be explained 
teleologically (as when a muscle moves in order to move an arm), whereas a given 
state of mind (such as a physiologically induced passion) may be explained 
mechanistically. Of course, the alleged unintelligibility of Cartesian mind-body 
causal interaction may call into question the ultimate adequacy of these 
explanations. But in any case, whereas each kind of Cartesian substance may 
participate in either or both kinds of explanandum, each can evidently participate 
only in its own proper kind of explanans, each grounding or originating only its 
own proper kind of explanation. Minds, but not bodies, can have ends, goods, or 
purposes; and bodies, but not minds, can have physical structures and 
distributions of forces. (Garett 1999: 326) 
If this is right, we can see Descartes reverting to the position suggested by Plato’s 
Timaeus, namely a dualism of mind and necessity, where mind is solely responsible for 
the teleological, and necessity governs all interactions. Since Descartes is convinced that 
we need no recourse to teleology to explain any natural occurrences that do not involve 
human intentional and conscious activity, he can completely omit consideration of 
teleology in natural philosophy. But this does not in itself mean that teleology is out of 
the picture. Like Plato and the Christian Aristotelians, Descartes could have supposed 
that the operations of appropriately structured matter need not be explained through 
final causation, but that their structure, and the appropriateness of this structure, needs 
to be explained by referring to divine intentions.  
It is on this point that Descartes departed from the tradition. For him, it was 
impossible to properly investigate the possible uses of the structure of the material 
world. Since Descartes’s God has an intelligence that is so vastly removed from the 
intelligence we know from our own case, we can make no reasonable analogies 
concerning his intentions. Nor need we: we can perfectly take the structures in the 
world as given, as brute facts, and then examine these structures and the way in which 
they constrain mechanical interactions. The peculiarity in Descartes’s world-view is, 
then, that we continue to focus on natural entities from the perspective of theology, 
namely insofar as they are artifacts and instruments of a divine artificer, but omit 
reference to this artificer altogether. This sleight of hand, I fear, has fooled many into 
believing that Descartes’s mechanical universe is any less a theological world-view than 
that of his scholastic predecessors. 
It did not fool the mechanical philosophers themselves, however. As mechanicism 
left Descartes’s hands and entered what we now like to regard as the scientific 
revolution, the banishment of final causes did not become a fundamental tenet of the 
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mechanical philosophy. In fact, they were ultimately reintroduced, with their full 
theological import, by Robert Boyle.7 
Boyle responded to Descartes’s dismissal of reference to final causes in natural 
philosophy in a variety of ways. He argues for instance that it is not presumptuous, but 
rather prudent, to infer that some of the most obviously contrived entities in the world, 
such as the eye, are created with their most obvious use at least partly in mind. Besides 
this, he asserts that the consideration of final causes in such a case does not in any way 
impede the properly physical way of understanding the entity:  
I see not how God’s designing some of his works for particular uses, amongst 
others, is inconsistent with the physical accounts of their creation. Thus, a man 
may give a mechanical reason of the structure of every wheel, and other part of a 
watch, and of their way of acting upon one another, when rightly set together, 
and, in short, of the contrivance and phenomena of the little machine; tho’ he 
supposes that the artificer design’d it to shew the hours of the day, and tho’ he has 
that use in view, whilst he explains the fabric and operations of the watch. (Boyle 
1725: 155-156) 
In this passage, Boyle is making a distinction between structure and function, and 
argues that there is no difficulty in considering both, since they do not infringe upon 
each other. The function of a mechanical system can be cited in order to argue why it 
was contrived, and its structure may suggest that it was contrived, but attribution of 
function does not run counter to description of structure.  
The account just presented seems to suggest a neat division of labour between 
physics, in which we consider the structure and mechanical causes of physical things, 
and natural theology, in which we are concerned with the final causes of things. The 
reason why these two kinds of accounts can be neatly distinguished is the same as in the 
case of some 14th century scholastics, and of Descartes, namely the rejection of 
unintentional, i.e. natural teleology: 
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 I suspect that Boyle was inspired here, as in other things, by Francis Bacon, who wrote in The Advancement of 
Learning: “in the work of the creation we see a double emanation of virtue from God; the one referring more 
properly to power, the other to wisdom; the one expressed in the subsistence of the matter, and the other in 
disposing the beauty of the form.” (Bacon 1876: 295) Bacon suggests here that the two aspects are not only 
different aspects of creation, they also correspond with different divine attributes. In the subsistence of 
matter, we find the God’s power to create and maintain existents, and in its structure or form, we find his 
intentional disposing of matter. In later naturalist accounts, the power of God would be transferred, giving 
nature itself the power to subsist and matter itself its general properties. The correlate of wisdom, form, 
however, would never be conveniently naturalized, and would remain, to this day, an obstacle to any 
naturalist project based on mechanicism. 
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There are two accounts on which the actions of natural agents may be said to tend 
to a certain end; as either when the agent has a knowledge of that end, and acts 
with an intention to obtain it; or, when the action of the proximate agent is 
directed as it ought, to obtain an end, which, yet, is neither known, nor intended, 
by that proximate agent, but by a remoter, that is intelligent. In the former of 
these senses, I cannot admit, that any inanimate body acts for ends, since that pre-
supposes the agent both to know the end he is to obtain, and to purpose to obtain 
it: things whereof inanimate bodies are incapable. And, to fancy with some, that 
they may have a knowledge, sui generis, as they speak; which, tho’ confined to the 
actions proper to a particular kind of body, shall yet suffice to determine them to 
those actions, is, to offend against that rational, and receiv’d rule in philosophy, 
that Beings are not to be multiply’d, without there appears a necessity for them; 
and to introduce a sort of knowledge that seems unintelligible. 
It remains, then, that I embrace the second sense, in which ‘twas formerly said, 
natural things may work for an end, tho’, in this case too, we must speak 
somewhat improperly, for the action may more justly be attributed to the remote 
intelligent, than to the immediate agent, which is but, as it were, the instrument 
of the other. Now, it appears to me, that the most wise, and powerful author of 
nature, whose piercing sight is able to penetrate the whole universe, and survey 
all the parts of it at once; did, originally, frame material things into such a system, 
and settle among them such laws of motion, as he judged suitable to the ends that 
he proposed to himself in making the world. (Boyle 1725: 170) 
This passage will be important for our understanding of Kant’s concept of 
purposiveness. First, Boyle rejects natural teleology because it violates Ockham’s razor. 
Indeed, as we saw, the doctrine of natural teleology was intimately connected, in 
Aristotle, with the idea that we need to postulate distinct natural kinds of things in 
order to understand nature. Aristotle’s insistence on the explanatory relevance of 
species seems a clear violation of the economical considerations of natural philosophy. 
For Kant, this connection would prove essential, as we will see in the next chapter, since 
he recognized that the mechanical philosophy and the idea of ontological and 
explanatory parsimony are strongly connected. Second, Boyle suggests that final 
causation in nature may be incomprehensible when we limit ourselves to finite 
intellects, but that it becomes unproblematic when we ascribe the intentions in nature 
to an infinite intellect transcendent to nature and capable of regarding it entirely at 
once. We will address this picture again later in this chapter, when we discuss the 
concept of the supersensible in Kant’s “Antinomy of Teleological Judgment”. 
The picture offered just now seems to suggest a neat division of labor between 
natural philosophy, the proper business of which is the explanation of natural 
phenomena on the basis of mechanical descriptions of structures, and natural theology, 
which is concerned more with the origins of and reasons for these mechanical 
structures. But the division is not as neat as would appear at first sight, because Boyle 
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admits that there is a way in which considerations of final causation, of function, can be 
of use in physics proper: 
There are two ways of reasoning from the final causes of natural things, that 
ought not to be confounded. For sometimes men draw arguments from the use of 
bodies, that relate to the author of nature, and the general ends he is supposed to 
have intended in things corporeal, as when from the manifest usefulness of the 
eye, and all its parts, for vision, ‘tis inferred that the eye was originally framed by 
a very intelligent Being, with a particular care that animals should be furnish’d 
with the fittest organ of so necessary a sense. And sometimes, also, men ground 
arguments upon the supposed ends of things, as to the peculiar nature of things 
themselves, and conclude, that this affection of a natural body or part ought to be 
granted, or that deny’d, because by this, and not by that, or by this more than by 
that, the end design’d by nature may be best and most conveniently obtain’d. The 
latter sort of arguments I usually call purely physical, and those of the former may 
be called physico-theological, or, by a shorter name, metaphysical. (Boyle 1725: 
173) 
Boyle thus allows for reference to final causes in natural philosophy as well because 
they can guide our investigation into mechanical structures. Even in this case, however, 
he tends to restrict their use to a very distinct kind of investigation. He advises against 
using considerations of final causation in astronomy, and admonishes us to employ 
them only when reflecting on the nature of animals (by which he also means plants). 
Moreoever, even in the case of animals, Boyle will insist that we never take into account 
their uses to other animals, but only consider “those ends and uses of the parts of an 
animal, that relate to the welfare and propagation of the animal itself, and which, 
therefore, I call animal ends” (Boyle 1725: 177). Finally, he claims only that such 
considerations will help us in our investigations into structure by allowing us to “draw 
probable conjectures” (Boyle 1725: 177).8 
Boyle’s account of teleology partly became influential because it cleared the ground 
for the two uses of final causation just described. On the one hand, they allow us to 
infer, from the mechanical structures of the universe, the existence of a supreme 
mechanic responsible for these structures. In this way, he spawned the British tradition 
of natural theology, which sought to forge or strengthen the alliance between the 
mechanical philosophy and theology. It is not coincidental that Boyle’s testament 
arranged for lectures to be held on these topics, the so-called Boyle lectures. On the 
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 It is in this context that Boyle makes his famous ascription to Harvey of the claim that it was considerations 
on the uses of the valves in the veins that allowed him to come up with the idea of the circulation of the blood. 
(Boyle 1725: 179-180). 
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other hand, Boyle allowed for a heuristic use of final causation in natural philosophy. On 
this interpretation, final causes had no explanandum of their own, no explanatory role 
to play in natural philosophy, but could be adopted in order to facilitate the search for 
proper mechanical descriptions and explanations. It is against these two legacies that 
Kant would react in the “Critique of Teleological Power of Judgment”. 
4.2 Natural Purpose and Circular Causation 
4.2.1 Natural Purposiveness Delineated 
Kant’s most important discussion on topics that we would now identify as belonging to 
the philosophy of biology, is to be found in the second part of his 1790 Critique of the 
Power of Judgment, which he named the “Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment”. 
This part is again composed of three major divisions, or rather two divisions and a 
lengthy appendix. The first division, the “Analytic of the Teleological Power of 
Judgment”, is devoted to the analysis of the concept of a natural purpose and the 
concomitant idea of teleology or purposiveness that is one of objective, material and 
intrinsic purposiveness. In this subsection, I will discuss the way in which Kant contrasts 
this form of purposiveness with various others. In the next two subsections, I will 
discuss his example of a natural purpose and his elaboration of the concept of a natural 
purpose respectively. 
The first important contrast Kant introduces is that between subjective and objective 
purposiveness. Subjective purposivenes was the topic of the first part of the Critique of 
the Power of Judgment, the “Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment”. There, Kant 
argued that 
[o]ne has good reason to assume, in accordance with transcendental principles, a 
subjective purposiveness of nature in its particular laws, for comprehensibility for 
the human power of judgment and the possibility of the connection of the 
particular experiences in one system of nature; where among its many products 
those can also be expected to be possible which, just as if they had actually been 
designed for our power of judgment, contain a form so specifically suited for it 
that by means of their variety and unity they serve as it were to strengthen and 
entertain the mental powers (which are in play in the use of these faculties), and 
to which one has therefore ascribed the name of beautiful forms. (AA V: 359) 
Subjective purposiveness is therefore the purposiveness of the structure of nature for 
our cognitive capacities and powers. In the “Critique of the Aesthetic Power of 
 
172 
Judgment”, Kant had already advanced his idea that an objective purposiveness requires 
that there be a determinate end, and thus a concept, in light of which we judge the 
purposiveness of the object, whereas in the case of subjective purposiveness, no 
determinate concept is involved in the aesthetic judgment (AA V: 227-228). This 
contrast serves us fairly little here, because the notion of subjective purposiveness is far 
less readily understood, far more specific to Kant’s own system, than that of objective 
purposiveness. We will therefore only return to the notion of subjective purposiveness 
in the last chapter of this dissertation. For now, it suffices to note that objective 
purposiveness contrasts with subjective purposiveness because the former involves a 
judgment on the object, and more precisely the nature of that object itself.  
 The objective purposiveness of which Kant intends to treat in the “Critique of 
Teleological Power of Judgment” is, moreover, material rather than formal. Formal 
objective purposiveness is the purposiveness exhibited by mathematical principles, 
figures, etc.: 
All geometrical figures that are drawn in accordance with a principle display a 
manifold and often admired objective purposiveness, namely that of serviceability 
for the solution of many problems in accordance with a single principle, and 
indeed of each of them in infinitely many different ways. The purposiveness here 
is evidently objective and intellectual, not, however, merely subjective and 
aesthetic. For it expresses the suitability of the figure for the generation of many 
shapes aimed at purposes, and is cognized through reason. But the purposiveness 
still does not make the concept of the object itself possible, i.e., it is not regarded 
as possible merely with respect to this use. (AA V: 362) 
The idea of formal purposiveness, and its placement in the discussion, is somewhat 
peculiar to contemporary readers. In many ways, it is a digression that is no longer 
central to our thinking on the subject, but it is important to discuss it here precisely for 
the misunderstandings it may otherwise engender. The inclusion of the idea of formal 
objective purposiveness here is the direct result of Kant’s criticism of traditional, 
Pythagorean-inspired aesthetical theories that believe certain geometrical figures (or 
numbers, for that matter), to be aesthetically pleasing in virtue of their mathematial 
properties. If such theories were right, then Kant’s own aesthetics would be flawed, for 
these figures would be beautiful in virtue of the fact that they are “mere 
representations of a determinate concept” (AA V: 241), and Kant’s theory holds that 
aesthetic judgment cannot include reference to any determinate concept. He therefore 
argues that such approaches are mistaken, and advances instead that we appreciate 
these geometrical shapes for their usefulness in mathematics:  
It is customary to call the properties of geometrical shapes as well as of numbers 
that have been mentioned beauty, on account of a certain a priori purposiveness, 
not expected from the simplicity of their construction, for all sorts of cognitive 
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use, and to speak of this or that beautiful property of, e.g., a circle, which is 
discovered in this way or that. But it is not an aesthetic judging by means of which 
we find it purposive, not a judging without a concept, which makes noticeable a 
merely subjective purposiveness in the free play of our cognitive faculties, but an 
intellectual judging in accordance with concepts, which gives us distinct cognition 
of an objective purposiveness, i.e., serviceability for all sorts of (infinitely 
manifold) purposes. One would have to call it a relative perfection rather than a 
beauty of the mathematical  figure. (AA V: 366) 
For Kant, then, the purposiveness exhibited by geometrical shapes and by numbers is 
objective rather than subjective. But this purposiveness is not thereby to be attributed 
to the concrete objects that instantiate these shapes or numbers, for the familiar reason 
that, in mathematics, it is these shapes and numbers which concern us, and (somehow) 
not the concrete empirical objects which happen to be characterized in mathematical 
terms. For this reason, Kant indicates that formal purposiveness is relative to a certain 
cognitive enterprise of man, namely the employment of mathematics for a variety of 
uses. 
This brings us to the final major contrast that Kant lists, namely that between 
relative and internal purposiveness. A useful initial characterization is that an object is 
relatively purposive insofar as it is a means for the end of another object, and internally 
purposive insofar as it is a means to its own ends. This initial characterization will 
require much more comment – in a way, Kant’s entire analysis of natural purposiveness 
is intended to bear out what it means to be internally purposive.  
In discussing relative purposiveness, Kant typically refers to either ecology or human 
activity. In such a way, oxen are purposive as food for carnivores, or purposive as beast 
of burden for humans. But Kant protests that it is extremely problematic to ascribe such 
purposes to objects, because they do not characterize the objects themselves, and are 
rather external to them. There is thus no specific need, in understanding these objects, 
to take into account their usefulness to other objects. 
But there is an initial problem in this picture, one that becomes clear once we reflect 
on an important similarity between an ecology and an organism. Kant seems to assume 
that relative purposiveness is the subordination of one thing to another as a means. This 
is born out by his central argument against the consideration of relative purposiveness: 
From this it can readily be seen that external purposiveness (advantageousness of 
one thing for another) can be regarded as an external natural end only under the 
condition that the existence of that for which it is advantageous, whether in a 
proximate or a distant way, is in itself an end of nature. This, however, can never 
be made out by mere contemplation of nature; thus it follows that relative 
purposiveness, although it gives hypothetical indications of natural ends, 
nevertheless justifies no absolute teleological judgments. (AA V: 368-369) 
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In this passage, Kant assumes that external purposiveness means a subordination of an 
object to the ends of another, for only on that assumption need there be a member in 
the chain of sub- and superordinated means and ends that is an end in itself in order for 
the relatively purposive to be legitimately regarded as purposive at all. But this 
assumption is not necessary for an assesment of an ecology, for we might regard 
ecologies as self-sustaining due to the reciprocal means-ends relations obtaining 
between their various subsystems. Such a “relative purposiveness” could not be 
dismissed on the given basis, since it is precisely the purposiveness that obtains 
between the various relevant parts (organs in the most general sense of the word) of an 
organism. Initially, then, it would seem that we need either accept that ecologies exhibit 
teleology, contrary to what Kant seems to say, or deny that we can legitimately ascribe 
purposiveness to organs, which Kant explicitly wants to do. 
I will leave the issue of relative purposiveness hanging here until the conclusion of 
the next subsection. Only a better understanding of Kant’s concept of internal 
purposiveness and natural purposiveness will allow us to resolve this puzzle. I have 
raised it, however, because I do not believe clarity would be gained by taking Kant’s 
concept of relative purposiveness at face value. On the contrary, this misgiving will be 
useful in our further analyses, first of all in our assessment of Kant’s most important 
illustration for the concept of a natural purpose. 
We have seen now that, in §§61-63, Kant sought to negatively delineate the notion of 
purposiveness with which he will be concerned in the “Critique of Teleological Power of 
Judgment”, from subjective purposiveness, from objective formal purposiveness, and 
from objective material relative purposiveness. The last distinction is the most 
important one for the present discussion, since it implies that objective material 
internal purposiveness characterizes a purpose not as relative to some external end, but 
rather as relative to an internal end. This raises the question, of course, of what it means 
for a natural object to have internal ends, or, as Kant says it, to be an end: 
In order to see that a thing is possible only as an end, i.e., that the causality of its 
origin must be sought not in the mechanism of nature, but in a cause whose 
productive capacity is determined by concepts, it is necessary that its form not be 
possible in accordance with mere natural laws, i.e., ones that can be cognized by 
us through the understanding, applied to objects of the senses, alone; rather even 
empirical cognition of their cause and effect presupposes concepts of reason. 
Since reason must be able to cognize the necessity in every form of a natural 
product if it would understand the conditions connected with its generation, the 
contingency of their form with respect to all empirical laws of nature in relation 
to reason is itself a ground for regarding their causality as if it were possible only 
through reason; but this is then the capacity  for acting in accordance with ends (a 
will); and the object which is represented as possible only on this basis is 
represented as possible only as an end. (AA V: 369-370) 
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In the first sentence of this passage, Kant clarifies that a thing that is also an end is not 
possible through mere natural laws because its concept determines its production. 
Moreover, he specifies that we require not just concepts of the understanding, but also 
concepts of reason, to properly cognize such an object. The claim is thus that, on the 
one hand, mechanicism, understood as explanation according to natural laws alone, 
does not suffice for explaining the object understood as end, because it 
underdetermines the form of the object (hence the reference to the contingency of this 
form with respect to natural laws), and that, on the other hand, such an object prompts 
us to adopt the idea of causation determined by a concept of reason, i.e. the causation of 
will. In order to make this idea clearer, he gives an initial example: 
If someone were to perceive a geometrical figure, for instance a regular hexagon, 
drawn in the sand in an apparently uninhabited land, his reflection, working with 
a concept of it, would become aware of the unity of the principle of its generation 
by means of reason, even if only obscurely, and thus, in accordance with this, 
would not be able to judge as a ground of the possibility of such a shape the sand, 
the nearby sea, the wind, the footprints of any known animals, or any other 
nonrational cause, because the contingency of coinciding with such a concept, 
which is possible only in reason, would seem to him so infinitely great that it 
would be just as good as if there were no natural law of nature, consequently no 
cause in nature acting merely mechanically, and as if the concept of such an 
object could be regarded as a concept that can be given only by reason and only by 
reason compared with the object, thus as if only reason can contain the causality 
for such an effect, consequently that this object must be thoroughly regarded as 
an end, but not a natural end, i.e., as a product of art. (AA V: 370) 
The example here is that of one stumbling across a perfect simple geometrical figure in 
nature. In such a case, Kant has it, one would be immediately tempted to assume this 
figure to have been made by human hands. Unfortunately, Kant’s own presentation of 
the reasoning that would lead one to such a conclusion is somewhat enthymematic, 
since he suppresses important premises. The most important premise is that, in nature, 
we usually do not find regular geometric shapes: such shapes are considered and 
constructed by men as idealizations of the complex natural shapes in order to 
understand the latter. It would thus seem an extreme coincidence if natural laws would 
conspire to form such a regular shape. Given this extreme coincidence, Kant believes it 
is natural to assume that somehow, we must understand the concept of the regular 
geometric shape to have played a role in the generation of the figure. In labeling the 
figure as a product of art, we claim that the concept has in fact played a role in the 
generation of the figure, namely insofar as the concept was intended by the maker of the 
figure. 
Immediately after giving this example, however, Kant qualifies its scope and 
importance by noting that his concern here is natural ends, not artificial ends: 
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But in order to judge something that one cognizes as a product of nature as being 
at the same time an end, hence a natural end, something more is required if there 
is not simply to be a contradiction here. I would say provisionally that a thing 
exists as a natural end if it is cause and effect of itself (although in a twofold 
sense); for in this there lies a causality the likes of which cannot be connected 
with the mere concept of a nature without ascribing an end to it, but which in that 
case also can be conceived without contradiction but cannot be comprehended. 
(AA V: 370-371) 
Kant notes that the account given of the regular geometric shape in his preceding 
example cannot be simply transposed to what he calls natural ends on pains of 
contradiction. He does not specify which contradiction this would invite, but the 
subsequent discussion reveals that it is, in all likelihood, that of ascribing a non-natural 
cause (a volitional, intentional act) to a natural entity. This is in fact a contradiction, 
because one would seek to explain what it means to be a natural purpose by making its 
purposiveness non-natural. Kant solves this problem by characterizing a natural end as 
that which is cause and effect of itself. Such an account, he states, can avoid the 
contradiction between the object’s status as end and the status as natural, but avoids it 
on the pain of making this concept incomprehensible. In the final subsection of this 
section, we will see exactly what Kant means by a solution that resolves the 
contradiction but introduces incomprehensibility. First, however, we will need to turn 
our attention to Kant’s own example of a natural end. 
4.2.2 Natural Purposiveness Exemplified  
In this subsection, I will discuss Kant’s example of a natural purpose as he introduces it 
in §64 of the “Analytic of the Teleological Power of Judgment”, which he intends as a 
preliminary characterization of the concept. This example, I believe, elucidates much 
more than is usually recognized, if only because it reveals rather than explicitates much 
of Kant’s thinking on the subject.  
In §64, Kant enumerates three ways in which a tree can be said to produce itself. 
These three ways are best characterized as reproduction, growth and/or nutrition, and 
regeneration. Before discussing the three separately listed characteristics as Kant 
presents them, I would first like to point out that they together seem to constitute the 
natural faculties, which were considered by Aristotle to be the powers of the vegetative 
Soul. For Aristotle, these powers were the minimal conditions for something to count as 
living (413b). It is important, moreover, to note that, for Aristotle, the presence of 
vegetative powers did not imply the presence of intentionality, since the latter is a 
property accompanying the animal soul, which needn’t itself accompany the vegetative 
soul. This is also the reason why Galen (1916: 3) decided to dismiss talk of a vegetative 
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soul, since for him, soul implied (a modicum of) intentionality or consciousness, 
whereas the teleological properties of the natural faculties involved no intentionality. In 
choosing to talk of the vegetative properties, and of plants, Kant is thus referring to 
those properties which are traditionally regarded as non-intentionally teleological.  
As Philippe Huneman (2007: 215-246) has noted, however, it is not obviously so that 
Kant regards plants as paradigmatically alive, for all his explicit definitions of the 
concept of life seem to refer to volition and intentionality, and exclude vegetative 
processes. This is already the case in a relatively early discussion of the topic to be 
found in the Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics from 1766, where 
Kant notes that “[t]he undisputed characteristic of life, belonging to that which we 
perceive by means of our outer senses is, doubtless, free movement, which shows us 
that it has originated from the power of the will” (AA II: 330). This passage seems to say 
that the concept of life is intricately linked to the concept of will, i.e. of free action. 
Moreover, in the context of this work, it also seems as if Kant is defining organic 
processes as material processes which seem to involve or exhibit the action of an 
immaterial principle, i.e. a spirit or soul. All of this would suggest that Kant is in fact 
identifying life and intentionality. Such a conclusion would be mistaken, however, since 
Kant immediately continues: 
However, the conclusion that, when this characteristic mark is not encountered, 
then every degree of life is also lacking, is not certain. Boerhaave says somewhere: 
The animal is a plant which has its root in its stomach (inside itself). Someone else 
might, with equal propriety, play with these concepts and say: the plant is an animal 
which has its stomach in its root (outside itself). It is, therefore, possible for plants to 
lack the organs of voluntary motion and, in lacking them, to lack the external 
characteristic marks of life, which are certainly necessary to animals, for a being 
which has the instruments of its nourishment within itself must be able to move 
itself according to need. A being, on the other hand, which has the instruments of 
its nourishment outside itself and sunk in the element which supports it, is 
already adequately provided for by forces external to itself. Even though such a 
being contains within itself a principle of inner life, namely, vegetation, it does 
not need an organic arrangement to be made for external voluntary activity. None 
of this is necessary for my argument, for, apart from the fact that I should have 
very little to say in favour of such conjectures, these conjectures, which are 
regarded as dusty and outmoded whims; are also exposed to fashionable mockery. 
The ancients, namely, thought that three different types of life could be assumed 
to exist: vegetative, animal and rational. When the ancients combined the three 
immaterial principles of these three different types of life in man, they may well 
have erred. But when they distributed these immaterial principles among the 
three different classes of creature which grow and reproduce their kind, they 
were saying something which, although, of course, probably not capable of proof, 
was not for that reason absurd. (AA II: 330-331) 
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Here, Kant argues that we should not infer from the fact that an object lacks the 
undisputed external characteristic of life that it cannot be considered as living. His 
immediate concern is the undesired consequence that plants will turn out not to be 
living. He seems to argue that plants are probably alive, although their characteristic 
form of life, namely vegetation, is internal rather than external, and because of the way 
in which a plant is alive, it needs no external articulation necessary for voluntary or 
intentional action. Moreover, Kant reveals his awareness of the fact that this is rarely 
appreciated because the consideration of the difference between animal and vegetative 
life became unfashionable together with the philosophy that insisted on it: Aristotelian 
scholasticism. Against this fashion Kant defends the idea that considerations of the 
vegetative soul are legitimate, in spite of all other failures Aristotelianism might have, 
and that his contemporaries are misconstruing the issue of life when they are 
exclusively focused on the question whether animals have souls.9 This is not to say that 
Kant embraces the notion of vegetative soul, or at least any more than that of animal 
soul, for he stresses that the recourse to immaterial principles is lazy philosophy, and 
that the mechanicist approach is therefore the right way to go about investigating life, 
even though he is sympathetic to vitalism and animism for their recognition of the 
specificity of life. As a result, then, we find that Kant is unlikely to have regarded 
vegetative, unintentional teleology as counter to life. 
When we turn to Kant’s discussion, we see that the first kind of self-production he 
ascribes to natural purposes is that of reproduction: 
First, a tree generates another tree in accordance with a known natural law. 
However, the tree that it generates is of the same species; and so it generates itself 
 
                                                     
9
 The question on whether animals have souls, or whether they are capable of sensation, of pleasure and pain 
and of consciousness, became extremely important in the wake of Descartes’s infamous purported denial of 
animal life. Descartes’s position is, however, best understood as a conveniently two-targeted attack on both 
the tendency of pyrrhonists since Montaigne to base skeptical arguments on the possibility of animal 
rationality, and the scholastic insistence that the explanation of animal behaviour and arguably even 
physiology requires resource to a separate explanatory principle. The problem Descartes left may have been 
the result of the convergence and perhaps even conflation of the two debates. Descartes seems to have read 
Montaigne as collapsing the distinction between the animal soul and the rational soul by arguing that there is 
no clear line to be drawn between the sensitive, locomotive, and appetitive properties of animals and the 
rational properties of man. This would then imply that man has no ground to claim that he has a better access 
to knowledge than any other animal has (cf. Popkin 2003: 48-49). Descartes seems to believe as well that the 
rational and the sensitive properties are not fundamentally distinct, and therefore seeks to avoid Montaigne’s 
conclusion by denying that animals have the latter properties at all. Thus, he arrives at a position where 
something is either fully rational or not alive at all. The aftermath of  this problem in the 17th and 18th century 
reveals the difficulty of mechanicism of not subscribing to this fundamental dualism between rational 




as far as the species is concerned, in which it, on one side as effect, on the other as 
cause, unceasingly produces itself, and likewise, often producing itself, 
continuously preserves itself, as species. (AA V: 371) 
One might wonder why Kant lists reproduction as a case of something being both cause 
and effect of itself, since it seems to be a relation between two (or three) different 
entities, where one brings about the other. This puzzle is best solved by reminding 
ourselves of some features of the traditional idea of reproduction as we saw it in the 
first section of this chapter, and of Kant’s theory of epigenesis as I described it in the 
second chapter of this dissertation. In the first place, both Kant and Aristotle defend 
epigenesis because it ascribes to natural entities a genuine capacity to reproduce. 
Remember that the Platonic account in the Timaeus had serious difficulties in making 
reproduction a natural process, i.e. a process occurring in nature through the natural 
capacities of things. On this account, the creation of new biological individuals would 
require a new creative act either by the demiurg or by its world-immanent vicars. This 
is why Aristotle instead offered the theory of epigenesis, which states that biological 
individuals can produce their like without this production having to be one if 
intentional design. Similarly, Kant rejected preformation because it made all 
reproduction supernatural, and argued instead that we should attribute to natural 
things a capacity to reproduce, which he called a generative force. Thus, both Aristotle 
and Kant insisted that reproduction is a natural process occurring according to natural 
properties. 
Nevertheless, both Aristotle and Kant also insisted that this reproductive capacity 
exhibits teleology because they did not believe material and mechanical processes could 
account for the specific form or structure of the end-product of generation. For this 
reason, they claim that the formative process is subject to further constraints, which 
specify what is otherwise underdetermined, i.e. “contingent”, by material and 
mechanical processes. These specifying constraints are, according to both, species-
constraints. The natural process of reproduction is thus one that is best understood as 
guided by the form or the idea of the species.  
The two comments just made show that Kant could believe that reproduction 
involved natural teleology because he insisted on its natural rather than supernatural 
nature, and on its form or idea-directedness rather than material-mechanical nature. But 
this does not yet show why reproduction is a form of self-production. To understand 
this, we should take into account that Kant is here speaking of biological individuals 
insofar as they are of a specific species, i.e. of a certain kind rather than of another, 
which means that he is concerned here with the nature and properties of biological 
species. A reproductive process is one where the species is not just a classificatory 
concept, but a causally explanatory one: it explains why a certain kind of entity is 
produced through this process rather than another. Reproduction thus prompts us to 
commit ourselves to the existence of species as natural kinds. On the basis of this 
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assumption, Kant can characterize reproduction as the self-production of a species. In 
doing so, he adopts Aristotle’s claim that reproduction is the means by which things 
perpetuate and produce themselves, not numerically, but as a kind. In fact, in De Anima, 
Aristotle already invoked this idea in order to show how both reproduction and 
nutrition are self-production: 
[F]irst of all we must treat of nutrition and reproduction, for the nutritive soul is 
found along with all the others and is the most primitive and widely distributed 
power of soul, being indeed that one in virtue of which all are said to have life. 
The acts in which it manifests itself are reproduction and the use of food, because 
for any living thing that has reached its normal development and which is 
unmutilated, and whose mode of generation is not spontaneous, the most natural 
act is the production of another like itself, an animal producing an animal, a plant 
a plant, in order that, as far as its nature allows, it may partake in the eternal and 
divine. That is the goal towards which all things strive, that for the sake if which 
they do whatsoever their nature renders possible. The phrase ‘for the sake of 
which’ is ambiguous: it may mean either the end to achieve which, or the being in 
whose interest the act is done. Since then no living thing is able to partake in what 
is eternal and divine by uninterrupted continuance (for nothing perishable can for 
ever remain one and the same), it tries to achieve that end in the only way 
possible to it, and success is possible in varying degrees; so it remains not indeed 
as the self-same individual but continues its existence in something like itself-not 
numerically but specifically one. (415a-b) 
It is rather obvious, therefore, that Kant is referring to this Aristotelian doctrine in the 
first example of the self-productive feature of the tree, and that he thereby embraces 
the idea that the consideration of species is important, and perhaps even indispensable, 
in the life sciences. 
The second feature Kant lists is then unsurprisingly one of numerical or individual 
rather than specific self-production and self-perpetuation: 
Second, a tree also generates itself as an individual. This sort of effect we call, of 
course, growth; but this is to be taken in such a way that it is entirely distinct from 
any other increase in magnitude in accordance with mechanical laws, and is to be 
regarded as equivalent, although under another name, with generation. This plant 
first prepares the matter that it adds to itself with a quality peculiar to its species, 
which could not be provided by the mechanism of nature outside of it, and 
develops itself further by means of material which, as far as its composition is 
concerned, is its own product. For although as far as the components that it 
receives from nature outside of itself are concerned, it must be regarded only as 
an educt, nevertheless in the separation and new composition of this raw material 
there is to be found an originality of the capacity for separation and formation in 
this sort of natural being that remains infinitely remote from all art when it 
attempts to reconstitute such a product of the vegetable kingdom from the 
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elements that it obtains by its decomposition or from the material that nature 
provides for its nourishment. (AA V: 371) 
This passage is again reminiscent of the ancient theories of natural teleology espoused 
by Aristotle and Galen. First of all, Kant’s claims that the process by which a biological 
individual produces itself is that of growth, which requires the power of nutrition, and 
is also a manifestation of the same power as that which is manifested, “under another 
name”, in generation and reproduction, clearly refer to the Aristotelian doctrine that 
nutrition, growth and generation are properly viewed as collectively powers of the 
vegetative soul because they are in a way the same power. Additionally, Kant’s claim 
that growth and nutrition cannot be understood by mere mechanical means echoes 
Aristotle and Galen as well, since both these thinkers stressed that nutrition involves 
three component capacities that, either singly or together, cannot be accounted for by 
the properties of material parts and their relative motions. The first power is that of 
attraction, whereby the nourished selects and draws in only the proper nutrients and 
ignores all others. The second is that of transformation, for living beings do not even 
use their proper nutrients in the form in which they receive them, but transform them 
into their own substance, tissue, etc. Finally, there is the process of intussusception, 
which we already encountered before (cf. 3.3.1), and which is responsible for the 
maintenance or production of the specific shape of the body or its parts. The reasoning 
behind postulating the latter power is that growth and nutrition cannot be understood 
as increase in magnitude through aggregation alone, but are better regarded as internal 
adaptation to a specific form. 
Taken together, these comments reveal that Kant, together with Aristotle and Galen, 
regards physiology as revealing of the specificity of biological individuality. Biological 
entities must be understood as individuals which seek to maintain themselves by 
selectively attracting, transforming and assimilating materials that were initially alien 
to them. They cannot simply be understood as local mechanical and material processes 
that are not clearly delineated and individuated over and against their environments. In 
an important way, then, the life sciences do not just prompt us to invoke species as 
explanatory, but also to allow for individuating principles.  
This clarification allows us to dispel a lingering confusion about Kant’s concept of 
final causation. This confusion is explicit with Peter McLaughlin, who writes that “when 
Kant speaks of an idea or a concept as a ‘purpose’ or a ‘final cause’, he usually means the 
anticipation of the product, i.e. not the causa finalis in the proper sense but the causa 
formalis” (McLaughlin 1990: 39). I believe this is not a confusion on Kant’s part, nor that 
it is peculiar, but that is rather revelatory of Kant’s Aristotelianism on the topic. Kant is 
explicit about the fact that a natural purpose is to be considered as something which has 
its ends internal to it, which he usually phrases by stating that it is itself an end. This 
echoes Aristotle’s views on natural substances, where the formal cause and the final 
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cause are supposed to coincide: the generative and nutritive processes in living beings 
are properly understood only insofar as they are understood as for the sake of the 
production and perpetuation of the species and the individual.  
We can now also better understand what Kant means when he says that natural 
purposes too prompt us to regard them as possible only according to a certain concept. 
This needn’t mean that we can understand them only as intended to have this form, 
because it can also mean that these natural purposes need to be understood by taking 
recourse to the concept of their species or of their individual nature.10 As Kant states 
elsewhere in the “Analytic of the Teleological Power of Judgment”, what we need to 
understand about a natural purpose is its unity according to a certain rule (AA V: 360). I 
suggest we understand this as meaning that the processes we characterize as naturally 
teleological prompt us to regard them as if they were coordinated in order to accord 
with a certain norm, i.e. that they are best understood as exhibiting discriminating 
properties which suggest that they are guided by a normative rather than a factual idea, 
namely that of having to preserve a given structure or entity. The question then, of 
course, becomes that of how natural processes can be norm-governed despite being 
non-intentional. This is precisely the puzzle of the concept of a natural purpose, the 
puzzle that qualifies the concept as incomprehensible. 
It is important, however, that we discuss the final trait of a natural purpose that Kant 
lists in his example of a tree, since it has important consequences for our understanding 
of what Kant means by the previous two. This trait is best described as that of plasticity 
(Cf. Zuckert 2007: 99): 
Third, one part of this creature also generates itself in such a way that the 
preservation of the one is reciprocally dependent on the preservation of the 
other. An eye from the leaf of one tree grafted into the twig of another brings 
forth a growth of its own kind in an alien stock, and similarly a scion attached to 
another trunk. Hence one can regard every twig or leaf of one tree as merely 
grafted or inoculated into it, hence as a tree existing in itself, which only depends 
on the other and nourishes itself parasitically. At the same time, the leaves are 
certainly products of the tree, yet they preserve it in turn, for repeated defoliation 
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 Rachel Zuckert has remarked that “[t]hough Kant initially presents the three aspects of organisms as 
equally important, he tends to neglect the first in his further discussion” (Zuckert 2007: 99). I fear this is a bit 
too precipitous, because on my reading the discussion of species identity remains constantly in view insofar as 
the individual is best understood not only as this specific thing (tode ti, in its haecceity), but also as this 
specific kind of thing (in its quiddity). For Aristotle, the latter always contributed importantly to the former, 
since the kind-terms constitutes the sortal which allows the individual to be numerically identified. Of course, 
Kant is, as Zuckert rightly remarks, more concerned here with individuality than with species persistence, but 




would kill it, and its growth depends upon their effect on the stem. The self-help 
of nature in the case of injury in these creatures, where the lack of a part that is 
necessary for the preservation of the neighboring  parts can be made good by the 
others; the miscarriages or malformations in growth, where certain parts form 
themselves in an entirely new way because of chance defects or obstacles, in order 
to preserve that which exists and bring forth an anomalous creature: these I 
mention only in passing, although they belong among the most wonderful 
properties of organized creatures. (AA V: 371-372) 
This passage actually lists two forms of plasticity that are best discussed separately. The 
first form is that whereby a part of a natural purpose, when removed, persists in its 
function as a part despite removal from the whole in which it is embedded. Kant gives 
the example of grafting, whereby a transplanted twig retains its specificity as a part of 
the previous tree, even though it now flourishes in another tree that may be of a 
different species. This suggests to Kant that the parts of natural purposes do have, to 
some extent, an individuality and persistence of their own apart from their parent 
whole, and that these parts can therefore be viewed as individuals in their own right. 
This is expressed in his comment that the branches and twigs of trees can be seen as 
distinct biological individuals parasitic upon the supposed whole in which they figure. 
But he equally notes that this is misleading as a characterization, because these parts 
are not merely parasitic on the whole or on other parts, for they serve to preserve the 
others. Kant thus describes an organism here as a kind of coordinated symbiosis rather 
than as an unequivocal individual or unity. 
The second form of plasticity is that of compensation, whereby upon injury or 
damage of one part the other parts can recoordinate such as to compensate for the 
functional loss. This resilience of biological individuals is very peculiar, for it seems to 
run counter to the idea of an individual essence. In discussing the second trait of a 
natural purpose, Kant stressed that the concept of an individual is central to our 
understanding of biological processes. This concept is supposed to be the criterion 
according to which a structure counts as that individual and no other. In its turn, the 
criterion seems to be a specific form or structure, a relation between certain parts. But 
now Kant seems to be saying that an individual can change the proportion and relation 
between its parts and the specific nature of those parts in order to persist as a functional 
and functioning whole. At first glance, the idea of an individual essence would imply 
that the whole is no longer functioning, or malfunctioning, and thus either deceased or 
diseased when its criterion or individuation is no longer strictly observed and 
conserved. 
I would like to submit that the solution to this problem lies in the fact that, in his 




the pathological or abnormal state does not consist in the absence of every norm. 
Disease is still a norm of life but it is an inferior norm in the sense that it tolerates 
no deviation from the conditions in which it is valid, incapable as it is of changing 
itself into another norm. The sick living being is normalized in well-defined 
conditions of existence and has lost his normative capacity, the capacity to 
establish other norms. (Canguilhem 1991: 183) 
In this passage, Canguilhem is suggesting that the persistence of a biological individual 
is not conditional on its maintaining a certain norm, but rather on its capacity to change 
this norm. In the event of damage, or of changing outside conditions, a healthy and 
functioning organism can change its specific structure to respond to these alterations 
and compensate for losses. A diseased individual is precisely one which is incapable of 
such a renormalization, of such a shift in norms: it is one whose norm, whose concept, 
whose essence is no longer plastic, and thus lacks responsiveness. 
That Kant regarded biological essences as essentially plastic is unsurprising in the 
light of his theory of epigenesis. After all, as we saw, the constraints on the generative 
force that form the specific constraints can change over time, and are thus plastic, 
although not indefinitely so. Moreover, Kant stated in his discussion of the second form 
of self-production that the power of reproduction and the power of nutrition and 
growth are different manifestations of the same power. As a result, we can expect that 
the latter exhibits the same plasticity as the former. Plasticity and adaptability, then, 
are built into the Kantian conceptions of biological species and individual. 
One final remark that I would like to make before leaving this discussion of what are 
ultimately Kant’s preliminaries to his proper discussion of the concept of natural 
purpose, is that the concept of plasticity reveals why Kant would not be tempted to 
think feedback and equilibriation mechanisms could account for the natural processes 
he listed in §64. The reason for this is that the stability of an organism is never actually 
one of equilibrium, for if so it would lack the plasticity and responsiveness which Kant 
deems somehow essential to life. An organism never fully actualizes its form, but always 
maintains a certain room for potential alternative ways of being. The stability of the 
organism on such a view would best be characterized, in the terms of Gilbert Simondon 
(1989: 18-19), as a metastability, a stability away from equilibrium. Mechanicist 
conceptions of equilibrium, of balance, of feedback, are at place only in an entity which 
is always already fully formed and no longer capable of change and responsiveness – a 
preformationist conception of the organism. 
In listing all these peculiar properties of natural purposes, Kant himself realizes he 
has made it all the more urgent to explain how one could even consider such an entity. 
After all, these preliminaries all point in the same direction, namely the idea of a natural 
process which involves concepts of reason as causally explanatory without involving 
intentionality and volition. Kant now has to face the task of clarifying the concept of 
such a process or entity. 
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4.2.3 Natural Purposiveness Determined 
The central paragraph of the “Analytic of the Teleological Power of Judgment” is §65, 
where Kant proposes to derive the concept of something which is reciprocally cause and 
effect of itself, which he admits to be “somewhat improper and indeterminate” (AA V: 
372), from a more determinate concept. Such a derivation would require, of course, that 
one determine what it means to be cause and effect of oneself, which in turn requires a 
gloss on the possible constraints on the relation of cause and effect. It is unsurprising, 
then, that Kant starts off his treatment with a discussion of causality, or rather, with the 
different commonly accepted forms of causality. The first one is that of efficient causes: 
The causal nexus, insofar as it is conceived merely by the understanding, is a 
connection that constitutes a series (of causes and effects) that is always 
descending; and the things themselves, which as effects presuppose others as 
their causes, cannot conversely be the causes of these at the same time. This 
causal nexus is called that of efficient causes (nexus effectivus). (AA V: 372) 
This first form of causality seems to be that of mechanical causation, which is strictly 
linear, and proceeds from cause to effect. This is borne out by Kant’s use of the term 
“descending”, by which he usually means a progression in a series from the anterior to 
the posterior, or from the antecedent to the consequent. Nevertheless, this 
characterization is somewhat misleading, because there is a sense in which mechanical 
causation can be reciprocal, namely in the sense of a mechanical system or equilibrium. 
The solar system, for Kant, can be regarded as mechanical system, even though the 
attractive relations work both ways, and the movement of every planet or planetoid is 
determined by the movements of all others. In this case, however, the movements of the 
objects in the systems can be understood as composed of all the simple movements they 
would have if they would only be causally related to one other object of the system. 
Efficient causation therefore does not imply that a system be understood as if all 
relations of cause and effect in it are linear and descending, but only that all causal 
relations in the system can be fully analyzed into causal relations that are linear and 
descending. Presumably, the reciprocal causality of natural purposes would not be of 
this kind. 
Another issue with this passage is that of its scope. It seems as if Kant is saying that 
the understanding must think of causal relations as descending. This raises the question 
as to whether Kant thinks this restriction is imposed by the category of causality or not. 
At least on first sight, it seems as if the linearity is required by the category of causality, 
since Kant calls the latter “the concept of the relation of cause and effect, the former of 
which determines the latter in time, as its consequence” (CPR A 188 / B 234). But then it 
would seem that mechanical causation is required by the very category of causality, 
which would mean that no sense can be made of the idea of natural teleology. As will 
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become clear in the rest of my discussion, I believe it is right to read Kant as stating that 
reciprocal causation violates mechanicism, but that it is not right to claim that 
mechanicism is required by causality in general. I believe the reason for this is that 
mechanicism is a claim about the rules that connect causes and effects, and the way in 
which these rules relate to each other, rather than a claim about the direction of causal 
relations. 
In spite of this important restriction, Kant believes that we can grasp the idea of a 
causal connection where the relation between cause and effect is not linear and 
descending, for he writes that 
a causal nexus can also be conceived in accordance with a concept of reason (of 
ends), which, if considered as a series, would carry with it descending as well as 
ascending dependency, in which the thing which is on the one hand designated as 
an effect nevertheless deserves, in ascent, the name of a cause of the same thing of 
which it is the effect. (AA V: 372) 
This passage is puzzling, because Kant seems to be saying that we can conceive of a form 
of causality where the final cause is as much a cause as the efficient cause is. But this 
would violate the temporal restriction required by the category of causality. Peter 
McLaughlin (1990: 48-49) explicitly signaled this problem, and argued that, because “[a] 
consideration of some kind of ‘backwards causality’ is strictly excluded by the Kantian 
concept of causality”, “[t]he interpretation that might suggest itself of Kant’s metaphor 
of the ‘series’ of cause and effect as forwards or backwards in time is untenable”. For 
this reason, he suggests we take Kant to mean not the strict temporal causal relation 
between cause and effect, but rather the simultaneous and spatial mereological relation 
between part and whole. 
I believe this move is mistaken, not just because it requires that we read past Kant’s 
own explicit wording (which may sometimes be necessary), but also because, as we will 
see, Kant did not believe such a causal relation involved contradiction, even though he 
would have to hold it to be incomprehensible. But this is not surprising, since in the 
previous paragraph Kant stated explicitly that the form of purposiveness under 
consideration, namely natural purposiveness, is non-contradictory but 
incomprehensible. I therefore suggest we take Kant to really mean that this concept of 
causality is thinkable but not comprehensible, and try to make sense of that claim.11 
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 Unlike many other commentators, Rachel Zuckert does not seem to have a problem accepting that the 
reciprocal relation invoked by Kant as that of natural purposiveness is in fact a temporal one (Cf. Zuckert 2007: 
117-118). This is because she stresses the plasticity of organisms, as well as their capacity for anticipation. In 




After introducing this peculiar kind of causality, Kant states that there is a form in 
which it is not really that objectionable at all: 
In the practical sphere (namely, of art) such a connection can readily be found, 
e.g., the house is certainly the cause of the sums that are taken in as rent, while 
conversely the representation of this possible income was the cause of the 
construction of the house. Such a causal connection is called that of final causes 
(nexus finalis). (AA V: 372) 
I take Kant to say here that we are familiar with a kind of ascending causality in the case 
of intentional and volitional action. This is the form of causality usually referred to as 
final causation. In order to understand that Kant is here referring to the classical, 
scholastic version of the notion of a final cause, we need to note that he describes the 
end as a certain benefit to be gotten from the existence of that which is brought about, 
namely the rent. This allows us to read the relation between efficient and final causality 
here as akin to that suggested by Aquinas (2014: 9) with his phrase “an end is the cause 
of the causality of the efficient, because it brings it about that efficient is efficient”. In 
one sense, the efficient cause is in fact the cause of the end, but in another, this efficient 
cause would not have operated without the end. That which makes an efficient cause 
efficient, or brings it into motion, is best understood as a “motive”, at least in the case of 
intentional action. This brings us to the traditional scholastic notion of a final cause, 
which required that the final cause be temporally prior to the end of a cause in the form 
of an intention or representation in the mind of the one undertaking the efficient 
causation. The idea of intentionality, then, is used to reconcile the notion of final 
causation with the temporal restriction, but on pains of equivocating between the 
concept of cause, as Kant seems to realize:”The first could perhaps more aptly be called 
the connection of real causes, and the second that of ideal ones, since with this 
terminology it would immediately be grasped that there cannot be more than these two 
kinds of causality.” (AA V: 372-373) Kant suggests that, on this explanation, the 
distinction is not one between efficient and final, or between descending and ascending 
causation, but between two kinds of cause. The one is the cause in the sense of the real 
processes taking place in the world, whereas the latter is the cause in the sense of the 
intentions and motives, which are ideas, of the free agent undertaking the construction. 
Moreover, Kant clarifies that according to this distinction only these two kinds of 
causality are possible, namely mechanical causation and free intentional action.  
In the literature, there has been a marked tendency to believe that Kant himself 
admitted these to be the only possible kinds of causation. I will argue, however, that this 
is wrong, and that they are merely the only concepts of causation comprehensible to us 
as finite cognizers. Before doing so, however, I will briefly discuss some issues with 
trying to fit Kant’s treatment of natural purposiveness within the confines of this 
dichotomy or antinomy. Such a fit would require that we understand organisms as 
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somehow suggesting the causality of freedom. The most obvious way to do this is to 
read Kant as saying that organisms exhibit the causation of freedom because they 
exhibit intentional action. We have already seen, and will see again, that this option is 
unsatisfactory because Kant seems constantly concerned with showing that organisms 
cannot be understood as designed.  
But if not intentionality, then which trait of freedom do natural purposes exhibit? 
Clark Zumbach has offered the suggestion that it is spontaneity to which we must turn: 
“One way of understanding Kant’s position is to view it as the claim that we must view 
living processes in terms of the idea of randomness; that is, we might consider these 
occurrences as inherently (not just descriptively) random occurrences” (Zumbach 1984: 
103). This proposal has an initial attractiveness, since it would do justice to the plastic 
and adaptive traits Zumbach admits Kant’s “epigenetic systems” to have. But it does not 
withstand further scrutiny, because Zumbach is merely pushing onto Kant the dogmas 
of the philosophical spokesmen of mainstream biology in the mid and late 20th century, 
like Ernst Mayr and Jacques Monod. For Mayr (1997) and Monod (1970), the specificity of 
the biological subject matter was due to its being produced by both necessity and 
contingency. In the forms of mutation and of variation within a biopopulation, a 
random and non-deterministic element creeps into evolution and genetics. 
But this is mere appropriation, inspired by the cultural dominance of the modern 
evolutionary synthesis and molecular biology at the time of writing of Zumbach’s 
monograph. Zumbach is here desperately, and against textual evidence, trying to read 
Kant as embracing the “sensible” mainstream biology of the 20th century rather than the 
heterodox perspectives that would again resurface after the publication of Zumbach’s 
book, with the rise of systemic approaches, with the reintroduction of epigenetics and 
with the renewed attention to the recalcitrant fields of developmental biology, ecology 
and ethology. Kant’s own concept of a natural purpose fits more with these 
heterodoxies than with the mechanistically inspired modern synthesis. Moreover, 
Kant’s claim that the concept of natural purpose and its peculiar features are 
indispensable and ineradicable in the life sciences seem vindicated by the recurrent rise 
of heterodoxies and sentiments of failure regarding the 20th century’s mechanicist 
paradigm in so much research in the life sciences. 
I would like to argue, however, that there is one feature of freedom that is more 
clearly exhibited by natural purposes, in spite of their being natural, and this is 
normativity. It is sometimes too readily forgotten that Kant’s talk of intentionality and of 
spontaneity in the case of humanity is there mostly to make room for the aspect of 
normativity, i.e. of the ought over and against the is. This is clear from the manner in 
which Kant characterizes freedom, namely as autonomy of reason. By this he does not 
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mean that human action is undetermined, but rather that we need to think of it as self-
determined.12 Spontaneity, on such a reading, is not the capacity for random or fickle 
action, but rather the capacity to be determined not (only) by causes, but (also) by 
reasons, reasons which have a normative character in that they determine how one 
ought to behave. This does not just mean moral obligation, but also epistemic obligation. 
Knowledge, for Kant, is more a matter of what one ought to accept, what one ought to 
think, how one ought to justify, than a matter of what is and how one acquires access to 
it.13 In many ways, transcendental idealism is the claim that our ontological 
commitments are dependent upon our epistemic commitments, and our epistemic 
commitments are normative commitments just as much as our moral commitments are 
– hence the unity of the theoretical and the practical. Given that, for Kant, freedom 
means autonomy, and autonomy means determination by justification alone, a random 
event would not be free precisely because it lacks justification. Similarly, human 
intentionality is understood as the capacity to set, picture and recognize ends, whereas 
spontaneity is the capacity to act in accordance with these ends rather than in 
accordance with causes. 
In the previous subsection, I already argued that an organism is best understood as 
exhibiting normativity, in the sense that it is not obviously mechanistically determined 
to maintain its form, but rather that it seems to strive to instantiate and preserve a 
 
                                                     
12
 Cf. AA V: 33, where Kant contrasts a negative and a positive sense of freedom, the negative being the fact 
that reason, in morality, is not determined by external ends set by nature, and the positive being the fact that 
reason can act according to its own principle, which yields obligation. 
13
 The idea that, with Kant, we see a decisive shift to epistemology as dealing with a normative enterprise first 
became explicit in the work of Wilfrid Sellars, and was subsequently articulated by Sellarsians like Robert 
Brandom, who wrote: “The nature and significance of the sea change from Cartesian certainty to Kantian 
necessity will be misunderstood unless it is kept in mind that by 'necessary' Kant means 'in accord with a 
rule'. It is in this sense that he is entitled to talk about the natural necessity whose recognition is implicit in 
cognitive or theoretical activity, and the moral necessity whose recognition is implicit in practical activity, as 
species of one genus. The key concept of each is obligation by a rule. It is tempting, but misleading, to 
understand Kant's use of the notion of necessity anachronistically, in terms of contemporary discussions of 
alethic modality. It is misleading because Kant's concerns are at base normative, in the sense that the 
fundamental categories are those of deontic modality, of commitment and entitlement, rather than of alethic 
modality, of necessity and possibility as those terms are used today. Kant's commitment to the primacy of the 
practical consists in seeing both theoretical and practical consciousness, cognitive and conative activity, in 
these ultimately normative terms.” (Brandom 1994: 10) This realization is important, because it marks the 
major distinction between Kant’s transcendental idealism and phenomenalism or idealism: the latter views 
are all committed to the fact that reality ultimately consists more of the mental or intentional entities that we 
are more directly acquainted with. Transcendental idealism, however, is the view that such debates on what 
there is are futile and ultimately even harmful. Instead, it replaces talk of “is” and “reality” with talk of 
“ought” and “obligation”. To express it in the form of a boutade, with the obvious qualification that it is but a 
boutade: for transcendental idealism, all that there “is” is “oughts”.  
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certain form and nature. A natural purpose seems as if it is committed to, as if it ought to 
instantiate this form, this form being its proper and internal end. The following passage 
from the first, unpublished Introduction to the Critique of the Power of Judgment explicitly 
phrases the specificity of natural purposes in terms of “oughts”: 
A teleological judgment compares the concept of a product of nature as it is with 
one of what it ought to be. Here the judging of its possibility is grounded in a 
concept (of the end) that precedes it a priori. There is no difficulty in representing 
the possibility of products of art in such a way. But to think of a product of nature 
that there is something that it ought to be and then to judge whether it really is so 
already presupposes a principle that could not be drawn from experience (which 
teaches only what things are). That we can see with the eye we experience 
immediately, as we do the outer and internal structure of the eye, which contain 
the conditions for its possible use, and therefore its causality in accordance with 
mechanical laws. But I can also use a stone, either in order to crush something 
upon it, or to build something upon it, etc., and these effects can also be related to 
their causes as ends, although I cannot on that account say that it ought to have 
served for building. Only of the eye do I judge that it ought to have been suitable 
for seeing, and although its figure, the character of all its parts and their 
composition, judged in accordance with merely mechanical laws of nature, is 
entirely contingent for my power of judgment, I nevertheless think in its form and 
in its construction a necessity for being formed in a certain way, namely in 
accordance with a concept that precedes the formative causes of this organ, 
without which the possibility of this product of nature is not comprehensible for 
me in accordance with any mechanical natural law (which is not the case with the 
stone). Now this ought contains a necessity which is clearly distinguished from 
physical-mechanical necessity, in accordance with which a thing is possible in 
accordance with mere laws of efficient causes (without any preceding idea of that 
thing), and can no more be determined through merely physical (empirical) laws 
than the necessity of the aesthetic judgment can be determined through 
psychological ones, but instead requires its own a priori principle in the power of 
judgment, insofar as it is reflecting, under which the teleological judgment stands 
and by means of which both its validity and its limitation must also be 
determined. (AA XX: 240-241) 
If this is how Kant interpreted natural purpose, then this would explain why he saw it as 
mechanically inexplicable, and as suggesting an analogy with human freedom, for we 
only know such normative behavior in the form in which we exhibit it. We now what it 
is to have internal ends, to be determined by these internal ends, and to be committed 
to these ends, in the peculiar feeling of freedom encountered in our obtrusive moral 
considerations and self-incriminations. But human freedom has the peculiarity that it 
suggests that we take ourselves, insofar as we are moral and epistemic agents, as 
somehow (not obviously) natural. In the case of natural purposes, however, we can do no 
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such thing, for in their case we need to make sense of them as somehow natural and 
normative, i.e. naturally normative. 
Having made these comments on the concept of causality, Kant continues with a 
further characterization of the concept of a natural purpose, listing two criteria. The 
first criterion is what I will call the holism-criterion: 
Now for a thing as a natural end it is requisite, first, that its parts (as far as their 
existence and their form are concerned) are possible only through their relation 
to the whole. For the thing itself is an end, and is thus comprehended under a 
concept or an idea that must determine a priori everything that is to be contained 
in it. But insofar as a thing is conceived of as possible only in this way it is merely 
a work of art, i.e., the product of a rational cause distinct from the matter (the 
parts), the causality of which (in the production and combination of the parts) is 
determined through its idea of a whole that is thereby possible (thus not through 
nature outside of it). (AA V: 373) 
First of all, Kant seems to clarify here what he meant when he said that, when we 
consider a thing as an end, we are comprehending it under a concept or idea that must 
determine a priori everything that is to be contained in it. The clarification adds that to 
the understand a thing in this way is to regard its parts as possible only through their 
relation to the whole. This is in itself unsurprising, given the fact that organisms have 
throughout history prompted holistic conceptions, and given the specific features of 
natural purposes Kant listed in his discussion of the example of  a tree. The parts of a 
natural purpose are to be understood as together constituting an individual of a certain 
kind (species), in such a way that the coordination of these parts is what allows the 
natural purpose to be this individual of this kind (species).  
In spite of the familiarity of this holist criterion to organismic thinking, Kant goes on 
to warn us that it is in itself insufficient and misleading, because there are things that 
exhibit such a holist structure without being natural purposes, namely artifacts and 
machines. In the case of an artifact, in its literal sense of “work of art”, the whole does 
determine the nature and relation of the parts, because these parts have been selected 
and disposed by a rational agent in such a way that they together bring about the 
desired effect. What Kant finds problematic here is that the whole, insofar as it is 
productive of the parts and their relations, is not internal to the natural purpose itself, 
but external to it, as the representation, idea or concept in the rational artificer. This is 
why Kant offers a second criterion for being a natural end: 
But if a thing, as a natural product, is nevertheless to contain in itself and its 
internal possibility a relation to ends, i.e., is to be possible only as a natural end 
and without the causality of the concepts of a rational being outside of it, then it is 
required, second, that its parts be combined into a whole by being reciprocally the 
cause and effect of their form. For in this way alone is it possible in turn for the 
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idea of the whole conversely (reciprocally) to determine the form and 
combination of all the parts: not as a cause – for then it would be a product of art – 
but as a ground for the cognition of the systematic unity of the form and the 
combination of all of the manifold that is contained in the given material for 
someone who judges it. (AA V: 373) 
I will call this second criterion the naturality criterion, for it is the criterion for being 
not just an end, not just purposive, but a natural purpose, i.e. naturally purposive. Such a 
natural purpose should be purposive “without the causality of the concepts of a rational 
being outside of it”. Here, Kant is explicit that the concept of a natural purpose does not 
suggest, but rather precludes, intentional agency.14 It is clear that he is talking about 
non-intentional, natural teleology, the conception of teleology that was central to 
Aristotle’s theory. Now, just as he clarified the idea of purposiveness in the first 
criterion through the determination of the parts by the whole, here he clarifies the idea 
of natural purposiveness as a reciprocal determination of the parts. Understanding this 
puzzling, and at first sight inconsistent characterization of a natural purpose will allow 
us to understand the revolutionary nature of Kant’s concept of an organism. 
The major peculiarity about Kant’s treatment here is that it doesn’t just add another 
criterion to the holist criterion, but rather that he qualifies the first criterion. In fact, 
Kant states that in the case of a natural purpose the whole is not a cause of the nature 
and relation of the parts in the sense that it is prior to and distinct from this nature and 
relation of the parts. The judgment of holism is not prompted by there (necessarily) 
being some or other whole that is in some sense prior to the parts, but rather by the fact 
that the different parts are not causally prior to one another in spite of their intimate 
and intricate interconnection. The nature of each part is in a way due to its relation to 
other parts, and its relation to other parts due to the respective natures of all involved 
parts. This radically changes the sense Kant attaches to circular causation: it is not the 
coexistence of a descending causal relation from part to whole and an ascending causal 
relation from whole to part, but rather the coexistence of a large amount of reciprocal 
causal relations between parts and other parts. Kant’s picture of the organism, then, is 
not that of a harmonious whole due to the imposition of a general form or structure, but 
rather that of a harmonious whole due to the reciprocal formative actions of the parts: 
 
                                                     
14 We can see why this is so by reflecting on the following passage from Dante Alighieri’s De Monarchia: 
“according to the intention of the creator, as creator, the ultimate end of a created being is not the being itself 
but its proper function.” (1904: 10) Dante here expresses the creationist view that all created entities exist for 
the sake of something, but that they can never exist for the sake of themselves. Kant’s concept of a natural 
purpose is precisely that of an end in itself. The idea of intentional creation thus does not form a good 
framework for understanding natural purposiveness. 
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For a body, therefore, which is to be judged as a natural end in itself and in 
accordance with its internal possibility, it is required that its parts reciprocally 
produce each other, as far as both their form and their combination is concerned, 
and thus produce a whole out of their own causality, the concept of which, 
conversely, is in turn the cause (in a being that would possess the causality 
according to concepts appropriate for such a product) of it in accordance with a 
principle; consequently the connection of efficient causes could at the same time 
be judged as an effect through final causes. (AA V: 373) 
In natural purposes, it is the causality of the parts, insofar as these mutually determine 
each other, that are responsible for the whole, and the idea or concept of the whole is 
due to the peculiarly coordinated, concerted co-production of these parts. Such parts 
are, Kant specifies, organs: 
In such a product of nature each part is conceived as if it exists only through all 
the others, thus as if existing for the sake of the others and on account of the 
whole, i.e., as an instrument (organ), which is, however, not sufficient (for it could 
also be an instrument of art, and thus represented as possible at all only as an 
end); rather it must be thought of as an organ that produces the other parts 
(consequently each produces the others reciprocally), which cannot be the case in 
any instrument of art, but only of nature, which provides all the matter for 
instruments (even those of art): only then and on that account can such a product, 
as an organized and self-organizing being, be called a natural end. (AA V: 373-374) 
For most of its history, the word organ maintained its original meaning of an 
instrument in general, not just an organ of an organism. The reason for assimilating the 
latter to the former is that the organ is conceived as an instrument of which the 
organism makes use in its specific way of life. For Kant, however, these two senses of 
organ cannot so easily be assimilated to each other on pain of equivocation: an organ, in 
the sense of an instrument of life, does not merely coordinate its actions with other 
organs, nor is it able to contribute merely because of the natures of other organs; it 
produces other organs (usually with the assistance of yet other organs) and is in turn 
produced by those organs (usually with the assistance of yet other organs). An organ, on 
this view, is a product of its products, is productive only due to the productivity of its 
products.  
It is on this feature that Kant focuses in order to distinguish organisms from artifacts, 
amongst others by discussing the example of the watch, a favourite example of 
mechanicist natural theology: 
In a watch one part is the instrument for the motion of another, but one wheel is 
not the efficient cause for the production of the other: one part is certainly 
present for the sake of the other but not because of it. Hence the producing cause 
of the watch and its form is not contained in the nature (of this matter), but 
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outside of it, in a being that can act in accordance with an idea of a whole that is 
possible through its causality. Thus one wheel in the watch does not produce the 
other, and even less does one watch produce another, using for that purpose other 
matter (organizing it); hence it also cannot by itself replace parts that have been 
taken from it, or make good defects in its original construction by the addition of 
other parts, or somehow repair itself when it has fallen into disorder: all of which, 
by contrast, we can expect from organized nature. – An organized being is thus 
not a mere machine, for that has only a motive power, while the organized being 
possesses in itself a formative power, and indeed one that it communicates to the 
matter, which does not have it (it organizes the latter): thus it has a self-
propagating formative power, which cannot be explained through the capacity for 
movement alone (that is, mechanism). (AA V: 374) 
I believe Kant is saying here that, in an artifact, the typical circular causality obtaining 
between parts in organisms is not present, for the way that parts relate to each other 
insofar as their form and their existence is concerned is not a causal one. Admittedly, 
the parts of an artifact interact with others, and its causal behaviour was intended to be 
constrained in a particular way by the parts to which it relates, but it is not itself the 
cause of these constraints. In an organism, each part is to be considered as constrained 
due to parts that are in a way due to its specific causal behaviour. In this manner, the 
causal properties of the parts of an organism are self-determining and self-constraining. 
The difference thus becomes the following: the parts of an organism can behave/move 
in any of a number of ways, but their being surrounded by specific other parts ensures 
that they only behave/move in a very (limited number of) specific manner(s). These 
specific movements are, then, contingent to the motive force of these parts. The parts of 
an organism, however, do not only have the capacity to behave/move in any number of 
ways, they also have the capacity to produce/form the surrounding part that constrain 
its own capacity to behave/move. For an organic part, its specific behaviour is not 
contingent to it, but essential, even though it seems to be contingent to its motive 
properties alone. 
Kant does not, however, think we can readily understand this property of living 
beings, or the species of causality it suggests. In fact, he stresses that it is “inscrutable” 
and “not analogous with any causality that we know”: 
One says far too little about nature and its capacity in organized products if one 
calls this an analogue of art: for in that case one conceives of the artist (a rational 
being) outside of it. Rather, it organizes itself, and in every species of its organized 
products, of course in accordance with some example in the whole, but also with 
appropriate deviations, which are required in the circumstances for 
selfpreservation. Perhaps one comes closer to this inscrutable property if one calls 
it an analogue of life: but then one must either endow matter as mere matter with 
a property (hylozoism) that contradicts its essence, or else associate with it an 
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alien principle standing in communion with it (a soul), in which case, however, if 
such a product is to be a product of nature, organized matter as an instrument of 
that soul is already presupposed, and thus makes that product not the least more 
comprehensible, or else the soul is made into an artificer of this structure, and the 
product must be withdrawn from (corporeal) nature. Strictly speaking, the 
organization of nature is therefore not analogous with any causality that we 
know. (AA V: 374-375) 
In this passage, Kant first points out that we have not understood living beings at all if 
we merely attribute to them a causality analogous to practical causality, i.e. the 
causality of art. In the case of art, the whole, in the form of the idea, is external to the 
product, whereas in the case of life, the artificer is the artifact itself. But he goes on to 
dismiss both hylozoist and animist ways of doing justice to this property. The Hylozoist 
explains the self-organizing property by ascribing this property to the matter of the 
organism, whereas the animist explains it by postulating a non-material principle with 
intentional or quasi-intentional capacities that is somehow responsible for the form and 
the formation of the organism. For Kant, hylozoism is problematic, because, for him, the 
notion of matter means that which is causally passive and inert15, and hence no sense 
can be made of the idea of active matter. Animism, on the other hand, must either place 
the guiding principle in the matter of the organism itself, in which case it collapses into 
hylozoism, or place it outside (not necessarily spatially, of course) of the organism, in 
which case it collapses into the view of self-organization as analogous the practical 
causality.  
Before going on to discuss some further important consequences of Kant’s 
idiosyncratic conception of the organism, I would like to tackle a recurrent challenge in 
the literature. This challenge surfaces best in Hannah Ginsborg’s claim that there are 
two kinds of mechanical inexplicability in Kant: “the first supporting a teleological 
conception of organisms, and emphasizing the analogy between organisms and 
artifacts; the second supporting a conception of organisms as natural, and emphasizing 
the way in which organisms differ from artifacts.” (Ginsborg 2004: 60) These two kinds 
of mechanical inexplicability are of course intended to correspond to the two criteria 
for natural purposiveness, the first being a criterion for being an end, the second one for 
being a natural end.  
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 This is not merely a stipulation of Kant’s of course. His reasoning seems to be that the notion of matter plays 
a specific role in natural philosophy by its difference from certain other concepts. A very important concept 
for Kant is of course that of a force. A force is not a metaphysical entity, on Kant’s account, but a physical one 
which means “that which accounts for motion”. On such a reading, Kant would be able to conclude that the 
notion of active matter is nonsensical because it would mean that matter is a force, and a force is supposed to 
be that operating on matter. 
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Although there is some truth to Ginsborg’s analysis, she, like many other authors, 
may have misconstrued the sense in which artifacts are supposed to be mechanically 
inexplicable. Recall the discussion of the relation between mechanicism and teleology in 
4.1.2. There, we saw that the mechanicist philosophy is in no way inhospitable to the 
notion of teleology, as long as the teleology is adequately understood. For mechanicists, 
the only admissable explanations are those in terms of the general principles of 
movements insofar as they work in specifically spatially configured systems. Thus, two 
elements are required: general principles of motion and specific structures. In 
themselves, the general principles of motion underdetermine their outcomes in these 
systems, for the determination equally comes from the specific spatial configurations, 
or, in later systems, the specific values entered into the argument-positions of the 
functions expressing these general principles. Now, for mechanicists, the only powers 
that nature has are the general principles of motion, which by themselves cannot 
account for the structure of nature, for this is partly due to some initial spatial 
configuration, some initial input. This raises the question of whence this initial 
structure is derived, if it is not to be a brute fact about nature. The early mechanicists 
answer this question by stating that God has determined the initial structures or inputs. 
The debate is then on whether the reasons of God’s choice for these structures and 
values are accessible to us or not (Descartes said no, Boyle said yes). 
There is therefore something very peculiar about saying that artifacts are 
mechanically inexplicable because their specific structure cannot be explained by the 
general principles of mechanics, because in this sense, all mechanical systems are 
mechanically inexplicable. This is the reason why, for mechanicists, the structure of the 
universe suggests the hand of God, for any other range of structures or inputs might 
have led to a much less satisfying (in whatever sense they may attach to this word) 
universe. The interesting feature of the mechanicist paradigm is that it can neatly 
distinguish between motion and structure, because it assumes they correspond with 
different kinds of causality. In this way, mechanicists have found it useful to regard 
every physical system as if it were an artifact. But then there is no class of entities which 
specifically suggests design in nature, as long as we take it to be so that all, or at least 
most, alternative configurations would have had less interesting results. 
I would like to advance, therefore, that neither for Kant nor for any of his 
contemporaries, there is something interestingly mechanically inexplicable about 
artifacts. The problem arises only if we regard the structure and the form of these 
artifacts as due to nature. What emerges from this distinction is the strained relationship 
between naturalism and mechanicism in the sciences, where naturalism is understood 
as the claim that everything in nature is to be understood through nature, and 
mechanicism as the claim that everything is due to the most general of principles of 
motion. If nature only acts generally, then it obviously cannot account for specificity, 
which results in the defender of mechanicism having to invoke a supernatural principle 
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in order to account for specificity, thereby violating his supposed naturalism. I submit 
that, in his discussion of the notion of a natural purpose, Kant was attempting to 
formulate the idea that artifacts are mechanically explicable at the expense of being 
naturally inexplicable, whereas self-organizing systems are considered to be naturally 
explicable at the expense of being mechanically inexplicable. This is the puzzle that will 
give rise to the antinomy of the teleological power of judgment, as we will see in the 
next section. 
Before passing on to the antinomy, however, I would like to briefly dispel two 
possible misgivings about Kant’s conception of a natural purpose. The first is that of his 
much decried panfunctionalism, and the second is the solution to the issue of whether 
ecologies can be natural purposes, which we left hanging at the end of 4.2.1. 
After concluding his presentation of the concept of a natural purpose in §65, Kant 
offers, in §66, a principle for the judging of the internal purposiveness in organized 
beings: “This principle, or its definition, states: An organized product of nature is that in 
which everything is an end and reciprocally a means as well. Nothing in it is in vain, 
purposeless, or to be ascribed to a blind mechanism of nature.” (AA V: 376) This 
principle has met with serious skepticism, because its assumption that in a natural 
purpose everything is functional seems to be outrageously implausible, if not 
empirically false. Our reticence towards this panfunctionalism in Kant may, however, be 
due to our different interpretation of the notion of function. In order to appreciate this, 
consider one of the most famous and effective critiques of panfunctionalism in 
evolutionary biology, offered by Stephen J. Gould and Richard Lewontin. Gould and 
Lewontin (1979) criticized what they called the adaptationist program for ultimately 
conciding with the Panglossian paradigm. They mean by this the views of the character 
doctor Pangloss from Voltaire’s Candide, who defended Leibnizian optimism, i.e. the 
view that this is the best world and that everything is for the best, through laughable 
explanations of for instance the nose as something that is there for supporting glasses. 
For Gould and Lewontin, the adaptionist program is Panglossian because it treats every 
part of the organism as an individual trait, which is then thought to be present because 
it makes an individual contribution to the optimization of the fitness of the organism, or 
because its presence together with other traits leads to a Pareto-optimal16 situation in 
the organism (where, of course, no part can be more optimal without decreasing the 
optimality of other parts). Against this, they argue that there are in organisms, much 
like in designed structures such as architectural products, elements that do not 
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 It is not difficult to see in Gould and Lewontin’s two steps of studies in the adaptationist programme as that 
of first determining the optimality of individual traits, and than determining the Pareto-optimality of a group 
of traits. I believe it is not too far-fetched to suggest that at least Lewontin intended these resonances between 
evolutionary theory and neoclassical economics in this paper, given his Marxist commitments. 
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themselves make an immediate individual contribution to fitness, but are rather only 
there because they are necessary to any structure in which other, more obviously 
useful, traits or elements occur together. 
The question now is whether Kant’s panfunctionalism commits him to the 
Panglossian paradigm, i.e. whether Kant indeed wishes to claim that every part of an 
organism makes an immediate individual contribution to the usefulness of the 
organism. I believe not, because on Kant’s theory, a function is not necessarily 
something as straightforward as an individual contribution to the fitness of the 
organism. Indeed, what may trouble many readers of Kant is that his notion of function 
is not identifiable with the familiar concept of function known from evolutionary 
theory. Instead, Kant focuses on the intimate interconnection between the parts of an 
organism, and their mutual productive and formative capacities. Thus, a part of an 
organism can be functional if it makes a structural contribution to the organism as well, 
i.e. if it is a condition for the presence and proper functioning of other parts. Ironically, 
this is the very notion of functionality that Lewontin and Gould seem to endorse in their 
paper as well, since they suggest that we should judge organisms as wholes, with the 
historic themes of developmental morphology and Bauplan in mind, themes that are 
more closely connected with the Kantian tradition in the life sciences. In a way, then, 
Lewontin and Gould’s account does not target the Kantian notion of function as of a 
piece with the notion that should be removed from evolutionary biology – it suggests 
that we reinsert the Kantian notion of function in evolutionary biology. 
In stressing the centrality of the organism in Kant’s philosophy of the life sciences, I 
may have already forced a negative answer to the question of whether ecologies can be 
considered as natural purposes. Yet, it is not because Kant focused on organisms, and 
obviously preferred organisms as paradigms, that he could not allow systems other than 
organism to be judged as natural purposes. After all, Kant himself notes that the 
admission of internal purposiveness allows for a certain slippage which lets us consider 
nature as a whole as a purposive system, in which everything is purposive and 
functional. Kant’s reticence towards this idea is understandable, because it is far more 
difficult and misleading to assess the contributions of a thing to an ecology rather than 
to an organism, primarily because it is so difficult to identify an ecology or an ecological 
niche. Given the amount of philosophical work done by individuality in Aristotelian and 
Kantian approaches to the life sciences, this is a serious challenge to the recognition of 
ecological systems as natural purposes. But maybe recent developments in the theory of 
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the life sciences have removed some of the challenges by developing a more flexible 
account of biological individuality17. 
4.3 Assuaging the Antinomy of Teleological Judgment 
4.3.1 Presentation of the Antinomy 
Like every Kantian Critique, the “Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment” 
contains a “dialectic” , i.e. a section which deals with the errors to which our cognitive 
capacities are liable to lead because of their own nature, and which must be revealed as 
erroneous. In other works, however, the errors are due to reason, and its specific 
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 I am thinking specifically of two strands of thought on the indiduation of organisms that have arisen in the 
past 25 years. The first is the conception of a developmental system proposed by Griffiths and Gray (1994), 
who note that the following thought is perhaps the most surprising result of their account: “Organism and 
environment are both evolving as an effect of the evolution of differentially self-replicating life cycles. Life 
cycles still have fitness values, but these are interpreted, not as a measure of correspondence between the 
organism and its environment but as measures of the self-replicating power of the system. Fitness is no longer 
a matter of "fittedness" to an independent environment.” (Griffiths & Gray 1994: 300-301). Thus, the biological 
systems that they individuate are neither genes nor organisms. The other interesting reconception of 
biological individuality is that suggested by Thomas Pradeu’s study of the philosophical relevance of 
immunology. Pradeu argues that immunology is concerned with investigating the problem of biological 
individuality. This is because “the immune system, with its surveillance activity, defines what is accepted or 
rejected by the organism. A criterion of immunogenicity thus constitutes a criterion of inclusion: the 
distinction between entities that are interconnected and form a whole as constituents of the organism and 
those that are rejected is carried out by the immune system. In other words, immunology allows for an 
understanding of the living thing’s spatial boundaries and by extension determines which entities constitute 
its components.” (Pradeu 2012: 240). Here, the remarkable result is that the organism is “heterogenous”, i.e. 
that “an organism is made of countless foreign entities; it is never constructed in a purely endogenous way. 
This heterogeneity can be illustrated by the functional role of certain symbiotic bacteria in their host. Each 
human being is made up of symbiotic bacteria numbering at least ten times those that are its “own” cells, in 
the sense of cells originating from the egg cell. The majority of these symbiotic bacteria live in the intestine. 
Most are obligatory symbionts, which means that they cannot survive outside the host, and that without them 
the host cannot survive either. They play indispensable physiological (functional) roles, particularly in 
digestion and immunity.” (Pradeu 2012: 247). Of these two perspectives, Pradeu’s is closer to Kant, because it 
conceives of biological individuality through physiological integration rather than through evolution and 
selection. Nevertheless, the account of Griffiths & Gray strongly suggests that the integration of an organism 
with its environment, with its ecology, might be stronger than suspected in much the same way that the 
connection between an organism and its symbionts is stronger than traditional conceptions of biological 
individuality seem to suppose. 
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internal structure, whereas here Kant speaks of a dialectic of the power of judgment. We 
will deal in detail with the capacity of the power of judgment to end up in such issues in 
the next chapter. In this section, we will focus on the antinomy of the teleological power 
of judgment and its resolution. In this subsection, I will discuss Kant’s presentation of 
the antinomy in §70, and then offer my interpretation of Kant’s announcement of the 
general strategy of the resolution of the antinomy in §71. In the next subsection, I will 
discuss Kant’s presentation of the different theories of teleology in §72, his assessment 
of these theories in §73 and his general conclusion regarding the puzzle in §74. In the 
final subsection of this chapter, I will discuss Kant’s resolution of the antinomy as it 
appears in §§75-78. 
In §70 of the Dialectic of the “Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment”, Kant 
presents the antinomy as one that runs between two maxims: 
The first maxim of the power of judgment is the thesis: All generation of material 
things and their forms must be judged as possible in accordance with merely 
mechanical laws.  
The second maxim is the antithesis: Some products of material nature cannot be 
judged as possible according to merely mechanical laws (judging them requires an 
entirely different law of causality, namely that of final causes). (AA V: 387) 
There are two interpretative difficulties with this presentation of the antinomy, both of 
which are revealed by the immediately preceding passage, which is responsible for the 
standard interpretation of Kant’s position here up until Peter McLaughlin’s 1990 
challenging reinvigoration of the study of the “Critique of the Teleological Power of 
Judgment”. The passage runs:  
Now in the case of this contingent unity of particular laws the power of judgment 
can set out from two maxims in its reflection, one of which is provided to it by the 
mere understanding a priori, the other of which, however, is suggested by 
particular experiences that bring reason into play in order to conduct the judging 
of corporeal nature and its laws in accordance with a special principle. It may then 
seem that these two sorts of maxims are not consistent with each other, thus that 
a dialectic will result that will make the power of judgment go astray in the 
principle of its reflection. (AA V: 386-387) 
Kant has been read as saying here that, first, the antinomy is between a principle of the 
understanding a priori, and a principle of the reflective power of judgment, and second, 
that it is only seemingly there. Indeed, this has been the standard reading (for this, see 
McLaughlin’s (1990: 137-142) invaluable analysis of different interpretations of the 
Antinomy). The first idea is then supported by the claim that the first maxim, that of 
mechanicism, is simply the principle of causality as expressed in the Analytic of the 
Critique of Pure Reason, whereas the second maxim is a heuristic one adopted for the sake 
of understanding particular natural entities through reflective judgment. This delivers 
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the first element to Kant’s supposed answer to the antinomy, namely that the two 
principles are not on the same footing. The second element is that these principles are 
merely regulative, and not constitutive, and therefore do not truly conflict. The latter 
reading is then supported by the fact that Kant immediately goes on to contrast these 
two maxims with the two principles as constitutive, and the contradiction into which 
they are supposed to run:  
Now if one were to transform these regulative principles for research into 
constitutive principles of the possibility of the objects themselves, they would 
run: 
Thesis: All generation of material things is possible in accordance with merely 
mechanical laws.  
Antithesis: Some generation of such things is not possible in accordance with 
merely mechanical laws.  
In this latter quality, as objective principles for the determining power of 
judgment, they would contradict one another, and hence one of the two 
propositions would necessarily be false; but that would then be an antinomy, 
though not of the power of judgment, but rather a conflict in the legislation of 
reason. However, reason can prove neither the one nor the other of these 
fundamental principles, because we can have no determining principle a priori of 
the possibility of things in accordance with merely empirical laws of nature. (AA 
V: 387) 
But there are several serious objections to the identification of either supposed element 
of the resolution of the Antinomy. First of all, as McLaughlin has pointed out, readings 
depending on either element lead to the conclusion that Kant has resolved the 
antinomy, or at least believes to have done so, in §70. This raises the difficult 
interpretative issue of why Kant ended up writing 8 more paragraphs. Furthermore, if 
the solution of the antinomy consists in showing that there really is no antinomy as 
long as we bear in mind that we are dealing with reflective judgment rather than with 
determinate judgment or understanding, then it becomes mysterious why Kant elected 
to add an antinomy at all. McLaughlin has shown that, in order to explain Kant’s 
expansiveness on a moot issue, many interpreters end up massively violating the 
principle of charity by stating that there really was no reason to write any of this, and 
Kant merely adds it for reasons of architectonic symmetry. This is of course highly 
problematic, not only because of the violation of the principle of charity, but also 
because it is simply wrong that Kant believes the distinctness of topics cannot overrule 
the symmetry of architectonics. After all, neither the Critique of Practical Reason nor the 
two parts of the Critique of the Power of Judgment contain an aesthetic. Moroever, Kant 
says that, because of the nature of the power of judgment, its critique can have no 
doctrinal part, and hence no doctrine of method. Thus, Kant is not above abandoning 
architectonic symmetry in textual and argumentative structure if it is demanded by his 
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theory on the specific status of different faculties. Thus, if it were the case that the 
teleological power of judgment cannot lead to an antinomy because of its merely 
regulative status, Kant could perfectly have said this. 
Besides this more general objection, there are textual reasons for dismissing standard 
reasons. I will discuss three such reasons, namely that the principles cannot be read as 
stemming from different faculties, that the antinomy is not resolved by removing the 
blatant contradiction of the determinative and constitutive version, and that Kant 
clearly intends these paragraphs as a statement of the problem and a preparation for 
the solution rather than as a dismissal of the problem and ipso facto presentation of the 
solution. 
First of all, it is not the case that Kant regards the regulative version of the antinomy 
as between a constitutive, determinative principle and a regulative one, for in that case, 
he would have to say that the first principle is provable by reason. After all, if the first 
maxim comes down to the principle of causality, then not only is it provable, Kant 
would have claimed to have proven it in the Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason. But 
Kant insists that “reason can prove neither the one nor the other of these fundamental 
principles” (AA V: 387). Thus, whatever the content of the first maxim, it is not identical 
with the category of causality. Kant does say, of course, that the first maxim is 
“provided to it by the mere understanding a priori” (AA V: 386), but this does not have to 
imply that it is a principle of the mere understanding a priori. Given the straightforward 
contradiction (within the distance of a page) that would occur if we were to draw this 
implication, a different reading of how the understanding a priori would provide the 
first maxim would be desirable. In the next chapter, we will provide such a reading, but 
for now we will merely note the unsatisfactory nature of the opposite thesis. 
Second, the removal of the contradiction between the two principles does not fully 
remove the antinomy. In the case of the opposition of the two principles read as 
constitutive, the two claims obviously contradict each other, since the first thesis says 
that all A are p, whereas the second thesis says that some A are not p. Kant suggests that  
by transforming the two theses from constitutive principles to regulative maxims, this 
contradiction is removed. I assume he believes this to be the case because the 
constitutive version makes generalizing statements about the objects, whereas the 
regulative version says something about the judging subject, and stating that a subject is 
under conflicting demands does not imply a contradiction, for not only are double binds 
logically possible, they are extremely common and pervasive in the concrete lives of 
human beings. 
But Kant is here not speaking of the concrete lives of human subjects and the 
conflicting personal and societal demands and obligations under which they find 
themselves – he is talking about the subject of cognition and the transcendental 
constraints on his cognitive activity. The conflicting demands of reflective judgment are 
therefore not a matter of the vicissitudes of our psychological life, but rather an a priori 
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condition of finite cognition. The conflict is, like all antinomies, self-incurred. How is 
one then to proceed in judging according to conflicting maxims? This, I believe, is the 
problem sketched by Kant in §71, and which he attempts to resolve in the subsequent 
paragraphs of the “Antinomy of the teleological power of judgment”. 
In §71, which Kant titled  “Preparation for the resolution of the above antinomy”, 
Kant presents what I take to be the general strategy of his resolution: 
Whether, therefore, the productive capacity of nature may not be as adequate for 
that which we judge as formed or combined in accordance with the idea of ends as 
well as for that which we believe to need merely the machinery of nature, and 
whether in fact things as genuine natural ends (as we must necessarily judge 
them) must be based in an entirely different kind of original causality, which 
cannot be contained at all in material nature or in its intelligible substratum, 
namely, an architectonic understanding: about this our reason, which is 
extremely limited with regard to the concept of causality if the latter is supposed 
to be specified a priori, can give us no information whatever. – However, with 
respect to our cognitive faculty, it is just as indubitably certain that the mere 
mechanism of nature is also incapable of providing an explanatory ground for the 
generation of organized beings. It is therefore an entirely correct fundamental 
principle for the reflecting power of judgment that for the evident connection of 
things in accordance with final causes we must conceive of a causality different 
from mechanism, namely that of an (intelligent) world-cause acting in accordance 
with ends, no matter how rash and indemonstrable that would be for the 
determining power of judgment. (AA V: 388-389) 
As is to be expected, Kant takes as a premise for this argument the idea that we cannot 
actually prove that some objects cannot be explained according to the mere mechanism 
of nature, for this would make the principle of teleology constitutive. This means that 
we can never determinately identify an object as a natural purpose, even though there 
are objects which we must necessarily judge as natural purposes. The problem, 
however, is that natural ends “must be based in an entirely different kind of original 
causality, which cannot be contained at all in material nature or in its intelligible 
substratum, namely, an architectonic understanding”. With this statement, Kant repeats 
what I have argued to be the upshot of the Analytic, namely that natural purposes 
cannot be understood through either the merely mechanical causality of nature or the 
causality of intentional agency. What is now peculiar is that Kant nonetheless concludes 
that we should judge natural purposes according to the principle of intentional action. I 
will argue, in the next two subsections, that Kant’s resolution to the antinomy consists 
precisely in suggesting that we should heuristically understand natural purposes not 
according to the incomprehensible causality that is proper to them, but according to the 
non-mechanical but comprehensible causality of intentional agency, because the latter 
can be harmonized with mechanicism in a way in which the former cannot. The 
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mechanicist paradigm, after all, allows for the compatibility and the neat distinctness of 
the mechanical and the intentional levels of explanation, and allows the latter to inform 
the former as a heuristical means. Kant’s solution, then, is that we adopt the Boylean 
position on final causes heuristically in order to harmonize our otherwise massively 
conflicting commitments to mechanicism, which denies the productivity of nature, and 
the doctrine of natural teleology, which insists on the productivity of nature.  
4.3.2 Candidates for Heuristics 
In this subsection, I will argue that, in §§72-74, Kant develops an argument for his choice 
of intentional causality as the best and all only admissible candidate for a heuristic 
approach to living systems that does not massively conflict with the maxim of 
mechanicism. It is in the light of this task that we should read the following passage 
from §72: 
Insofar as we would call the procedure (the causality) of nature a technique, on 
account of the similarity to ends that we find in its products, we would divide this 
into intentional technique (technica intentionalis) and unintentional technique 
(technica naturalis). The former would mean that the productive capacity of 
nature in accordance with final causes must be held to be a special kind of 
causality; the latter that it is at bottom entirely identical with the mechanism of 
nature, and that the contingent coincidence with our concepts of art and their 
rules, as a merely subjective condition for judging nature, is falsely interpreted as 
a special kind of natural generation. (AA V: 390-391) 
This passage is bound to lead to misinterpretations, for here Kant seems to be saying 
that every causality that is not intentional is ultimately identical to mechanical 
causality, whereas I have been arguing that he sees natural purposiveness as a non-
mechanical and non-intentional causality. As a result, it is tempting to read here that 
ultimately, Kant’s notion of natural purpose is intended to allow for the fact organisms 
can be fully mechanical, although it is heuristically useful to regard them, at least for 
the time being18, as non-mechanical. I believe this is a mistake, however, as is revealed 
by the context of the passage. In this paragraph, Kant will list four historical alternative 
stances towards teleology in nature. The idea that the option between unintentional 
and intentional purposiveness collapses into the option between denying and admitting 
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 For example, Angela Breitenbach (2008) has argued that, for Kant, the idea of teleology is merely one that 
we must adopt until a proper mechanicist reduction is available. The idea behind this is that we need to have a 
preliminary concept to identify the reduced concept (that of natural purpose) to be able to reduce it to the 
reducing concept (that of mechanical system). 
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purposiveness is an underlying assumption of the traditional list, not of Kant’s own 
approach. Indeed, he will stress that none of these approaches actually capture the idea 
of purposiveness that he seeks to accommodate. I therefore suggest we read Kant not as 
subscribing to that dichotomy, but rather as showing which options are open once one 
accepts it. 
Before discussing the four positions, I would first like to offer a table which shows 
how Kant clarifies the various positions: 
 
Purposiveness is Unintentional Intentional 
Due to the physical Epicureanism Hylozoism 
Due to the hyperphysical Spinozism Theism 
Kant presents the two positions in the first column as follows:  
The idealism of purposiveness (I always mean objective purposiveness here) is 
now either that of the accidentality or of the fatality of the determination of 
nature in the purposive form of its products. The first principle concerns the 
relation of matter to the physical ground of its form, namely the laws of motion; 
the second concerns the hyperphysical ground of matter and the whole of nature. 
The system of accidentality, which is ascribed to Epicurus or Democritus, is, if 
taken literally, so obviously absurd that it need not detain us; by contrast, the 
system of fatality (of which Spinoza is made the author, although it is to all 
appearance much older), which appeals to something supersensible, to which our 
insight therefore does not reach, is not so easy to refute, since its concept of the 
original being is not intelligible at all. But this much is clear: that on this system 
the connection of ends in the world must be assumed to be unintentional (because 
it is derived from an original being, but not from its understanding, hence not 
from any intention on its part, but from the necessity of its nature and the unity 
of the world flowing from that), hence the fatalism of purposiveness is at the same 
time an idealism of it. (AA V: 391-392) 
The idealism of purposiveness takes that which creates the illusion of purposiveness in 
nature to be fully explainable without purposiveness, since there is no, nor can there be, 
intentional agency involved. Kant distinguishes between two such positions, namely 
one that explains the seeming purposiveness in terms of blind chance, and one that 
explains it in terms of necessity. A further complication is that Kant believes this to 
coincide with a different opposition, one between physical and hyperphysical grounds, 
which is far less obvious. I will first discuss the distinction between blind chance and 
fatality and then offer a way of identifying with the distinction between the physical 
and the hyperphysical. 
Kant presents the first kind of idealism of purposiveness as “Epicurus’s kind of 
explanation, on which the difference between a technique of nature and mere 
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mechanism is completely denied, and blind chance is assumed to be the explanation not 
only of the correspondence of generated products with our concepts of ends, hence of 
technique, but even of the determination of the causes of this generation in accordance 
with laws of motion, hence of their mechanism” (AA V: 393). Although he does not say 
so explicitly, it becomes clear from the way in which he contrasts this position with that 
of fatality that epicureanism intends to explain the origin of the apparent contingency 
of natural purposes with regard to general laws. This contingency, the epicurean would 
say, is not due to the involvement of an intentional agency in their production, but 
rather to the element of randomness that blind chance inserts. The apparent 
purposiveness is thus indeed contingent, but blindly and not purposively contingent. 
In contrast, the fatalism of purposiveness does not allow for such an element of blind 
chance, since it does not allow for any chance, coincidence or indeterminacy: 
Spinoza would suspend all inquiry into the ground of the possibility of the ends of 
nature and deprive this idea of all reality by allowing them to count not as 
products of an original being but as accidents inhering in it, and to this being, as 
the substratum of those natural things, he ascribes not causality with regard to 
them but merely subsistence, and (on account of the unconditional necessity of 
this being, together with all natural things as accidents inhering in it), he secures 
for the natural forms the unity of the ground that is, to be sure, requisite for all 
purposiveness, but at the same time he removes their contingency, without which 
no unity of purpose can be thought, and with that removes everything intentional, 
just as he removes all understanding from the original ground of natural things. 
(AA V: 393) 
The approach identified as Spinoza’s thus does not explain the illusion of purposiveness 
by showing how contingency can occur in nature, but rather by showing how the world 
and the phenomenon can be understood as from a unitary ground, not an aggregate of 
parts and processes. But the spinozist does not explain the unity of purpose, for he 
focuses not on the illusion of purposiveness, but rather on the unity of the organism. 
The problem of course is that the organism does not have this unity because of its own 
nature, but rather because its subsistence is an expression of the power of the one 
substance in which it inheres.  
This brings us to the distinction between physical and hyperphysical grounds of the 
alleged purposiveness in nature. For epicureanism, nature has general principles, and 
organisms are entirely the product of these general principles and the blind chance that 
operates within them. Organisms are therefore regarded as being due to natural 
principles. On the spinozist position, on the other hand, the alleged purposiveness is not 
due to the inner workings of nature, but due to the ground of nature as a whole.  
In order to understand the importance of the distinction between the two positions, 
however, we will have to see how the distinction works out in the case of the realism of 
purposiveness, for only there does Kant fully articulate it. One reason why Kant may not 
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fully develop this distinction in the case at hand is because of the unsatisfactory nature 
of both accounts for his purposes. They are unsatisfactory not because they deny 
purposiveness, but because they cannot account for the illusion of purposiveness they 
posit: that is, they cannot show how, in spite of the fact that there is no purposiveness at 
work in nature, the concept of purposiveness is so strongly suggested by some natural 
occurrences. In the case of epicureanism, this is because blind chance may account for 
the contingency of a thing with respect to the general principles, of nature, but not for 
the unity this thing exhibits in its contingency. If it were merely due to blind chance, we 
would expect this chance to be equally at work within the organism, but the latter’s 
functional organization belies such randomness. Spinozism, on the other hand, explains 
not the contingency with respect to general principles, but rather the unity exhibited 
by modes (the striving making up, or made up by, their individual essences)19. Such 
unity, however, is not functional unity, and thus is not the kind of purposiveness that 
we would be tempted to postulate. 
The importance of this analysis is that it shows us not why epicureanism and 
spinozism are wrong, but that they turn out to be bad candidates for the harmonization 
of mechanism and teleology. Both approaches can initially be regarded as such 
harmonization, because they are supposed to explain why the appearance of 
purposiveness in nature can be squared with the absence of purposiveness. Kant 
concludes that neither of these idealisms of purposiveness can explain why nature 
would falsely appear to be purposive, and therefore cannot harbor the teleological 
principle. 
Kant next considers the two forms of the realism of purposiveness: 
The realism of the purposiveness of nature is also either physical or 
hyperphysical. The first bases ends in nature on the analogue of a faculty acting in 
accordance with an intention, the life of matter (in it, or also through an 
animating inner principle, a world-soul); and is called hylozoism. The second 
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 There have been several authors who suggested that Spinoza’s concept of conatus ultimately committed 
him to some form of teleology. Nietzsche, for instance, wrote, in Beyond Good and Evil (2002: 15): “In short, here 
as elsewhere, watch out for superfluous teleological principles! – such as the drive for preservation (which we 
owe to Spinoza’s inconsistency)”. Don Garett (1999) has suggested that we resolve the inconsistency by 
reading Spinoza as allowing for unintentional teleology in the form of the conatus, and rejecting only 
intentional teleology. This would make him more akin to Aristotle and Kant. Whether this reading is desirable 
or not, the general reception of Spinoza warrants Kant’s interpretation of Spinozism as anti-teleological. 
Moreover, Kant would seem to have discounted the teleological properties of the conatus because he regarded 
the conatus as nothing more than a modal expression of God’s own non-teleological power of subsistence as 
causa sui (as is clear from his comments on the issue). This reading may be incorrect, but it is neither crude 
nor obviously unacceptable. 
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derives them from the original ground of the world-whole, as an intentionally 
productive (originally living) intelligent being; and it is theism. (AA V: 392) 
These two positions are not distinguished by the aspect of the appearance of 
purposiveness that they explain, or neglect, for they both fully allow for both aspects of 
purposiveness. They can, however, be distinguished by the distinction between the 
physical and the hyperphysical ground of purposiveness, to the extent that one cannot 
help but feel that this distinction is mostly applicable to the realism of purposiveness, 
and only derivatively to the idealism of purposiveness. Hylozoism explains 
purposiveness in nature by ascribing to matter itself or to nature itself an animating 
capacity for organization, whereas theism explains it by positing, apart from nature, a 
transcendent, external intelligent agent responsible for organizing nature. Thus, like 
epicureanism, hylozoism locates the ground of purposiveness in nature itself, although 
in this case this ground is intentional rather than blind. Theism, on the other hand, like 
Spinozism, locates that capacity in the hyperphysical ground of nature, although in this 
case the hyperphysical ground is transcendent rather than immanent and intentional 
rather than necessitarian20. 
After having described and categorized the possible positions, Kant goes on to assess 
them, beginning with hylozoism, which he resists vehemently: 
the possibility of a living matter (the concept of which contains a contradiction, 
because lifelessness, inertia, constitutes its essential characteristic), cannot even 
be conceived; the possibility of an animated matter and of the whole of nature as 
an animal can be used at all only insofar as it is revealed to us (for the sake of an 
hypothesis of purposiveness in nature at large), in experience, in the organization 
of nature in the small, but its possibility can by no means be understood a priori. 
There must therefore be a circle in the explanation if one would derive the 
purposiveness of nature in organized beings from the life of matter and in turn is 
not acquainted with this life otherwise than in organized beings, and thus cannot 
form any concept of its possibility without experience of them. Hylozism thus 
does not accomplish what it promises. (AA V: 394-395) 
Kant’s rejection of hylozoism is easily misinterpreted as a definitional issue, for he 
claims that it is a contradiction. Note, however, that the argument is more complex than 
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 I say necessitarian rather than necessitated because, strictly speaking, Spinoza’s God is free and not 
necessitated, since he is not determined by anything external to him. Nevertheless, God is not intentional 
because he necessarily acts in the way he does precisely because he is fully determined by his own nature. It 
may have been the case that this nuance was lost on Kant, much like it was lost on many of those who read or 
heard of Spinoza’s theories. However, it is important to see that Kant’s argument does not rely on Spinoza’s 
God being necessitated, but rather on his being unintentional. 
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that. The first argument basically states that one cannot ascribe life to matter a priori, 
whereas we could ascribe inertia to it. But he does not therefore exclude that we might 
for empirical reasons decide to ascribe further properties to matter. I suggest we read 
this passage as an allusion to Newtonianism, for indeed Newton specified matter in 
terms of inertia in the principles, and nevertheless went on to allow for gravity. Of 
course, Kant would prefer to think of gravity as a force and not a property of matter, but 
even for those who would think of it in the latter way, the parallel between vitality and 
gravity would not hold. As Kant notes, there is a circularity involved in deciding that the 
organization of living beings is due to the life of matter, and seeing the life of matter as 
manifesting itself only in the organization of living beings. I take it he means to say that 
it is ad hoc. After all, gravity is a general property of matter (on the relevant 
interpretation) that exhibits itself in every physical system and interaction, whereas 
vitality would only manifest itself in living systems. For such an ad hoc posit, the 
Newtonians’ argument that gravity is not mysterious because it is simple and ubiquitous 
would not bring solace.  
This criticism against hylozoism is a familiar one in Kant’s oeuvre, for, as we saw in 
section 2.3.1, he already raised it in 1763 when criticizing the Newtonian analogy as 
used by Buffon and Maupertuis in their theories of generation. This reveals an 
important aspect of the argument, namely that it was directed against those who would 
expand the list of general principles allowed in mechanicism in order to accommodate 
purposiveness. Such attempts at expansion of mechanicism, Kant believed, were 
doomed to fail because the kind of principles that could be general enough to be 
acceptable in mechanicism could not explain the specificity of purposiveness, and the 
kind of principles that could explain the specificity of purposiveness would be too 
specific to be acceptable in mechanicism. Here, too, we see Kant assessing hylozoism not 
in itself, but as a possible way of harmonizing teleology and mechanicism. 
The final option Kant considers is theism, namely the familiar theory that (some) 
natural entities exhibit purposiveness because they are intentionally designed. Like all 
other positions, it cannot provide a ground for “dogmatically establishing the possibility 
of natural ends as a key to teleology” (AA V: 395), but Kant believes that it is superior to 
all others because it is not as obviously unacceptable as hylozoism. For this reason, he 
concludes the paragraph as follows: 
for us there remains no other way of judging the generation of its products as 
natural ends than through a supreme understanding as the cause of the world. But 
that is only a ground for the reflecting, not for the determining power of 
judgment, and absolutely cannot justify any objective assertion. (AA V: 395) 
In light of Kant’s constant criticism of the idea that natural purposiveness is best 
understood as intentional, this passage would be bizarre, because here he seems to 
conclude that design is the best conception after all. My answer to this puzzle will 
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probably have become clear by now: Kant does not embrace design because it is the best 
theory of natural purposiveness, but because it is the best candidate for a heuristic to 
inquire into natural purposes within the constraints of mechanicism. After all, Kant’s 
intention here is to find a way out of our necessity of regarding organisms in terms of 
the problematic concept of a natural purpose, which 
[a]s a concept of a natural product […] includes natural necessity and yet at the 
same time a contingency of the form of the object (in relation to mere laws of 
nature) in one and the same thing as an end; consequently, if there is not to be a 
contradiction here, it must contain a basis for the possibility of this thing in 
nature and yet at the same time a basis of the possibility of this nature itself and 
its relation to something that is not empirically cognizable nature (supersensible) 
and thus is not cognizable at all for us, in order to be judged in accordance with 
another kind of causality than that of the mechanism of nature, if its possibility is 
to be determined. (AA V: 396) 
The direct conflict of a natural purpose as both natural and purposive is assuaged under 
the assumption of design because, although the natural purpose is regarded entirely as a 
natural entity obeying the mechanical principles, nature itself, specifically its 
organization and its structure, is regarded as intentionally designed. This allows for a 
resolution of the antinomy by neatly partitioning the workings and the structure of 
nature between the two principles: the workings of an organism are to be understood 
entirely according to mechanical principles, but the structure which constrains these 
mechanical principles is not itself understood as a product of the working of nature, but 
as due to the (original) structuring of nature by a creator. But this way of regarding 
natural purposiveness is necessary only “because of the peculiar constitution of my 
faculties” (AA V: 397). 
4.3.3 The Resolution of the Antinomy 
In this subsection, I will present §§75-78 of the Critique of Judgment as the actual solution 
to the antinomy of the teleological power of judgment. As we will see, §75 explains why 
the theistic conception of teleology can be adopted without thereby altering the merely 
regulative (and not constitutive) status of the two maxims of the teleological power of 
judgment. §76 will not be discussed in detail, because it is basically a digression, or 
rather a reminder of the meaning of the concept of a regulative principle or idea. §77, 
on the other hand, is essential because it tells us which limitations of human cognition 
make this solution necessary and why. §78, finally, shows how the suggested position 
solves the antinomy. 
Kant opens §75 with the invaluable reminder that the adoption of a theistic 
conception of teleology is not to be taken as constitutive: 
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To say that the generation of certain things in nature or even of nature as a whole 
is possible only through a cause that is determined to act in accordance with 
intentions is quite different from saying that because of the peculiar constitution of 
my cognitive faculties I cannot judge about the possibility of those things and their 
generation except by thinking of a cause for these that acts in accordance with 
intentions, and thus by thinking of a being that is productive in accordance with 
the analogy with the causality of an understanding. In the first case I would 
determine something about the object, and I am obliged to demonstrate the 
objective reality of a concept that has been assumed; in the second case, reason 
merely determines the use of my cognitive faculties in accordance with their 
special character and with the essential conditions as well as the limits of their 
domain. The first principle is thus an objective fundamental principle for the 
determining, the second a subjective fundamental principle merely for the 
reflecting power of judgment, hence a maxim that reason prescribes to it. (AA V: 
397-398) 
My discussion in the previous subsection allows us to see why Kant insists so much on 
this distinction and why he can. The theistic position is not itself suggested by the 
necessity of judging some natural entities as natural purposes, since natural 
purposiveness itself is not adequately covered by intentional or practical causality. The 
problem is rather that no concept of causality adequate to capture natural 
purposiveness is comprehensible for our form of cognition. This is why we adopt the 
theistic stance, namely because it has the merit of allowing us to capture some 
important features of purposiveness whilst still operating within the mechanicist 
framework forced upon us by the limitations of our knowledge. As a result, we can 
never conclude from the need to admit purposiveness in nature to the need to admit the 
intentional causation of a supersensible being. The latter principle is necessary only for 
our empirical scientific investigations into organized beings (AA V: 398). Once we have 
adopted this principle, however, it becomes natural to regard teleology and theology as 
necessary for one another: 
Now the concept of a thing whose existence or form we represent as possible  
under the condition of an end is inseparable from the concept of its contingency 
(according to natural laws). Hence natural things which we find possible only as 
ends constitute the best proof of the contingency of the world-whole, and are the 
only basis for proof valid for both common understanding as well as for 
philosophers of the dependence of these things on and their origin in a being that 
exists outside of the world and is (on account of that purposive form) intelligent; 
thus teleology cannot find a complete answer for its inquiries except in a 
theology. (AA V: 398-399) 
It is perhaps too tempting to once again read Kant as agreeing unambiguously with this 
pervasive idea, namely that the full understanding of teleology would require, and in its 
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turn imply, theology. The next passage immediately reveals, however, that Kant is 
aware of the lack of fit or convergence:  
But what does even the most complete teleology prove in the end? Does it prove 
anything like that such an intelligent being exists? No; it proves nothing more 
than that because of the constitution of our cognitive faculties, and thus in the 
combination of experience with the supreme principles of reason, we cannot form 
any concept at all of the possibility of such a world except by conceiving of such 
an intentionally acting supreme cause. (AA V: 399) 
Here Kant is saying that it we cannot conclude from the contingency of the world-whole 
that it is intelligently designed, since it is only because of the peculiar constitution of 
our cognitive faculties that we need to conceive of this contingency as due to 
intentionality. Mind that Kant is not saying that it is only due to the peculiar 
constitution of our cognitive faculties that we need to regard the world as containing 
contingency. The problem is not whether some aspects in the world need to be 
understood as mechanically inexplicable or not, but rather over whether this 
mechanical inexplicability is due to intelligent design or not. Thus, whereas we are 
somehow required to admit to the occurrence of ends in nature, 
 we do not actually observe ends in nature as intentional, but merely add this 
concept as a guideline for the power of judgment in reflection on the products of 
nature, they are not given to us through the object. It is even impossible for us to 
justify a priori the assumption of the objective reality of such a concept. There is 
thus left nothing but a proposition resting only on subjective conditions, namely 
those of a reflecting power of judgment appropriate to our cognitive faculties, 
which, if one were to express it as objectively and dogmatically valid, would say: 
There is a God; but all that is allowed to us human is the restricted formula: We 
cannot conceive of the purposiveness which must be made the basis even of our 
cognition of the internal possibility of many things in nature and make it 
comprehensible except by representing them and the world in general as a 
product of an intelligent cause (a God). (AA V: 399-400) 
The main benefit of this reading is that it can help us make sense of a famous passage 
from Kant which would otherwise be deeply problematic: 
For it is quite certain that we can never adequately come to know the organized 
beings and their internal possibility in accordance with merely mechanical 
principles of nature, let alone explain them; and indeed this is so certain that we 
can boldly say that it would be absurd for humans even to make such an attempt 
or to hope that there may yet arise a Newton who could make comprehensible 
even the generation of a blade of grass according to natural laws that no intention 
has ordered; rather, we must absolutely deny this insight to human beings. But for 
us to judge in turn that even if we could penetrate to the principle of nature in the 
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specification of its universal laws known to us there could lie hidden no ground 
sufficient for the possibility of organized beings without the assumption of an 
intention underlying their generation would be presumptuous: for how could we 
know that? Probabilities count for nothing here, where judgments of pure reason 
are at stake. – Thus we cannot make any objective judgment at all, whether 
affirmative or negative, about the proposition that there is an intentionally acting 
being as a world-cause (hence as an author) at the basis of what we rightly call 
natural ends. (AA V: 400) 
To see why this passage is incomprehensible on traditional readings, observe that Kant 
is here saying both that it is impossible that nature can be understood fully 
mechanically, and that it is impossible to prove that this feature of nature cannot be due 
to a causality that is non-intentional. If Kant equated non-mechanical causation with 
intentional causation, this point would be contradictory, for he would be saying that it 
is impossible to fully understand nature merely mechanically, and that it is impossible 
to prove that nature cannot be fully understood merely mechanically. Thus, we cannot, 
on pain of contradiction or of ascribing to Kant a blatant contradiction, embrace this 
interpretation. And yet this interpretation is ubiquitous. 
Peter Mclaughlin’s interpretation of the resolution of the antinomy clearly endorses 
the interpretation leading to the contradiction, since it runs as follows: 
The resolution of the conflict between the general necessity and the occasional 
impossibility of mechanical explanation is thus the following: We must judge all 
natural things mechanistically because for us only mechanical objects can be 
explained. If we are unable to conceive of a particular object of experience as 
naturally mechanical, we must judge it as an artificial mechanism that was 
intended by some understanding. This is not because such an understanding exists, nor 
because the thing is not really mechanical (if we knew all empirical laws we might be able 
to conceive it as mechanical), but because we cannot otherwise conceive the 
apparent causal dependency of the parts on the whole. (Mclaughlin 1990: 168; my 
stress) 
In the passage above, I have stressed the sentence to which I unambiguously object, for 
it ascribes to Kant the idea that we cannot determinately state that these things are 
mechanically inexplicable. First of all, this reading ends up ascribing to Kant the 
contradiction I just offered. Secondly, Kant does state that nature cannot be understood 
merely mechanically, since he insists that the concept of a natural purpose implies 
mechanical inexplicability, and that in teleological judgment we rightly call some things 
natural ends. What he believes is a bridge too far is the admission that this mechanical 
inexplicability is due to intentional causation. This passage, however, does not speak of 
mechanical causation, but rather of unintentional causation. We can thus avoid the 
contradiction by reading Kant as saying that we somehow know that nature is not fully 
mechanically explicable, but that we cannot know whether this is due to its being 
 
214 
designed, since it is always possible that this teleology is due to a non-intentional, 
natural teleology, precisely the kind of teleology he ascribes to natural purposes. The 
conclusion of the passage I have been discussing clearly supports such a reading, for 
Kant writes that “[t]hus we cannot make any objective judgment at all, whether 
affirmative or negative, about the proposition that there is an intentionally acting being 
as a world-cause (hence as an author) at the basis of what we rightly call natural ends.” 
In this sentence, Kant is stating that the issue is of whether we should ascribe an 
intentional ground to what we righly call natural ends. But rightly calling something a 
natural end is righly calling it mechanically inexplicable. The issue is thus not whether 
natural ends are in fact mechanically inexplicable, but rather whether the mechanically 
inexplicable natural ends are in fact intentionally designed.  
Another reading that fails to account for this passage is that of James Kreines. Kreines 
(2005: 288) has argued that, for Kant, it is simply so that natural purposes themselves 
suggest intentional, intelligent design, the real question being whether something is 
rightly judged to be a natural purpose. The passage I just quoted cannot be harmonized 
with this reading, for here Kant is clearly saying that the decision that something is 
rightly called a natural purpose does not decide whether it is rightly called intentional. I 
feel that Kreines’ reading is suggested by the fact that somehow, Kant does not believe 
we can determinately judge things to be natural purposes either. This is an important 
issue in itself, and I will deal with it in the next chapter, where I will argue that it is the 
demand of specificity internal to the systematic drive of nature that compels us to 
regard organisms as natural purposes. My argument, however, will turn on a novel 
reading of the idea of systematicity. As a result, I will also be able to argue that this 
novel reading is interesting because it explains the peculiar status of the judgment of 
something as a natural purpose. 
For now, Kant has been merely asserting, or suggesting, that the reason for adopting 
the theistic stance on natural purposes is the peculiar limitations of our cognitive 
capacities. Only in §77 does he clarify what he means by this. He introduces the issue 
with the following peculiar passage, which has been fateful in the reception of Kant’s 
argument: 
What is at issue is therefore a special character of our (human) understanding 
with regard to the power of judgment in its reflection upon things in nature. But if 
that is the case, then it must be based on the idea of a possible understanding 
other than the human one (as in the Critique of Pure Reason we had to have in mind 
another possible intuition if we were to hold our own to be a special kind, namely 
one that is valid of objects merely as appearances), so that one could say that 
certain products of nature, as far as their possibility is concerned, must, given the 
particular constitution of our understanding, be considered by us as intentional 
and generated as ends, yet without thereby demanding that there actually is a 
particular cause that has the representation of an end as its determining ground, 
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and thus without denying that another (higher) understanding than the human 
one might be able to find the ground of the possibility of such products of nature  
even in the mechanism of nature, i.e., in a causal connection for which an 
understanding does not have to be exclusively assumed as a cause. (AA V: 405-406) 
The move Kant makes here recurs throughout his work, namely that of contrasting our 
own cognition, which is irrevocably finite, with an infinite one, an “intuitive 
understanding”. The big initial puzzle is that Kant seems to be saying that, for such an 
alternative understanding, the purposiveness of nature might in fact be grounded in the 
mechanism of nature. This seems to run counter to his constant insistence that natural 
purposes are to be explained non-mechanically. We thus need to make sense of the kind 
of entity that would be able to explain the non-mechanical mechanically.  
The first thing that we need to note is that the concept of an intuitive understanding 
always figures in Kant as a contrastive notion. It is tempting to read him as saying that 
there is, or can be, such an alternative understanding. One problem with this reading is 
that the contrastive idea is such that we can only conceive of it negatively, namely as 
something which would not be limited in the way we are. Positive characterizations of 
this form of knowledge are inherently deceitful. I believe part of the difficulty here is 
Kant’s suggestion that there the idea of intelligent design relies on a slippage from a 
negative to a positive characterization of the intuitive understanding. 
The intuitive understanding is here first negatively characterized as that which does 
not have the contingency typical of the constitution of our understanding: 
This contingency is quite naturally found in the particular, which the power of 
judgment is to subsume under the universal of the concepts of the understanding; 
for through the universal of our (human) understanding the particular is not 
determined, and it is contingent in how many different ways distinct things that 
nevertheless coincide in a common characteristic can be presented to our 
perception. Our understanding is a faculty of concepts, i.e., a discursive 
understanding, for which it must of course be contingent what and how different 
might be the particular that can be given to it in nature and brought under its 
concepts. But since intuition also belongs to cognition, and a faculty of a complete 
spontaneity of intuition would be a cognitive faculty distinct and completely 
independent from sensibility, and thus an understanding in the most general  
sense of the term, one can thus also conceive of an intuitive understanding 
(negatively, namely merely as not discursive), which does not go from the 
universal to the particular and thus to the individual (through concepts), and for 
which that contingency of the agreement of nature in its products in accordance 
with particular laws for the understanding, which makes it so difficult for ours to 
bring the manifold of these to the unity of cognition, is not encountered – a job 
that our understanding can accomplish only through the correspondence of 
natural characteristics with our faculty of concepts, which is quite contingent, but  
which an intuitive understanding would not need. (AA V: 406) 
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The contingency is due to our understanding being discursive, which means that we 
only ever grasp particulars and individuals through concepts. Such concepts never fully 
grasp, or can never be determinately admitted to fully grasp the particularities of that 
which is subsumed under it. This is because, if we want to think a particular or an 
individual, we must have a concept of it, since we cannot directly reason with it as 
presented in intuition. But it always remains a question of whether this concept is 
adequate to that which is subsumed under it. We usually grasp the particularities of 
particulars and individuals by developing more specific concepts under which to 
subsume them. As a result, there is always a certain gap between the concept and that 
thought under it, and the universal and the particular.21  
Kant then determines the intuitive understanding as one for whom the grasping of 
particulars and individuals is not possible only through the more general concepts and 
principles under which they can be subsumed. For such an understanding, the harmony 
of the world and the conceptual system grasping it would not be contingent. This brings 
us one step closer to understanding Kant’s peculiar point, since we saw that the problem 
of mechanicism versus teleology was that the latter exhibits a specificity which runs 
counter to the generality of mechanical principles. Thus, this problem is that of a 
particular which is recalcitrant to subsumption under a universal, or a more general 
principle. For a discursive understanding, the threat of such recalcitrance is always at 
least in the background: 
Our understanding thus has this peculiarity for the power of judgment, that in 
cognition by means of it the particular is not determined by the universal, and the 
latter therefore cannot be derived from the former alone; but nevertheless this 
particular in the manifold of nature should agree with the universal (through 
concepts and laws), which agreement under such circumstances must be quite 
contingent and without a determinate principle for the power of judgment. (AA V: 
406-407) 
To console us for this threat, however, we tend to conceive of an understanding for 
which this threat is not only non-existent, but which would also have the view of nature 
as the intelligible unity that we cognitively hope it to be:   
Nevertheless, in order for us to be able at least to conceive of the possibility of 
such an agreement of the things of nature with the power of judgment (which we 
represent as contingent, hence as possible only through an end aimed at it), we 
must at the same time conceive of another understanding, in relation to which, 
and indeed prior to any end attributed to it, we can represent that agreement of 
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natural laws with our power of judgment, which for our understanding is 
conceivable only through ends as the means of connection, as necessary. (AA V: 
407) 
We can assert that nature is such that it is amenable to being grasped by a discursive 
understanding. i.e. such that the particularities occurring in them can be understood on 
the basis of general or universal concepts or principles, only if we assume that nature 
was somehow meant to exhibit such comprehensibility. Moreover, we can only conceive 
of nature in this way if we conceive of an understanding for whom this harmony is 
immediate and unproblematic, and thus does not suggest that nature was meant to be 
cognized. 
I would like to suggest that Kant offers this notion of an intuitive understanding as 
one for whom there would be no antinomy because it could conceive of a natural 
purpose as it is described in the “Analytic of the Teleological Power of Judgment”, 
whereas for us this concept is incomprehensible. An intuitive understanding could thus 
harmonize mechanism and teleology not because it sees that nature is inherently 
mechanical, but because it can reason otherwise than mechanically. Mechanical 
explanation, Kant insists throughout the “Critique of the Teleological Power of 
Judgment”, is the explanation of phenomena through the most general motive forces at 
work in nature alone. As a result, specificity and particularity are anathema to 
mechanicism, for they violate its principle of intelligibility. Mechanicism, it seems, is 
necessary for a discursive understanding because discursive understanding can only 
understand the particular through the general, and not through its own particularity. 
For an understanding that is not bound by such limitations, specificity can be directly, 
“intuitively” understood, and needn’t be reduced to more general principles.  
This is in fact what we can read in the continuation of Kant’s argument: 
Our understanding, namely, has the property that in its cognition, e.g., of the 
cause of a product, it must go from the analytical universal (of concepts) to the 
particular (of the given empirical intuition), in which it determines nothing with 
regard to the manifoldness of the latter, but must expect this determination for 
the power of judgment from the subsumption of the empirical intuition (when the 
object is a product of nature) under the concept. Now, however, we can also 
conceive of an understanding which, since it is not discursive like ours but is 
intuitive, goes from the synthetically universal (of the intuition of a whole as 
such) to the particular, i.e., from the whole to the parts, in which, therefore, and 
in whose representation of the whole, there is no contingency in the combination 
of the parts, in order to make possible a determinate form of the whole, which is 
needed by our understanding, which must progress from the parts, as universally 
conceived grounds, to the different possible forms, as consequences, that can be 
subsumed under it. (AA V: 407) 
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Kant thus characterizes the two forms of understanding, discursive and intuitive 
understanding respectively, as one which can only grasp the particular through general 
principles, and is always threatened by the possibility of the particular’s recalcitrance to 
this subsumption under general principles, and one which can have a complete 
cognition of the particular in its particularity. For the latter, there is of course no 
contingency, for the particular or individual is understood through its own concept, and 
not through another concept. It is important to note that the problem here would not 
be of asking how the parts come to constitute this particular, for they are already 
understood as constituting this particular. Similarly, the question of whether the whole 
precedes the parts is a moot one, for the cause of the product need no longer be 
regarded as prior to it in the manner that an antecedent is prior to its consequent, since 
in an intuitive understanding the distinction between such moments of judgment is  
absent. Matters are different for discursive understanding, of course: 
In accordance with the constitution of our understanding, by contrast, a real 
whole of nature is to be regarded only as the effect of the concurrent moving 
forces of the parts. Thus if we would not represent the possibility of the whole as 
depending upon the parts, as is appropriate for our discursive understanding, but 
would rather, after the model of the intuitive (archetypical) understanding, 
represent the possibility of the parts (as far as both their constitution and their 
combination is concerned) as depending upon the whole, then, given the very 
same special characteristic of our understanding, this cannot come about by the 
whole being the ground of the possibility of the connection of the parts (which 
would be a contradiction in the discursive kind of cognition), but only by the 
representation of a whole containing the ground of the possibility of its form and 
of the connection of parts that belongs to that. But now since the whole would in 
that case be an effect (product) the representation of which would be regarded as 
the cause of its possibility, but the product of a cause whose determining ground 
is merely the representation of its effect is called an end, it follows that it is 
merely a consequence of the particular constitution of our understanding that we 
represent products of nature as possible only in accordance with another kind of 
causality than that of the natural laws of matter, namely only in accordance with 
that of ends and final causes, and that this principle does not pertain to the 
possibility of such things themselves (even considered as phenomena) in 
accordance with this sort of generation, but pertains only to the judging of them 
that is possible for our understanding. (AA V: 407-408) 
For a discursive understanding, the whole is to be understood according to the general 
principles of motion governing its parts. Such general principles and forces are the only 
ones which can be admitted as present prior to the constitution of the whole itself. In 
trying to understand the specification of the parts, however, as far as their relation and 
existence is concerned, we assume that the concept of the whole itself is also somehow 
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causally involved. The only way for us to do so is to assume that the concept of the 
whole is prior to the whole itself. Of course, it can be prior only as a representation in an 
intentional agent. An intuitive understanding, however, need not supplement its 
understanding with the concept of the particular, for it is already entertaining this 
concept; nor need it regard it as a pre-existing representation. It is therefore a 
consequence of the fact that our understanding is discursive, i.e. finite, that we 
understand the specificity at work in nature as external to nature, as due to an 
intentional agency restricting the otherwise too general working of nature.  
The possibility of a different kind of understanding has two important functions at 
this stage of Kant’s argument. First of all, it is meant to show that the two kinds of 
causality are only strictly opposed for our limited understanding, since for us to be a 
natural entity means to be explainable in terms of the general principle of nature, and 
to be purposive is to be explainable only by a non-natural causality. If we imagine a 
different kind of understanding that can have knowledge of natural entities otherwise 
than through general principles alone, we see that such an understanding could 
understand natural purposes without taking recourse to non-natural causality. Kant 
admittedly obscures this point at times by insisting that this intuitive understanding 
would understand natural purposes mechanically. But by this he always means that it 
would understand natural purposes solely through the natural activities of its parts, and 
not through the idea representation of a whole. Here, an equivocation takes place, 
because the mechanicism through which the intuitive understanding would understand 
natural purposes would not be what we mean by mechanicism, since it would not 
understand only through general principles. This terminological peculiarity is, I believe, 
due to a tendency, even in Kant, to regard mechanicism as the problem of eliminating 
supernatural explanations from natural philosophy. What Kant envisions is a 
mechanicism that would have eliminated all such explanations, but he admits that such 
a mechanicism would differ toto caelo from the one in which we are currently engaged. 
The second important function of the idea of an intuitive understanding is to allow 
for the solution to the antinomy by harmonizing mechanicism and teleology. If another 
kind of understanding than ours is conceivable, then we cannot equate the way we need 
to think of the world with the way the world needs to be. Were we to in fact equate the 
two,  
then the unity that constitutes the ground of the possibility of natural formations 
would be merely the unity of space, which is however no real ground of 
generatings but only their formal condition; although it has some similarity to the 
real ground that we seek in that in it no part can be determined except in relation 
to the whole (the representation of which is thus the basis of the possibility of the 
parts). (AA V: 409) 
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The spatial, extensive configuration, is indeed the only admissible element in 
mechanical explanation besides general principles of motion. Thus, if the world were in 
fact spatially determined in the way we regard it, we would have no choice but to either 
dismiss teleology or allow it as another kind of causality working in the world. Luckily, 
Kant believes that the findings of transcendental idealism allow us to avoid this 
possibility. Through the adoption of the idea of a supersensible substrate, 
since it is still at least possible to consider the material world as a mere 
appearance, and to conceive of something as a thing in itself (which is not an 
appearance) as substratum, and to correlate with this a corresponding intellectual 
intuition (even if it is not ours), there would then be a supersensible real ground 
for nature, although it is unknowable for us, to which we ourselves belong, and in 
which that which is necessary in it as object of the senses can be considered in 
accordance with mechanical laws, while the agreement and unity of the particular 
laws and corresponding forms, which in regard to the mechanical laws we must 
judge as contingent, can at the same time be considered in it,  as object of reason 
(indeed the whole of nature as a system) in accordance with teleological laws, and 
the material world would thus be judged in accordance with two kinds of 
principles, without the mechanical mode of explanation being excluded by the 
teleological mode, as if they contradicted each other. (AA V: 409) 
Kant here makes the bold suggestion to regard the empirical world as we know it to be 
merely the empirically knowable one, and to be subject to the limitations of our 
understanding, whilst equally holding it to be grounded in a substratum of which we 
cannot even conceive, and in which natural purposiveness can occur without 
intentional causation being involved. This supersensible substratum is characterized by 
Kant as the one to which we also belong, presumably in so far as we are moral agents. At 
first sight, it could seem that organisms can therefore be assumed to exhibit intentional 
free agency in the way that we assume ourselves to exhibit it. But it is clear from Kant’s 
line of thought that this would be mistaken, since the whole point of a natural purpose 
is that it can exhibit purposiveness without intentionality. A better way to think of it 
may be to read the supersensible substrate as that which is governed by normativity, 
instead of – or possibly as well as – by non-normative causality. As we saw in section 
4.2.3., it is indeed plausible to read Kant as thinking of natural purposes as 
unintentionally normative. This could indeed explain why Kant thinks grounding 
natural purposes in the supersensible allows us to avoid the apparent contradiction of 
natural normativity. We would in such a manner conceive of the world as if the kind of 
causality that he described in the Analytic were really at work in it, although such a 
world is incomprehensible to us. The result is that we proceed in our inquiries with the 
conviction that, although the antinomy between mechanical and teleological 
explanation is very much real for our form of cognition, it needn’t be real at all, since 
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alternate causalities, alternate forms, are strictly speaking conceivable (though not 
comprehensible to us). 
But conceiving of such a possibility is what allows us to take a regulative stance on 
the maxims; it is not what allows us to pursue them both simultaneously. Explaining 
how the two maxims can meaningfully be jointly pursued is the task of the final 
paragraph of the “Dialectic of the Teleological Power of Judgment”. There, Kant keeps 
insisting that, although the idea of a supersensible ground allows us to escape the 
contradiction between the two kinds of explanation, it does not show us how we can 
unite the two kinds of explanation in our scientific enterprises, since this supersensible 
ground is unknowable and can thus not be invoked in explanation: 
Now of course the principle of the mechanism of nature and that of its causality 
according to ends in one and the same product of nature must cohere in a single 
higher principle and flow from it in common, because otherwise they could not 
subsist alongside one another in the consideration of nature. But if this objectively 
common principle, which also justifies the commonality of the maxims of natural 
research that depend upon it, is such that it can be indicated but can never be 
determinately cognized and distinctly provided for use in actual cases, then from 
such a principle there can be drawn no explanation, i.e., a distinct and 
determinate derivation of the possibility of a natural product that is possible in 
accordance with those two heterogeneous principles. (AA V: 412) 
We would therefore need some other way of jointly pursuing the two maxims rather 
than pursuing one at the expense of the other. Kant’s own suggestion for such a 
heuristic is regarding the principle of mechanicism as valid, but as subordinated to the 
principle of teleology: 
For where ends are conceived as grounds of the possibility of certain things, there 
one must also assume means the laws of the operation of which do not of 
themselves need anything that presupposes an end, which can thus be mechanical 
yet still be a cause subordinated to intentional effects. Hence even in organic 
products of nature, but even more if, prodded to do so by their infinite multitude, 
we assume that intentionality in the connection of natural causes in accordance 
with particular laws is also (at least as a permissible hypothesis) the universal 
principle of the reflecting power of judgment for the whole of nature (the world), 
we can conceive a great and even universal connection of the mechanical laws 
with the teleological ones in the productions of nature, without confusing the 
principles for judging it with one another and putting one in the place of the 
other, because in a teleological judging of matter, even if the form which it 
assumes is judgedc as possible only in accord with an intention, still its nature, in 
accordance with mechanical laws, can also be subordinated as a means to that 
represented end[.] (AA V: 414) 
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This way of looking at things is essentially the traditional mechanical theist perspective, 
wherein nature is supposed to operate solely by means of the general principles of 
motion governing matter, and the hand of intentional design is seen in the specific 
structures and forms which happen to be the ones on which these general principles 
operate. Much like the artificer structures an artefact in such a way that, in it, the 
general principles of nature give rise to certain processes and activities rather than 
others, so God has structured nature such that the in itself blind and absolutely general 
principles of nature give rise to precisely those effects he intended. If one dismisses, 
along with many mechanicists, the idea that unstructured nature can give rise, by 
means of the general principles of matter alone, to the specific structures of the world, 
then one needs to accept at least the initial structure of the universe as a brute given. 
This, of course, amounts to giving up on explaining the structure of nature naturally, 
but it does allow one to go on pursuing the mechanicist programme without 
disregarding the structure of the universe. As we saw in chapters 1 and 2, this dilemma 
was central to Kant’s thinking throughout the whole of his career. Here, we finally see a 
full response to the issue: 
[S]ince the ground of this unifiability [of teleological and mechanicist judging] lies 
in that which is neither the one nor the other (neither mechanism nor connection 
to an end) but is the supersensible substratum of nature, of which we can cognize 
nothing, the two ways of representing the possibility of such objects are not to be 
fused into one for our (human) reason, but rather we cannot judge them other 
than as a connection of final causes grounded in a supreme understanding, by 
which nothing is taken away from the teleological kind of explanation. (AA V: 414) 
Thus, although it would be more adequate to understand nature through the concept of 
natural purposiveness, given that this concept is incomprehensible to us because of the 
peculiar constitution of our cognitive capacities, we need to understand it through the 
idea of intentionally designed artifacts in order to harmonize teleology and mechanism. 
The two principles are harmonized because we are only ever investigating the 
capacities of nature given these structural constraints in order to understand exactly 
how far these capacities extend. But to some extent these structural constraints will 
always themselves remain unexplained by the natural capacities. The fact that the 
structural component of a mechanicist explanation is always itself mechanically 
unexplained is usually not much of an issue. In the case of natural purposes, however, it 
needs to be held in mind as essential, since they are entities for whom the fact that they 
have this rather than another structure is relevant in a way in which it does not seem to 
be for other mechanical interactions. By assuming that nature was disposed such that it 
give rise to these and precisely these structures, we are capable of regarding these 
structures as uncoincidental, but at the same time deny that something causally 
intervenes in nature, as characterized by its general principles alone, in order to bring 
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about these structures. The conclusion of the “Critique of the Teleological Power of 
Judgment” thus resonates with Kant’s perpetual hesitance between the adequacy of 
organicism and the heuristic commitment to mechanicism, clearly instantiated in the 
following comment from his 1766 Dreams of a Spirit Seer: 
I am convinced that Stahl, who is disposed to explain animal processes in organic 
terms, was frequently closer to the truth than Hoffman or Boerhaave, to name but 
a few. These latter, ignoring immaterial forces, adhere to mechanical causes, and 
in so doing adopt a more philosophical method. This method, while sometimes 
failing of its mark, is generally succesful. It is also this method alone which is of 
use in science (AA II: 332) 
This hesitance is the commitment to never bring the swing of Canguilhem’s pendulum, 
described in section 2.1., to a halt, however tempting it may be to proclaim that we have 
at last found our Newton of the blade of grass.22 
4.4 Conclusion 
In this lengthy chapter, I have tried to reconstruct and interpret the argumentive 
course of the tortuous and sinuous text that is the “Critique of the Teleological Power of 
Judgment”, or at least its first two parts.23 Given the length and the complexity of this 
dialectical path, it is useful to recapitulate here what I take to be the most important 
conclusions of this chapter for the present dissertation. 
First of all, Kant understands organisms as natural entities that inevitably suggest to 
us the idea of a unity of purpose. Such unity of purpose is to be understood as a 
functional or normative unity, namely unity of a rule or a norm for the species or the 
 
                                                     
22
 The scope of this dissertation prevents me from spelling out some of the most important results of this 
reading of Kant for the philosophy of biology. After all, my topic is transcendental epistemology, even though 
this requires, as I am continuously arguing, an eye on Kant’s perspectives on the life sciences. A study which is 
more focused on the philosophy of biology from similar premises is currently being undertaken by Joris Van 
Poucke, and I refer the reader to his work for further exploration of these issues. 
23
 I have abstained from offering an interpretation of Kant’s subsequent treatment of physicotheology. This is 
not because I find it wholly irrelevant or uninteresting, but rather because I believe I am not yet well equipped 
do tackle this issue. The issue of physico-theology is intricately bound up with Kant’s transcendental idealist 
position on the relation between nature and normativity. In future work, I would like to reevaluate this 
position in the light of the findings of this dissertation, but I hope my reader shares my conviction that it 
should not be the subject of a summary treatment in the present work.  
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individual. Organisms are therefore to be judged as striving to maintain a certain unity 
of purpose, as under the obligation of answering to a certain norm. Such a norm, 
however, is not entirely static: it is plastic, since the organism can change its norm, i.e. 
change the relation and proportion of its relevant parts in order to adapt to 
contingencies.  
In spite of the unity suggested by natural purposes, this unity should not be thought 
of as apart from, or over and above, the multiplicity of parts of which it consists. Kant 
rejects any interpretation of natural purposes as obeying to an externally imposed or 
transcendent norm, and insists that in order to maintain this, the whole itself cannot be 
distinct from the multiplicity of parts. The unity of a natural purpose is not, therefore, 
the unity of a transcendent principle of individuation or essence or idea, but rather that 
of the reciprocally productive and formative properties of the parts. In insisting on this, 
Kant reveals his distrust towards previous organismic theories for understressing the 
multiplicity of the organism to the detriment of a ruling part or transcending principle. 
Despite his insistence on the concept of a natural purpose in this form, he insists that 
it is incomprehensible to us. Thus, the obligation to judge things as natural purposes 
embroils us in an antinomy due to the finite, i.e. discursive nature of our cognition, 
which means that the harmony between the universal and the particular is contingent 
for us, and always threatened by the possibility of failure. As a result, we cannot at the 
same time understand the unity of purposiveness and the naturality of a natural 
purpose, since we understand a purpose in light of its irreducible particularity, and 
nature in light of its general principles and features. The antinomy of the teleological 
power of judgment thus reveals a division internal to our cognitive capacities itself. 
In the Antinomy chapter of the “Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment”, the 
antinomy is resolved in two steps. In the first step, Kant reveals that there is no 
straightforward contradiction between mechanicism and teleology, since they are only 
opposed for our finite cognition. This allows us to think that there is a way in which 
they might harmonize, although they will never do so for us. But this leaves us with two 
contradictory demands of reason instead, and such a contradiction remains a danger to 
our capacity to coherently investigate nature. Kant shows that we can resolve this 
tension by heuristically adopting theistic mechanicism, which regards organisms as 
intentionally structured for a certain end or purpose, and then investigates how the 
processes within these organisms and in which these organisms figure can be 
understood through mechanical means alone.  
Those who still find resolution of the antinomy somewhat dissatisfying, may do so 
because Kant made no effort to overcome the finite nature of our cognitive capacities, 
and to protect us from the perpetual threat of cognitive failure. But this limitation is 
one that Kant himself would not regard as a failing, and instead regarded as a core 
aspect of his philosophy. In the next chapters, I will present an interpretation of this 
core aspect by first showing how reason itself is subject to disunity and therefore to an 
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antinomy even in its regulative demand for systematicity, and then how Kant’s system 
of cognition is best understood not as a traditional unity, but as the kind of constantly 





Chapter 5 Systematicity and the Disunity of 
Reason 
We impose on one another, & it is but lost time to 
converse with you whose works are only [Aristotle’s] 
Analytics 
Opposition is True Friendship 
- William Blake 
 
In this chapter, I will argue that Kant’s conception of Reason and of Systematicity is 
such that a fundamental tension, and perhaps even an antinomy, can arise even within 
the heuristic use of this faculty. In 5.1, I will present a status quaestionis on the topic of 
transcendental systematicity, and introduce my own interpretation. Before developing 
this interpretation, I will first offer a sketch of the debate on systematicity and 
antisystematicity in the Enlightenment in 5.2. In 5.2.1, I will present the idea of 
systematicity as it was understood in Early Modernity, namely as a specific 
interpretation of Aristotle’s semantics in terms of the tree of Porphyry. In 5.2.2, I will 
outline Locke’s seminal criticism of that idea and indicate its influence on many 
important Enlightenment philosophes. In 5.2.3, I will then present Leibniz’s attempt to 
overcome Locke’s overly skeptical criticism with a new way of understanding and 
employing the idea of systematicity. I believe this background is important for a correct 
understanding of Kant’s own conception and employment of this idea. In 5.3, I discuss 
the idea as it appears in the Critique of Pure Reason. First, I discuss the merely logical use 
of the idea of systematicity in 5.3.1, arguing that there too the commitment to 
completeness implies maximum particularity with maximal unity. In 5.3.2, I then 
discuss the transcendental use of systematicity, and argue that Kant saw a conflict 
arising between the distinct maxims to which it gives rise. In the CPR, the solution of 
this conflict is still the reminder that a merely reflective usage cannot run into an 
antinomy. In 5.4, however, I argue that the Critique of Judgment goes beyond this 
treatment by admitting that a reflective stance does not yet dispel all difficulties with 
the conflicting maxims. In 5.4.1, I present an interpretation of the introductions to the 
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third Critique as offering an answer to this issue, and argue that the principle of 
reflective judgment is meant to offer the solution. In 5.4.2, I then indicate how the 
antinomy of the teleological power of judgment can be better understood when it is 
read as a manifestation of the greater antinomy of systematicity. This latter discussion 
allows us to see the intimate connection between the tension between particularity and 
generality on the one hand, and that between sensibility and understanding on the 
other. 
5.1 The Problem of Transcendental Systematicity 
In the past few decades, Kant scholarship has been turning a more approving gaze at the 
peculiar section of the Critique of Pure Reason called the “appendix to the Dialectic of Pure 
Reason” (henceforth the Appendix). In that section, Kant concludes his critique of 
metaphysics with the claim that the ideas of reason do have a legitimate use, for even 
though we cannot take them as determinate metaphysical theses, or even as 
determinate transcendental principles, we can use them as guiding maxims in our quest 
for knowledge. This is because the ideas and maxims serve our striving for systematicity 
in knowledge, and such systematicity is required to speak of knowledge at all. 
The thesis of the appendix raises some important questions of interpretation. We 
may ask, for instance, why this striving for systematicity would be necessary for 
knowledge, and why the forms of sensibility and the categories of the understanding are 
not sufficient as conditions for knowledge. After all, the point of the analytic is 
supposed to be that knowledge is possible, in spite of what the skeptic might want to 
claim, in virtue of the distinct contributions of sensibility and understanding. Now Kant 
seems to say that understanding and sensibility do not suffice to constitute knowledge. 
This brings us to a second task, namely to show why the maxims of reason, despite 
being necessary conditions for knowledge, can still not be taken as determinate. In the 
analytic, Kant allegedly legitimated the constitutive use of the categories of the 
understanding by arguing that the categories are the conditions of the possibility of 
knowledge. But if this is true, then why can we not extend the same argument to the 
ideas of reason, i.e. why can we not conclude from their indispensibility to knowledge 
that their constitutive use is legitimate? 
 To these two major issues a third needs to be added, namely the question why the 
striving for systematicity gives rise to the specific principles and ideas listed by Kant. 
The striving for systematicity is a very general goal, but Kant claims that several 
maxims and ideas can be derived from it and that these maxims and ideas are therefore 
indispensible guidelines in the quest for knowledge. 
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These puzzles explain why readers of Kant have often been extremely dissatisfied 
with the Appendix chapter. The first two problems, for instance, have been taken as 
indicators that Kant is blatantly contradicting himself here, for instance by Kemp Smith: 
The teaching of this section is extremely self-contradictory, wavering between a 
subjective and an objective interpretation of the Ideas of Reason. The probable 
explanation is that Kant is here recasting older material, and leaves standing more 
of his earlier solutions than is consistent with his final conclusions. We can best 
approach the discussion by considering Kant's statements in A 645 - B 673 and in A 
650 ff. - B 678 ff. They expound, though unfortunately in the briefest terms, a 
point of view which Idealism has since adopted as fundamental. Kant himself, very 
strangely, never develops its consequences at any great length. (Kemp Smith 2003: 
547) 
as well as by Walsh: 
What this seems to say is that, unless ideas operated as they do, we could not 
make any judgments. It seems clear, however, that we could make judgments 
provided that we could conceptualise our data under the general restrictions of 
the categories; to prove that was the whole of the Analytic. Categories, and 
concepts generally, have a central role in Kant’s scheme which makes them 
absolutely indispensable; without them there would be no experience at all. Kant 
cannot be saying that ideas too are necessary for the very possibility of 
experience, for this would undermine the whole distinction between ideas and 
categories. (Walsh 1975: 245) 
Both authors object that the ideas and maxims of reason cannot at the same time be 
held to be necessary for knowledge and not amenable to constitutive use. Kemp Smith 
offers an explanation for this contradiction, namely that the appendix is an atavist 
moment in Kant’s thought, a remnant from his Leibnizian and Wolffian background. On 
such a reading, the contradiction would not be internal to Kantian philosophy, but 
rather between a more and a less mature state of that philosophy. Kemp Smith suggests 
that the Appendix should therefore be rejected as inconsistent with the mature 
transcendental philosophy. He also complains that Kant’s brevity and inconsistency on 
the matter is unfortunate because this idea would become fundamental in the focus on 
unity in German (and British) Idealism. 
Jonathan Bennett has equally protested against Kant’s argument in the appendix: 
A principle which was guaranteed to be permanently regulative would have to be 
necessarily incapable of (dis)confirmation. That privilege might belong to a 
principle which was somehow supposed by scientific endeavour as such, so that 
its confirmation would be question-begging and its disconfirmation self-refuting. I 
doubt if there are any such principles. (Bennett 1974: 275) 
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Bennett’s objection is based on the question as to what kind of principle would be both 
necessary and non-constitutive in the manner Kant describes. But he indicates another 
issue at the same time, namely that of identifying such principles. The Ideas and maxims 
Kant identifies are supposed to be neither confirmable nor discomfirmable, yet still 
necessary. We might wonder why he took the ideas and maxims he proposed as 
satisfying this criterion. 
Over the past twenty years, a thorough reappraisal of Kant’s argument in the 
Appendix revealed that it is not nearly as problematic or straightforwardly 
contradictory as commentators like Kemp Smith, Walsh and Bennett presented it to be. 
Readings that mean to salvage Kant’s claim that there are necessary though merely 
regulative requirements of knowledge stemming from the demand of systematization, 
could be called, with Ido Geiger (2003), transcendental interpretations. Several such 
transcendental interpretations have been offered by, for instance, Susan Neiman (1997), 
Nicholas Rescher (2000), Michelle Grier (2001), Ido Geiger (2003) and Henry Allison 
(2004). 
What is remarkable about most such transcendental interpretations is that they seek 
to answer only the first two puzzles I identified at the start of this subsection, namely by 
offering a view on which systematization is a necessary condition for knowledge whilst 
being merely regulative, and not constitutive. The third puzzle, however, is deemed less 
important, for it is the demand of systematization, and not the maxims or ideas in 
which it expresses itself, which is of interest to these interpretations. Neiman (1997: 76-
77) seems to suggest that Kant merely registered in them a variety of rules that 
scientists in fact use in their reasoning, which makes Kant’s claim descriptive. Other 
readers, such as Grier (2001: 298-301), have seen little virtue in the concrete maxims and 
instead focused on the peculiar kinds of quasi-objects projected by the illusion of 
reason. Invariably, however, authors treat these maxims as mattering little, since they 
are all somehow equivalent to the general idea of systematic unity. 
In this chapter, I will argue that this too summary treatment of the specific maxims 
and their relations has distorted our view both of Kant’s argument for the necessity of 
systematicity to knowledge as of the nature of the systematicity he envisioned. By 
focusing only on the idea of systematicity itself, the striving for systematicity has been 
read as a striving for unity. This is unsurprising, given that Kant is usually read either in 
the context of Leibnizian philosophy, or in that of the German Idealism which he was to 
spawn. Many commentators, even those who defend the importance of the assumption 
of systematicity in Kant’s philosophy (cf. Rescher 2002: 69 and Geiger 2003: 277), have 
suggested that this element is decidedly inherited from Leibniz, and that the Appendix 
account is some kind of leibnizianism made regulative rather than constitutive, 
heuristic rather than metaphysical. Reading Kant through the lense of German Idealism, 
however, leads us to focus on the feature of unity in the notion of systematicity. The 
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Appendix can then be read as an argument for assuming that nature is strongly unified, 
but at the same time denying that it is legitimate to assume this constitutively. 
In this chapter, I will argue against this general reading by showing that unity is not 
Kant’s sole concern in the project of systematicity, but that multiplicity and diversity 
are equally important. I will argue that Kant instead saw the problem of systematicity as 
an antinomy between two fundamental maxims: that of unity and that of specificity, 
and that he came to understand this problem through the 18th century debate on 
systematicity and antisystematicity erupting in the wake of Locke’s Essays. On my 
reading, Kant is inspired by Leibniz’s answer, but not in the way he is usually assumed 
to be. In the next section, I will present a brief outline of the debate on systematicity in 
Early Modernity. This will serve to understand the problem to which Kant is responding. 
In the final two sections of the chapter, I will offer my interpretation of Kant’s position 
in the Critique of Pure Reason  and the Critique of the Power of Judgment respectively. I will 
argue that the difference between these two accounts is less great than is traditionally 
assumed, and that in both the fundamental disunity of reason is the core topic. The 
principle of purposiveness as the principle for the reflective judgment is then to be 
regarded as Kant’s response to the question of how to deal with this fundamental 
disunity, not his account of why we needn’t worry about it at all. 
5.2 The Spirit of Systems 
5.2.1 The 17th Century Spirit of Systems1 
The seventeenth century “modernists” profiled themselves as the great innovators of 
philosophy and science. Our history since then has often taken them at their word, 
stressing their major departures from previous thought and hailing them for having 
liberated us from the great prejudices of the past, namely those stemming from 
Aristotelian and Theological conceptions of the world and of reality. In the previous 
chapter, I already indicated one way in which this is misleading, for the so-called 
banishment of final causes from natural philosophy is misunderstood if taken as a clear 
mark of secularization. In this subsection, I will discuss another way in which a 
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 This sections contains many passages, copied verbatim, from an earlier paper of mine on the topic of 
systematicity and antisystematicity in the Enlightenment. For a fuller treatment of the issue, I refer the reader 
to that text (Demarest 2013a). 
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fundamental critique of the Aristotelians’ picture of science, harbours a peculiar 
continuity with it. This continuity is to be found in the idea that nature has a rational 
and systematic structure, and that hence we are warranted in examining it through 
certain rational means. In the next subsection, I will show how this assumption came to 
be attacked in various ways in the Enlightenment, predominantly the Enlightenment 
movements associated more closely with empiricism. In the final subsection of this 
section, I will present Leibniz’s response to the challenge famously offered by Locke and 
adopted by many prominent philosophes.  
When Aristotle speaks of science, he speaks of knowledge begotten through 
demonstration. Demonstrations yield knowledge because they are truth-preserving 
syllogisms that also preserve the necessity of their conclusions and that go from the 
prior to the posterior. In other words, demonstrations are syllogisms in which the three 
terms are related in a certain way. It is not my intention here to discuss the whole of the 
Aristotelian theory of knowledge and of science, but rather to indicate that, for many 
Aristotelians, demonstration is a matter of expanding and articulating the system of 
subordinate and superordinate concepts. 
For many followers of the stagirite, this system of concepts formed what they called 
the tree of Porphyry, after the 3rd century neo-Platonic commentator of Aristotle. In 
Porphyry’s text, the tree is more a vertical schema subordinating and superordinating 
certain concepts to each other. The rationale behind this schema is the following idea: 
In each type of predication there are some most general items and again other 
most special items; and there are other items between the most general and the 
most special. Most general is that above which there will be no other 
superordinate species; and between the most general and the most special are 
other items which are at the same time both genera and species (but taken in 
relation now to one thing and now to another). (Porphyry 2003: 6) 
Afterwards, however, the tree of Porphyry became associated not only with the idea of 
superordination and subordination, but also with the idea that all concepts might have a 
place in a tree diagram where the most general principles form the trunk and the most 
specific the branches. The tree diagram is generated by first taking the most general 
difference, and then either affirming or denying a specific difference of it. The 
affirmation yields one subordinate species, the negation another. Of each of the 
subordinate species, a further specific difference may then be either be affirmed or 
denied, yielding species subordinate to them. This process then goes on until we arrive 
at the lowest species, i.e. those concepts to which no others are subordinate, and under 
which only individuals are thought. All these “specifications” yield new “branches” of 
the tree, whose bifurcations connect the sturdy stem with the tender twigs. 
The idea of superordination and subordination of concepts has a clear basis in some 
of Aristotle’s explicit comments, although to my knowledge he never suggests that all 
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concepts can be organized into one hierarchical system of such a form. For Aristotle, the 
principles of a science are predications of concepts that are more universal, and thus 
superordinated. It is on the basis of the most general essential properties of the class of 
entities of which the science treats that we come to know the more specific properties. 
Science, for Aristotle, always moves from the more general to the more specific, 
deducing the properties of the specific from the general. In the same way, sciences 
themselves are subordinate to other sciences if the former treat of a species that is 
subordinate to the species of the latter.2 Thus, scientific disciplines dealing with 
subordinate species are often regarded as applications of the higher-order sciences. 
Nevertheless, Aristotle insists (76a; Aristotle 1960: 67) that “the special principles of 
each science cannot be demonstrated; for the principles from which they would be 
demonstrable would be principles of all existing things, and the science of those 
principles would be supreme over all.” By this, he seems to mean that, at each (relevant) 
specification, there are some new properties which emerge and are the specific basic 
properties of that species. There can be no universal science from which all the specific 
properties of all the ontological kinds of things can be derived or deduced. This is why 
subaltern sciences are distinct from their superordinate sciences: they have their own 
principles and can use only their own principles. Nevertheless, a science might contain 
principles which are in fact provable or supposed by a superior science. 
Throughout the Renaissance and the 17th Century, Philosophers targeted the 
philosophy of the schools by criticizing the traditional logic based on Aristotle’s 
Organon. The aspect of this doctrine that met with the most resistance was the so-called 
syllogistics. Francis Bacon, one of those figures who, in the philosophes’ eyes, provided 
the great inspiration and instauration of modern science and its accompanying 
empirical mindset, formulated this criticism in the following way:  
in the ordinary logic almost all the work is spent about the syllogism. Of induction 
the logicians seem hardly to have taken any serious thought, but they pass it by 
with a slight notice, and hasten on to the formulae of disputation. I on the 
contrary reject demonstration by syllogism, as acting too confusedly, and letting 
nature slip out of its hands. For although no one can doubt that things which 
agree in a middle term agree with one another (which is a proposition of 
mathematical certainty), yet it leaves an opening for deception; which is this. The 
syllogism consists of propositions; the propositions of words; and words are the 
tokens and signs of notions. Now if the very notions of the mind (which are as the 
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 The precise subordination of the various sciences is rather a complex issue in Aristotle’s Analytica Posteriora, 
which I will not disentangle here. The goal of the presentation here is only to indicate the general themes that 




soul of words and the basis of the whole structure) be improperly and overhastily 
abstracted from facts, vague, not sufficiently definite, faulty in short in many 
ways, the whole edifice tumbles. I therefore reject the syllogism; and not only as 
regards principles (for to principles themselves logicians do not apply it) but also 
as regards middle propositions; which, though obtainable no doubt by the 
syllogism, are, when so obtained, barren of works, remote from practice and 
altogether unavailable for the active department of the sciences. (Bacon 1875: 24) 
In this passage, Bacon finds fault with the old Organon for its undue stress on the 
syllogism as the motor of reasoning, and therefore offers to replace it with his own new 
method, a new Organum. The typical Aristotelian demonstrative syllogism proceeds 
from the more general to the particular, thereby presupposing knowledge of the 
general, the principle. This is unacceptable to Bacon because it precludes any 
investigation into those principles themselves. In fact, his proposal, an Organum that is 
based on the method of induction, consists in an inversion of this process, a climbing of 
the scales of generality towards the most general: 
hitherto the proceeding has been to fly at once from the sense and particulars up 
to the most general propositions, as certain fixed poles for the argument to turn 
upon, and from these to derive the rest by middle terms: a short way, no doubt, 
but precipitate; and one which will never lead to nature, though it offers an easy 
and ready way to disputation. Now my plan is to proceed regularly and gradually 
from one axiom to another, so that the most general are not reached till the last: 
but then when you do come to them you find them to be not empty notions, but 
well defined, and such as nature would really recognise as her first principles, and 
such as lie at the heart and marrow of things. (Bacon 1875: 25) 
But an inversion of the order proper to Aristotelian logic leaves one thing unharmed: its 
basic conception of subsumption, of intension and extension. That Bacon still adhered 
to the hierarchical and unitary conception of nature as expressed in the trope of the 
tree of Porphyry, is clear from his exegesis of the myths surrounding the figure Pan in 
Greek literature in the Sapientia Veterum3. The key with which he tackles these tales, 
which he interprets as philosophical parables, namely the idea that “Pan, as the very 
word declares, represents the universal frame of things, or nature” (1878: 709), opens 
his path to the following observation:  
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 McRae (1957: 30-31) equally takes Bacon’s interpretation of the Pan-Myth as evidence that he subscribed to 
the hierarchical conception of nature, whereby the whole of nature is subsumed under one supreme principle. 
This is largely because, as Anderson (1948: 54) has pointed out, the Sapientia Veterum is an indirect attack on 
the ruling philosophies, via an interpretation of ancient myths as philosophical parables full of the wisdom of 




That the world is represented with horns, and that such horns are broad at 
bottom and narrow at top, has relation to the fact that the whole frame of nature 
rises to a point like a pyramid. For individuals are infinite: these are collected into 
species, which are themselves also very numerous, the species are gathered into 
genera, and these again into genera of a higher stage; till nature, contracting as it 
rises, seems to meet at last in one point. Nor need we wonder that Pan’s horns 
touch heaven; since the summits, or universal forms, of nature do in a matter 
reach up to God; the passage from metaphysic to natural theology being ready and 
short. (1878: 710)  
This assent to the hierarchical conception behind Aristotelian logic does not imply that 
Bacon is an Aristotelian: it is in fact likely that his major difference of opinion with 
Aristotle concerned precisely how we should conceive of the status of these “universal 
forms”, and how we should investigate them. But whatever Bacon may have meant with 
his concept of a form (and this is very hard to make out indeed4), he clearly believed 
that forms are related to each other after the logical manner in which Aristotelian 
species and genera are subordinated to each other. This is clear from his description of 
proper inquiry into forms in the second part of the Novum Organum by means of the 
example of heat. There, he suggests that heat is a specific kind of motion, distinguished 
from motion in general by a number of specific differences (1875: 151). In discussing the 
specific kinds of instances which may serve to guide one in proper inductive research, 
he states that “as Striking Instances lead easily to specific differences, so are Clandestine 
Instances the best guides to genera, that is, to those common natures, whereof the 
natures proposed are nothing more than particular cases” (1875: 160).  
That Bacon leaves the scholastic conception of logical hierarchy unscathed is not to 
be mistaken for an indicator of the ultimately pre-modern mindset some believe to be 
behind his philosophical project. In fact, we can find the hierarchical notion of 
subsumption nearly everywhere in early modernity, not just in the writings of the Port-
Royal rationalists, who merely saw the study of syllogism as rather unenlightening 
because they believed a great deal more errors of judgment result from relying on false 
or unclear principles of thought than from the inadequate employment of a rule of 
inference (Arnauld & Nicole 1992: 167), but also in those writings commonly taken to be 
precursors of the empirical line of thought that dominated the philosophes’ theoretical 
enterprises. Gassendi’s Institutio Logica includes an example clarified by means of a 
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 Some authors, such as Whitaker (1970), go as far as suggesting that Bacon’s concept of a form is indefinite, 
and this because it harks back to a variety of concepts from other philosophies. For an overview of the 
literature’s indecision with regard to Bacon’s forms, as well as a recent attempt to remedy it, see Fletcher 
2005. It seems likely, however, that Bacon’s concept of a form anticipates Boyle’s, which is decidedly non-
Aristotelian, but may still allow for a proper classification (cf. Jones 2005) . 
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schema situating the idea within the porphyrian tree (1727: 84), and Hobbes (1839: 30) 
equally believes that a proposition consists in a statement that one name comprehends 
another.5 
Finally, the image of the tree of Porphyry also famously appears in the introduction 
to the French edition of Descartes’s Principes de la Philosophie: 
Thus the whole of philosophy is like a tree. The roots are metaphysics, the trunk is 
physics, and the branches emerging from the trunk are all the other sciences, 
which may be reduced to three principle ones, namely medicine, mechanics and 
morals. By ‘morals’ I understand the highest and most perfect moral system, 
which presupposes a complete knowledge of the other sciences and is the ultimate 
level of wisdom. (AT IXB: 14; Descartes 1985: 186) 
This image of the tree is in no way original in Descartes, as was pointed out by Roger 
Ariew (1992). Ariew suggests that, in invoking this image, Descartes is deliberately using 
Aristotelian imagery to alleviate the remonstrances of scholastics, a hypothesis that is 
further supported by the fact that mathematics has no place in this tree. Nevertheless, 
there is no need to think that Descartes is wholly disingenuous here. For one, 
Descartes’s claim that he agrees with Aristotle where the necessity for firm first 
principles in philosophy and science is concerned does not sound quite as hypocritical. 
This makes it plausible that he did indeed believe that the subaltern sciences are 
somehow legitimated by their deductive connection with the higher sciences. As a 
result, we should be skeptical towards the following claim made by Matthews, and 
identified by Ariew as the standard interpretation of Descartes arboreal metaphor: 
Following upon some disturbing dreams in late 1619, Descartes's life work became 
the creation of a systematic philosophy which would encompass all branches of 
knowledge. The system would be based on a few undeniable principles, and all 
knowledge would be deduced from them, so that metaphysics, physics, 
mathematics, morals, and politics would all cohere. Knowledge is an organic 
whole, in which all fields have the same method. Descartes repeatedly used the 
metaphor of a tree: 'Thus philosophy as a whole is like a tree whose roots are 
metaphysics, whose trunk is physics, and whose branches, which issue from this 
trunk, are all the other sciences'. This doctrine of a single, all embracing method, 
is contrary to that of Aristotle, for whom the different fields of human knowledge 
all have their own subject matter and appropriate method. (Matthews 1989: 87-88)  
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 Hobbes does, of course, treat the hierarchical relation as a relation between names, and the relation between 
names as arbitrarily imposed. Unlike Bacon, he therefore need not regard nature as something that expresses 
the hierarchical systematic order, but he is committed to the fact that man’s system of knowledge must take 
the form of a hierarchical system. 
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Matthews is wrong in believing that Descartes’ invocation of the metaphor of a tree is a 
clear criticism of the Aristotelian division of the sciences. What is more plausible is that 
he is giving an account of the different interpretations of the tree metaphor in the two 
versions. As we saw above, Aristotle insisted that subaltern sciences are rooted in, and 
partly justified by, their superior sciences, but that they are nonetheless irreducible to 
those superior sciences. Matthews ascribes to Descartes the belief that such reduction is 
possible and warranted. Whether this is in fact the case, is not my concern here. I have 
solely wished to stress the wide spread of the systematic conception of knowledge in the 
17th century, even among the great opponents of Aristotelian thought.  
5.2.2 The Spirit of Systems under Attack 
We have seen that, in spite of their disagreements with the scholastics, many heroes of 
Early Modern philosophy followed them in the belief that there is a systematicity to 
knowledge and to the universe, and therefore preserved the image of Porphyry’s tree in 
some form or other. It is this lingering commitment to the systematic order that Locke 
sought to eradicate with his novel description of the inferential process, which did away 
with levels of generality and particularity altogether. Like his Early Modern 
predecessors, he believed that the focus on syllogism in reasoning was misplaced. His 
argument proceeds from the common 17th century theme that man has a natural light, 
which allows him to recognize validity or even truth and falsity without having to take 
explicit recourse to the highly artificial and complex syllogistics: 
God has been more bountiful to Mankind than so. He has given them a Mind that 
can reason without being instructed in Methods of Syllogizing: The Understanding 
is not taught to reason by these Rules; it has a native faculty to perceive the 
Coherence, or Incoherence of its Ideas, and can range them right, without any 
such perplexing Repetitions. (Locke 1975: 671) 
As is clear from this passage, Locke still believes that correct inference involves a good 
arrangement of the ideas, although he does not believe this arrangement needs to take 
the form of a syllogistic figure. Instead, he proposes another image of how terms are 
inferentially connected through intermediate ones: 
To infer is nothing but by virtue of one Proposition laid down as true, to draw in 
another as true, i.e. to see or suppose such a connexion of the two Ideas, of the 
inferr’d Proposition. v.g. Let this be the Proposition laid down, Men shall be punished 
in another World, and from thence be inferred this other, then Men can determine 
themselves. The Question now is to know, whether the Mind has made the 
inference right or no; if it has made it by finding out the intermediate Ideas, and 
taking a view of the connexion of them, placed in a due order, it has proceeded 
rationally, and made a right Inference. If it has done it without such a View, it has 
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not so much made an Inference that will hold, or an Inference of right Reason, as 
shewn a willingness to have it be, or be taken for such. But in neither Case is it 
Syllogism that discovered those Ideas, or shewed the connexion of them, for they 
must be both found out, and the connexion everywhere perceived, before they 
can rationally be made use of in Syllogism: unless it can be said, that any Idea 
without considering that connexion it hath with the two other, whose Agreement 
should be shewn by it, will do well enough in a Syllogism, and may be taken at a 
venture for the Medius Terminus, to prove any Conclusion. But this no body will 
say, because it is by vertue of the perceived Agreement of the intermediate Idea 
with the Extremes, that the Extremes are concluded to agree, and therefore each 
intermediate Idea must be such, as in the whole Chain hath a visible connexion 
with those two it is placed between, or else thereby, the Conclusion cannot be 
inferr’d or drawn in; for whereever any Link of the Chain is loose, and without 
connexion, there the whole strength of it is lost, and it hath no force to infer or 
draw in any thing. (Locke 1975: 672-673) 
Locke points out here that the very capacity to reason syllogistically is dependent upon 
the capacity to appreciate, besides the mode and the figure of the deduction, the 
connection between the terms thus related. After all, a syllogism fails to demonstrate if 
the terms are not in fact related in such a way as stated by the form of the propositions. 
In itself, this does not contradict Aristotelianism, for it also maintains that 
demonstration requires the terms to be related in the right way. The difference between 
the two thinkers is that Aristotelians believed that terms relate to each other in 
patterns of subordination, superordination and coordination within something like the 
tree of Porphyry, whereas Locke seems to require no such structure. This appears first 
of all from his shift in metaphor for the connection of terms, since he speaks of a chain 
of ideas rather than a tree of concepts. Unlike a tree, a chain suggests a linear rather 
than a hierarchical structure. Indeed, one of the major traits of Locke’s philosophy is 
that he rejects the need for higher-order principles and maxims in reasoning as 
warrants for truth preservation and validity: 
[S]ince the Knowledge of the Certainty of Principles, as well as other Truths, 
depends only upon the perception, we have, of the Agreement, or Disagreement, 
of our Ideas, the way to improve our Knowledge, is not, I am sure, blindly, and with an 
implicit Faith, to receive and swallow Principles; but is, I think, to get and fix in our 
Minds clear, distinct, and complete Ideas, as far as they are to be had, and annex to 
them constant and proper Names. And thus, perhaps, without any other Principles, 
but barely considering those Ideas, and by comparing them one with another, finding 
their Agreement, and Disagreement, and their several Relations and Habitudes; we 
shall get more true and clear Knowledge, by the conduct of this one Rule, then by 
taking up Principles, and thereby putting our Minds into the disposal of others. 
(Locke 1975: 642-643) 
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It seems plausible to read this passage as Locke’s charge against Descartes and the 
Cartesians, who maintained both the doctrine of clear and distinct ideas and that of 
general principles of thought. Locke seems to believe that, once we have accepted that 
there are clear and distinct ideas, and that the clarity and distinctness of an idea is an 
adequate philosophical ground, no further general principles are required as 
epistemological grounding. Hence, the whole machinery of different levels of 
generality, where reasonings of a more concrete nature are regarded as instantiations 
or applications of reasonings of an abstract nature, is redundant and, Locke adds, 
possibly harmful. 
Locke has thereby radicalized the Early Modern critique of syllogistic reasoning in 
order to direct it against what he may have regarded as a residue of scholasticism: the 
systematic conception of reason and the world. One such form that this residue took is 
the persistent belief in general principles of reasoning. But Locke attacks another as 
well, namely the belief that nature forms a hierarchy of forms or kinds, a belief that still 
existed in Bacon, the patron saint of the Royal Society. In his chapter on General Terms, 
he disputes the authority of the traditional classification according to species and 
genera by arguing that instead of regarding a genus as an essence or form 
superordinated to the species, a lower-order essence, we should regard ideas as wholes 
consisting of other ideas, and the more general or abstract ideas as parts of the more 
specific ideas. According to Locke, 
[t]his may shew us the reason why, in the defining of words, which is nothing but 
declaring their signification, we make use of the Genus, or next general Word that 
comprehends it. Which is not out of necessity, but only to save the labour of 
enumerating the several simple Ideas, which the next general Word, or Genus, 
stands for; or, perhaps, sometimes the shame of not being able to do it. But though 
defining by Genus and Differentia […] I say, though defining by the Genus be the 
shortest way; yet, I think it may be doubted, whether it be the best. This, I am 
sure, it is not the only, and so not absolutely necessary. For Definition being 
nothing but making another understand by Words, that Idea, the term defined 
stands for, a definition is best made by enumerating those simple Ideas that are 
combined in the signification of the term Defined: and if instead of such an 
enumeration, Men have accustomed themselves to use the next general term, it 
has not been out of necessity, or for greater clearness; but for the quickness and 
dispatch sake. (Locke 1975: 414-415) 
Locke here replaces the residual Aristotelian semantics behind logic with a modern one 
in terms of ideas. For Aristotelians, this semantics is one of concepts related to each 
other by the relation of intensional inclusion. Although Aristotle at times uses 
mereological language to characterize this relation, in doing so, as Aquinas put it, he 
“uses whole and part and comprehension equivocally”, (Aquinas 1954: 5). The genus is 
contained in the species in the sense that all specific differences listed in the definition 
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of the genus and every genus to which it is subordinate, are also listed in the definition 
of the species and every other species contained under the genus. But, in Aristotle’s 
philosophy, there is no clear way in which one can say that the terms of a definition are 
parts of the definition in a mereological sense. To see this, note that every genus contains 
under it (at least) a pair of contradictory species, one of which the specific difference is 
affirmed, and one of which it is denied. This would mean that the genus is either a part 
of two distinct contradictory terms, or that the two contradictory terms overlap all but 
completely accept for the one specific difference. I doubt very much that Aristotle 
would be willing to accept either alternative, and would rather insist on the sui generis 
nature of the purportedly mereological relation of conceptual inclusion, i.e. used the 
mereological language merely metaphorically. 
The Lockean picture is in that respect more easily understood as a mereological 
understanding of concept-relation. He starts from the ideas of particulars, which are 
complete, and which can be analyzed into their component ideas until each idea has 
been analyzed into simple ideas that cannot be further analyzed. The conceptually 
adequate definition of any idea is the list of simple ideas it contains. The idea of 
humanity is a component idea of Peter and Paul, but itself has components. It is 
therefore an abstractum. Now as to the question whether the same idea of humanity is 
contained in Peter and Paul, Locke can say that the idea of humanity in Peter is exactly 
like that contained in Paul because it consists of the same simple ideas. The question 
then becomes whether the same simple ideas are contained in an infinite possible 
amount of ideas. Here, the answer is offered by the fact that two simple ideas need not 
be token-identical, but can be type-identical, in the same way that two corpuscles in the 
corpuscularian philosophy can be: the simple idea red contained in my idea of the 
middle painting on the wall opposite me is then of the same type as the same simple 
idea red contained in my idea of the rightmost painting on that wall, but it is not the 
same idea. 
Locke concludes from this that there is no need for universals, since universals are 
simply type-identical, and not token-identical, and hence that the logic of ideas allows 
us to be thoroughly nominalist on universals and essences: 
It is plain, by what has been said, That General and Universal, belong not to the real 
existence of Things, but are the Inventions and Creatures of the Understanding, made 
by it for its own use, and concern only Signs, whether Words, or Ideas. Words are 
general, as has been said, when used, for Signs of general Ideas; and so are 
applicable indifferently to many particular Things: but universality belongs not to 
things themselves, which are all of them particular in their Existence, even those 
Words, and Ideas, which in their signification, are general. When therefore we quit 
Particulars, the Generals that rest are only Creatures if our own making, their 
general Nature being nothing but the Capacity they are put into by the 
Understanding, of signifying or representing many particulars. For the 
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signification they have, is nothing but a relation, that by the mind of Man is added 
to them. (Locke 1975: 414) 
But Locke’s position here only means that universals do not really exist as distinct 
individual entities, not that the classifications in terms of species and genera is thereby 
false. For it might be that, while there are no metaphysically distinct essences of species 
and genera, the particulars in the world are grouped according to clear-cut 
resemblance-classes. Locke realizes that this is a problem, since one of the major 
motivations for admitting the existence of universal essences (and not just particular 
ones) is that the regularities of nature suggest them. Specifically, the existence of 
universals is most suggested by the phenomena grouped under the concept of life that, 
namely the regularity of reproduction and the groupings of biological individuals into 
species or classes: 
I would not here be thought to forget, much less to deny, that Nature in the 
Production of Things, makes several of them alike: there is nothing more obvious, 
especially in the Races of Animals, and all Things propagated by Seed. But yet, I 
think, we may say, the sorting of them under Names, is the Workmanship of the 
Understanding, taking occasion from the similitude it observes amongst them, to make 
abstract general Ideas, and set them up in the mind, with Names annexed to them, 
as Patterns, or Forms, (for in that sence the word Form has a very proper 
signification,) to which, as particular Things existing are found to agree, so they 
come to be of that Species, have that Denomination, or are put into that Classis. 
(Locke 1975: 415) 
Locke responds to the taxonomist that there are indeed similarities in nature, some of 
which are very remarkable, but denies that this is evidence for the existence of species 
essences. His reasons for this are spread out over several chapters, but I will focus here 
on those arguments which challenge the biological evidence for species essentialism. 
The first challenge Locke issues is against the belief that the similarity between a parent 
and a child suggests a shared essence somehow responsible for that similarity: 
Concerning the real Essences of corporeal Substances, (to mention those only,) 
there are, if I mistake not, two Opinions. The one is if those, who using the Word 
Essence, for they know not what, suppose a certain number of those Essences, 
according to which, all natural things are made, and wherein they do exactly every 
one of them partake, and so become of this or that Species. The other, and more 
rational Opinion, is of those, who look on all natural Things to have a real, but 
unknown Constitution of their insensible Parts, from which flow those sensible 
Qualities, which serve us to distinguish them from one another, according as we 
have Occasion to rank them into sorts, under common Denominations. The former 
of these Opinions, which supposes these Essences, as a certain number of Forms or 
Molds, wherein all natural Things, that exist, are cast, and do equally partake, has, I 
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imagine, very much perplexed the Knowledge of natural Things. The frequent 
Productions of Monsters, in all the Species of Animals, and of Changelings, and 
other strange Issues of humane Birth, carry with them difficulties, not possible to 
consist with this Hypothesis: Since it is as impossible, that two Things, partaking 
exactly of the same real Essence, should have different Properties, as that two 
Figures partaking in the same real Essence  of a Circle, should have different 
Properties. (Locke 1975: 418) 
Locke’s move here is original in the sense that he takes traditional essentialism as a 
hypothesis which can then either square with, or be contradicted by, the phenomena. 
The hypothesis is that the species-similarity between parent and child is due to their 
both having the same species-essence. Locke invokes teratogeny as an empirical 
refutation of this hypothesis, for he takes birth defects to reveal that the child does not 
always maintain the species of the parent. Thus, he decides that is better to speak only 
of the individual essences constituted by the corpuscularian structure of a thing, and 
the possible similarities between these corpuscularian structures. In the next paragraph 
(1975: 419), he also cites nutrition as counter-evidence, since the materials of a creature 
of one species can be converted into that of another. This is problematic, Locke 
suggests, if species are indeed fixed and maintained.  
These two arguments are directed at the idea that species are real because they 
explain the stability of these similarities. Together, they show that no such stability 
exists in nature. In a later chapter, Locke also adds an argument against the idea that 
species explain the clear grouping of natural entities (specifically animals and plants) by 
challenging the existence of such a clear grouping: 
in all the visible corporeal World, we see no Chasms, or Gaps. All quite down from 
us, the descent is by easy steps, and a continued series of Things, that in each 
remove, differ very little one from the other. There are Fishes that have Wings, 
and are not Strangers to the airy Region: and there are some Birds, that are 
Inhabitants of the Water; whose Blood is cold as Fishes, and their Flesh so like in 
taste, that the scrupulous are allowed them on Fish-days. There are Animals so 
near of kin both to Birds and Beasts, that they are in the middle between both: 
Amphibious Animals link the Terrestrial and Aquatique together; Seals live at 
Land and at Sea, and Porpoises have the warm Blood and Entrails of a Hog, not to 
mention what is confidently reported of Mermaids, or Sea-men. There are some 
Brutes, that seem to have as much Knowledge and Reason, as some that are called 
Men: and the Animal and Vegetable Kingdoms, are so nearly join’d, that if you will 
take the lowest of one, and the highest of the other, there will scarce be perceived 
any great difference between them; and so on till we come to the lowest and most 
inorganical parts of matter, we shall find everywhere, that the several species are 
linked together, and differ but in almost insensible degrees. (Locke 1975: 446-447) 
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Locke invokes the idea of the Great Chain of Being, famously traced through the history 
of Western thought by Arthur Lovejoy (1966), according to which there are no gaps 
between the various beings in the world, because all entities form a chain of beings, 
ordered from the highest to the lowest. Here, Locke presents it as an empirical fact that 
frustrates all attempts to find clear general groupings according to taxonomical classes, 
and even a distinction between the living and the non-living itself. Furthermore, he 
insists that the distance between two adjacent links in the great chain are almost 
insensible. The result is a picture of nature as so diverse and so rich in forms that no 
rational system can neatly order it.  
This line of thought in Locke became enormously influential in the Enlightenment. 
For many Enlightenment philosophes¸ the Essay revealed that our rationality or 
understanding is rather poor in its capacity, only being able to regurgitate received 
knowledge and dwell in a cycle of tautologies. Moreover, the systematic tendency of 
human rationality was a curse rather than a blessing, for in its hope to find nature 
mirror its own workings, it substitutes an impoverished, neat nature for the opulent 
though disorderly one that we know from our empirical inquiries. Denis Diderot 
phrased this idea as follows: 
When we come to compare the infinite multitude of phenomena of nature with 
the limits of our understanding and the weakness of our organs, can we ever 
expect anything from the sluggishness of our labours, of their long and frequent 
interruptions, of the rarity of creative geniuses, than some shattered and 
scattered pieces of the great chain that links all things? (Diderot 1994: 562; my 
translation) 
Diderot’s friend and sometime collaborator Jean le Rond D’Alembert expressed a similar 
sentiment with regard to the lack of systematicity in natural products: 
Of the truths that we have called isolated and floating, and that attach or do not 
seem to attach to any other, neither as consequence nor as principle, it is only in 
physics, and specifically in natural history that we can find examples. They consist 
above all in certain facts that experience discovers to us, and that seem, contrary 
to our expectations, to have no analogy at all with the facts that we constantly 
observe in the same species. For example, the sensitive quality in certain plants, 
or at least the apparent effects of this sensitive quality, a property that seems 
denied to all other plants, and limited almost uniquely to animated beings ; the 
multiplication of some animals without intercourse ; the reproduction of the legs 
of  crayfish after they have been cut off ; the skill with which some animals, even 
some insects, seem gifted more than others; in a word, the peculiar properties that 
we observe in another genus of physical beings, and that seem contrary to those 
of other beings of the same genus. We can therefore define the isolated truths of 
which I am speaking here as particular truths that form, or seem to form, 
exceptions to general truths. (D’Alembert 1821: 135-137; my translation) 
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Like Locke, D’Alembert specifically singles out phenomena from the life sciences in 
order to reveal the vanity of our usage of general principles. Specifically, he shows that 
the phenomena of life at least appear to disobey the rigid taxonomical boundaries we 
construct. This blurring of kinds and sorts led Buffon to an anti-systematic approach to 
natural history, an approach with which Kant was intimately acquainted: 
Since, without keeping ourselves to superficial knowledge the results of which can 
give us only incomplete ideas of the products and workings of nature, we want to 
penetrate deeper, and investigate with eyes that are at their most attentive to the 
form and the behaviour of her works, we are also surprised by the variety of 
design, as by the multiplicity of the manners of execution. The number of works of 
nature, although enormous, is responsible for only the smallest fraction of our 
astonishment; its mechanics, its art, its resources, even its disorders, merit our 
entire admiration. Too small for this immensity, overwhelmed by the number of 
wonders, the human spirit succumbs. It seems as if all that can be, is. The hand of 
the creator does not seem to have opened in order to give life to only a certain 
number of species; rather, he seems to have cast all at once a world of beings that 
are related and non-related, an infinity of combinations both harmonious and 
contrary, and a constancy of destructions and renewals. Such Idea of power this 
spectacle offers us! Such feeling of respect for our author this view of the universe 
inspires! What would happen if the feeble light that guides us would become clear 
enough to allow us to perceive the general order of things and the dependance of 
effects? But the vastest of spirits, the most powerful of geniuses would never 
elevate itself to such a height of knowledge: the first causes will remain for ever 
hidden to us, and the general results of these causes will be as difficult for us to 
know as the causes themselves. All that is possible for is, is to perceive some 
particular effects, compare them, combine them, and finally recognize an order 
that is more relative to our own nature, than proper to the existence of the things 
we are considering. (Buffon 1749a: 11-12; my translation) 
At the zenith of Enlightenment philosophie in France, the idea that we will find in the 
world a structure that matches the cognitive faculties and demands, that does not 
constantly frustrate our attempts at understanding, and that can be measured by any 
remotely human standard of rationality, is completely absent. Focusing on the general, 
on the unity and on the systematicity of the universe will only bring us so much more 
sophistry and illusion. Instead, we are admonished to focus on the particularities in 
nature rather than its generalities, to train our eyes for detail rather than for outline, 
and to allow for disorder rather than demand order at any cost. This Age of 
Enlightenment was not so much the Age of Reason as the age of Reason’s self-
deprecation and self-castigation. In praising the humility of Locke’s powers of the mind, 
the elusiveness of Newton’s metaphysical commitment and the erudite ignorance of 
Bayle’s Encyclopedism, the philosophes saw shadows where until only recently the 
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natural light of human understanding had shone bright, shadows they believed were 
cast by the flickering of this light itself. 
5.2.3 The Spirit of Systems on the Defense 
Although Locke’s opinion would carry much authority on the European continent in the 
first half of the 18th century, it did not go unchallenged either. One of the most 
important challenges came from Leibniz, who attacked Locke’s defamation of 
systematicity in his Nouveaux Essays. Leibniz’s riposte is interesting because it is not 
merely a stubborn defense of systematicity against Locke’s assumptions. In fact, the 
problem was a real one even internal to Leibniz’s own system, for he shared Locke’s 
focus on particular or individual essences and his insistence on the great chain of being 
and its concomitant idea of the plenitude of forms. This makes Leibniz’s response all the 
more interesting, for it is an attempt to deal with the issue within the scope of a new 
philosophical atmosphere rather than an outright dismissal of newfangled systems. In 
this subsection, I will first discuss how Leibniz responds to the charge that there can be 
no generalities in nature because only particulars exist. Then, I will show how Leibniz is 
committed to the existence of a plenitude of logical forms. Finally, I will present Leibniz’ 
solution to the problem through his optimism. 
Logic was always a major interest of Leibniz’, so much so that the two authors who 
arguably constitute the starting point of most 20th century Leibniz-scholarship, namely 
Bertrand Russell (1996) and Louis Couturat (1901) argued that it forms the basis and the 
key to his entire philosophy. While this claim has lost its attractiveness in light of the 
many studies into the relevance of other aspects of Leibniz’s thought for his general 
philosophy (such as, but not exclusively, his physics, metaphysics, theology and 
biology), it has spawned serious inquiry into Leibniz’s logic. One of the results of these 
investigative efforts is that we can no longer naively assume that logic remained 
unchanged between Aristotle and Frege. Another is that we have slowly acquired a 
better insight into what exactly sets Ancient logic apart from Modern (postfregean) 
logic. An important distinction is that Modern logic is concerned with propositions, 
where Ancient logic is concerned with concepts. The logically relevant components of a 
syllogism are not the propositions, but the terms related through the structure of the 
propositions and of the syllogism. A related distinction is that Modern logic is usually, 
and according to many ideally, extensional, whereas Ancient logic is intensional. Thus, 
Ancient logic is concerned with the modal relations between concepts rather than with 
the truth values of propositions or the set-theoretic relations between the extensions of 
concepts. 
Like most Ancient logics, Leibniz’s logic is concerned with the conceptual inclusion 
relation, i.e. with the specific entailment relation obtaining between the intensions of 
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concepts. Parkinson (1965: 14-15) has suggested that the key to understanding Leibniz’s 
account of conceptual inclusion is his doctrine of an “alphabet of human thoughts”. This 
doctrine is that all concepts ultimately consist of a combination of primitive and simple 
concepts. I believe that these simple concepts are what Leibniz elsewhere calls 
“perfections”6, defined as follows: “I call a perfection every simple quality which is 
positive and absolute, that is to say that expresses whatever it expresses without limits 
whatsoever” (G VII: 261; my translation). From this definition, several things follow: 
first, no perfection entails another, since no perfection entails anything but itself; and 
second, no two perfections contradict each other, since all perfections are positive. 
Hence, we can define every concept intensionally through the list of perfections that it 
contains.  
There is a non-negligeable relation between Locke’s and Leibniz’s respective accounts 
of the semantics behind their logic. Both reject the idea that there needs to be a specific 
order to the listing of the different perfections. This contrasts with the older 
hierarchical system which insisted on defining a concept through its immediately 
superordinate genus and a specific difference. Leibniz seems to agree with Locke that 
the idea of a specific difference as a somehow privileged or more proper predicate is 
unnecessary.7 Whereas Locke defines concepts as abstract ideas consisting of a number 
of simple ideas, however, Leibniz defines them as intensions consisting of a number of 
simple concepts. This contrast both stresses the fundamental agreements and the 
fundamental disagreements between the two accounts. 
The next step of Leibniz’s logic to consider is his distinction between abstract and 
concrete concepts. In the New Essays, he gives his position in response to Locke’s claim 
that abstract ideas are formed by abstracting from certain ideas contained in an idea of 
a particular: 
I do not deny that abstractions are used in that way, but it involves an ascent from 
species to genera rather than from individuals to species. You see, paradoxical as 
it may seem, it is impossible for us to know individuals or to find any way of 
precisely determining the individuality of any thing except by keeping hold of the 
thing itself. For any set of circumstances could recur, with tiny differences which 
we would not take in; and place and time, far from being determinants by 
themselves, must themselves be determined by the things they contain. The most 
 
                                                     
6
 There may be some objections against the identification of perfections and simple concepts. I believe that 
whereever the two concepts don’t seem to fully coincide, this is due to the fact that Leibniz is trying to have 
them do double duty as simple concepts and as divine attributes. In fact, Leibniz’ stipulations work only for 
logical atoms, and not for divine attributes, which do not seem simple at all.  
7
 Leibniz says, for instance, in the New Essays (G V: 270: Leibniz 1996: 291-292), that genus and differentia can 
often be switched (Cf. also Parkinson 1965: 15). 
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important point in this is that individuality involves infinity, and only someone 
who is capable of grasping the infinite could know the principle of individuation 
of a given thing. This arises from the influence – properly understood – that all 
the things in the universe have on one another. (G V: 270; Leibniz 1996: 289-290) 
In this passage, Leibniz is criticizing Locke for thinking that we are ever in the 
possession of a complete concept of an individual, for a complete concept would be one 
which would allow us to grasp it and only it, in the way in which a Russellian definite 
description is supposed to do. According to Leibniz, we are only capable of individuating 
objects through demonstrative identification, because an individuating concept would 
be infinite in intension. This is of course due to his theory of individuation, which 
entails that from the essence or concept of an individual follow all seemingly contingent 
facts about it and about the world in which it exists. But I believe there is another 
reason: in order to have a complete concept of an individual, we would have to know of 
every perfection whether it is contained in the concept or not. Now, Leibniz arguably 
believed that there are an infinite number of perfections (Cf. Adams 1994: 148). Hence, a 
complete concept would either deny or affirm every perfection of the subject. An 
incomplete concept, however, can be finite, and hence can be grasped and used 
adequately by finite cognizers. Its downpart is, however, that through it we think a 
number of things, and the less complete our concept is, i.e. the less perfections it either 
affirms or denies of the subject, the less precise it is in scope, i.e. the more objects are 
thought under it. 
An at first sight peculiar feature of Leibniz’s criticism of Locke in the New Essays is 
that he agrees with the latter that there are only particulars, and that there are no such 
ontologically distinct things as universals. It would seem as if this commits him to 
nominalism. But Leibniz in fact argues that this does not follow, since Locke admits that 
our generalizations have some root in reality, namely the patterns of resemblances 
between different particulars. Leibniz agrees with this, saying that “generality consists 
in the resemblance of singular things to one another, and this resemblance is a reality” 
(G V: 271; 1996: 292), and then inquires, somewhat rhetorically, of Locke’s spokesperson: 
“Then why not look for the essence of genera and species there too?” Leibniz seems to 
say that there is no need to accept the ontological existence of universals to admit that 
general concepts correspond with something in nature, for they may simply consist in 
the patterns of similarity that Locke believes to exist as well. This seems to allow for an 
intermediate position between nominalism and realism, which insists that universals 
are real without admitting that they are distinct ontological entities.  
But this solution still lacks something, for the universals the existence of which Locke 
denies are not just factual patterns of similarity between existing particulars, but have 
some kind of modal import. That is to say, these generalities do not say anything about 
possibilities. This is not a problem for Leibniz, however, since he is not limited to 
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considering only actual objects. His solution to this is rooted in his conception of God. 
According to Leibniz,  
all truths that concern possibles or essences and the impossibility of a thing or its 
necessity (that is, the impossibility of its contrary) rest on the principle of 
contradiction; all truths concerning contingent things or the existence of things, 
rest on the principle of perfection. Except for the existence of God alone, all 
existences are contingent. Moreover, the reason why some particular contingent 
thing exists, rather than others, should not be sought in its definition alone, but in 
a comparison with other things. For, since there are an infinity of possible things 
which, nevertheless, do not exist, the reason why these exist rather than those 
should not be sought in their definition (for the nonexistence would imply a 
contradiction, and those others would not be possible, contrary to our 
hypothesis), but from an extrinsic source, namely, from the fact that the ones that 
do exist are more perfect than the others. (Leibniz 1989: 19) 
In this passage, Leibniz is making a distinction between the possible and the actual. All 
entities whose concepts do not involve a contradiction are possible, but not all of them 
really exist. Only some possibles are actualized, not all. This means that Leibniz could 
strictly speaking say that the modal overtones of universals rest on the considerations 
of the similarity relations between all possible objects, and not just all actual objects. But 
this raises the issue of the status of these non-actual possible objects: in what sense can 
their essences come under consideration at all? Leibniz responds to this in the 
Monadology: “God’s understanding is the realm of eternal truths or that of the ideas in 
which they depend; without him there would be nothing real in possibles, and not only 
would nothing exist, but also nothing would be possible” (G VI: 614; Leibniz 1989: 218). 
Thus, whereas actuals exist somehow8 outside of the mind of God, possibles exist only in 
the mind of God. Theologically, it thus seems that actuality depends upon the divine 
attribute of omnipotence, whereas possibility depends upon divine omniscience.  
In this way, Leibniz can show that both similarities between actual individuals and 
between possible individuals can be taken into consideration, and the latter give us the 
modal aspects of the universals. In the mind of God, which is the realm of logical 
intension, all possible objects are represented (all there essences are included in it). And 
it is here where Leibniz locates the Law of Continuity in logic: the possibles together 
form a continuous series of objects, each differing from the next only infinitesimally. I 
 
                                                     
8
 I insert this admission of vagueness here because it is not clear to commentators exactly in which sense 
actuals exist independently of the Mind of God. This is because despite, Leibniz’s constant polemicizing 
against Spinozism, it is at times unclear exactly how his position avoids collapse into Spinozism. I have no 
intention to enter that thorny debate here. 
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will here give a brief sketch of an argument which would have entitled Leibniz to this 
conclusion, but which was probably no more than somehow suspected by him. 
First, we need to get clear on one of the implications of Leibniz’s concept of a God. 
According to Leibniz, God is the ens realissimum, which implies that he has all the 
perfections. Leibniz tried to argue that the concept of an ens realissimum is consistent 
because no two perfections can contradict each other (since they are all positive and do 
not imply anything else). If we accept the reading that identifies the perfections with 
the simple predicates, it results that God has all of the infinite number of perfections, 
whereas each finite entity somehow lacks a perfection. Leibniz also argues that the 
perfections had by finite entities are derived from God: God is somehow the ground and 
the reserve of all possible predicates, and all finite beings are somehow privations of 
divinity.  
If we accept that there is an infinite number of perfections, and that each perfection 
is either affirmed or denied, we can characterize the concept of each possible object 
through a series of 1s and 0s, where each place in the series represents a perfection, a 1 
represents the affirmation of that perfection, and a 0 the privation of that perfection. 
God would be characterized by an infinite series of 1s, and nothing by an infinite series 
of 0s. Now we can prove that the series of possible objects is continuous. Assume an 
infinite list of possible combinations of 1s and 0s. According to Leibniz, each of those 
combinations yields a possible object (it is a complete concept, and no combination can 
result in a contradiction): 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 … 
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 … 
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 … 
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 … 
.         
.         
.         
 
We can now use Cantor’s (1892) diagonal method to prove that this series of possible 
forms is of a cardinality greater than that of the series of natural numbers, and, on the 
condition that we accept the continuum hypothesis, that it has at least the cardinality of 
the continuum).9 
 
                                                     
9
 This means taking the first number of the first member of the list and switching from 1 to 0 or from 0 to 1, 
the second from the second member and switching from 1 to 0 or from 0 to 1, etc. The result will be an infinite 
series of 1s and 0s which represents a possible complete concept, but differs in at least 1 perfection from any 
other member of the list. Upon adding the resultant to the infinite series, we can again use the diagonal 
method to generate a new possible complete concept not already in the list, and can do so ad infinitum. 
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Now all of this is hypothetical, for first of all it is not clear whether Leibniz in fact 
believed that perfections work in the way assumed above, and it is all but certain that 
he did not anticipate Cantor’s proof. But the fact that one of the central principles of 
Leibniz’s metaphysics and Logic, namely the Law of the continuity of forms, follows 
directly from this position that he arguably had, of course adds some plausibility to the 
interpretation; for even if Leibniz was not well placed to prove that this series would be 
continuous, he could have easily suspected it. 
We can now turn to Leibniz’s answer to Locke’s criticism of the idea of systematicity 
in nature. As could be expected from the comments above, this solution is that while the 
series of all possible objects constitutes a continuous series, the series of all actual objects 
contains discontinuities: 
Able philosophers have addressed themselves to this question of whether there is 
a vacuum among forms, that is, whether there are possible species which do not 
actually exist, so that nature might seem to have overlooked them. I have reasons 
for believing that not all possible species are compossible in the universe, great as 
it is; not only with regard to things existing at the same time, but also with regard 
to the whole succession of things. My view, in other words, is that there must be 
species which never did and never will exist, since they are compatible with that 
succession of creatures God has chosen. But I believe that the universe contains 
everything that its perfect harmony could admit. (G V: 286; Leibniz 1996: 307) 
This passage has a clear ring of irony to it: we find Leibniz, one of the great champions 
of the principle of continuity, whose dynamics was largely based on this principle, 
having to constrain it in order to guarantee the systematicity of the universe. In fact, 
this passage supports Nicholas Rescher’s point that Leibniz’s harmony is a real trade-off 
between maximal unity and maximal diversity:  
One immediately striking feature of the Leibnizian standard of metaphysical 
perfection in terms of orderliness and variety is that this is a conflict-admitting two-
factor criterion, and, as such, contrasts sharply with the long series of monolithic 
summum bonum theories that have so generally been in vogue in ethics – both 
before the time of Leibniz and afterwards, down to our own day. (Rescher 1981: 
10)  
Rescher’s point is that God selects the best of all possible worlds not by means of a single 
hierarchy of goodness, but by a trade-off between a variety of conflicting desiderata. In 
this case, God is supposed to have balanced both the variety contained in the universe 
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with the unity or systematicity it exhibits.10 This mirrors a trade-off between two of the 
divine attributes. In the passage quoted in 5.2.2, Buffon praised the incomprehensible 
variety of the universe as a sign of God’s omnipotence. For Leibniz, this discredits God’s 
omniscience, i.e. his supreme rationality. As supremely rational, God is not content to 
create a variety which frustrates all rational structure and coherency. If he is thereby 
limited in his creative capacity, it is of course only a limitation internal to his own 
nature and indicative of his volition. 
In this way, Leibniz vindicates rationality by vindicating systematicity. The 
philosophes believed that our understanding and our rationality are poor instruments for 
grasping nature. Leibniz responds not by simply defending rationality’s claims to 
hegemony, but by showing that, although an irrational world is possible, the actual world 
is selected at least partly for its rational structure. Of course, this does not give us a safe-
conduct for projecting our current systems of knowledge onto the world, but it does 
warrant us to believe that, whatever the world may be like, it is rational in structure and 
hence comprehensible by our rational capacities. 
5.3 The Disunity of Reason in the Critique of Pure Reason 
5.3.1 Logical Systematicity 
One of Kant’s most peculiar claims in the Appendix to the Critique of Pure Reason is that 
the demand for systematic unity is a logical one. The claim is peculiar because it is not 
clear how these laws are logical ones – which is why Walsh (1975: 244) suggested that 
this claim bears witness to Kant’s failure to distinguish between logic and methodology. 
The reasoning behind these objections is easily recognized: as logical principles, the 
maxims of reasons would indeed have the necessity Kant confers upon them, but is 
difficult to see how they are logical laws rather than mere methodological tools. In this 
subsection, I will argue that given Kant’s own post-Leibnizian intensional logic, there is 
a good reason to assume that these principles are indeed logical ones. 
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 Rescher’s position has been sharply criticized as an interpretation of Leibniz (e.g. Rutherford 1996), but I 
believe there are good reasons to assume that a reader like Kant, being aware of the aftermath of these 
arguments, would be sensitive to the conflict-admitting nature of the parameters of diversity and unity. In 
fact, I will argue, in sections 5.3 and 5.4, that Kant explicitly charged Leibniz with the disingenuousness of his 
own balance between the two unities. 
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The first clue Kant gives us is his thesis that, whereas the function of understanding 
somehow corresponds with judgment, that of reason corresponds with syllogism (CPR A 
330 / B 386. This idea is a puzzle to any initial reading of the Critique of Pure Reason. Not 
only is it unclear how exactly reason is linked to syllogism, and how syllogism would 
lead to the idea of the unconditioned, it is unattractive to ally the function of reason this 
closely to a by now unattractive piece of Aristotelian logic. 
 The problem with this appraisal is that it misses the extent to which Kant changed 
the notion of a syllogism and its meaning for philosophy. In many cases where he seems 
to be talking about inferential rules, he is in fact attempting to characterize the 
principles behind reasoning through concepts alone, without the bearing of these 
concepts on reality, be it metaphysical or empirical. This is already apparent in a paper 
from the early 1760s, in which Kant argued that logicians had traditionally exaggerated 
the “subtlety” of the syllogistic figures, and argued against Aristotle that there was only 
one principle of the syllogism. Instead of listing correct and incorrect, reducible and 
irreducible syllogistic figures, Kant offered two general rules: 
the first general rule of all affirmative syllogisms is this: A characteristic mark of a 
characteristic mark is a characteristic mark of the thing itself […]. And the first 
general rule of all negative syllogisms is this: that which contradicts mark of a 
thing, contradicts the thing itself. (AA II: 49) 
These principles amount to the following idea: the idea of conceptual inclusion is 
transitive, i.e. a concept contained in a concept contained in the definition of a thing is 
also contained in the definition of that thing. This means that in order to fully explicate 
a concept, we need to list all the concepts contained in it, not just immediately, but also 
mediately. Only then do we adequately grasp what a concept entails and what it 
excludes. The semantic rule on which the validity of syllogistic reasoning is based 
therefore entails that we have a grasp of the concepts we employ only when we have 
determined their inferential roles completely. In light of the discussion of 5.2.1, Kant’s 
point here becomes clear, for he is stating that the concept of a syllogism is intimately 
bound up with the semantics behind Aristotelian logic, which is a semantics of a 
hierarchy of concepts related through the sui generis relation of conceptual inclusion. 
In this respect, Kant is explicitating what was already at work in German rationalism, of 
which a late representative is Moses Mendelssohn, who in his 1785 Morgenstunden still 
wrote that all syllogistic reasoning depends on the correct analysis of concepts, and that 
this correct analysis is obtained by picturing the system of concepts as a tree, with the 
stem as the most general concept and the twigs as the most concrete concepts (2008-96). 
A second aspect of Kant’s theory points towards the principle of unity, namely that of 
the transcendental prototype. The transcendental prototype as an argument stems from 
an early attempt by Kant to offer a proof for the existence of God that bypassed his own 
famous objection that existence is not a predicate. In the 1763 treatise The Only Possible 
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Argument, Kant argued that the possibility of all things rested in the existence of a thing 
including, as a ground, all possible predicates (AA II: 78-79). I will not go into the details 
of the argument here, partly because I find the argument confused, and because Kant 
equally came to see it as confused. In fact, he came to believe that he was mistaken, in 
much the same way as Leibniz was, to attempt at deriving a proof of the existence of 
God from a logical requirement. As we saw in subsection 5.2.3., Leibniz believed that all 
perfections somehow reside in God, and that finite beings are to be understood as 
privations of God. In 1763, Kant adopted a similar argument, believing that it was in fact 
superior to the Anselman-Cartesian proof that Leibniz ultimately preferred. Kant’s 
argument starts from the idea that there has to be a real ground for possibility. This 
move is obviously Leibnizian, because Leibniz too thought that possibility needs to 
reside somewhere, namely in the intellect of God. Through a series of reflections, Kant 
arrives at the idea that the real ground of possibility is an ens realissimum: 
The data of all possibility must be found in the necessary being either as 
determinations of it, or as consequences which are given through the necessary 
being as the ultimate real ground. It is thus apparent that all reality is, in one way 
or another, embraced by the ultimate real ground. But precisely these 
determinations, in virtue of which this being is the ultimate ground of all possible 
reality, invest that being with the highest degree of all real properties which could 
ever inhere in a thing. Such a being is, therefore, the most real of all possible 
being, for all other beings are only possible through it alone. (AA II: 85) 
This passage sounds very similar to the Leibnizian picture of the ens realissimum as that 
which has all the perfections. But the similarity immediately turns out to be more 
superficial than we would expect, for Kant continues as follows: 
But this is not to be understood to mean that all possible reality is included among 
its determinations. This is a conceptual confusion which has been uncommonly 
prevalent until now. All realities are attributed indiscriminately as predicates to 
God or to the necessary being. That all these predicates can by no means co-exist 
together as determinations in a single subject is not noticed. The impenetrability 
of bodies, extension and such like, cannot be attributes of that which has 
understanding and will. Nor does it help if one seeks to evade the issue by 
maintaining that the quality in question is not regarded as true reality. The thrust 
of a body or the force of cohesion are, without doubt, something positive. 
Similarly, in the sensations of the mind, pain is never merely a deprivation. A 
confusion has seemingly justified such an idea. It is said: reality and reality never 
contradict each other, for both of them are true affirmations; as a consequence, 
they do not conflict with each other in  the subject either. Now although I concede 
that there is no logical contradiction here, the real repugnancy is not thereby 
cancelled. Such a real repugnancy always occurs when something, as a ground, 
annihilates by means of a real opposition the consequence of something else. The 
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motive force of a body in one direction and an equally strong tendency in the 
opposite direction do not contradict each other. They are also really possible in 
one body at the same time. However, one motive force annihilates the real 
consequences of the other motive force; and since the consequences of each 
motive force by itself would otherwise be a real movement, the consequence of 
both together in one subject is nought. That is to say, the consequence of these 
opposed motive forces is rest. But rest is, indubitably, possible. From this it is also 
apparent that real opposition is something quite different from logical opposition 
or contradiction, for the result of the latter is absolutely impossible. (AA II: 85-86) 
It is hard not to read this as a direct criticism of the Leibnizian interpretation of the 
argument, given what we have seen in 5.2.3. Leibniz argued that God had all the 
perfections as his properties or attributes, and that he could have all of them 
simultaneously because none of them can conflict with any other. Kant objects that all 
the properties can coexist in God as in a ground, but not as in a subject, i.e. not as 
properties of God, for two reasons. First of all, there are positive properties of other 
objects that cannot be properties of God, and secondly, and more importantly, whereas 
two realities cannot logically contradict each other, they can really cancel each other 
out.11 Here, we see an early form of Kant’s doctrine that we should distinguish between 
the logical possibility governing concepts and the real possibility governing objects. In 
the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant would eventually come to recognize that it is a 
philosophical category mistake to regard the ground of all possible predication as a 
possible object rather than as the horizon of the space of concepts: 
Every thing […], as to its possibility, further stands under the principle of 
thoroughgoing determination; according to which, among all possible predicates of 
things, insofar as they are compared with their opposites, one must apply to it. 
This does not rest merely on the principle of contradiction, for besides 
considering every thing in relation to two contradictorily conflicting predicates, it 
considers every thing further in relation to the whole of possibility, as the sum total 
of all predicates of things in general (CPR A 572 / B 600) 
Kant calls this sum total of all predicates an ideal of reason, which is a transcendental 
substratum. He clarifies its role in judgment as follows: 
Thus if the thoroughgoing determination in our reason is grounded on a 
transcendental substratum, which contains as it were the entire storehouse of 
material from which all possible predicates of things can be taken, then this 
substratum is nothing other then the idea of an All of reality (omnitudo realitatis). 
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 In 6.3.1, I will return to this argument about the distinction of the logical and the real. 
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All true negations are then nothing but limits, which they could not be called 
unless they were grounded in the unlimited (the All). (CPR A 575-576 / B 603-604) 
Determination of a concept or an object consists in denying a part of this whole of 
reality of something: 
the transcendental major premise for the thoroughgoing determination of all 
things, is none other than the representation of the sum total of all reality, a 
concept that comprehends all predicates as regards their transcendental content 
not merely under itself, but within itself; and the thoroughgoing determination of 
every thing rests on the limitation of this All of reality, in that some of it is 
ascribed to the thing and the rest excluded from it, which agrees with the 
“either/or” of the disjunctive major premise and the determination of the object 
through one of the members of this division in the minor premise. (CPR A 576-577 
/ B 604-605) 
Kant insists here that the concept of the omnitudo realitatis is not primarily to be 
understood as the highest concept under which every other concept is subsumed, but 
rather as a whole in which all marks or determinations are included. This idea is clearly 
related to the idea of God as the summum realitatis, i.e. as that which has all the positive 
predicates. Nevertheless, Kant immediately criticizes the conflation between this whole 
of reality with the concept of God as most perfect being. The transcendental prototype 
is an ideal that we must assume in order to hope to completely determine concepts. At 
no point, however, can we believe that we are in possession of this concept, and even 
less that we than have a concept of an object that is the real ground of the possibility of 
things. With this criticism, Kant is recuperating his original idea of the sum total of 
possibility, but repudiating his earlier conviction that this yielded a basis for a proof of 
the existence of God. 
In adopting this picture of the transcendental prototype, Kant is introducing a new 
metaphor for the relation obtaining between concepts, namely a spatial metaphor: 
One can regard every concept as a point, which, as the standpoint of an observer, 
has its horizon, i.e., a multiplicity of things that can be represented and surveyed, 
as it were, from it. Within this horizon a multiplicity of points must be able to be 
given to infinity, each of which in turn has its narrower field of view; i.e. every 
species contains subspecies in accordance with the principle of specification, and 
the logical horizon consists of only smaller horizons (subspecies), but not of 
points that have no domain (individuals). But different horizons, i.e., genera, 
which are determined from just as many concepts, one can think as drawn out 
into a common horizon, which one can survey collectively from its middle point, 
which is the higher genus, until finally the highest genus is the universal and true 
horizon, determined from the standpoint of the highest concept and 
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comprehending all manifoldness, as genera, species, and subspecies, under itself. 
(CPR A 658-659 / B 686-687) 
In this passage, Kant introduces an idea of logical space and suggests its analogy with 
the space of intuition. One of the reasons why the transcendental philosophy is so keen 
on asserting that space is a pure intuition and the form of outer intuition, is that it 
needs to be given before every spatial representation. Every space is conceived as a part 
of the one space, and hence relatable to any other part of space. Here, Kant argues that a 
similar situation occurs in logic: the reason why all our concepts can be brought to bear 
on each other is because they are all merely determinations of the one conceptual 
space. The logical principle of unity is precisely this: a concept is determined by its place 
in conceptual space, which means that it is determined by its relation to all other 
concepts. A concept that could not be related to other concepts, one that would be 
outside of conceptual space, could play no role in reasoning, and is hence not a concept 
at all. There are two other analogies between space and logical space: like space, logical 
space is not given in its totality, but rather as a horizon of all possibility, and like space, 
logical space is continuous, which offers a version of the law of continuity in logic. 
 What I have offered so far is the logical ground of unity, which comes down to 
Kant’s logical holism. Now I will offer an interpretation of why Kant held the law of 
specificity to be equally required, namely by showing that it arguably follows from his 
intensionalism in logic. Kant’s logic is determined by a central law that states that the 
intensions and the extensions are inversely related.12 This means that, as more things 
are thought under a concept, less characteristic marks are thought in the concepts. At 
first, this principle seems rather obvious: the less restrictions we place on the 
membership of a class, the more members that class can have. However, in his attempt 
to reappraise intensional logic after the logical revolution of Frege and Russell, Clarence 
Irving Lewis (1918: 322) criticized the validity of this purported relation between 
intension and extension. His main objection is that there are a variety of cases where 
the coextensiveness of two concepts does not imply their identity of meaning, i.e. where 
the expansion of the meaning of a concept does not entail a restriction of its extension. 
For example, take a world containing forty objects, of which twenty are red cubes and 
twenty are green orbs. In this world, the class of green things and the class of orbs 
would be coextensive. But this does not mean that green and orb have the same 
meaning.13 
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 This law is best articulated in Kant’s first proof for the fact that space is an intuition in the second edition 
version of the transcendental aesthetic (Cf. Allison 2004: 111). 
13
 According to Nelson Goodman, the nominalist needs to accept that, in this case, green and orb are simply 




 Lewis’ misgivings arise from a misunderstanding, however. When Leibniz and Kant 
speak of the extension of a concept, they mean by this its possible extension, not just in 
this reality, but in logic. Leibniz already argued against Locke that the modal claims we 
make about objects are not determined by the actual state of the world, but by the 
possibilities perceived in the mind of God. In Kant’s de-theologized version of the 
argument, it means that there is a difference between the logical extension and the real 
extension of a concept, whereby the former is merely an extensional projection of its 
intension, and the latter a statement about the actual objects of experience. Part of the 
criticism Kant voices against his predecessors is that they mistook logical extension for 
an ontological category.14 The significance of the law of specification in Kant’s logic is 
then the following: for every modal nuance we can make, there needs to be a concept 
that grasps this nuance perfectly, and a set of objects that sets it apart from all other 
concepts. This law is a consequence of endorsing a logic that is concerned with 
intensions rather than extensions. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
content at least partially differs. So far as individuals go, this is a truism; and any supposed exceptions, such as 
the case of two objects fashioned out of the same piece of clay at different times, clearly depend on the fallacy 
of ignoring the temporal or some other dimension. Further it is clear that two classes, however defined, are 
indistinguishable if they have the same members; classes are in a sense distinguished only by what is 
comprised within them. But the nominalist goes still a step further. If two distinct entities whatever have the 
same content, then a class (e.g. that of the counties of Utah) is different neither from the single individual (the 
whole state of Utah) that exactly contains its members nor from any other class (e.g. that of acres of Utah) 
whose members exactly exhaust this same whole. The Platonist may distinguish these entities by venturing 
into a new dimension of Pure Form, but the nominalist recognizes no distinction of entities without a 
distinction of content.” (Goodman 1977: 36) Goodman thus claims that there can be no difference in meaning 
between sets or concepts that are coextensive (I will bracket for now the more difficult claim that the class 
does not differ from the individual that is the mereological fusion of all the members of that class, partly 
because Goodman’s proposal to equate mereological parthood and memberhood is so problematic). In order to 
be able to say that, for instance, the state of Utah and the set of all the counties of Utah are not the same, we 
need to be able to say that some members of the set of the counties of Utah might not have been members of 
the state of Utah. For instance, some easternmost counties might through some legal peculiarity secede from 
the state of Utah and join the state of Colorado in order to be able to sell marijuana legally. In such a case, the 
set of all counties of Utah in the actual world and the set of all counties of Utah in the alternative 
(metaphysically, but not necessarily legally) possible world are not coextensive. Now, although it may be true 
at any world that the set of all counties of Utah and the set of all acres of Utah be coextensive, it is not true 
that the set of all counties of Utah is coextensive with the set of all acres of Utah across worlds. This shows us 
why extending from actual to possible extension allows us to express modal statements without recourse to 
extensions. However, this is precisely the move made by Leibniz, a move which installs a strict relation 
between intensions and extension such that they can be defined in terms of each other: the intensions can be 
defined in terms of the relations between possible objects, sets of objects or worlds, the relations between 
possible objects, sets of objects or worlds can be defined in terms of intensions. The distinction between 
Kripkean essentialism and Lewisian modal realism is partly a debate on which of these dual terms we take to 
be metaphysically more fundamental, and which as derived and reducible. 
14
 Cf. 6.3.1. 
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In this subsection, I have tried to show why Kant could have regarded his maxims to 
be logical principles, and in so doing, I have already briefly indicated why they cannot 
be taken as straightforwardly metaphysical. In the next subsection, I will turn my 
attention to the concept of systematic unity in the Appendix in order to show that, 
when taken constitutively, these two laws contradict each other. 
5.3.2 Transcendental Systematicity 
In identifying the maxims of reason with logical principles, Kant can achieve two major 
steps in his argument. Firstly, he can argue that these principles are more than merely 
pragmatic aids in the search for knowledge, since they are imposed by the nature of 
reason and its proper business itself. These aims and ideas are not ones that we can 
adopt and discard at will: they are dependent on the structure of our cognitive faculty. 
Secondly, Kant can take his cue from logic to identify the transcendental principles, and 
can argue that there is a systematicity to them. Throughout his work, he relies on 
certain schemes, derived from his architectonic, to make claims about the necessity, 
indispensability and completeness of certain principles and concepts. These structures 
often mirror either the fourfold division of the categories, or the threefold division of 
the three moments of a single category. Just like Kant had claimed in the Analytic that 
the categories are the schematized versions of the forms of logical judgment, Kant here 
claims that the principles and ideas of reason can be regarded as the schematized 
versions of the principles of logical reasoning. As a result, the three maxims form a triad 
of thesis, antithesis and synthesis: 
Reason thus prepares the field for the understanding 1. By a principle of sameness 
of kind in the manifold under higher genera, 2. By a principle of the variety of 
what is same in kind under lower species; and in order to complete the systematic 
unity it adds 3. Still another law of the affinity of all concepts, which offers a 
continuous transition from every species to every other through a graduated 
increase of varieties. We can call these the principles of the homogeneity, 
specification and continuity of forms. The last arises by uniting the first two, 
according as one has completed the systematic connection in the idea by 
ascending to higher genera, as well as descending to lower species; for then all 
manifolds are akin to one another, because they are all collectively descended, 
through every degree of extended determination from a single highest genus. (CPR 
A 657-658/ B 685-686) 
Readers have tempted to focus almost exclusively on the first of the three principles, 
which dictates unity and homogeneity. This is undoubtedly because it is rather easy for 
20th century readers to get an idea of what one would mean by a demand of unity 
through a Porphyry-tree of concepts. McFarland (1970: 20-21), for instance, does not 
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hesitate to read beyond what he sees Kant’s awkward outdated logic towards the idea of 
reduction and unification prescribed by a hypothetico-deductive theory of science. On 
such a reading, Kant means to say that, in our investigation of the variety of phenomena 
given to us in experience, we should aim at subsuming them under ever more general 
laws or theories, despite the fact that we can have no guarantee that nature itself 
exhibits such unity. As a result, Kant is read as defending a progressivist theory of 
science, according to which we see ourselves as gradually approaching the asymptote of 
a grand unifying theory. 
 There are problems with this reading, however, and concomitantly with the 
recuperation of Kant to save a central but now unpopular aspect of logical positivist 
philosophy of science: the ideal of theory reduction and the progressivism that 
accompanies it. I want to focus on two related problems. The first is that it suggests that 
variety is a given, and reduction is an aim. It is easy to see that this is unsatisfying as a 
theory, because, as many readers have noted, there is no reason to assume that variety 
cannot be reduced in principle: whether a reduction succeeds is really an empirical 
affair. This objection is understandable, but it targets this reading of Kant rather than 
Kant himself. Indeed, Kant stresses that the variety of which he speaks is not an 
empirical given, but a logical and transcendental demand: 
Also this law of specification cannot be borrowed from experience; for experience 
can make no such extensive disclosures. Empirical specification soon stops in 
distinguishing the manifold, unless through the already preceding transcendental 
law of specification as a principle of reason it is led to seek such disclosures and to 
keep on assuming them even when they do not immediately reveal themselves to 
the senses. (CPR A 657 / B 685) 
I take Kant’s meaning here to be the following: objects are given to us through concepts, 
and thought as objects through these concepts. For that reason, they are not given with 
their full, proper specificity. Throughout the Appendix, Kant denies that there are 
lowest species, i.e. concepts so specified that their extension necessarily comprises only 
one individual. Because we will never have the lowest species, we will forever need to 
think individuals through sortal terms, and thereby fail to grasp their individuating 
properties.15 Nevertheless, in order to get a conceptual grasp on individuality, we need 
to go on specifying our concepts such that the specificity of individuals can be given to 
thought. In this passage, Kant is making a transcendental claim out of Leibniz’s 
objection to Locke that we are never empirically presented with the full concept of an 
object: 
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 Cf. 6.3.1 for some alternative reasons why Kant took this to be the case. 
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Hence every genus requires different species, and these subspecies, and since 
none of the latter once again is ever without a sphere, (a domain as a conceptus 
communis), reason demands in its entire extension that no species be regarded as 
in itself the lowest; for since each species is always a concept that contains within 
itself only what is common to different things, this concept cannot be thoroughly 
determined, hence it cannot be related to an individual, consequently, it must at 
every time contain other concepts, i.e. subspecies, under itself. This law of 
specification could be expressed thus: entium varietates non temere esse minuendas 
(CPR A 655-656 / B 683-684) 
Here, Kant is attacking a version of the myth of the given that states that the fullness of 
the empirical can be presented to thought as such, and that our conceptual activity is 
therefore supposed to grasp this empirical richness. Against this, Kant claims that the 
empirical never appears on the conceptual level as such, and has no authority over it. 
What forces us to take empirical richness into account is not that this richness directly 
impinges on our thought, but rather that we are constantly driven, by an internal 
demand of reason, to further specify our concepts, such that ever more fineness of grain 
in our conceptual grasp of the empirical can be achieved. 
It is therefore wrong to read Kant as stating that we have a drive for unification that 
will be forever thwarted by the recalcitrance of experience. He is saying that the 
unrealizability of unification in the first sense is due to the fact that it is opposed by a 
second, conflicting maxim of reason, that of specification: 
To the logical principle of genera which postulates identity there is opposed 
another, namely that of species; which needs manifoldness and variety in things 
despite their agreement under the same genus, and prescribes to the 
understanding that it be no less attentive to variety than to agreement. This 
principle (of discrimination, or of the faculty of distinguishing) severely limits the 
rashness of the first principle (of wit); and here reason shows two interests that 
conflict with each other: on the one side, an interest in the domain (universality) 
in regard to genera, on the other an interest in content (determinacy) in respect 
of the manifoldness of species; for in the first case the understanding thinks much 
under its concepts, while in the latter it thinks all the more in them. (CPR A 654 - 
655 / B 682-683) 
Kant is thus explicit that the two principles do not clearly harmonize, and are in fact in 
conflict with each other. The reason for this is, as the conclusion of the quoted passage 
indicates, that in the realm of logic, extension and intension are inversely related, and 
that generality therefore usually comes at the expense of information.  
 Kant thus denies that we can realize the unity which we seek because this unity is 
an internally conflicting demand. The systematicity of reason has an antinomical 
structure: it is guided by two mutually restricting principles. This reading is further 
suggested by the following passage: 
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If merely regulative principles are considered as constitutive, then as objective 
principles, they can be in conflict; but if one considers them merely as maxims, 
then it is not a true conflict, but it is merely a different interest of reason that 
causes a divorce between ways of thinking. Reason has in fact only a single unified 
interest, and the conflict between its maxims is only a variation and a reciprocal 
limitation of the methods satisfying this interest. (CPR A 666 / B 694) 
This passage reveals that the single interest of reason, that of systematicity, invariably 
translates into conflicting methods and interests, and that for that reason it cannot be 
used as a constitutive idea. Interestingly, Kant goes on to indicate that the conflict of 
these principles has translated into two camps of natural philosophers, each stressing 
one of only two principles: 
There is nothing here but the twofold interest of reason, where each party takes 
to heart one interest or the other, or affects to do so, hence either the maxim of 
the manifoldness of nature or that of the unity of nature; these maxims can of 
course be united, but as long as they are held to be objective insights, they 
occasion not only conflict but also hindrances that delay the discovery of the 
truth, until a means is found of uniting the disputed interests and satisfying 
reason about them. (CPR A 667-668 / B 695-696) 
With my discussion from section 5.2. in mind, it is not hard to read Kant as addressing 
the high Enlightenment debate between proponents of the systematic approach, usually 
of a rationalist persuasion, and opponents of the spirit of systems, usually inspired by 
empiricist philosophies. Each party intends to do justice to one of the two demands of 
reason, but does so to the detriment of the other. Champions of unification gloss over 
the variety of nature, and make it ungraspable, whereas the panegyrists of variety lose 
hold of the intelligibility of the variety that they are witnessing. Furthermore, Kant 
realizes the central role played by the principle of continuity in this debate. He denies 
that we can claim that this continuity is an observed, empirical fact rather than a logical, 
transcendental or even metaphysical desideratum. Finally, the examples Kant uses 




5.4 The Disunity of Reason in the Critique of the Power of 
Judgment 
5.4.1 Reflective Judgment and its Principle 
In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant returns to the issue of the systematicity of 
knowledge already tackled in the Appendix. This raises the question of why he thought 
such a return was required, i.e. what failings in the original account he had identified in 
the meantime and how he sought to remediate them. According to many interpreters, 
Kant’s revision is due to his discovery of the problem of contingency. Here is how this 
thesis is put in one of the best and most recent studies on the topic: 
in the brief Appendix argument concerning the threat of diversity, Kant argues 
that only one of the regulative principles must hold of empirical nature, the 
principle of homogeneity. In the CJ, by contrast, immediately after Kant has 
presented the same threat of ‘‘infinite’’ empirical diversity (v:185), he glosses the 
principle of purposiveness, as it is to address this threat, as ‘‘the law of the 
specification of nature with regard to its empirical laws’’ (v:186), suggesting that 
all the regulative principles of systematicity, including those (specification and 
continuity) concerned with empirical diversity, are requisite for empirical 
knowledge, even of the most minimal kind. (Zuckert 2007: 44) 
As my discussion of section 5.3. reveals, this common assumption is false, for Kant does 
require the principle of specification in the Appendix, and he already acknowledges that 
there is a tension between homogeneity and specification. Whatever the change that 
occurred  between the first and the third Critique may be, it is not the discovery of a 
tension between the two principles. But then what can the additional discovery be? I 
would like to suggest that Kant had come to believe that his resolution of the antinomy 
of systematicity was insufficient. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant stated that no 
antinomy arose because the two principles are merely regulative, and not constitutive. 
But this is unsatisfactory in the same way that the initial solution to the antinomy of 
teleological judgment was unsatisfactory16, for we are still under possibly conflicting 
regulative demands. The Critique of the Power of Judgment is intended to overcome this 
additional difficulty and give us a principle for overcoming the conflict of the maxims of 
reason, namely the principle of purposiveness. 
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 Cf. Section 4.3.1. 
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In order to understand what the principle of purposiveness entails, we need to turn 
first to the formulation of the problem as it appears in the Introduction to the Critique of 
the Power of Judgment. Here, the problem is framed in terms of the contingency of the 
empirical laws with respect to the general order of nature required by the categories: 
For it may certainly be thought that, in spite of all the uniformity of things in 
nature in accordance with the universal laws, without which the form of an 
experiential cognition in general would not obtain at all, the specific diversity of 
the empirical laws of nature together with their effects could nevertheless be so 
great that it would be impossible for our understanding to discover in them an 
order that we can grasp, to divide its products into genera and species in order to 
use the principles for the explanation and the understanding of one for the 
explanation and comprehension of the other as well, and to make an 
interconnected experience out of material that is for us so confused (strictly 
speaking, only infinitely manifold and not fitted for our power of comprehension). 
(CJ AA V: 185) 
I take Kant to mean the following: The categories require that a certain coherence and 
unity is found in nature, which guarantees that causality obtains in it. But the fact that 
causal regularities obtain tells us nothing about what form these causal regularities will 
take. For all we know, some things or kinds of things, or all things or kinds of things, 
may exhibit causal features that cannot be related to other principles. For instance, it 
might turn out that a class of objects (which may be a unit class) behaves perfectly 
regularly and predictibly in different circumstances, but a very similar class of objects 
behaves wildly different. Thus, the regularities exhibited by the former class give us no 
ground for inquiry into the latter class, and more importantly, we are always at risk that 
a tiny overlooked difference between two cases might mean that wholly different causal 
laws apply there. In other words, the principle of causality only requires that there are 
causal regularities in the world, but it does not require that such causal regularities are 
themselves related in a regular and orderly manner. 
If we want to understand Kant’s reason for thinking that this threat is brought about 
by the demand of systematicity itself, we need to see how the relation of causal laws 
relates to the relation between concepts. After all, Kant usually speaks of the 
particularity and generality of empirical laws and the particularity and generality of 
laws intermittently. The connection between the two is no longer obvious for us, but it 
was for anyone reflecting on the difference between mechanical philosophy and school 
philosophy. Kant did not think of laws as generalized statements of the form “all x are 
p” that are then somehow injected with modal robustness. Instead, he probably thought 
about laws along more Aristotelian lines as conceptual inclusion between concepts, 
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yielding a law more like “x-ness implies p-ness”. Such a statement needs no modal 
injection, since it is already intensional rather than extensional.17 
Nevertheless, there are two major differences between how an Aristotelian and a 
mechanist would put these principles to work. For an Aristotelian, a substance has its 
specific causal powers by grace of being that specific kind of substance. Being of a 
different kind usually implies having different causal powers. For a mechanicist, the 
critique of substantial forms implies two things: 1) a good causal explanation is given in 
terms of very general causal properties shared by all things, not in terms of the causal 
properties specific to this kind of thing, and 2) the most general properties shared by all 
things in terms of which we need to explain causally are non-sortal. Let me explain this 
further by a Kantian example that I have already briefly tackled in 1.1.3. 
According to Kant, Newton improved upon Kepler by generalizing Kepler’s law. 
Kepler’s law states that all planets move in specific ways. In intensional terms, this 
implies that planethood implies a certain kind of behaviour, namely a specific 
movement pattern. Newton, however, shows that planets behave that way because all 
things with masses relate to each other in certain ways (through the law of gravitation). 
This law is not just a generalization, explaining why planets behave in a certain way 
because all material objects behave in a certain way; it also recasts the law from a 
statement in terms of sortals (planets, material objects…) in terms of a mass-term: mass. 
For Newton, according to Kant, planets behave in the way specified by Kepler’s law not 
because they are planets, nor because they are material objects, but because they have 
mass. Other such non-sortal concepts in terms of which a proper mechanicist 
explanation can be cast are extension or properties sharing extension’s peculiarity of 
being continuous and quantitative. 
This two-pronged reconceptualization of a proper causal principle explains why 
mechanicism incurred such problems with the issue of individuation. For an 
Aristotelian, the concepts in terms of which we can causally explain the behaviour of an 
entity are the same concepts that allow us to identify that entity as a specific (kind of) 
thing. For mechanicism, on the contrary, the causal principles in terms of which we can 
legitimately explain the behaviour of an entity should not be specific or individuating. 
For Kant, this problem was undoubtedly known at least because of the influence of 
Leibniz: after all, Leibniz complained that the mechanical philosophy required 
supplementation with some kind of substantial form to allow for individuation, or else 
collapse into Spinozism. 
We can understand how this  relates to Kant’s problem by reflecting on the following 
marginal note to the first, unpublished draft of the Critique of the Power of Judgment: 
 
                                                     
17
 Cf. footnote 18 and 19 of chapter 1 of this dissertation. 
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Could Linnaeus have hoped to outline a system of nature if he had had to worry 
that if he found a stone that he called granite, this might differ in its internal 
constitution from every other stone which nevertheless looked just like it, and all 
he could hope to find were always individual things, as it were isolated for the 
understanding, and never a class of them that could be brought under concepts of 
genus and species. (AA XX: 216) 
Several things are to be noted in this passage. First of all, it clearly reveals that the issue 
of classification is at stake. Second, Linnaeus’ problem would be exactly that signaled by 
Locke and his followers, like Buffon. Kant makes a distinction between the outward form 
and the inner constitution, which matches up with Locke’s distinction between nominal 
and real essence. The nominal essence of a thing is the way we identify or classify it on 
the basis of our perceptions on it: two things share a nominal essence when we find that 
they resemble each other in some important respect. Locke’s challenge to nominal 
essences is that we have no idea of telling whether the surface similarities we can 
perceive match up with the similarities between the inner structures of things. This 
inner structure is the mechanico-corpuscularian structure. Because of this possible gap, 
we need to be skeptical of our capacity to find the right similarities in nature, “right” 
here meaning: the similarities between the mechanically and causally relevant 
descriptions of things. 
This allows us to restate the problem. For Kant, the problem is not that of classifying 
things, but of classifying things according to their causally relevant properties. The 
problem is double, as is revealed by Locke and Buffon. First of all, we cannot know 
whether the properties according to which we classify a thing match up with the 
properties in terms of which we should causally explain the behaviour of these things. 
Secondly, however, we do not even know whether the causally explanatory properties 
of things themselves allow for some classification. With this statement of the problem, 
we can better understand Kant’s proposal for a solution in the form of a principle. 
There are several versions of this principle in Kant’s work. The first version in the 
published Introduction of the Critique of the Power of Judgment runs as follows: 
that since universal laws of nature have their ground in our understanding, which 
prescribes them to nature (although only in accordance with the universal 
concept of it as nature), the particular empirical laws, in regard to that which is 
left undetermined in them by the former, must be considered in terms of the sort 
of unity they would have if an understanding (even if not ours) had likewise given 
them for the sake of our faculty of cognition, in order to make possible a system of 
experience in accordance with particular laws of nature. Not as if in this way such 
an understanding must really be assumed (for it is only the reflecting power of 
judgment for which this idea serves as a principle, for reflecting, not for 
determining); rather this faculty thereby gives a law only to itself, and not to 
nature. (CJ AA V: 180) 
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This principle basically states that we should regard nature as if it is rationally 
structured, with “rational” here meaning “corresponding to the demands and capacities 
of our rationality”. In other words, it is the principle of the purposivity of the structure 
of nature for our cognitive capacities. Nevertheless, it is only to be assumed as a rule for 
inquiry, not as a determination of nature as an object or a structure. In itself this is 
rather vague, but the reconstruction of the context I offered in this subsection allows us 
to make it more substantial.  
I suggest that the principle of purposiveness of nature prescribes that the similarities 
and dissimilarities on the basis of which we form concepts ultimately match the 
similarities and dissimilarities between the causal properties of things. Another way to 
say this is that the principle precribes that things (causally) behave similarly to the 
extent that they are similar, and that they (causally) behave dissimilarly to the extent 
that they are dissimilar. This principle establishes a harmony between the generality 
and the specificity in the form of the genus-species distinction. Remember that a species 
is defined by a genus, namely the more general features it shares with other concepts, 
and a specific difference. This specific difference does not overrule the genus, but rather 
adds a further specificity. According to Kant, the principle of purposiveness is therefore 
that the specificity that does occur in nature does not overrule the general features of 
nature. 
This is precisely how the principle is formulated in the first Introduction to the 
Critique of the Power of Judgment: “Nature specifies its general laws into empirical ones, in 
accordance with the form of a logical system, in behalf of the power of judgment” (AA 
XX: 216). This formulation connects the doctrine more closely with that of the 
Appendix, because it demands that the conceptual structure of nature is isomorphous to 
that of logical space, and therefore conceivable: 
The logical form of a system consists merely in the division of given general 
concepts (of the sort which that of a nature in general is here), by means of which 
one thinks the particular (here the empirical) with its variety as contained under 
the general, in accordance with a certain principle. To this there belongs, if one 
proceeds empirically and ascends from the particular to the general, a 
classification of the manifold, i.e., a comparison with each other of several classes, 
each of which stands under a determinate concept, and, if they are complete with 
regard to the common characteristic, their subsumptionb under higher classes 
(genera), until one reaches the concept that contains the principle of the entire 
classification (and which constitutes the highest genus). If, on the contrary, one 
begins with the general concept, in order to descend to the particular through a 
complete division, then the action is called the specification of the manifold 
under a given concept, since the progression is from the highest genus to lower 
(subgenera or species) and from species to subspecies. This would be expressed 
more correctly if, instead of saying (as in common usage) that one must specify 
the particular which stands under a general concept, it were instead said that one 
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specifies the general concept by adducing the manifold under it. For the genus is 
(considered logically) as it were the matter, or the raw substratum, which nature 
works up into particular species and subspecies through various determinations, 
and thus it can be said, in analogy with the use of this word by jurists, when they 
speak of the specification of certain raw materials, that nature specifies itself in 
accordance with a certain principle (or the idea of a system). (AA XX: 215) 
Two things are remarkable about this passage. First of all, it explicitates the problem of 
the antinomy in the Appendix. There, the antinomy arose because the principles that 
can be taken to hold for the realm of concepts insofar as it forms the semantics of logic, 
cannot be straightforwardly applied to nature, for antinomies could result. Here, Kant 
specifies his solution: specificity and generality can only run counter to each other if 
they do not end up forming a neat system. If we assume that nature forms such a 
system, we can regard both the quest for specificity and the quest for generality as 
compatible. In a way, this was already the solution of the first critique, but there it 
offered no concrete guidance of how to go about investigating according to such a 
picture. Here, we get the advice to hold things to be similar to the extent that they are 
similar, and dissimilar to the extent that they are dissimilar. Without the principle of 
systematicity, all we could get is the advice of holding things to be similar that are 
similar and dissimilar that are dissimilar. The latter advice would forbid any concept 
that does not completely cover a particular, and as we have seen, Kant believes no 
concept can ever fully cover a particular. In other words, the principle of reflective 
judgment forms the basis and justification of reasoning through analogies, i.e. to take 
the similarities between things as clues for expecting and investigating other 
similarities between them. 
A second thing that is remarkable about the passage, and about the first introduction 
version of the principle, is that it is not phrased in the deistic terms of the published 
version. Here, the assumption is not that nature has been structured as a logical system 
by an understanding, but that nature structures itself as a logical system. Moreover, the 
metaphor Kant uses here is that of nature who herself species her matter, which is the 
general substratum, into specific forms. The attentive reader will recognize in this the 
picture of nature suggested by natural purposivenes, for there too Kant assumes natural 
purposes to be the entities that reveal the self-specifying, self-determining properties of 
the natural. There are two possible reasons why Kant may have left this out of his 
official introduction. The first is that this passage sounds profoundly atheist, since 
nature is conceived as herself having specifying, shaping powers, whereas in the official 
version she is conceived as systematically structured by an understanding. On such a 
reading, Kant may have been censoring himself in his official works. I believe this is only 
part of the story. As we have seen in subsection 4.3.3., Kant also resolves his antinomy of 
the teleological power of judgment by stating that nature might itself have the 
specifying properties required to engender natural purposes, but that we cannot 
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conceive of this given our cognitive limitations. As a result, we need to consider that 
specificity as intended and installed by a transcendent intentional agent. In the official 
introduction, Kant is stressing the latter aspect of the solution, whereas in the 
unpublished one he is stressing the former. This shift in focus may have been due to 
some degree of self-censorship, but the later position is not straightforwardly a 
retraction of the earlier. 
In the next subsection, I will further develop the connection between the critique of 
teleological judgment and the antinomy of systematicity. Before doing so, however, I 
need to stress, for the sake of my discussion of the connection between the antinomy of 
systematicity and the critique of the aesthetic power of judgment in chapter 7, that the 
solution should not be overestimated, for the fact that the power of judgment employs 
this principle does not in itself guarantee that it will always be satisfied. On the 
contrary, although the principle guides us in finding the systematicity in nature, it does 
not make nature automatically appear systematized: 
Now this transcendental concept of a purposiveness of nature is neither a concept 
of nature nor a concept of freedom, since it attributes nothing at all to the object 
(of nature), but rather only represents the unique way in which we must proceed 
in reflection on the objects of nature with the aim of a thoroughly interconnected 
experience, consequently it is a subjective principle (maxim) of the power of 
judgment; hence we are also delighted (strictly speaking, relieved of a need) when 
we encounter such a systematic unity among merely empirical laws, just as if it 
were a happy accident which happened to favor our aim, even though we 
necessarily had to assume that there is such a unity, yet without having been able 
to gain insight into it and to prove it. (AA V: 184) 
Thus, although this principle is posited, we do feel amazement and delight if it turns out 
to be fruitful because we nevertheless realize that it is in no way legislative for nature or 
experience. This means that we also sometimes incur a feeling of frustration when 
nature proves recalcitrant to systematization, i.e. when our efforts at conceptualization 
of the particular are opposed by irreducible specificity. In chapter 7, I will discuss these 
pure feelings of delight and frustration and their relevance for understanding Kant’s 
theory of constitution. Here, I would just like to signal some possible misunderstandings 
concerning the implication of this principle for Kant’s theory of science, namely that it 
would somehow nevertheless be reductionist, unificatory and progressivist. 
First of all, it does not follow from Kant’s image of the genus-species relation that his 
image of nature is reductive, since in Aristotle, its originator, it forms the basis of an 
anti-reductionist picture of science. After all, nothing precludes that the specific 
differences of nature are themselves not reducible to higher-order principles. 
Moreover, as I will argue in the next subsection, Kant regarded mechanicist theories as 




It makes more sense to think of the theory as unificatory, but here too there is an 
important difference between a reductive and a non-reductive version of unification. 
For a reductionist, there is a master science which is to form the backbone of 
unification, and which sets its conceptual standards as the standards of science in 
general. For a non-reductionist, the conceptual apparatus of the master science is just a 
scientific dialect with an army and a navy. In this picture, although the conceptual 
apparatus of one science is ultimately accountable to that of all others, there are no, or 
at least very little, preset rules of how differences are to be adjudicated. In a sense, 
unification requires that the concepts of all sciences need to be aligned to each other, 
and should not constitute insular idioms, but it does not require that all should speak a 
lingua franca, or that each idiom should simply renounce its specific expressive power. 
Finally, although Kant’s theory of science is importantly unificational, it should not 
be regarded as progressivist. To see this, I will show why three important possible 
readings of the progress of science in Kant cannot be upheld. First of all, one might 
think that Kant identifies the progress of science as finding ever more general genera 
and ever more specific species. But this is simply ludicrous, because it assumes that we 
have already stumbled upon adequate concepts, and all that is required is filling in the 
blanks in the conceptual system. On the contrary, we may reject whole systematizations 
because, upon closer examination, its concepts do not do justice to the similarities and 
dissimilarities they need to capture, i.e. prove to be inadequate.  
But this presents us with a second way in which science can progress, namely by 
yielding ever more adequate systems of concepts. This is surely the drive behind 
Kantian science, but the concept of adequacy should not be misinterpreted. First of all, 
Kant cannot be held to believe that a concept is adequate if it corresponds with a 
conceptual juncture in the real world. As a transcendental idealist, he has no such 
hypostasized, metaphysically independent concept of nature at his disposal to function 
as the standard of adequacy. One could say here that Kant is an empirical realist, but the 
precise meaning of this doctrine is exactly what is under discussion. The empirically 
real, after all, is the product of constitutive activity, and the world the horizon of 
empirical reality, not a definite given whole with which we are faced in science. Thus, 
for transcendental idealism there is no nature in the sense of a transcendent standard of 
adequacy for our concepts. 
Another transcendent standard can be imagined, namely the empirical. In this sense, 
science progresses as it finds ever more empirically adequate systems of concepts. But 
here we need to bear in mind that the empirical, for Kant, is only ever given through 
concepts. If this is true, then there is no concept-independent body of empirical data to 
which conceptual systems are held accountable. As our conceptual system changes, 
what is empirically given may change as well, since the empirical is now presented to 
the understanding by new concepts. In Kant’s picture of science, the empirical changes 
along with the conceptual. This means that the empirical does not form an independent 
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standard against which rivalling conceptual systems can be tested and confronted. What 
can happen is that a change in the conceptualization at one area, prompted by the 
search for specificity and/or generality within the framework of a system of concepts, 
can lead to disruptions and incoherences in that conceptual system, because the system 
of similarities and dissimilarities no longer aligns properly. When this occurs, the 
obstacle might be overcome by a reconceptualization that may remain local, or may 
overthrow the whole previous conceptual system. The resulting novel system can then 
be said to be superior only because it overcame an obstacle that the former could not 
overcome. In this sense, the “superare” of “superiority” is not the overcoming of the old 
theory, but the overcoming of the obstacles, the disruptions, the challenges spawned by 
activities within the horizon of previous conceptualizations. 
For Kant, I believe, adequacy is a property of the reciprocal alignment of concepts 
within a system, an alignment that is judged on the basis of whether it maintains the 
proportion of similarities and dissimilarities. Scientific investigation is the inquiry into 
the adequacy of conceptual systems to deal with these proportions. Although I cannot 
give that account here, I will offer the following conjecture on the correct 
interpretation of Kant’s theory of science: In science, we are interested in the adequacy 
of our conceptualizations. We test them by testing the alignment of similarities and 
dissimilarities. Newton does so by introducing a standard of judging the similar and the 
dissimilar in mechanics: the three laws jointly offer a framework of when we can speak 
of a difference or a change in motion (through absolute space, absolute time, and, most 
importantly, inertia). In experimentation, we set up our inquiry such that we receive an 
answer on what has remained stable and what has changed, what is similar and 
dissimilar. What is at stake here is not a “theory”, a “law”, a “principle”, but a concept, or 
rather how that concept relates to others. In sum, the standard of adequacy in science is 
a structural one. 
 
5.4.2 The Antinomy of the Teleological Power of Judgment and the 
Antinomy of Systematicity 
In this subsection, I will briefly revisit the antinomy of the teleological power of 
judgment in the light of the antinomy of systematicity. I will argue that the former 
antinomy is essentially a version of the latter, i.e. that the tension between 
mechanicism and teleology is a version of the tension between generality and 
specificity. In order to better grasp this, I will first return to a thesis from the 1763 Only 
Possible Argument with which I have already dealt in a different context, namely in 2.3.1, 
where I discussed the problem of mechanicism and teleology in Kant’s early reflections 
on embryology. There, Kant revealed the tension between two theses: the thesis that 
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the world is so constituted that the variety of its effects follows from a small set of 
general principles, and the thesis that certain effects of nature, namely, organisms, do 
not seem to be possible on the basis of but a small set of general principles. More 
concretely, he was picking up on the fact that the problem of living systems, and of 
generation in particular, was that it frustrated the mechanicist attempt to describe 
nature through a minimal set of general principles. In Kant’s own time, two answers to 
this question were very popular. 
The context of the discussion of mechanicism and teleology in the Only Possible 
Argument is the intention to show how the idea of a single intelligent creator can be 
relevant to our inquiries into nature. In 5.3.1, I briefly discussed Kant’s proof for the 
existence of God from the Only Possible Argument. This proof makes up only the first part 
of the text, whereas the bulk is dedicated to the relevance of this thesis to various 
philosophical issues. One such result is that it allows us to regard nature as strongly 
unified, which suggests a mechanicist worldview in terms of general laws. The irony is 
that Kant goes on to show that the unity of nature seems disproved by the structure of 
living things, which seem too contingent and specific to be naturally generated. In light 
of this statement of the problem, Kant can be read as refusing metamorphosis and 
preformation because the former ends up denying the specificity of life, thereby 
violating the principle of specification, and the latter ends up denying the unity of 
nature, making each living being due to a specific creative act, thereby violating the 
principle of homogeneity. He disagreed with the traditional assessment of the 
desirability of preformation, arguing that it maintained the austerity of mechanicism 
only through rendering a variety of entities incomprehensible on natural principles. 
Leibniz’s protestations that organisms were not supernaturally imposed because they 
were in nature from the beginning, is unconvincing because their natural inexplicability 
means that they are not truly integrated in nature. It seems that Kant learned from this 
discussion that accounting for life as natural does require you to violate your demand 
for austerity in principles. In reducing the number of natural principles, you are 
effectively losing a conceptual grasp over a wide variety of natural entities. Kant’s own 
solution is to refuse the mechanicist basis of the answer and suggest epigenesis, which 
ascribes to natural entities specific productive and self-formative principles. 
The very same logic seems to lie behind the antinomy of the teleological power of 
judgment. What is important about that antinomy is that it arises between two maxims, 
one being the thesis, the other the antithesis. In fact, an antinomy arises only because 
the two principles have the same standing as maxims of judgment. The antinomy would 
not arise if we were dealing with a demand for unity in explanation, embodied in the 
first maxim, and a set of phenomena recalcitrant to that maxim. As merely empirically 
given, organisms would not prompt us to restrain our desire for austerity. The antinomy 
arises only because we are led to regard organisms as not merely actually, but 
principally recalcitrant to mechanical explanation. However, they can only be 
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recognized as such if there is a maxim of reason demanding this. I submit, therefore, 
that the second maxim of the antinomy of teleological judgment is importantly related 
to the second maxim of systematicity, and that it is the demand for recognizing the 
specificity of living systems as natural purposes that constrains the principle of 
mechanical explanation. 
In the previous chapter, I stressed that what Kant found mechanically inexplicable 
about natural purposes is that they exhibit a specificity for which we cannot account 
with the general principles of mechanics alone. I have argued that such general 
principles not only lack specificity, they also characteristically cannot function as a 
basis for individuation. We have seen, however, that Kant thinks of natural purposes as 
intrinsically specific and self-specifying and even self-individuating. Given his analysis 
of the conceptual requirements and resources of mechanicism, Kant cannot but 
conclude that mechanicism fails in principle to account for the specificity of life. But 
since reason has both a drive to generalize and a drive to acknowledge specificity, 
neither principle can simply be abandoned. 
This also explains the connection with Kant’s analysis of the limitations of our 
cognitive capacities. He claims that we are led to this antinomy because we cannot think 
the particular except through the general (cf. 4.3.3.). This means that there is always a 
tension between our need to understand the particularity of the objects which we try to 
conceptualize, and the fact that we only ever grasp this particularity through a general 
concept, i.e. through the general. For Kant, this was a direct result of the fact that we 
are divided between sensibility and understanding, and do not have an intuitive 
understanding. 
5.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that Kant’s notion of systematicity was not uniquely one 
of unity and unification. On the contrary, the commitment to diversity is equally 
powerful and legitimate according to the critical philosophy. This, however, generates a 
tension, perhaps even an antinomy, between two possibly conflicting commitments. 
The Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic of the First Critique and the Third 
Critique as a whole present solutions to this problem. Still, there is a disunity in reason 
itself, a disunity which may give rise to conflicts, and which corresponds with another, 
namely that between sensibility and understanding: the two commitments of 
systematicity are commitments to the irreducible contributions of two distinct faculties 
of the Gemüt, namely sensibility, which is responsible for particularity, and 
understanding, which is responsible for generality. In the next chapter, I will try to 
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develop this connection between the antinomy at the heart of systematicity and the 




Chapter 6 The Disunity of the System of 
Faculties 
L’originalité de la doctrine des facultés chez Kant 
consiste en ceci: que leur forme supérieure ne les abstrait 
jamais de leur finitude humaine, pas plus qu’elle ne 
supprime leur différence de nature. 
- Gilles Deleuze 
 
In this chapter, I will argue that Kant conceived of the system of faculties as an organic 
unity, i.e. as a normative unity of diverse parts that reciprocally produce and specify 
each other. In section 6.1, I present the broad lines of a dominant interpretative stance 
on Kant’s doctrine of the faculties, specifically regarding the unity of multiplicity of the 
faculties. I focus on those interpretations that have sought to push onto Kant the view 
that there is a fundamental faculty in order to overcome the various Kantian dualisms. 
In the rest of the chapter, I argue against this view by first, in section 6.2, presenting an 
overview of the historical background to the debate before Kant. In 6.2.1, I discuss 
Christian Wolff’s theory that the many different functions of the mind can be reduced to 
a single fundamental power of representation, the simplicity and uniqueness of which 
matches that of the substance in which it inheres, namely the soul. In 6.2.2, I present the 
theory of a major critic of Wolff’s theory, Christian August Crusius, whose insistence on 
the plurality of fundamental forces influenced Kant. In 6.2.3, I present the views of 
Johannes Nikolaus Tetens on the subject, and linger on his idea of an epigenesis of the 
soul. Kant’s reception of this idea will not be dealt with until chapter 7, where I will 
present my interpretation of the Kant’s conception of the epigenesis of reason. With 
these historical backgrounds, both forward facing (6.1) and backward facing (6.2) in 
mind, I then turn to Kant’s own views, in 6.3. In 6.3.1, I discuss the irreducibility of 
sensibility to understanding, and argue that it is central to Kant’s transcendental 
idealism. Concretely, I argue that the specific contribution of sensibility is its intuitive 
nature, i.e. its capacity to present us with particulars, to allow us to refer. I then pass to 
a discussion of the underlying idea of the paralogisms, in 6.3.2, where I show that Kant 
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sought to dissociate the idea of the unity of thought from the kind of unity rationalist 
metaphysicians ascribe to the soul. In 6.3.3, I argue that although Kant saw some merit 
to attempt a unification of the faculties, and even regarded it as a necessary maxim of 
reason, he sincerely doubted whether it could be done, and even argued for the 
irreducibility of five distinct faculties. Finally, in 6.4, I argue that Kant’s doctrine of the 
faculties can be better understood if we read him as regarding the unity of the system of 
faculties as an organic unity. 
6.1 Against Kantian Dualism: the Hegelian and Heideggerian 
Legacies 
The distinction and the mutual dependency of sensibility and understanding constitutes 
one of the core doctrines of Kant’s critical philosophy, for it is the basis of the famous 
dictum that “thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are 
blind” (CPR A 51 / B 75). Indeed, it forms the core of Kant’s theory of knowledge as 
presented in the Critique of Pure Reason: 
these two faculties or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The 
understanding is not capable of intuiting anything, and the senses are not capable 
of thinking anything. Only from their unification can cognition arise. But on this 
account one must not mix up their roles, rather one has great cause to separate 
them carefully from each other and distinguish them. (CPR A 51-52 / B 75-76) 
However exciting and central this thesis may have been, the history of the reception of 
Kant’s philosophy has been marked by hesitations with regard to its correct 
interpretation and evaluation. Many readers have felt that this radical distinctness 
between the two faculties causes philosophical difficulties, and have therefore read Kant 
as envisageing the overcoming of this radical opposition. In defense of this reading, the 
following passage from the A-introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason is often cited: 
All that seems necessary for an introduction or a preliminary is that there are two 
stems of human cognition, which may perhaps arise from a common but to us 
unknown root, namely sensibility and understanding, through the first of which 
objects are given to us, but through the second of which they are thought. (CPR A 
15 / B 29) 
For many post-Kantian readers, Kant here confesses his hopes that, one day, his own 
brute distinction could be overcome, and that the common root of the two faculties 
could be discovered.  
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The first elaboration of such a reading already occurred in the German Idealists, all of 
whom believed that Kant’s philosophy was incomplete for being unsystematic. This lack 
of systematicity they identified in Kant’s tendency to merely posit his oppositions and 
tables, whereas they demanded that all these posits be deduced. A proper deduction, 
they believed, would account for the different forms in terms of a unitary principle that 
gives rise to them rationally and/or genetically. Karl Leonhard Reinhold, for instance, 
believed that the resistance towards Kant’s philosophy was due to problems with the 
presentation of that philosophy in the works of its originator, and that an emendation of 
presentation and argument was required (1795: 21-22). The most important such 
emendation, according to Reinhold, is the definitive treatment of the faculty of 
knowledge and its limitations. He intends to offer this through an analysis of what he 
calls “Vorstellungskraft”, i.e. representative power, because he thinks of the concept of 
a representation as the genus to which the species of sensation, intuition, concept, idea, 
etc. belong (1795: 211). From this, he deduces that the various faculties responsible for 
these different species of representations ultimately belong to the one faculty of 
representation (1795: 212). In doing so, he effaces the Kantian distinction between the 
faculties to a certain extent. 
Nevertheless, it was the German Idealists who most vehemently rejected Kant’s 
distinction between sensibility and understanding. For Kant, it is essential that only 
intuition is intuitive, i.e. presents us with particulars, whereas understanding is always 
discursive, i.e. presents us with mere generalities. In the previous two chapters, we have 
seen how this peculiar constitution of our cognitive capacities results in clear 
limitations to our knowledge, and lures us into antinomies. For the German Idealists, 
these limits on our knowledge seemed arbitrary and unwelcome, since they frustrated 
any attempt to acquire real knowledge. This is why they sought to overcome the 
distinction and attempted to defend the idea of an intuitive understanding, which Kant 
rejected as impossible for us. Versions of this strategy are to be found in both Fichte and 
Schelling, but I will here focus on its most influential version, namely the one offered by 
Hegel. 
It is in his early essay Faith and Knowledge from 1802 that Hegel presents his seminal 
criticism of the sensibility-understanding distinction in Kant. He first gives his general, 
Schelling-inspired criticism of Kant’s philosophy as failing to complete the proper 
course of philosophy: 
The Kantian philosophy remains entirely within the antithesis. It makes the 
identity of the opposites into the absolute terminus of philosophy, the pure 
boundary which is nothing but the negation of philosophy. We must not, by 
contrast, regard it as the problem of the true philosophy to resolve at that 
terminus the antitheses that are met with and formulated perchance as spirit and 
world, or soul and body, or self and nature, etc. (Hegel 1977: 67) 
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The criticism here is that the Kantian philosophy is characterized by a series of brute 
oppositions that it does not itself desire to overcome, but that true philosophy should 
overcome: “the sole Idea that has reality and true objectivity for philosophy, is the 
absolute suspendedness of the antithesis.” (Hegel 1977: 68) It does not take Hegel long to 
identify the foundation of this entire shortcoming in Kant’s theory: 
 The Kantian philosophy has the merit of being Idealism because it does show that 
neither the concept in isolation nor intuition in isolation is anything at all; that 
intuition by itself is blind and the concept by itself is empty; and that what is 
called experience, i.e., the finite identity of both in consciousness is not a rational 
cognition either. But the Kantian philosophy declares this finite cognition to be all 
that is possible. It turns this negative, abstractly idealistic side [of cognition] into 
that which is in itself, into the positive. It turns just this empty concept into 
absolute Reason, both theoretical and practical. In so doing, it falls back into 
absolute finitude and subjectivity, and the whole task and content of this 
philosophy is, not the cognition of the Absolute, but the cognition of this 
subjectivity. In other words, it is a critique of the cognitive faculties. (Hegel 1977: 
68) 
It is thus due to the brute opposition between sensibility and understanding that Kant 
remained stuck in an incomplete philosophy, incomplete in the sense that it could not 
arrive at, and could not want to arrive at, absolute knowledge. Given that it is an 
important feature of Hegel’s general argumentative strategy that he presents his own 
philosophy as emerging from the internal logic of the systems of his predecessors, he 
presents his own solution as somehow already anticipated by the very position it 
overcomes. In casu, Hegel sees Kant as already breaking down the rigid boundaries 
between the faculties as he attempts to solve his central problem: 
How are synthetic judgments a priori possible? This problem expresses nothing 
else but the Idea that subject and predicate of the synthetic judgment are identical 
in the a priori way. That is to say, these heterogeneous elements, the subject which 
is the particular and in the form of being, and the predicate which is the universal 
and in the form of thought, are at the same time absolutely identical. It is Reason 
alone that is the possibility of this positing, for Reason is nothing else but the 
identity of heterogeneous elements of this kind. One can glimpse this Idea 
through the shallowness of the deduction of the categories. With respect to space 
and time one can glimpse it, too, though not where it should be, in the 
transcendental exposition of this forms, but later on, in the deduction of the 
categories, where the original synthetic unity of apperception finally comes to the 
fore. Here, the original synthetic unity of apperception is recognized also as the 
principle of the figurative synthesis, i.e. of the forms of intuition; space and time 
are themselves conceived as synthetic unities, and spontaneity, the absolute 
synthetic activity of the productive imagination, is conceived as the principle of 
 
 279 
the very sensibility which was previously characterized only as receptivity. (Hegel 
1977: 69-70) 
In this passage, Hegel is arguing that, in the concrete course of his arguments, Kant 
cannot maintain his distinction between sensibility and understanding, because the 
activity of constitution requires that this distinction be overcome in the synthetic a 
priori judgment. Moreover, Hegel suggests that the centrality of the imagination and 
the doctrine of the figurative synthesis show that the forms of sensibility are 
themselves due to the power of spontaneity as well. I will not here develop a reading of 
the transcendental deduction, but I would like to point out that the distinction is never 
truly overcome. The figurative synthesis, for instance, does not produce the forms of 
sensibility and understanding; it rather seems to act upon these forms to transform them 
in some way. It is not contradictory for Kant to maintain that even the forms of 
sensibility must undergo some constitutive process in order to be presentable to the 
understanding in certain specific ways. On the contrary, we should expect that even the 
pure intuitions are in some way blind in abstraction from conceptual activity. 
According to Hegel, however, even Kant must admit that there is an original 
synthetic unity in which all the faculties are grounded: 
This original synthetic unity must be conceived, not as produced out of opposites, 
but as a truly necessary, absolute, original identity of opposites. As such, it is the 
principle both of productive imagination, which is the unity that is blind, i.e. 
immersed in the difference and not detaching itself from it; and of the intellect, 
which is the unity that posits the difference as identical but distinguishes itself 
from the different. This shows that the Kantian forms of intuition and the forms of 
thought cannot be kept apart at all as the particular, isolated faculties which they 
are usually represented as [sic]. One and the same synthetic unity – we have just 
now determined what this means here – is the principle of intuition and of the 
intellect. (Hegel 1977: 70) 
Hegel thus concludes that the doctrine of the synthetic a priori itself requires that Kant 
abandon the distinction between the two faculties, and that he recognize their common 
ground and principle, which he believes to be the productive imagination (Hegel 1977: 
71). This idea, erroneous as it seems when judged as an interpretation of Kant, was 
definitive for all subsequent scholarship, and in a way accepted uncritically, as was 
argued by Dieter Henrich (1994). It resurfaced both in the early and in the late 20th 
century, but never indepently of the horizon formed by German Idealism.  
The idea of the imagination as the common source of both sensibility and 
understanding also figures as a core thesis of Heidegger’s admittedly eccentric Kant-
interpretation, presented in his 1929 book Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. In his 
account of the imagination, Heidegger focuses on its peculiar double identity. According 
to Kant, the lower faculties are characterized as intuitive and receptive, whereas the 
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higher faculties are discursive and spontaneous. The problem is that he characterizes 
imagination as intuitive yet spontaneous. This suggests that it cuts across the rigid 
distinction between the lower and the higher faculties. (Heidegger 1962: 136) Moreover, 
Heidegger notes that Kant admits the imagination to be a fundamental faculty, even 
though elsewhere he says there are only two fundamental sources of our mind 
(Heidegger 1962: 141-142). Slowly but steadily, Heidegger manoeuvers his way to the 
same conclusion suggested by Hegel: 
The interpretation of the laying of the foundation of metaphysics has revealed 
that the transcendental imagination is not merely an external bond which fastens 
two extremities together. It is originally unifying, i.e., it is the specific faculty 
which forms the unity of the other two, which faculties themselves have an 
essential structural relation to it. 
Is it possible that this originally unifying [bildende] center is that "unknown, 
common root" of both stems? Is it accidental that with the first introduction of 
the imagination Kant says that "we are scarcely ever conscious" of its existence? 
(Heidegger 1962: 144) 
Both Heidegger and Hegel profile their reading of Kant as to be situated in the quest for 
grounding the possibility of knowledge. This suggests that they are dissatisfied with the 
answer Kant seems to give on first sight, namely that knowledge is possible through the 
specific cooperation of the faculties. Both seem to suggest that this overstresses the 
finite nature of human knowledge and the inability to go beyond our subjective bounds. 
Instead, they claim that the unity of the faculties is necessary to account for a specific 
aspect of knowledge, namely its transcendence, even though both thinkers have very 
different conceptions of this unity. 
In more recent times, namely in the last decade of the previous century, the issue of 
the faculties again came under the attention of philosophers outside of the often 
insulated community of scholars of German philosophy, namely in the writings of those 
thinkers usually grouped under the heading “Pittsburgh School”. The context is best 
understood through the presentation of John McDowell’s Mind and World. 
McDowell devoted his series of John Locke lectures to the peculiar nexus of 
epistemology and philosophy of mind that became so problematic after Wilfrid Sellars 
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind and Donald Davidson’s “On the very Idea of a 
Conceptual Scheme”. McDowell read the arguments of these two seminal essays as 
converging on a very similar conclusion, namely the inadequacy of empiricism. Sellars’ 
attack on the Myth of the Given revealed that the kind of brute givens philosophers 
have taken empirical data to be cannot play the foundational role in epistemology often 
accorded to them. This foundational role was taken to be warranted by the fact that 
givens are somehow immediate, whereas the constructions built upon them are 
irremediably mediated. According to Sellars, this idea of immediacy is untenable, a 
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conclusion he partly reached through a philosophical reenactment of Kantian and 
Hegelian arguments.1 Donald Davidson, in his turn, argued against what he perceived as 
residual empiricism in Quine’s philosophy by identifying a third dogma of empiricism 
and subsequently criticizing it. This dogma is that concepts or conceptual schemes 
stand over and against something external to them which contributes their content. 
Once this dogma is abandoned, Davidson argues, we have ipso facto abandoned the very 
idea of empiricism as well (2001: 189). 
McDowell takes up Kant’s doctrine of the relation between conceptual schemes and 
the given as captured in his famous dictum that “thoughts without content are empty, 
intuitions without concepts are blind” as a basis for the solution of the problem raised 
by Sellars and McDowell. This problem, it seems to me, is actually an interrelation of 
two problems, one from epistemology and one from the philosophy of mind. Given 
McDowell’s sources, this is understandable, since both Sellars and Davidson usually treat 
these two domains as entangled. But in McDowell, this connection also leads to a 
bivalent evaluation of Kant’s own doctrine, bivalent in the sense that he regards it as 
good in dealing with the first problem, and bad in dealing with the second. 
The first problem is described by McDowell as an antinomy: “experience both must 
and cannot stand in judgement over our attempts to make up our minds about how 
things are” (McDowell 1994: xii). More specifically, the antinomy arises because, in 
absence of anything that plays the role of the given, there is no external constraint on 
thought, thereby making our reasoning about the world a mere game. This is a problem 
given that we usually think knowledge should have a justification, preferrably at least in  
part in an evidentiary basis. But Sellars and Davidson have argued that the given cannot 
play that particular role of external constraint precisely because of its externality. The 
solution to this antinomy would be to think of the constraint as already arising within 
the space of concepts, rather than as arising on its edges and originating outside of it. 
The other problem McDowell attempts to tackle is already announced in his 
formulation of the antinomy quoted above: he does not just want thought to be 
constrained in a non-trivial way, he wants it to be constrained by how things are. In other 
words, he wants thought to be meaningfully about an external word. The motivation 
behind this is that the Davidsonian and Sellarsian focus on the distinction between the 
natural and the normative frustrates the naturalist commitments of twentieth-century 
philosophers, for it becomes unclear how normatively engaged beings can become 
engaged with the non-normative structure of the world at all. Here the problem is that, 
 
                                                     
1
 Sellars (1997: 45) notoriously describes this work of his as “incipient Hegelian Meditations”, and, in doing so, 
seems to contrast it explicitly with Husserl’s Cartesian meditations. Where Husserl’s work is meant to show us, 
amongst others, the contemporary value of the idea of immediate presence in the form of evidence, Sellars 
joins continental critics of the metaphysics of presence in rejecting the alleged grounding nature of presence. 
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due the the radical difference between the nature of our mind and the nature of the 
world, the two could never meet. McDowell’s own answer to this problem is a Platonized 
naturalism. 
This two-pronged problem forms the background of the following evaluation of 
Kant’s philosophy: “Does Kant credit receptivity with a separable contribution to its 
cooperation with spontaneity? It seems that the answers “No” and “Yes are both 
applicable” (McDowell 1994: 41): 
From the standpoint of experience, the answer is “No”. If one posits an 
empirically separable contribution from receptivity, one commits oneself to 
something Given in experience that could constitute the ultimate extra-
conceptual grounding for everything conceptual, and it is a way of putting a 
central Kantian thought to say hat that idea must be rejected. For Kant, 
experience does not take in ultimate grounds that we could appeal to by pointing 
outside the sphere of thinkable content. In experience we take in, through 
impacts on the senses, elements in a reality that is precisely not outside the 
sphere of thinkable content. (McDowell 1994: 41) 
Here, McDowell praises Kant’s solution to the problem, although he immediately also 
raises the questions that a good account of Kant’s problem needs to answer, namely, 
why sensibility should be distinguished at all on this picture and, if it is distinguished, 
how it comes to be so marvelously integrated. In this chapter, I will suggest answers to 
these two problems by indicating how Kant thinks sensibility constrains thought and 
how it comes to acquire the normative force to do so. 
McDowell also rejects Kant’s solution in another sense, however: 
But Kant also has a transcendental story, and in the transcendental perspective 
there does seem to be an isolable contribution from receptivity. In the 
transcendental perspective, receptivity figures as a susceptibility to the impact of 
supersensible reality, a reality that is supposed to be independent of our 
conceptual activity in a stronger sense than any that fits the ordinary empirical 
world. (McDowell 1994: 41) 
McDowell is thus criticizing Kant for his confusion of reasons and causes in the 
transcendental perspective, even though he strictly observed, and was even largely 
responsible for the recognition of their distinction at the empirical level. Moreover, 
McDowell suggests that it is, paradoxically, only by accepting this notion of a 
supersensible inaccessible reality that Kant could maintain his idealism, whereas the 
abolishment of the very idea of the supersensible would allow us to embrace empirical 
realism without the constant reminder that it is at the same time a transcendental 
idealism. McDowell credits Hegel with the necessary step for such a completion, 
agreeing with the latter that absolute idealism is precisely what brings us into contact 
with the world in itself once again. (McDowell 1994: 44) The fact that two other major 
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figures of the movement to which McDowell belongs, namely Robert Brandom and John 
Haugeland, choose to build on Hegel and Heidegger respectively is telling in this 
respect. 
This dissertation is not an interpretation and defense of transcendental idealism. Nor 
could it be, given the immensity of the task of defending this much-assailed doctrine. 
Nevertheless, I do want to signal a peculiarity in McDowell’s criticism, namely his 
interpretation of transcendental idealism and its implications for the interpretation of 
the relation between transcendental idealism and the doctrine of the faculties. His 
interpretation of transcendental idealism is built around the so-called doctrine of 
affection, namely the doctrine that the empirical element of our thought is due to the 
causal influence of some external world. Since the very publication of Kant’s work, 
readers have been debating over the coherence and meaning of this doctrine. A 
traditional criticism is the following: Kant believes us to be causally affected by the 
supersensible in experience, even though he believes causal processes cannot be 
ascribed to the supersensible, since causality is a category for our empirical thought, 
and not for transcendental reality. I would like to point out that the problem is a 
constructed problem, because Kant nowhere advances the doctrine – it is only ascribed to 
him on the basis of some terminological peculiarities and his readers’ expectations of 
what he should or could hold. The very fact that any possible reading leads to 
incoherences might explain why Kant abstained from giving any doctrine, since no such 
doctrine can be given. The desire to have an account of the origin of the empirical is a 
metaphysical demand, and Kant might be consistent precisely in not meeting such a 
demand. The whole issue turns on the question of whether we may interpret the 
supersensible metaphysically. 
McDowell obviously ascribes to the traditional reading of the doctrine of affection, 
and thereby reads Kant as saying that transcendental idealism is true because there is a 
supersensible reality which we cannot come to know. Yet, he believes this doctrine to be 
fortuitously independent from the intuition-concepts story. Mind that Hegel and 
Heidegger were under no such illusion. Hegel clearly realized that transcendental 
idealism was more due to the distinction between sensibility and understanding than 
due to the nature of the thing-in-itself. I believe he was right in this: transcendental 
idealism is more a doctrine about the incompleteness of the higher faculties and their 
resultant inability to yield knowledge by themselves than about the metaphysical status 
of the supersensible. This is why McDowell might be underestimating the contributions 
of sensibility to knowledge, even though he is right to dismiss the idea that it 
contributes foundational bare givens. In subsection 6.3.1, I will argue that, according to 
Kant, sensibility is not just responsible for the empirical constraints on thought (it is 
receptive), it is also responsible for the capacity to think particulars (it is intuitive), and 
that it is the latter capacity which constitutes its distinct contribution. 
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In this section, I have sketched the background against which an interpretation of 
the doctrine of faculties may be philosophically relevant, and not just an issue of 
philosophical antiquarianism. But this does not waver historical considerations; on the 
contrary, in order to better understand Kant’s account, we cannot just read him in light 
of the debates he was to spawn – we must also read him in light of the debates in which 
he himself sought to intervene. 
6.2 Faculty Psychology in German Rationalism 
6.2.1 Wolff and the Substantial Unity of the Representative Power 
Arguably the most important source and target of debates on faculty psychology in 18th 
century German Schulphilosophie is Christian Wolff’s theory of the soul. It is well known 
that Wolff was a seminal figure in German philosophy in the 18th Century, and that 
before the advent of Kant’s mature philosophy his thought dominated academic debates 
in the universities of the Vielstaaterei. His importance is of course rarely reflected in the 
many historical overviews of philosophy produced since the middle of the 19th century, 
partly because he entered our collective memory as an epigon or systematizer of 
Leibniz. But even if this latter judgement were justified, it would still underrepresent 
the degree to which a systematization of the notoriously fragmented Leibnizian 
philosophy would have to be an original and philosophical effort of massive 
proportions. This reveals itself well in Wolff’s rational psychology, i.e. his metaphysical 
theory of the soul. 
In the Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen 
Dingen überhaupt, also known as the Deutsche Metaphysik, first published in 1719, Wolff 
argued that the Soul is a simple substance rather than a composite, because no 
composite, and hence no body, could conceivably think (Wolff 1747: 463). For him, this 
realization is fruitful basis for many insights into the nature of the soul, because a great 
many things follow from being a simple substance, i.e. a simple independent thing: 
A self-subsisting thing or a substance is that which has the source of its changes 
internal to it; a thing existing through something else, on the other hand, is 
nothing but a limitation of the former kind of thing. For example, our soul has a 
force through which it brings forth all of our thoughts one after the other in a 




It is noteworthy that Wolff introduces his notion of a self-subsisting thing or a 
substance with the example of the soul, even though he will only argue for the 
substantial nature of the soul many hundreds of pages later. This already suggests that 
the soul functions as the paradigm instance of a substance for him. Furthermore, he 
already suggests that the notion of a substance is intimately tied up with that of a force, 
understood as the internal principle of the changes of the substance: “The Source of the 
changes is called Power (Kraft): and therefore there is to be found in every self-subsisting 
thing a power of a kind that we do not encounter in other existing things.” (Wolff 1747: 
60; my transation). For Wolff, it is mostly important that this force is an active principle, 
and not a merely passive one: “A power should not be conflated with a mere capacity 
(Vermögen); for the capacity is merely a possibility of doing something; since the power, 
in contrast, is a source of the changes, an effort (Bemühung) to do something must be 
found in it.” (Wolff 1747: 61; my transation). Hessbrüggen-Walter (2004: 58) traces this 
distinction between capacity and power to Leibniz, and concludes that the distinction 
rests on the fact that the former requires an external influence to be activated, whereas 
the latter contains its principle of activity (its effort) in itself.  
In the fifth chapter of the Deutsche Metaphysik, Wolff argues that the specific power of 
the soul is a representative power (Wolff 1747: 469), more specifically the power to 
represent the world from the perspective of a specific material body (Wolff 1747: 489-
490). From the fact that this power forms the essence or nature of a simple substance, he 
believes to be justified in concluding that there can be only one such representative 
power: 
Since it is a simple thing, and there can be no parts in a simple thing, the soul 
cannot contain many distinct powers, because otherwise every force would 
require a specific self-subsisting thing existing for it alone. A power, after all, 
consists in an effort to do something, and therefore different powers would 
require different efforts. It cannot be, however, that a simple thing can have many 
simultaneous efforts, since it could no more move in different directions at once 
than a body that in its movement is to be regarded as an indivisible thing. And 
thus there is in the soul only one power, from which originate all of its changes, 
even though we are wont to call it by different names because of the different 
changes. (Wolff 1747: 463; my transation) 
Wolff thus deduces from the simplicity of the soul that it can have only one power, and 
argues on this basis that there are no distinct faculties of the soul. There is something 
truly peculiar about Wolff’s analogy between a material body and the soul in the quoted 
passage, for he seems to say that a body that is under the influence of different forces 
would move in different directions at once. But this assumes that forces cannot 
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compose to form a single composite force. In fact, it was well known to natural 
philosophers in the 17th and 18th century that the parallellogram of forces constitutes a 
solution to how forces compose.2 
The refusal to recognize multiple mental powers of course forces Wolff to explain 
how the one representative force can come to manifest itself in so different manners. 
The basis of his explanation is his contention that “all changes that can occur in a 
simple thing can be nothing else than variations in degree” (Wolff 1747: 56; my 
transation). The rationale behind this seems straightforward: since the force of a simple 
thing is unique, the changes cannot differ qualitatively (i.e. in the kind of forces), and since 
a simple thing is not extended, they cannot change quantitatively either. As a result, they 
can differ only in degree of quality. Indeed, Wolff goes on to argue, in the course of 
chapter 5 of the Deutsche Metaphysik, that all allegedly distinct mental faculties differ 
only in the degree of clarity and distinctness with which they represent, and that souls 
that seem to have different mental faculties actually differ only in the degree of clarity 
and distinctness of representation of which they are capable. 
 Wolff’s theory of the faculties thus comes down to the doctrine that every soul has 
just one faculty, because it is a simple substance, and that this faculty is rather a power, 
namely the principle of change, of the dynamics of mental life. This doctrine, however, 
ultimately feeds into a distinctly preformationist theory of knowledge and of mind: 
Since the soul brings forth sensations through its specific power, the images and 
concepts of material things do not enter from the outside – on the contrary, the 
soul already has them in itself, namely in the manner in which it can as a finite 
thing have them in itself merely potentially, and not actually; and it merely 
develops them gradually in an order that corresponds with the body, from its own 
essence, by determining itself to actualize the potential. (Wolff 1747: 508; my 
transation) 
Here, Wolff is admitting the link between his conception of the soul and the 
preformationist theory of knowledge Kant would go on to dismiss in the B-Deduction 
(cf. 3.3.2). This theory ascribes to the development of our knowledge an extreme 
determinism, since it not only assumes that all our representations are already 
contained in our soul as dispositions, but also that the development occurs according to 
the principle of sufficient reason. After all, Wolff constantly stresses that the succession 
of the degrees of clarity and distinction, the modulation of our mental life, is 
determined by this unyielding Leibnizian principle, and that force merely brings the 
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 Hessbrüggen-Walter (2004: 80) suggests that there is a methodological basis for Wolff’s claim, since it is 
easier to analyse the powers of the soul as manifestations of degrees of a single power rather than as the result 
of interactions between different powers. 
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determined to the fore. His constant demurals that the principle of determination is 
internal, did nothing to protect him from the charge of determinism that cost him a 
professorship. 
6.2.2 Crusius and the Interanimation of Mental Powers 
It is well-known among Kant scholars that the “All-destroyer” (as Moses Mendelssohn 
called him) was importantly influenced by Christian August Crusius, in all likelihood 
more so than by Christian Wolff himself. The originality and the specific influence of 
Crusius has often been overlooked because his philosophy is so intimately tied up with 
the Wolffian system, not because it is an extension of the latter (as Alexander 
Baumgarten’s seems to be), but because it is a critique of the latter. Because of this strong 
identification of the target, the terminology of Wolff is often adopted, even if only in 
order to transform and subvert it.  
A strong similarity between Wolff and Crusius could, for instance, be wrongly 
inferred from the first pages of the latter’s Pneumatologie, the final section of his 
important and influential 1745 work Entwurf der nothwendigen Vernunftwahrheiten wiefern 
sie den zufälligen entgegengesetzt werden. The first chapter of the Pneumatologie is basically 
an extensive polemic against materialism in all its forms, much like Wolff’s rational 
psychology was. Like Wolff, Crusius denies that the specific functions of the soul, 
namely thought or representation, can be due to movement, and like Wolff he ascribes 
souls to animals, even though he is not willing to extend this courtesy to all living 
things, on the ground that it is a mistake to believe that everything that can suffer 
changes perceives as well. Because of this, he subscribes to preformationism against 
metamorphosis theories (1766: 891). Nevertheless, there is already a peculiar difference 
with Wolff, for although he agrees with the latter that thought does not consist in 
movement, he does believe the thinking subject to be mobile (1766: 876-877). An 
important difference is then that, for Wolff, the mind changes its perspective on the 
world solely by changing the proportion between clarity and obscurity and distinctness 
and confusion, whereas for Crusius this change of perspective reflects a real (and not 
phenomenal, however well-founded) spatial displacement. 
But this difference is a humble one in comparison with the one announced at the 
beginning of chapter 2 of the Pneumatologie: 
The understanding of a rational yet finite mind is not a sole fundamental force. 
One must instead picture it as a totality [Inbegriff] of certain fundamental forces 
and capacities, all of which share this feature, namely that they consist in a 
manner of thought and that they collaborate with consciousness to the 
advancement of knowledge of truth. I gladly admit, that we cannot possibly find 
out the precise number of the primary fundamental forces of our understanding. 
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This much is certain, however, that we would act in contradiction with the 
characteristics of fundamental forces if we were to regard the rationality of a 
finite being as a single power, which is merely singular in its nature. (1766: 907; 
my translation) 
Crusius thus unambiguously rejects Wolff’s theory of the fundamental representative 
force. The interesting aspect of this rebuttal is that it is done on the basis of the concept 
of a force, for Crusius claims that the identification of reason as a fundamental force 
would contradict the very concept of a fundamental force. We will thus have to look at 
Crusius’ concept of a force insofar as it is pertinent to the present discussion. 
In the more general sense of the word, a force is, according to Crusius, a possibility, 
connected to one thing, to bring about another thing (1766: 121). This general definition 
is already rich in positive and negative consequences. For one, Crusius says that a force 
already assumes causality and subsistence (1766: 121), since it is a capacity to causally 
bring something about, and that this capacity inheres in a subject. This allows him to 
say that no power or force is ever without a subject. But in characterizing force as a 
possibility, he is already diverging from the Wolffian orthodoxy, according to which a 
force is only that which is active, and the merely potentially effective is a capacity 
(Vermögen). For Crusius, these two terms only distinguish two stages of a force, and do 
not ontologically distinguish two kinds of properties: 
As long as a force acts, and thus does that which is possible through it, and 
through which it is thought, it is called living [lebendig]. Of that, which was 
initially possible through the force, we say that it is henceforth present actu 
secundo, whereas it used to be merely present actu primo. Hence, to be present actu 
secundo means as much as really existing, insofar as we regard this existence as 
something which we credit to a force. To be present actu primo, on the other hand, 
means as much as being possible through an already really existing force, which 
nonetheless is not yet acting. (Crusius  1766: 124; my translation) 
For Crusius, thus, force denotes both the mere potentiality and the reality, whereas for 
Wolff these two were radically distinct ontological kinds. An important consequence of 
this is that, according to Wolff, the representative force is determined to act only by its 
own striving, whereas for Crusius, as we will see, the activation (vivification) of a force 
can be dependent upon the agency of other forces. 
But another major difference resides in the fact that Crusius enumerates a number of 
necessary conditions for a force to count as a fundamental force, in such a way that it 
leads directly to the falsity of the Wolffian account. Remember that, for Wolff, not just 
all the various kinds of activities and ideas, but all the individual activities and ideas of 
the soul are entirely due to the self-realization of the sole representative force. Crusius 
will charge this picture with incoherence, and will do so on the basis of his conception 
of a fundamental force. 
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Crusius needs the notion of a fundamental force in order to evade an obvious 
criticism, namely that his account is consistent with postulating for every possibility a 
separate capacity, which would come down to invoking occult qualities in the way that 
was mocked so efficiently by Molière in his Le Malade Imaginaire. Against this charge, 
Crusius admits that we should only allow for fundamental forces, in which other 
seemingly independent causal capacities are grounded (Crusius 1766: 128-129) This of 
course betrays a mechanicist commitment to an economy of causal principles. But he 
equally insists that such a fundamental force should be shown to be really capable of 
producing the necessary results, and in this he resists Wolff’s tendency to simply assert 
the necessity of fundamental forces on metaphysical, epistemological or methodological 
grounds. 
Crusius draws his readers’ attention to 8 necessary characteristics of fundamental 
forces. In the first place, a fundamental force must always be present in the subject in 
which it inheres, and not just under specific circumstances (Crusius 1766: 131). This 
criterion reminds one of the Aristotelian distinction between essential and accidental 
properties. The second criterion is that, when we ascribe an effect to a fundamental 
force, we must be able to show how it causally follows from that force, and not be 
seduced to simply assume it for reasons other than the presence of a causal account 
(Crusius 1766: 131-132). It is not wildly conjectural to assume that, on this basis, Crusius 
would charge Wolff with simply postulating representative force as a simple 
fundamental force because of his metaphysical commitments, even though he can offer 
no plausible causal accounts of how representative force gives rise to such a variety of 
effects. The third criterion makes a similar suggestion, because it demands that a 
fundamental force have sufficiently uniform effects, i.e. that its effects can differ only in 
degree and direction. Of course, Wolff assumed that the degree of clarity and 
distinctness was all that was truly different between the various effects of the 
representative force, so he would not have been impressed by that complaint. 
The fourth and fifth criteria are again better understood jointly. The fourth criterion 
postulates that the conditions for the activity or activation of a fundamental force 
should be found in the same subject as wherein the fundamental force itself inheres 
(Crusius 1766: 139). In other words, a fundamental force cannot be dependent, for its 
operativity, on conditions outside of its bearer. The fifth criterion states that the 
proximate effects of a fundamental force must inhere in the same subject as wherein 
the fundamental force resides (Crusius 1766: 140). Together, these two criteria state that 
there is a closure of proximate conditions and effects of a fundamental force under the 
subject of that force. 
The sixth and seventh criteria specify that a fundamental force should not be 
derivable from another force, either causally (6th criterion), or logically (7th criterion) 
(Crusius 1766: 140-141). These two criteria are understandable, since they basically insist 
that the fundamental force be fundamental and not derivative. The 8th criterion is really 
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more an admonition on the basis of the previous ones, for it is a result of the maxim that 
there is no more in the effect than in the cause. Crusius puts this maxim to use in the 8th 
criterion by insisting that, where a force requires additional causes for its operation, 
and cannot itself produce these additional causes, we must conclude that there are also 
additional forces at work. Together with the second and third criteria, the eighth 
criterion states that anyone postulating a fundamental force must either give a 
plausible account of how this force can be responsible for all of its effects, or admit that 
there are other fundamental forces at work. 
On the basis of these criteria Crusius mounts his attack against Wolff’s theory of the 
fundamental force: 
For [if this account is correct] we must either say, that the fundamental power to 
think, or to know the truth in general, and all that occurs in the understanding, 
would be merely determinations thereof [i.e. of this singular fundamental power]. 
The latter is perhaps true, but since the actions and changes of the understanding 
differ in more than merely direction and degree, this latter power is a mere 
general power, and not yet a true physical fundamental power. Or one should 
investigate whether from one of the parts listed above [i.e. one of the basic 
functions of the soul], which are required for reason, all the others can be derived 
through intelligible proximate causal effects, or whether they are at the very least 
so constituted that we cannot know whether they could not be derived from one if 
we were to have adequate knowledge. […] Neither can be done, however. The 
power to continue an idea can perhaps be a determination of the action which 
constitues the idea. It seems, as well, as if the capacity to abstract has its 
foundation merely in a higher degree of perfection of that activity through which 
the idea is thought in certain minds. I mean, it seems as if the capacity to analyze 
concepts, and to arrive from one idea to several of the many that are represented 
and contained in it, rests solely in a certain fineness and inner perfection of the 
original powers of thought by means of which the power to think brings forth this 
idea, which is possible through it, at once with a certain degree of inner perfection 
and the capacity to work in many ways. And when this is in fact the case, we 
cannot conclude to specific fundamental forces. Yet, we must keep in mind that 
every idea is an action, and that in every idea something different is represented 
than in any other idea; in other words that the proximate actions of a 
fundamental power would not continuously be similar, even though they must be, 
if all ideas are primarily dependent upon a single fundamental force. (Crusius 
1766: 908-909; my translation) 
Crusius is criticizing the recognizably Wolffian theory that all ideas in the mind are 
ultimately modifications of a single fundamental representative force on the grounds 
that such an account can make no sense of why the different accomplishments of this 
power are so diverse. He admits that ideas themselves may be modified in direction and 
degree, but he doubts that all ideas can be understood as directional and gradational 
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modifications of a single representation. Of course, he immediately warns that he does 
not thereby wish to conclude that the mind contains as many fundamental forces as it 
has ideas, for some reduction is possible. He merely concludes that, although we cannot 
know definitely how many fundamental forces the mind contains, we can be sure that it 
contains more than one on the ground that we are capable of thinking very different 
things (Crusius 1766: 909-910). 
This allows for a very different picture of the dynamics of the mind, which I will call 
an interanimation of mental powers. As we have seen, Crusius believes the mind to 
contain multiple powers, and he believes powers or forces to be either merely 
potentially active, or really active. The question then becomes how the different powers 
of the mind become active throughout the course of our mental life, i.e. how they 
become “living forces”, how they become animated. Crusius suggests that the activation 
of one power is dependent upon the activity of another (Crusius 1766: 950-951), and that 
the subsequent modification of its direction and degree is also due to the interaction 
with another force (Crusius 1766: 947). In this way, the mind is not a constant self-
developing of a single constant constitutive activity, as it is in the Wolffian picture, but 
rather a constant interaction of fundamental powers inhering in the same subject. 
This final gloss is important, because it is supposed to allow Crusius to harmonize this 
interactive model with the fundamental nature of the forces and the non-composite 
nature of the soul. After all, Crusius did not demand of a fundamental power that it be 
completely unconditioned – he just required that its conditions lie in the same subject 
in which it also inheres. Given that all fundamental forces inhere in the soul, their 
interdependency does not therefore violate their status as fundamental. Furthermore, 
Crusius complains that he is not to be blamed if people attempt to infer from the 
multiplicity and interaction of the fundamental forces that the soul itself is composite. 
He states that such an inference would only be legitimate if the distinct and interacting 
forces were moving forces. Since they are not moving forces (per chapter 1 of the 
Pneumatologie), their “composition” is entirely dissimilar from the kind of composition 
that is typical for extended substances. In this way, he wants to bar the inference from 
the disunity of fundamental forces within a subject to the disunity of the subject. 
With his account of the interanimation of mental powers, Crusius has offered a major 
alternative to the conception of the soul and its dynamics as understood by Wolff, and 
moved away from the monadological picture of the universe. This fits in his general 
project of putting the overly speculative Wolffian philosophy back on the ground by 
insisting on the distinction between the possible and the real. Crusius complained that 
the Wolffian school was mostly concerned with reasoning about possible objects, and 
consistently failed to show why these should be taken for real objects. He insisted that, 
whereas we are free to think up all kinds of objects, as long as they obey the laws of 
possibility, we cannot thereby conclude that they are also real. We can only encounter 
the real through sensation, for it is only in sensation that we are immediately forced to 
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take something as real (Crusius 1766: 28). This is because the capacity for sensation is a 
fundamental activity of the mind that cannot fail to be actualized when certain 
conditions are met. Sensation is thus the mark of the real because it occurs only when a 
certain capacity is realized, and this in turn can only occur when its conditions are 
realized. For Crusius, sensation is the mark of the real because it betrays causality, and 
all reality is grounded in causality. 
6.2.3 Tetens on the Development of the Soul 
In 1777, Johannes Nikolaus Tetens published his two-volume Versuche über die 
menschliche Natur und ihre Entwickelung. Although this work is dedicated to investigations 
into the nature of the soul, it differs from the works of Wolff and Crusius in being an 
attempt at observational or empirical psychology rather than rational psychology. Tetens 
aims to investigate the nature of the soul and its various functions insofar as they can be 
investigated through a purportedly scientific version of introspection. This general 
framework noticeably constrains the strength of the claims that can be made within it. 
As a result, Tetens is somewhat noncommittal on the issue of the unity or disunity of 
the faculties, however much it may pop up during his inquiries. 
Tetens opens his first essay with a sketch of the issue of the unity of the faculties, 
commenting on the attempt to find a single fundamental force from which to derive all 
the many functions of the soul. In the preface to the book, he already announced his 
predilection for the approach of regarding the many different functions of the soul as 
quantitatively and intensively differing manifestations of the same fundamental force. 
Yet, he immediately warns that we cannot simply assume this picture, lest we overlook 
the many differences these manifestations might exhibit (Tetens 1777, I: xxvi-xxvii). 
On the issue at hand, Tetens is both cavalier and reluctant, venturing wild 
hypotheses and then qualifying them with methodological remarks. For this reason, 
Dieter Henrich found that 
Tetens gives all his divisions a provisional character. And if he ultimately attempts 
to find a hint of the basic power in the capacity of feeling common to all powers, 
then he himself has already taken that back in the introduction to his work, where 
he apologizes for every instance in which he gave in to the "propensity to a 
uniform system." Considering the unsystematic, merely descriptive character of 
Tetens's book, it is unlikely that Kant profited from it. (Henrich 1994: 25) 
This judgement is too hasty, however, for Kant had plenty to learn from the wilder 
speculations of Tetens’ work. The very title suggests that the work is not just, or not 
primarily, a piece of empirical psychology, but rather an investigation into the nature 
and development of the human being. This appears clearly from the final essay of the 
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first volume (the tenth essay), and even more so in the final, long division of the second 
volume. 
In the tenth essay, Tetens again suggests, with great candour and little retraction (by 
his standards) the idea that, ultimately, the human soul must consist of a fundamental 
force (Tetens 1777, I: 730-731). But here, it soon becomes clear why he subscribes to such 
a theory, and why he still feels the need to revise it. For Tetens, it is imperative that we 
understand what it is that marks man off from the non-human, i.e. that we understand 
the nature of humanity. This means that we need to understand which capacities man 
has and that other (finite) living beings lack. Identifying such a capacity turns out to be 
difficult given the theory of the soul as simple and having only one fundamental force: 
When the soul has to be understood as simple in the metaphysical sense, and as 
distinct from the organized body, then the question regarding the distinctive 
mark of the human soul leads us to two others. Is the development of the human 
soul a development of this incorporeal being, or does it consist solely in the 
development of its organized body, with which it is united? If it is not itself 
subject to development, to heightening or expansion of its faculties, then all its 
acquired dispositions consist merely in the brain’s skill at serving the soul in its 
workings. What nature would the human soul then need? Indeed: none at all. The 
character of Man consists, on these conditions, merely in the special organization 
of the brain, or the representational machine. The soul of the waterpolyp, if one 
exists, as mr. Unzer claims, will become a human soul. This has already been 
advanced by many respected new philosophers.  
Or on the other hand: if in the inner nature of the soul developments and 
increases take place, then we can ask whether these also presuppose certain 
perfectable properties in its own special nature? If only the body would be 
concerned, and a dog’s soul in a human body would develop humanly, without 
disposing of any other fundamental dispositions [Grundanlagen], than it had in 
the brain of a dog, then how could we inquire into the human soul at all? (Tetens 
1777, I: 739; my translation) 
Tetens’ problem is thus that the traditional theory of the simplicity of the soul threatens 
to destroy the very idea of a specifically human soul. The idea of a simple soul suggests 
that a soul has its basic nature independently of its external circumstances, and that it 
has it as a simple nature. This again suggests that any soul has the same basic capacities 
as every other soul. The differences in the capacities of different souls are then 
completely due to the different bodies with which they are connected. Tetens sees this 
as resulting in a way from Bonnet’s theory that the soul is the substantive entelechy of 
the brain, and that the soul itself has no specific nature. The problem with this is that 
there would be no specifically human soul, and more importantly, that the perfectibility 
of man does not reach his inner nature. Tetens believes man to be set apart from other 
creatures by his extremely perfectable nature, namely his capacity to develop himself, 
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overcome his earlier limitations and expand his capacities (Tetens 1777, I: 740). This idea 
he states to have derived from Rousseau (Tetens 1777, I: 742), but complains that it is 
hollow if we do not insist that it is the human soul, and not just the human body, that is 
subject to development and perfection, for otherwise none of these improvements 
would affect our inner being. Yet, do we therefore need to assume an original capacity 
for perfectibility in man? 
Another problem is one that follows from the theory of the single fundamental force. 
This theory states that ultimately, the capacities of different souls differ only 
quantitatively, i.e. in degree, and not qualitatively. But this seems to imply, Tetens 
notes, that human souls have a higher degree of the same representative force. He 
suggests that this higher degree stems from the fact that the human soul has a higher 
degree of indepedentent activity (Selbsttätigkeit), and that is therefore more plastic 
(modificierbar). The specific difference of the human soul is then its high degree of 
independent activity. This idea seems to be a gloss on the Wolffian idea that the 
fundamental principle of the soul is an activity rather than a potency. Tetens now seems 
to say that, much like the capacity for representing clearly and distinctly depends on 
the degree of the fundamental power of representation, the capacity to reach higher 
degrees of power of representation depends on the intensity of the conatus driving the 
fundamental force.3 
In the second division of the second volume of the Versuche über die menschliche Natur 
und ihre Entwickelung, Tetens presents a more lengthy and systematic account of his own 
theory of the internal development of the human soul. He starts off by arguing, on the 
basis of what he calls observational data, but what we would now consider anecdotal 
material, that the growth and development of our faculties is more than the mere 
increase of the stock or the series of ideas of which we dispose. Against this more 
narrow conception of development, he advances that specific activities of reflection and 
representation contribute to the development of the faculties themselves. For the active 
faculties of the mind, specifically the understanding, this means that we acquire a 
greater capacity to conjure ideas of objects, and to conjure ideas of our representational 
activities. The latter increase also allows us to recall past representations more easily. 
(Tetens 1777, II: 390-391). For the passive or receptive capacities, such as sensibility, the 
increase consists in a greater receptivity to the nuances of nature in sensation, as well 
as a greater capacity to be modified, to store, past sensations. (Tetens 1777, II: 415-416). 
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 If this reading is correct, it seems that Tetens needs to notionally distinguish the conatus of a force from the 
force itself. It is unclear to me whether one can do this on Wolffian grounds, i.e. distinguish the intensity of 
the force from the intensity of its striving. It seems artificial to me, since it seems to require that a power is a 
bare capacity after all, which requires an external factor, its conatus, to be active, whereas Wolff seems to 
insist that, in the case of a true force, the conatus is not distinguishable from the force itself. 
 
 295 
Finally, Tetens insists that an increase in the capacity of one faculty ultimately also 
causes the increase of other capacities.4 
This whole theory of a genuine development of the soul raises an important question, 
namely how we should understand development here. It is in this context that Tetens 
discusses the distinction between epigenesis and preformation in order to find whch 
theory understands development better, and whether there might be a difference 
between the process governing the development of the soul and the process governing 
the development of the body.  
Tetens initially offers this general hypothesis concerning the development of the 
soul, which he assumes to be neutral with regard to the issue of preformation or 
epigenesis: 
This is then the law of the development of man in his psychic nature, and it is 
similar to that, according to which the body grows. Feelings and representations 
are the nutritional juice [Nahrungssaft] that are supplied to the fundamental 
power, which is initially limited in its activity to Feeling, and , thereby stimulating 
and activating it. Every active expression of this force strengthens it. That which 
was only predisposition [anlage] or possibility, becomes disposition [Disposition], 
capacity [Fähigkeit], drive [Trieb] and Skill [Fertigkeit]. The transition from mere 
skill to the nearest predisposition or disposition rests, according to the common 
opinion, on the fact that something additional is required to arrive from the 
former to the latter. (Tetens 1777, II: 426-427; my translation)5 
In this picture, the soul initially has mere possibilities, which are then activated through 
the intake of experiential data. This raises several issues, of course. First of all, is the 
effect of the experiential intake limited to occasioning the activation, or does it 
influence the mind in other ways as well? Secondly, are we to understand the process in 
the preformationist way and regard the faculties emerging later in the process of 
development as already preformed in the initial stage, or are we to regard them as new 
structures emerging through the process of development? Tetens himself raises these 
questions in the following fascinating passage: 
When any increase of the soul on one side radiates across the whole of the soul, 
and activates its power in other directions as well, then what does it effect? Does 
 
                                                     
4
 This is of course understandable from both the Wolffian and the Crusian perspective. For Wolff, the increase 
in one faculty would imply an increase in all others because they are ultimately the same faculty. For Crusius, 
the increase in one faculty would imply an increase in others because of the interanimation of the faculties. 
5
 I believe the last sentence is a confusion on Tetens’ part, because the “Fertigkeit” is intended to be a highly 
active version of an “Anlage” or “Disposition”. I therefore suggest we read the passage as saying that 
something external is required to pass from the “Anlage” to the higher degrees of “Thätigkeit”. 
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it produce a new faculty, or does it merely strengthen and maintain the faculty 
that is already present in nature in such a way, that it can express itself and go 
forth as soon as a favorable situation comes along? That is in other words the 
question that has been investigated with exceptional zeal as far as the body is 
concerned, and that has not even been raised as far as the development of the soul 
is concerned: namely, whether the articulation of the faculties is merely an 
evolution of preexisting natural predispositions [Naturanlagen], or an epigenesis, 
that brings forth new faculties, of which nothing more preexisted than the 
receptivity to acquire them. The German philosophers are almost invariably 
epigenesists of the soul, much like the German physiologists are evolutionists [i.e. 
preformationists] of the body. Hutcheson, Reid, Beattie, Oswald, mostly however 
Home, attribute many innate fundamental feelings to man. […] We can regard 
those that consider such determinate feelings as defenders of physiological 
evolutionism, since for them, the predispositions to the different manners of 
sensitivity or activity of nature, must be originally present in miniature next to 
one another in the soul, in the same way that in Bonnet’s opinion, in the fertilized 
egg and in germinating seeds all the canals and vessels of the whole body must be 
present in both form and predisposition. (Tetens 1777, II: 434-435; my translation) 
This passage is fascinating first of all because it starts off with the claim that the 
previous picture of development, and the very term entwicklung, is neutral with respect 
to epigenesis and preformation. This means that Tetens regarded the initial account as 
not already deciding whether epigenesis and preformation is to be preferred. Secondly, 
it offers a peculiar taxonomy of positions on the nature of the soul, since it regards the 
German theories of the soul as more epigenesist than the empiricist theories of the 
British and Scottish authors. This requires some comment, because it seems as if Tetens 
does so on the basis that German philosophers attribute to the soul higher order 
capacities that develop later on and have generic functions, whereas empiricists posit a 
special feeling or capacity for every higher-order capacity. Physiological epigenesis 
would then be the theory that a single principle or a limited set of principles suffices to 
generate the various functions of the soul, whereas physiological preformationism 
would require that each function of the soul stems from a distinct preexisting origin. 
As usual, Tetens seeks to find a middle ground between the two theories, in the form 
of a compromise. He suggests that the physiological preformationists have a good point 
in insisting that not all capacities can emerge from a single source, given the fact that 
the capacity for reasoning, for instance, differs infinitely from the capacity for feeling 
(Tetens 1777, II: 445). For this reason, he allows that there might be multiple 
predisposed capacities, but insists that we nevertheless also attempt to explain non-
fundamental capacities as newly emerging during development. The resulting theory is 
that the development of some preformed elements can give rise to novelty, or, as Tetens 
expresses it, that there can be epigenesis through evolution. 
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Tetens thus believes that the development of the soul proceeds according to a 
process analogous to the development of the body. He therefore first tries to develop a 
theory of generation of the body, not on the basis of research or observations, but on 
the basis of a review of the literature. He distinguishes three global positions: the 
system of evolution, which we know as preformation, defended most recently and most 
capably by Haller and Bonnet , the position of epigenesis, which he associates with 
Caspar Friedrich Wolff, and finally a group of related positions that are neither, 
defended by Buffon and Needham (and, as he adds later, Maupertuis) (Tetens 1777, II: 
448).6 He also importantly notes that the first two positions agree on two principles. The 
first principle is basically the version of the principle of sufficient reason Leibniz called 
the principle of causality, namely that nothing exists without ground or cause. In the 
context of embryology, this means: “the germ [Keim] and its internal and external 
properties, and that which is added to it, jointly contain the full sufficient ground of 
development, and determines the internal form, size and construction of the body that 
is produced” (Tetens 1777, II: 453; my translation). In the first two chapters of this 
dissertation, I already indicated how the issue of the principle of sufficient reason 
interrelated with theory of development in early modern philosophy, and in Kant’s 
philosophy prior to the 1770s. Here, Tetens uses it to bracket or even dismiss the third 
position he distinguished, because it does not sufficiently explain the grounds (Buffon), 
explains without sufficient ground (Needham), or introduces sufficient ground through 
quasi-intelligences (Maupertuis) (Tetens 1777, II: 464-473). This leaves him with two 
viable alternatives: evolution and epigenesis, in the versions of Bonnet and Wolff 
respectively. 
Tetens also discerns another principle on which both preformationism and 
epigenesis agree: the principle that an organized being develops from a germ (Tetens 
1777, II: 455). This would seem puzzling to those readers who take the notion of a germ 
to be “unambiguously preformationist”, since Tetens considers the term neutral with 
respect to theories of development. It should not be so suprising, however, since it 
resonates with my discussion of chapters 2 and 3, where I argued that Kant also used the 
terms germs and dispositions in a theory-neutral manner, and saw them as nothing 
more than the constraints on the process of development such that the latter can follow 
a determinate pattern or lead to a determinate result. Similarly, Tetens takes the term 
Keim to mean any causal influence on the process of development that accounts for its 
determinacy or specificity (Tetens 1777, II: 475-476). The difference between 
preformation and epigenesis then amounts to the fact that the former insists on the 
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 Remember that I argued, in chapter 2, that this was not an exceptional position at the time. Kant made very 
much the same distinction even before Tetens published the work I am discussing here. 
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uniqueness of germs, namely the original germ in which all forms are inchoately 
present, whereas the latter allows for multiple germs, some of which are external, and 
for the emergence of new forms through development. 
Tetens’ presentation is obviously meant to make the two leading rival theories 
somehow commensurable, and to allow him to propose a synthesis. This synthesis is the 
theory that a preformationist development can produce new forms, contrary to what 
authors like Bonnet insist (Tetens 1777, II: 497). He argues for this by starting off from 
Bonnet’s theory and then showing that this theory does not preclude the production of 
new forms. Bonnet’s theory holds that there is no new production of forms in 
development, that there is only growth and expansion of existing forms. This growth 
and expansion occurs according to intussusception – as Tetens remarks, both 
preformationists and epigenesists agree that the nutrition takes the form of 
intussusception into original material (Tetens 1777, II: 495). However, in taking in new 
materials and in growing, preexisting forms can not only be significantly altered: new 
connections between existing forms become possible, namely connections between the 
newly integretated parts. If such connections can themselves constitute forms – and 
Tetens believes they can – then new forms can arise simply through the preformationist 
process of development, i.e. a preformationist development can have epigenetic effects. 
This theory allows Tetens to distinguish between forms that were present in advance, 
namely those for which there were germs present, and forms that arise only later, 
through the epigenetic process, and did not arise out of preexisting germs. The former 
are essential, the latter accidental forms of the organization. Nevertheless, this 
accidental nature is not entirely the effect of mere outside influence: there are in the 
germs some tendencies, however small, to prefer one new formation over another 
(Tetens 1777, II: 521-522). Tetens constantly argues that even epigenesis must assume 
some such constraints to be in place on the process of development, and that it too 
requires that new development proceeds from some previous structure, even though 
the previous structure may be relatively dissimilar. He also argues that, whenever 
Bonnet resists any straightforward caricature of preformation, he is bound to admit 
great transformations in the process of development. In doing so, he of course 
undermines his claim that these transformations are merely increase and growth.7 
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 Tetens also insists that new germs can be produced in nature. He does so by using Buffon’s theory of the 
origin of reproductive materials. Buffon hypothesized that the reproductive materials present in the 
reproductive organs are produced by the organs, and that they form the inchoate forms of the same organs in 
the offspring. Tetens notices that this theory is perhaps compatible with preformation, because it states that 




Having provided this general picture of his theory of “epigenesis through evolution”, 
Tetens can then apply it, through analogy, to the development of the soul. Of course, he 
insists that analogies have their limits, but he also indicates that the existence of the 
analogy might explain why the soul and the body, despite their distinct natures and 
their separate developments, follow the same pattern of development. Nonetheless, this 
analogy goes very far: Tetens suggests that the human soul can itself, though it is 
immaterial, be produced by the act of fertilization, and he insists that it is already in its 
embryonal stage distinctly human. Its distinct nature consists in the fact that it already 
has the germs for certain properties, and that it has more or less tendency to be 
modified in certain ways. In this context, Tetens first notices that this is his solution to 
the debate on innate ideas. He argues that, although he wants to believe that we in fact 
do receive information from the outside, and are not born with all ideas innately 
present, we must be born with the disposition to receive certain impressions and not 
others, to be sensitive in some ways and not in others (Tetens 1777, II: 545). 
Tetens thus argues that the soul develops through an epigenesis prompted by 
evolution. In the case of the body, this was done through the intussusception of 
nutrients into the existing organic forms. In the soul, it is through the intake of 
sensations into the powers of the soul. (Tetens 1777, II: 548) This explains why the 
development of the soul does not solely consist in the increase in the stock of ideas, 
since the latter increase can strengthen the powers of the soul and give occasion to new 
connections. Finally, it allows Tetens to refine his theory of the distinction between 
fundamental and derivative faculties: the fundamental faculties are those that, like the 
fundamental forms in the body, are present in advance as a germ, whereas the 
derivative ones are those that are due to the growth and strengthening of the faculties, 
or composites allowed for by the new connections that arise between existing faculties 
as these expand. 
Given all this, it is wrong to suppose, with Henrich, that Kant would not have learned 
much from Tetens, for although the latter did not dare to make hard claims about the 
debate on the unity of the faculties, he did insist that it connects with the idea of the 
development of the mind. To be sure, Wolff and Crusius also had their pictures of the 
dynamics of mind: for Wolff, it consisted in the continuous effort of the unique 
representative force developing its internal determinations over time, and for Crusius it 
consisted in the interanimation of powers in the soul and their mutual occasioning. 
Tetens, however, made the connection with theories of development explicit, and also 
revealed the merits of an epigenesist picture of the mind. It is clear that Kant was 
fascinated by the latter, and that he too wished to have a developmental conception of 
the faculties. It would be wrong, however, to assume that he simply adopted Tetens 
theory, since the very shift from the context of rational(ist) psychology to that of 
transcendental epistemology brings along important changes. Moreover, there are 
subtle but nevertheless important differences between the Tetensian and the Kantian 
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accounts of epigenesis. In the final chapter of this dissertation, I will discuss Kant’s 
conception of the epigenesis of the faculties. In the remainder of this chapter, I will 
present my interpretation of his conception of the system of faculties. 
6.3 The Disunity of the Gemüt 
6.3.1 The Distinctness of Sensibility and Understanding 
As we have seen, the distinctness of sensibility and understanding is a core doctrine of 
Kant’s critical philosophy. This suggests that, for Kant, the two faculties do not 
ultimately arise from the same source, and are not different manifestations of the same 
underlying capacity. In this subsection, I will discuss Kant’s reasons for maintaining that 
the lower and the higher faculties are really distinct, reasons that are ultimately of an 
epistemological nature as well. 
The obvious target of Kant’s critical insistence on the distinction between sensibility 
and understanding is the Leibnizian-Wolffian theory of ideas. According to that theory, 
the ideas of perception and those of conception differ only in the degree, and not in 
kind: perceptions are often confused to a high degree, because in perceiving particulars 
we have a full idea of them, but do not discern all the various ideas contained in this full 
idea. In the previous chapter, I already mentioned that, according to Leibniz, a full idea 
of a particular does not just consist of an enormous amount of different ideas, it consists 
of an infinite amount of different ideas. This is due to the fact that, in Leibnizianism, 
identity, and therefore individuality, is governed by the principle of the identity of 
indiscernibles. According to Leibniz, two things that have exactly the same properties, 
conceptually, are identical, so that, ideally, one could grasp an individual through a 
concept, namely its full concept, the concept that characterizes it, and only it, precisely. 
Kant denies that it is possible to grasp individuals through mere concepts. According 
to him, we are only ever presented with individuals in sensibility, and not in the 
understanding. This means that sensibility does play a notionally distinct role in 
thought, contrary to what McDowell seems to maintain. However, this in turn suggests 
that Kant might be subject to the Myth of the Given, and that therefore the theory of 
the distinctness of the faculties might be intended, but nonetheless fundamentally 
misguided. I will argue that this latter conclusion can be avoided if we realize that it is 
its intuitive nature, and not its receptive nature, that is responsible for sensibility’s 
distinct contribution to knowledge. First, however, we must dismiss some initially 
plausible, but ultimately unsatisfying, alternative interpretations. 
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The first interpretation assimilates Kant’s reasons for maintaining the distinctness of 
the faculties to those of Crusius. In subsection 6.2.2, I mentioned that Crusius criticized 
Wolff for not observing the distinction between the possible and the real in philosophy. 
Concretely, he claimed that whenever Wolff spoke of entities, objects and things, he was 
actually dealing with mere concepts of possible things. In order to be able to pass from 
the concept of a possible thing to the thing itself, something further is required, and this 
further element is sensation. For Crusius, the real always refers to a causal ground that is 
responsible for activating the merely potential. In absence of the causal influences of 
other objects, i.e. the sensations they cause in us, we are not entitled to conclude that 
our concepts or representations have reality. 
If Kant were to hold this theory, it would mean that he believed the foundation of our 
thought about the real to be constituted by a causal relation with the external world 
that provides us with sensory particulars, in casu sensations. This, however, is the very 
paradigm of the Myth of the Given, so we should hesitate to ascribe it to Kant directly. 
Moreoever, as I have already indicated in section 6.1, the attribution to Kant of any 
serious claim about the causal ground of sensations has two demerits: first, its textual 
basis is only a possibly provisional phrasing to be found at the very beginning of the 
Transcendental Aesthetic that is never theoretically articulated; second, it leads to a 
highly intractable dilemma within transcendental idealism. There are thus good reasons 
to look for other interpretations of the sensibility-understanding distinction. 
The second interpretation holds that it is not the causal origin, but rather the specific 
content of perceptual information that yields its non-conceptual nature. A traditional 
way of expressing this is that sensory content has a fineness of grain not to be had 
through conceptual content, that, in Fred Dretske’s way of putting it, sensory content is 
analog whereas conceptual content is digital (Dretske 1981: 141-142). This means that 
sensory information takes the form of continuous quantities, whereas concepts make 
discontinuous cuts in these continuous degrees, and thereby “abstract” from the 
particular, “classify” where before there was only a difference of degree. I believe that 
some such reasoning is present in Kant, but that he did not believe sensory information 
to simply be continuous. In fact, I take the argument of the anticipations of sense-
perception to imply that the categorical framework requires that sensation takes the 
form of the continuous. In absence of the category of quality, there would be no reason 
to expect the sensory to be analog. I will not here go into the difficult argument for this, 
and simply indicate it. In any case, although I believe that Kant can hold that sensibility 
and understanding differ like the analog and the digital without falling prey to the Myth 
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of the Given, I do not believe it is because it is analog that sensory information is 
information of particulars.8 
A third interpretation starts from the familiar Kantian idea that the real needs to be 
the object of possible experience, and interprets the idea of possible experience as the 
idea of possible perceptual acquaintance. This theory is an advance on the former 
because it does not actually require that something is perceptually given; it only 
requires that we can possibly encounter something. This vastly expands what we can 
count as “real” beyond the petites histoires of our own perceptual episodes. This theory 
amounts to what Gareth Evans has criticized as Ideal Verificationism, which he thinks 
amounts to the following idea from Berkeley’s The Principles of Human Knowledge (2nd 
edition 1734):  
For the question, whether the earth moves or no, amounts in reality to no more 
than this, to wit: whether we have reason to conclude from what has been 
observed by astronomers, that if we were  placed in such and such circumstances, 
and such and such a position and distance, both from the earth and sun, we should 
perceive the former to move among the choir of the planets, and appearing in all 
respects like one of them; and this, by the established rules of nature, which we 
have no reason to mistrust, is reasonably collected from the phenomena. 
(Berkeley 2009: 107) 
Evans suggests that this idea is an illegitimate interpretation of perfectly legitimate 
philosophical clues: 
Who can deny, with his hand on his heart, that such imaginings play a part in both 
his ordinary and his philosophical thinking? But it is not the imaginings that need 
to be denied; only the interpretation placed upon them. Evidently what is 
essential for a subject's conception to involve a spatio-temporal object is his 
conceiving that somewhere there exists an object which his thought concerns, and 
these imaginings are no more than the reflection of this idea. Our thought about 
the spatial world is, perhaps necessarily, accompanied by models or maps. Most of 
us have, for example, such a model of the solar system, with the sun in the centre, 
and the planets revolving at differing distances around it. The mistake which 
renders some form of ideal verificationism almost inescapable-is to suppose that, 
 
                                                     
8
 Mind that the analog-digital distinction might be harmonized with Leibniz by stating that the information in 
sensory perception could be grasped conceptually only through an infinitely fine-grained concept. I suspect 
that this is part of the reason why Kant requires that quality be conceived as analog in nature, namely because 
it could then be grasped conceptually in principle, through an infinite process of refinement and conceptual 
elaboration. Regarding quality through continuous quantity makes quality conceptually graspable without 
reducing it completely. 
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in constructing these models, we are thinking of the content of a possible experience. 
(Evans 1982: 99-100) 
Instead, Evans suggests that what these clues point to “is not ideal verificationism, but 
the crucial role of our conception of the spatial world in much of our thinking” (Evans 
1982: 100). 
It would initially seem as if Kant’s usage of the idea of possible experience bears 
witness of his falling prey to the misconception against which Evans warns. This 
conclusion, however, is precipitous, for we may perhaps understand Kant better by 
taking our cue from Evans himself, and understand the concept of “possible experience” 
not through “possible perceptual acquaintance”, but through the concept of spatiality 
involved. In fact, as I will now argue, Kant may have believed our capacity for 
demonstrative identification, i.e. of non-conceptual identification of – and hence 
reference to –particulars, to depend not on these particulars being possible content of 
our experience, but on the a priori forms of sensibility, namely orientable space-time. 
The distinction between the sensible and the intelligible was a main topic of Kant’s 
thought throughout the 1760s. These inquiries culminated in the 1770 Inaugural 
Dissertation, which is explicitly on the topic – as is revealed by its official full title De 
Mundi Sensibilis atque Intelligibilis Forma et Principiis. This does not mean that the 
distinction would pass on unchanged to the critical writings, since it runs together 
those between concept and the intuition, between the real and the logical, and between 
phenomenon and the noumenon. Tracing the various transformations which have led to 
the differentiation of these three oppositions characteristic of the critical Kant, is a task 
beyond this dissertation. Here, I will merely indicate one major line of thought that runs 
through the discussions from the 1760s and that sheds light on the distinction between 
sensibility and understanding from the 1780s onwards. 
In 5.3.1, I have already mentioned in passing one argument for the distinction. In the 
1763 Only Possible Argument text, Kant briefly invoked the distinction between logical and 
real opposition in order to distinguish his own position on the ens realissimum from that 
of Leibniz. In a p aper of the same year, Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative 
Magnitudes into Philosophy, Kant further articulates that distinction and discusses the 
various philosophical uses to which it can be put. Remember that, for Leibniz, two 
concepts are either compatible or contradictory. They are contradictory if one 
predicates something of a subject which the other denies of it. This opposition is binary, 
in the sense that one is affirmative, and the other negative, and that there is no other 
option (the law of excluded middle). If two contradictory predicates are predicated of 
the same subject, then that subject cannot be thought (is incogitabile) and cannot exist. 
(AA II: 171) 
Kant argues that, besides this logical opposition holding between contradictory 
predicates, there is another opposition, namely real opposition. Really opposed 
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predicates, unlike logically opposed ones, can exist simultaneously in the subject 
without abolishing the very possibility of that subject. They do, however, at least 
partially cancel each other out. (AA II: 171-172) Kant makes this understandable through 
the concept of negative magnitudes in mathematics (AA II: 172ff). Negative numbers are 
something positive in mathematics: they have a determinate magnitude, and are 
therefore distinct from zero. Yet, they are opposed to positive quantities in that positive 
and negative quantities cancel each other out. For instance, the sum of +5 and -5 is zero, 
and not a contradiction. 
Kant’s claim is that the concept of a negative quantity provides a different kind of 
opposition. Whereas in the case of logical opposition, there is typically one truly 
positive, and one merely privative member of the pair, and the two together lead to an 
impossibility, in the case of real opposition, both members are truly positive, and 
neither merely privative, and they do not jointly cancel out the possibility of the subject 
in which they inhere. The concept of a negative magnitude makes the latter trait easy to 
understand, but we also need to understand why the former trait, that of being equally 
positive, follows from it. In what sense can negative numbers be considered equally 
positive as positive ones? 
We can understand this better if we take a look at one of the examples Kant gives, 
namely that of opposed forces. If a given material object is subject to two opposed forces 
at the same time, this does not involve a contradiction. What rather happens is that the 
two opposed forces cancel each other or that the weaker one cancels out a magnitude of 
the stronger equal to its own magnitude. In the former case, the object remains at rest, 
even though it is subject to forces – rest does not imply absence of force. In this 
example, we can not only see what Kant means by non-contradictory opposition, we can 
also see why he considers both opposed members of the pair to be equally positive: they 
differ in sense or direction. 
This reveals further why Kant thinks of negative numbers as positive, namely by 
associating the minus-sign not with privation, but with a difference in sense. Along the 
single dimension of the series of numbers, + means away from the zero-point in one 
sense, whereas – means away from the zero point in the opposed sense. Hence, adding a 
negative magnitude to a positive one may be considered as the counteracting of the 
positive vector by the negative vector. According to Kant, arithmetical addition is what 
we would now call vectorial addition, but in a one-dimensional system (along a single 
axis). Hence, real opposition is associated with a vectorial, and therefore directional, 
nature, and even arithmetics is best understood through the model of forces.9 
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 I believe we can understand, on the basis of this conception of arithmetic, how Kant came to the idea that, 




The concept of real opposition resonates with the central point of another text from 
the 1760s, the 1768 Concerning the ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of Directions in Space. 
In that text, Kant seeks out the condition of the possibility of comprehending the very 
idea of a direction, and concludes that it is the concept of absolute space. The argument 
of the paper seems to be directed at Leibniz, who believed that space is a mere 
phaenomenon bene fundatum, and that spatial relations can be reduced to the non-spatial 
properties of things. Kant attacks this assumption with the so-called incongruent 
counterparts argument. The argument of incongruent counterparts suggests that there 
may be two objects which are perfectly similar as far as their conceptual description is 
concerned, but that can be different as far as their specifically spatial properties are 
concerned. Kant’s example is that of the left and right hand, but is better understood as 
that of two objects that are each other’s perfect mirror image. According to Leibniz, two 
objects which are conceptually indistinguishable are identical (are not really two). Kant 
argues here that there are non-conceptual, i.e. irreducibly spatial properties in virtue of 
which an object can be distinct from another whilst being conceptually indiscernible 
from it, and these properties are the orientable, directional properties objects have by 
being situated in absolute space. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
derive their formal content from the a priori intuition of time. The idea can be better understood through a 
later elaboration of Kant’s philosophy of mathematics by William Hamilton. Hamilton presented his own 
version of the Kantian theory in a preliminary essay to one of his mathematical papers published in the 
transactions of the royal Irish Academy. Like Kant, he finds fault with the usual way of thinking about the 
contrast between postives and negatives, and introduces his theory in order to remove “the difficulties of the 
usual theory of Negative and Imaginary Quantities, or rather substituting a new Theory of Contrapositives and 
Couples, which he considers free from those old difficulties, and which is deduced from the Intuition or 
Original Mental Form of Time: the opposition of the (so-called) Negatives and Positives being referred by him, 
not to the opposition of the operations of increasing and diminishing a magnitude, but to the simpler and 
more extensive contrast between the relations of Before and After, or between the directions of Forward and 
Backward; and Pairs of Moments being used to suggest a Theory of Conjugate Functions, which gives reality 
and meaning to conceptions that were before Imaginary, Impossible, or Contradictory, because 
Mathematicians had derived them from that bounded notion of Magnitude, instead of the original and 
comprehensive thought of Order in Progression.” (Hamilton 1837: 297) The idea behind this remark is clear: as 
long as we think of numbers as magnitudes, we can make little sense of negatives, for negative magnitudes do 
not seem to make sense. If we instead think of numbers as the members of an ordered series, we can allow for 
different places and movements within that series. The fundamental concept of mathematics is therefore 
order, and not magnitude. Hamilton goes on to suggest that the capacity to think an ordered series depends 
on the concepts of order in space and time: “The notion or intuition of Order in Time is not less but more 
deep-seated in the human mind, than the notion of intuition of Order in Space; and a mathematical Science 
may be founded on the former, as pure and as demonstrative as the science founded on the latter” (Hamilton 
1837: 297). I believe this was Kant’s intuition as well: the very idea of an ordered series depends on an 
irreducible grasp of the concept of order, and this order lies in the orientability of time, as, for instance, the 
very capacity to count relies on the capacity to orient each step of counting in a synoptic whole of time. 
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The 1768 argument falls of course short of the critical theory, because, although it 
admits that the concept of space is indispensible to our capacity to orient ourselves and 
to conceive ourselves as related to other things otherwise than by logically conceiving 
of them, it assumes that space is a concept, and not an intuition. Secondly, Kant is still in 
doubt over the contribution of sensibility to our thought. This passage from the 
Inaugural Dissertation reveals an advance: 
There is (for man) no intuition of what belongs to the understanding, but only a 
symbolic cognition; and thinking is only possible for us by means of a singular 
concept in the concrete. For all our intuition is bound to a certain principle of 
form, and it is only under this form that anything can be apprehended by the mind 
immediately or as singular, and not merely conceived discursively by means of 
general concepts. But this formal principle of our intuition (space and time) is the 
condition under which something can be the object of our senses. Accordingly, 
this formal principle, as the condition of sensitive cognition, is not a means to 
intellectual cognition. Moreover, since it is only through the senses that all the 
matter of our cognition is given, the noumenon as such cannot be conceived by 
means of representations drawn from sensations. Thus the concept of the 
intelligible as such is devoid of all that is given in human intuition. The intuition, 
namely, of our mind is always passive. It is, accordingly, only possible in so far as it 
is possible for something to affect our sense. Divine intuition, however, which is 
the principle of objects, and not something governed by a principle, since it is 
independent, is an archetype and for that reason perfectly intellectual. (AA II: 386-
397) 
Kant’s theory here moves a considerable distance towards his position in the Critique of 
Pure Reason. First of all, he notes that our form of knowledge is essentially divided 
between sensibility and understanding, between the intuition and the concept. He also 
already contrasts the intellectus ectypus and the intellectus archetypus, although here 
he may be more committed to the position that there not only is such an intuitive 
intellect, but that it is also the source of the existence of the thing in itself. This 
standpoint still appears in the famous letter to Marcus Herz, although there it already 
reveals some of the evolutions of Kant’s thought on the subject.  
The most important feature of the quoted passage is, however, that it distinguishes 
between two aspects of sensibility, namely that, for all its passive nature, sensibility 
makes a contribution of its own, namely the form(s) of intuition, space and time. 
Moreoever, Kant suggests that it is through this form that we are capable of grasping 
things as singular, rather than as general. It thus seems that sensibility has two features: 
its receptivity, which makes us capable of acquiring the matter of thought, and its form, 
which allows us to grasp and think particulars. 
I believe this sets us on the path of understanding the critical account of sensibility. 
Kant defines sensibility as a faculty that is receptive and intuitive. It is receptive 
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because, through it, we are given information, and it is intuitive because it presents 
information in terms of particulars. The contribution of sensibility can then be 
understood as allowing us to have perceptual judgments or beliefs as judgments or 
beliefs about particulars. Traditionally, the distinct role of sensibility has been taken to be 
its receptivity, but we have seen that this is problematic. I suggest instead that it is its 
intuitive nature that makes up its contribution to thought. In itself, it might be that 
sensations could be directly given to the understanding as its matter. But this is not how 
Kant pictures it: sensations are only presented to the understanding through the form 
of intuition: space and time. I therefore suggest that the specific contribution of 
sensibility is its intuitive nature, that is, its capacity to have thought relate to 
particulars, and that in turn this capacity depends on the intrinsically and irreducibly 
orienting and orientable nature of intuitive space-time. 
This makes sense of various aspects of Kant’s presentation of the theory. First of all, 
Kant is unerringly silent about the receptivity of sensibility, and focuses instead on a 
proof for the intuitive nature of space and time. He thus seems more concerned with 
showing that the contributions of space and time are not reducible to conceptual 
capacities. It also reveals why Kant insists that in absence of intuitions, we are only ever 
presented with concepts, and never with objects. In the “Amphiboly of Concepts of 
Reflection” from the Critique of Pure Reason, he again lists the vectorial nature of real 
opposition and the orientability of space as reasons why Leibniz is wrong to believe that 
we can relate to objects merely by having the concepts of those objects: 
The principle of indiscernibles is really based on the presupposition that if a 
certain distinction is not to be found in the concept of a thing in general, then it is 
also not to be found in the things themselves; consequently all things are 
completely identical (numero eadem) that are not already distinguished from each 
other in their concepts (as to quality or quantity). But since in the mere concept of 
anything abstraction is made from many necessary conditions of an intuition, it is 
with peculiar haste that that from which abstraction has been made is taken as 
something that is not to be encountered at all, and nothing conceded to the thing 
except what is contained in its concept.  
The concept of a cubic foot of space, wherever and however often I think it, is in 
itself always completely the same. Yet two cubic feet are nevertheless 
distinguished in space merely through their locations (numero diversa); these are 
conditions of the intuition in which the object of this concept is given, which do 
not belong to the concept but to the entire sensibility. In the same way, there is no 
contradiction at all in the concept of a thing if nothing negative is connected with 
something affirmative, and merely affirmative concepts cannot, in combination, 
effect any cancellation. Yet in the sensible intuition in which reality (e.g., motion) 
is given, there are conditions (opposed directions), from which one had abstracted 
in the concept of motion in general, that make possible a conflict, which is 
certainly not a logical one, that produces a zero = 0 out of that which is entirely 
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positive; and one could not say that all reality is in agreement just because no 
conflict a is to be found among its concepts. According to mere concepts the inner 
is the substratum of all relation or outer determinations. If, therefore, I abstract 
from all conditions of intuition, and restrict myself solely to the concept of a thing 
in general, then I can abstract from every outer relation, and yet there must 
remain a concept of it, that signifies no relation but merely inner determinations. 
(CPR A 281-283 / B 337-339) 
Leibniz’s doctrine that we can relate to objects by concepts alone is false because what 
we would be related to are not the objects, but rather the general concepts through 
which we think them. In order to have an object as a particular before us, and not just a 
concept, we need the forms of sensibility, and their specific relational and directional 
features. 
The suggested reading also sheds light on the role accorded to imagination in the 
Transcendental Deduction: there, imagination is understood as intuitive  yet spontaneous. 
This can be understood as follows: understanding is not of itself related to objects, and 
sensibility cannot conceive at all. Thus, in order to bring the two together, a faculty is 
required that allows us to think about particulars, having the “think” aspect due its 
spontaneity, and the “about particulars” aspect due to being intuitiveness. It would thus 
be wrong to see the imagination as the shared origin of sensibility and understanding: it 
is rather a mediating capacity that is necessary because of the chasm between the two 
capacities: 
We therefore have a pure imagination, as a fundamental faculty of the human 
soul, that grounds all cognition a priori. By its means we bring into combination 
the manifold of intuition on the one side and the condition of the necessary unity 
of apperception on the other. Both extremes, namely sensibility and 
understanding, must necessarily be connected by means of this transcendental 
function of the imagination, since otherwise the former would to be sure yield 
appearances but no objects of an empirical cognition, hence there would be no 
experience. (CPR A 124). 
As I understand this passage, an object requires two aspects: a particular which is 
characterized, and a concept which characterizes it. Jointly, they present us with beliefs 
or judgments of the kind: “This is an x which is F”. Here, x stands for the base concept of 
a concept in general, characterized by the categories. An object is always conceived of as 
a particular located in space (and time) and characterized by a certain property. Thus, 
Kant’s position comes close to Evans’ position:  
When we represent material objects in the imagination, we ipso facto represent 
them as located and differentiated in space. We imagine the carpenter, in the 
example of 4.2, as located at a particular position in space, though, of course, there 
is no particular position we imagine him as having. Such representations of 
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objects in the imagination are just like arbitrary fundamental Ideas (to be 
understood on the model of the arbitrary names of certain formal systems). 
(Evans 1982: 114) 
Kant’s position thus seems to be that the understanding cannot grasp particulars; it can 
only grasp things through concepts, i.e. through properties which can in principle 
characterize multiple things. It could not even hope to grasp an object through a 
complete concept, for even then there could be massive reduplication. Only sensibility 
and imagination allow us to be presented with particulars, not because of their 
receptivity, but because of their intuitive nature. Sensibility and Imagination are 
intuitive because they present things under the forms of space and time, and it is these 
forms that are responsible for the capacity to demonstratively identify particulars. They 
can do this because they are irreducibly oriented, directional, topological. On this 
reading, we can demonstratively identify a particular not because we are related to it in 
a certain way, but because we place it and ourselves in the same oriented and orientable 
space. The very act of pointing, of saying “here” and “there”, does not depend on some 
causal or perceptual relation between objects, but rather on the fact that space is always 
already grasped as directional, and that we already grasp ourselves as irreducibly 
spatially situated. 
This account makes sense of much of Kant’s insistences, and ascribes to him a more 
refined theory of the distinct contribution of sensibility. But before passing on I would 
also like to point out that it harmonizes with the Critique of the Power of Judgment. We 
saw that the problem there was the relation between the particular and the general, and 
that this problem arises because we are divided between sensibility and understanding. 
This is so because the relevant feature of sensibility is that it allows us to refer to 
particulars, and the relevant feature of understanding is that it allows us to grasp 
through general properties. For this reason, whenever we think understanding yields us 
a concept of an object by itself, we are subject to illusion, because understanding cannot 
give us things; it can give us only properties. 
Furthermore, this explains why the contribution of sensibility is authoritative. One of 
the problems presented by the Myth of the Given is that it is not clear why the 
contribution of sensibility should matter to the conceptual, i.e. why in our conceptual 
activity we should “care” about the empirical. If it is true that sensibility is primarily 
responsible for presenting us with particulars, then it is obvious from where this 
authority stems. As I argued in chapter 5, Kant believes that reason has an intrinsic 
interest in striving for the recognition of particularity. It would thus seem that Kant’s 
sensibility matters to the understanding because it is sanctioned by reasons interest in 
specificity, which counteracts the interest in unity looked after by understanding. This 
will become clearer in the 7th and final chapter of this dissertation, in my discussion of 
the harmony of the faculties in aesthetic judgment. For now, I will simply conclude that 
Kant maintained the distinction of sensibility and understanding as a core doctrine of 
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his critical system, and that this does not subject him to the Myth of the Given, since the 
notionally distinct contribution of sensibility to thought is not its receptivity, but rather 
its intuitive nature, which is due to its a priori form, and not to its a posteriori matter. 
6.3.2 The Paralogisms and the Unity of the Soul 
In the previous subsection, I have tried to indicate why Kant believed there to be 
distinct and irreducible faculties, insofar as these faculties correspond with general 
moments of epistemic activity. I have argued that the lower faculties are indispensable 
and irreducible because they allow us to refer to particulars, a capacity that depends on 
our capacity to orient ourselves in a space-time of which we are in principle not the sole 
occupants. In admitting, however, that the soul, or at least its transcendental 
equivalent, consists of such a multiplicity of faculties, Kant seems to be opening himself 
up to a very simple charge, namely that of contradicting the simplicity of the soul. Wolff 
argued, after all, that the soul had to have a basic power and only one basic power 
because it is obviously a simple substance. It is obviously so, in the opinion of the German 
rationalists, because thought itself is simple and individuated in a way that only a true 
simple substance, and no aggregate can be. Crusius did not really challenge the 
assumption that the soul is a simple substance, but he did challenge the idea that the 
soul’s harboring multiple irreducible fundamental powers would imply that it is 
composite. The problem, however, is that he seems to assume that the composition of 
mental forces is sui generis and at best analogous to the composition of physical forces, 
simply because they have to compose within a single simple substance.  
In many ways, Kant was a follower of Crusius rather than of Wolff, and therefore 
defended some version of faculty pluralism. As a result, like Crusius, he is obliged to 
explain how the multiplicity of the faculties can be squared with the nature of the soul 
as it reveals itself in the very conception of thought. Such an argument can be found in 
the Paralogisms-chapter, where Kant targets the claims made by rational psychology 
and shows that they depend on illegitimate subreptions. In this subsection, I will argue 
that the Paralogisms, and concomitantly Kant’s theory of the self, are not just intended 
to bar the substantial metaphysical claims made in the Schulphilosophie, but that they are 
also meant to offer an alternative understanding of the unity that characterizes 
thought. Specifically, I will argue that Kant wanted to challenge the claim that thought 
immediately reveals itself to have a substantial (analytic) unity. In the next section, I 
will argue that Kant instead wished to think of thought, or of epistemic activity, as 
exhibiting a normative, organic unity. 
In discussing the Paralogisms chapter, it is important to note that it was all but 
completely rewritten for the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. Any 
interpretation must therefore offer some rationale for Kant’s choice to rewrite it. In his 
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study of the philosophy of mind that supposedly lies behind Kant’s philosophy, Andrew 
Brook (1994: 113-114) suggests that the substantial change in the Paralogisms chapter is 
at least correlated with one other chapter that was almost completely rewritten for the 
second edition: the transcendental deduction. He submits that Kant was forced to go 
into details about the nature of apperception in the Paralogisms chapter because he had 
not done so in the transcendental deduction, where he originally introduced the 
concept. In the B-deduction, Brook argues, we therefore find more of the comments that 
the first edition had postponed until the Transcendental Dialectic. I believe he is at least 
right in identifying the explanandum, namely the fact that the most valuable comments 
on the nature of transcendental apperception are to be found in the B-Deduction and 
the A-Paralogisms.  
Kant’s conception of transcendental apperception can only be understood in relation 
to his theory of synthesis. This is reflected by the structure of the completely rewritten 
second-edition version of the Transcendental Deduction proper, which opens with the 
following passage: 
the combination (conjunctio) of a manifold in general can never come to us 
through the senses, and therefore cannot already be contained in the pure form of 
sensible intuition; for it is an act of the spontaneity of the power of 
representation, and, since one must call the latter understanding, in distinction 
from sensibility, all combination, whether we are conscious of it or not, whether it 
is a combination of the manifold of intuition or of several concepts, and in the 
first case either of sensible or non-sensible intuition, is an action of the 
understanding, which we would designate with the general title synthesis in order 
at the same time to draw attention to the fact that we can represent nothing as 
combined in the object without having previously combined it ourselves, and that 
among all representations combination is the only one that is not given through 
objects but can be executed only by the subject itself, since it is an act of its self-
activity. One can here easily see that this action must originally be unitary and 
equally valid for all combination, and that the dissolution (analysis) that seems to 
be its opposite, in fact always presupposes it; for where the understanding has not 
previously combined anything, neither can it dissolve anything, for only through 
it can something have been given to the power of representation as combined. 
(CPR: B 129-130) 
Kant makes two distinct though related claims here, namely the spontaneity of 
synthesis and the primacy of synthesis. The first claim is that sensibility, being 
receptive, can never give us a combination of a manifold, but only the manifold itself. 
Combinations are never simply given; they require a specific act on the part of the 
subject that Kant calls synthesis. This leads to the second claim, that of the primacy of 
synthesis. If we are never simply presented with a synthetic whole, than all synthetic 
wholes are due to synthetic activities. Kant makes the latter point by stating that all 
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analysis is preceded by a synthesis. He thus refuses any account of thought that regards 
thinking primarily as analyzing a given complex whole into its simple constituents. 
Such an account seems to lie behind many Early Modern epistemologies. Kant states 
that analysis would not be possible if there were not already some capacity for thinking 
synthetic wholes, a capacity that needs to be distinct from sensibility. These sparse 
comments refer, of course, to the theory of the subjective deduction, which opened the 
A-deduction, but is absent in the B-deduction. 
After having introduced his theory that the very idea of a combination requires a 
capacity for synthesis, Kant continues §15 by noting that a further concept is required, 
namely that of unity: 
But in addition to the concept of the manifold and of its synthesis, the concept of 
combination also carries with it the concept of the unity of the manifold. 
Combination is the representation of the synthetic unity of the manifold. The 
representation of this unity cannot, therefore, arise from the combination; rather, 
by being added to the representation of the manifold, it first makes the concept of 
combination possible. This unity, which precedes all concepts of combination a 
priori, is not the former category of unity (§ 10); for all categories are grounded on 
logical functions in judgments, but in these combinations, thus the unity of given 
concepts, is already thought. The category therefore already presupposes 
combination. We must therefore seek this unity (as qualitative, § 12) someplace 
higher, namely in that which itself contains the ground of the unity of different 
concepts in judgments, and hence of the possibility of the understanding, even in 
its logical use. (CPR: B 130-131) 
This passage again announces two fundamental glosses on the kind of unity that is 
required for the capacity to be presented with combinations, and again they are 
importantly related. The first gloss is that the unity under consideration is synthetic, 
and, as Kant will indicate in the following paragraph, not analytic. We can already 
understand this by reminding ourselves of the already introduced doctrine of the 
primacy of synthesis: the analytic unity is the unity that can be analyzed into its 
constituents. But this unity already presupposes a synthetic activity that has 
accomplished the unity, as Kant states in a footnote two pages later: “only by means of 
an antecedently conceived possible synthetic unity can I represent to myself the 
analytical unity” (CPR: B 133). The second gloss on the synthetic unity is that it is not to 
be conflated with the kind of unity that is thought under the category of unity. Kant 
claims that, in fact, the very capacity to think something under the category of unity 
depends on the accomplishment of the more fundamental synthetic unity. 
Having introduced the idea of an original synthetic unity, Kant goes on to 
characterize this unity in §17, which is aptly titled “On the original-synthetic unity of 
apperception”, by connecting it with the idea of being represented in the same subject: 
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all manifold of intuition has a necessary relation to the I think in the same subject 
in which this manifold is to be encountered. But this representation is an act of 
spontaneity, i.e., it cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility. I call it the pure 
apperception, in order to distinguish it from the empirical one, or also the original 
apperception, since it is that self-consciousness which, because it produces the 
representation I think, which must be able to accompany all others and which in 
all consciousness is one and the same, cannot be accompanied by any further 
representation. I also call its unity the transcendental unity of self-consciousness in 
order to designate the possibility of a priori cognition from it. For the manifold 
representations that are given in a certain intuition would not all together be my 
representations if they did not all together belong to a self-consciousness; i.e., as 
my representations (even if I am not conscious of them as such) they must yet 
necessarily be in accord with the condition under which alone they can stand 
together in a universal self-consciousness, because otherwise they would not 
throughout belong to me. (CPR: B 131-133) 
Kant thus claims that the original unity of synthesis is a unity in the sense that the 
manifold unified in it is ascribed to the same subject, and therefore connected in the 
same thought. It is easy to misunderstand this as the theory that, in representing and 
knowing, we are capable of relating thoughts because they are all somehow modes or 
attributes inhering in the same substance or subject. However, this latter view, which is 
a version of Cartesianism popular among early modern rationalists, is precisely the 
target of Kant’s criticism. Kant’s view is not that thoughts are connected by being in the 
same subject, it is that they are understood as being in the same subject. But in order to 
be in the same subject in the latter way, in order to exhibit the latter unity, they need to 
first be unified through an original synthesis: 
this thoroughgoing identity of the apperception of a manifold given in intuition 
contains a synthesis of the representations, and is possible only through the 
consciousness of this synthesis. For the empirical consciousness that accompanies 
different representations is by itself dispersed and without relation to the identity 
of the subject. The latter relation therefore does not yet come about by my 
accompanying each representation with consciousness, but rather by my adding 
one representation to the other and being conscious of their synthesis. Therefore 
it is only because I can combine a manifold of given representations in one 
consciousness that it is possible for me to represent the identity of the 
consciousness in these representations itself, i.e., the analytical unity of 
apperception is only possible under the presupposition of some synthetic one. 
(CPR: B 133) 
I believe Kant can best be understood here as claiming that the manifold of 
representations is not itself a unity in the sense of belonging to a single subject. To 
exhibit the unity of the subject, the manifold must be unified by a specific original 
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operation, which is active, but which also precedes any conscious or intentional activity, 
since conscious activity is only possible on the condition that this original unification 
has already been effected. But then which function is responsible for this unity? 
According to Kant, this function is the transcendental apperception, the original unity, 
and interestingly this transcendental apperception forms the core of the faculty of 
understanding. This is apparent from Kant’s statement, in the A-deduction that “[t]he 
unity of apperception in relation to the synthesis of the imagination is the 
understanding, and this very same unity, in relation to the transcendental synthesis of 
the imagination, is the pure understanding” (CPR A 119). This statement suggests that 
the understanding is the working of transcendental apperception on the materials of 
sensibility and understanding. This makes sense if we understand Kant’s definition of 
understanding as a “faculty of rules” (CPR A 126): 
The understanding is thus not merely a faculty for making rules through the 
comparison of the appearances; it is itself the legislation for nature, i.e., without 
understanding there would not be any nature at all, i.e., synthetic unity of the 
manifold of appearances in accordance with rules; for appearances, as such, 
cannot occur outside us, exist only in our sensibility. The latter, however, as the 
object of cognition in an experience, with everything it may contain, is possible 
only in the unity of apperception. The unity of apperception, however, is the 
transcendental ground of the necessary lawfulness of all appearances in an 
experience. This very same unity of apperception with regard to a manifold of 
representations (that namely of determining it out of a single one) is the rule, and 
the faculty of these rules is the understanding. (CPR A 126-127) 
The understanding, as a faculty of unifying and synthesizing under rules, has as a core 
the transcendental ground of this unity: the transcendental apperception. If this is true, 
and if it is also the case, as Kant claims, that sensibility itself does not exhibit this unity, 
than the unity of the subject is not a pre-given – it is an accomplishment by one of the 
faculties as it works in concert with others, in this case sensibility and imagination. 
Such an interpretation provides a valuable clue for identifying how the arguments of 
the paralogisms, which are criticisms of the metaphysical conclusions drawn from the 
nature of selfhood, pertain to the debate on the doctrine of the faculties. Indeed, I will 
now try to show that one line of argument in the first two A-paralogisms is that rational 
psychologists like Wolff conflate the synthetic and the analytic unity of the subject, and 
therefore interpret what is, for Kant, an underlying unifying function with an 
underlying unity. 
Although I will not be offering a full interpretation of the paralogisms here, I will 
start off by discussing the notion of a paralogism. Kant opens the chapter as follows: 
A logical paralogism consists in the falsity of a syllogism due to its form, whatever 
its content may otherwise be. A transcendental paralogism, however, has a 
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transcendental ground for inferring falsely due to its form. Thus a fallacy of this 
kind will have its ground in the nature of human reason, and will bring with it an 
unavoidable, although not insoluble, illusion. (CPR A 341 / B 399) 
He later tries to clarify in what sense the paralogisms are logical fallacies by specifying 
the kind of fallacy involved: 
If one wants to give a logical title to the paralogism in the dialectical syllogisms of 
the rational doctrine of the soul, insofar as they have correct premises, then it can 
count as sophisma figurae dictionis, in which the major premise makes a merely 
transcendental use of the category, in regard to its condition, but in which the 
minor premise and the conclusion, in respect of the soul that is subsumed under 
this condition, make an empirical use of the same category. (CPR A 402-403) 
Indeed, Kant seemed to have regarded the sophisma figurae dictionis as a paradigmatic 
example of a paralogism, for instance in the Jäsche Logik: 
An inference of reason that is wrong as to form, although it has for itself the 
illusion of a correct inference, is called a fallacy (fallacia). Such an inference is a 
paralogism insofar as one deceives oneself through it, a sophism insofar as one 
intentionally seeks to deceive others through it.  
Note. The ancients occupied themselves very much with the art of making 
such sophisms. Therefore many of this kind have emerged, e.g., the sophisma 
figurae dictionis, in which the medius terminus is taken in different 
meanings - fallacia a dicta secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter, sophisma 
heterozeteseos, elenchid ignorationis,' etc. (AA IX: 134-135) 
Here, the fallacy of figurae dictionis is explained as a fallacy through the equivocation of 
the middle term. A syllogism is meant to connect the extreme terms through a third 
term, a middle term, which occurs in both the minor and the major proposition. But as 
Kant notes, Medieval logicians have often warned that the syllogism might be invalid if 
there is equivocation of the Middle term, i.e. if the middle term is taken in different 
ways in the different premisses. To us, this might not sound like a formal invalidity, but 
rather like a material invalidity. But we should not overlook one crucial feature of the 
figurae dictionis that would not have been overlooked by Kant, namely that this fallacy 
often depends on category mistakes. This is clear from the longer treatment of the fallacy 
in the Hecschel Logic: 
The sophisma figurae dictionis is where the medius terminus is taken in different 
meanings. E.g., A philosopher is a kind of learned man. Leibniz was a philosopher, 
consequently Leibniz was a genus of learned man. Vox medii termini, philosopher, is 
taken in different meanings[;] one time it is taken as a predicate, and the other 
time as a multitude of things to which the predicate belongs. When the medius 
terminus in the two premises is taken in different meanings, then this always 
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yields a fallacium. E.g., no artist is born; some men are artists[;] hence some men 
are not born. In the major the medius terminus means the art, and in the minor the 
man. (Kant 1992: 458) 
To understand how equivocation constitutes a logical fallacy, and not just a confusion, 
we must return to the context of homonymy and synonymy in Aristotelian logic. In the 
very first sentence of the Categories, Aristotle defines homonymy: “When things have 
only a name in common and the definition of being which corresponds to the name is 
different, they are called homonymous. Thus, for example, both a man and a picture are 
animals.” (1a1) The equivocation here is between the man and the depicted man: the 
former is a man truly, the latter is a representation of a man. The fallacy is based on the 
following rule: if two things are of the same species, they are of the same genus, and of 
the same higher genera as well. Yet, although the word man is equally applied to a real 
man and to a depicted man, these two things are not truly of the same genus. In the case 
of equivocation, two things are called the same because they share some difference, 
some distinct mark, although these differences or marks are not predicated of the same 
genera. In Aristotle’s case, both things are called man because they are man-shaped, but 
the former is a man-shaped animal and the latter is a man-shaped picture. 
This discussion explains two peculiarities about Kant’s conception of the paralogisms. 
First of all, it explains why Kant thought that the fallacies were formal errors: as we saw 
in 5.3.1, the semantics of species and genera forms an integral part of his logic, and is 
therefore properly understood as logical. Because the terms in logical propositions 
stand for spaces within logical space, it is a logical error to conflate such spaces, rather 
than an empirical or linguistic one. When Kant introduces the concept of a 
transcendental paralogism, he does not mean to introduce a fallacy that is not purely 
logical, but rather a form of purely logical fallacy where the equivocation is unavoidable 
because it is suggested by the nature of human reason. 
The second peculiarity we can explain is precisely why the employment of a category 
would be a necessary equivocation. As I have noted, a case of homonymy is usually due 
to some similarity between two things that are not of the same genus. There is in the 
Aristotelian tradition a strand of reflection on what it would mean if the two did not 
even fall under the same “highest genus”, i.e. under the same category. In such a case, 
the term would be applied homonymously to the two things because they are not of the 
same category. According to Aristotle, being is precisely such a term, i.e. a term that can 
only be applied across categories through equivocation (in fact, the Aristotelian 
categories are best understood as the many different senses of the fundamentally 
equivocal term “to be”, as is explained in Metaphysics IV.2). For this reason, being is 
often called a transcendental, since it transcends the categories. 
It is interesting that Kant himself mentions the notion of a transcendental term in 
the so-called “Metaphysical Deduction”. There, he reminds us of the Medieval theory 
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that “unum, verum et bonum” are three convertible senses of the transcendental term 
“being”, and objects to it: 
These supposedly transcendental predicates of things are nothing other than 
logical requisites and criteria of all cognition of things in general, and ground it in 
the categories of quantity, namely, the categories of unity, plurality, and totality; 
yet these categories must really have been taken as material, as belonging to the 
possibility of things itself, when in fact they should have been used in a merely 
formal sense, as belonging to the logical requirements for every cognition; thus 
these criteria of thinking were carelessly made into properties of things in 
themselves. In every cognition of an object there is, namely, unity of the concept, 
which one can call qualitative unity insofar as by that only the unity of the 
comprehension of the manifold of cognition is thought, as, say, the unity of the 
theme in a play, a speech, or a fable. Second, truth in respect of the consequences. 
The more true consequences from a given concept, the more indication of its 
objective reality. One could call this the qualitative plurality of the marks that 
belong to a concept as a common ground (not of in it as a magnitude). Third, 
finally, perfection, which consists in this plurality conversely being traced back to 
the unity of the concept, and agreeing completely with this one and no other one, 
which one can call qualitative completeness (totality). From this it is obvious 
these logical criteria of the possibility of cognition in general transform the three 
categories of magnitude, in which the unity in the generation of the magnitude 
must be assumed to be completely homogeneous, into a principle with the quality 
of a cognition for the connection of heterogeneous elements of cognition into one 
consciousness also. (CPR B 114-115) 
In this passage, which was added in the second edition, Kant tells us that the material 
use made of these transcendental concepts is in fact a usage which is within the 
category of quantity rather than transcendent to it. After all, Kant believes that 
metaphysics cannot meaningfully speak of that which transcends the categories. That is 
why he must object to the material, rather than merely logical, use of the categories of 
quantity. In this case, he seems most concerned with the case of unity, which is here 
fallaciously used in order to provide a concept of the unity of heterogeneous, rather 
than that of merely homogeneous natures. This comment pertains directly to the 
paralogisms, as we will see. 
Now that we have a better conception of a paralogism in general and of the 
transcendental paralogisms in particular, we can look at the first two paralogisms and 
see what makes them transcendentally paralogistic. The first paralogism runs as 
follows: 
That the representation of which is the absolute subject of our judgments, and 
hence cannot be used as the determination of another thing, is substance. 
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I, as a thinking being, am the absolute subject of all my possible judgments and 
this representation Myself cannot be used as the predicate of any other thing. 
Thus I, as thinking being (soul), am substance. (CPR A 348) 
Kant opens his discussion of the paralogism with the following passage, which does not 
itself constitute a criticism, but rather sets up his treatment of the problem: 
We have shown in the analytical part of the Transcendental Logic that pure 
categories (and among them also the category of substance) have in themselves 
no objective significance at all unless an intuition is subsumed under them, to the 
manifold of which they can be applied as functions of synthetic unity. Without 
that they are merely functions of a judgment without content. Of any thing in 
general I can say that it is a substance, insofar as I distinguish it from mere 
predicates and determinations of things. Now in all our thinking the I is the 
subject, in which thoughts inhere only as determinations, and this I cannot be 
used as the determination of another thing. Thus everyone must necessarily 
regard Himself as a substance, but regard his thinking only as accidents of his 
existence and determinations of his state. (CPR A 348-349) 
The first half of this passage reminds us of the constraint on the usage of the category of 
substance, namely that it can only legitimately be used when applied to an intuition. 
Kant states that without such a sensible element, the categories are merely functions of 
judgment without content. However, Kant does say that we are allowed to use the 
category in such cases, provided we use it in a purely logical way. I believe we can 
understand this better if we keep in mind that there have traditionally been two ways of 
using the concept of a substance, namely firstly as a proper subject of predication, and 
secondly as an independently existing thing. For Aristotle, both concepts were so 
intimately entwined that he believed that to be a metaphysically independent thing 
meant to be a proper subject of predication and conversely. If we read Kant as seeking 
to distinguish those two meanings of the term, we can read him as saying that we are 
systematically tempted to regard ourselves as the metaphysical substance underlying 
our thoughts because we cannot but regard ourselves as the logical subject of all our 
thoughts. After all, the transcendental unity requires that we regard all thoughts as 
connected in the same subject, i.e. as predicated of the same subject. But this does not of 
itself imply that all thoughts are the attributes of the same metaphysical substance. 
That the latter inference is problematic, appears from the continuation of the discussion 
of the first paralogism: 
But now what sort of use am I to make of this concept of a substance? That I, as a 
thinking being, endured for myself, that naturally I neither arise nor perish - this I 
can by no means infer, and yet it is for that alone that the concept of the 
substantiality of my thinking subject can be useful to me; without that I could very 
well dispense with it altogether. 
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So much is lacking for us to be able to infer these properties solely from the pure 
category of substance, that we must rather ground the persistence of a given 
object on experience if we would apply to that object the empirically usable 
concept of a substance. But now we have not grounded the present proposition on 
any experience, but have merely inferred [it] from the concept of the relation that 
all thought has to the I as the common subject in which it inheres. Nor would we 
be able to establish such a persistence through any secure observation, even if we 
supposed one. For the I is, to be sure, in all thoughts; but not the least intuition is 
bound up with this representation, which would distinguish it from other objects 
of intuition. Therefore one can, to be sure, perceive that this representation 
continually recurs with every thought, but not that it is a standing and abiding 
intuition, in which thoughts (as variable) would change. (CPR A 350-351) 
The first paragraph list some of the implications that metaphysicians have sought to 
draw from the fact that we must appear to ourselves as the substances in which our 
thoughts inhere. Kant immediately repudiates these implications, stating that they do 
not follow from the category of substance in itself, but rather from the category of 
substance as applied to empirical objects. Again, this statement cannot be understood 
unless we take the term “substance” to be equivocal here, namely in the sense of either 
the pure or of the schematized category. The pure category is limited to the idea of a 
subject of predication, whereas the schematized category means “persistent unity 
underlying change”. Since our self is not really intuited by us, but rather the result of a 
necessary function of the Gemüt,  or of the understanding, we cannot take it as an 
empirical basis. Hence, we are not allowed to apply the category of substance to it in 
more than the purely formal sense. 
 Kant’s whole discussion here is muddled, however, which may be an important 
reason why he chose to rewrite it for the second edition. The major problem is that, 
thus far, Kant locates the equivocation in the term substance. This cannot be the ground 
for the paralogistic nature of the argument, however, since the term substance is not 
even the middle term; the term “absolute subject of our judgments” is. I have already 
indicated how this confusion can be eliminated, namely by taking Kant to himself 
seemingly equivocate substance and subject, an equivocation that is understandable 
because of contemporary usage. 
That Kant himself takes the paralogism to be an equivocation on the concept of 
subject, is immediately clear from the conclusion of his discussion in the first edition: 
From this it follows that the first syllogism of transcendental psychology imposes 
on us an only allegedly new insight when it passes off the constant logical subject 
of thinking as the cognition of a real subject of inherence, with which we do not 
and cannot have the least acquaintance, because consciousness is the one single 
thing that makes all representations into thoughts, and in which, therefore, as in 
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the transcendental subject, our perceptions must be encountered; and apart from 
this logical significance of the I, we have no acquaintance with the subject in itself 
that grounds this I as a substratum, just as it grounds thoughts. (CPR A 350) 
Here, Kant explicitly states that the equivocation is between the purely logical concept 
of a subject as a subject of predication and the metaphysical concept of a subject as a 
subject of inherence. The same seems to lie behind the B-edition version of the first 
paralogism, which Kant rebuts as follows: 
The major premise talks about a being that can be thought of in every respect, and 
consequently even as it might be given in intuition. But the minor premise talks 
about this being only insofar as it is considered as subject, relative only to 
thinking and the unity of consciousness, but not at the same time in relation to 
the intuition through which it is given as an object for thinking. Thus the 
conclusion is drawn per Sophisma figurae dictionis, hence means of a deceptive 
inference. (CPR B 411) 
Here the equivocation appears to be between the different ways in which we take 
something to be the subject of something. Kant clarifies in a footnote that the 
equivocation is due to the fact that the relation between thought and its subject is 
simply not of the same kind as the relation between a substance and its properties: 
"Thinking" is taken in an entirely different signification in the two premises: in 
the major premise, as it applies to an object  in general (hence as it may be given in 
intuition); but in the minor premise only as it subsists in relation to self-
consciousness, where, therefore, no object is thought, but only the relation to 
oneself as subject (as the form of thinking) is represented. In the first premise, 
things are talked about that cannot be thought of other than as subjects; the 
second premise, however, talks not about things, but about thinking (in that one 
abstracts from every object), in which the I always serves as subject of 
consciousness; hence in the conclusion it cannot follow that I cannot exist 
otherwise than as subject, but rather only that in thinking my existence I can use 
myself only as the subject of judgment, which is an identical proposition, that 
discloses absolutely nothing about the manner of my existence. (CPR B 411-412) 
Kant again uses substance and subject in a confusing way here, since he says that “it 
cannot follow that I cannot exist otherwise than as subject, but rather only that in 
thinking my existence I can use myself only as the subject of judgment”. We would 
expect him to say that we cannot think of ourselves as substance, although we can think 
of ourselves as substance. On closer inspection, however, the passage is less 
problematic: he is talking about that which cannot exist otherwise than as subject, and 
that is precisely the definition of substance. The proper reading then becomes: although 
I am allowed to think of myself as the subject of thinking, I am not allowed to think of 
myself as the thinking existent. We can easily see why this is so on the basis of our 
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discussion of the transcendental apperception: the subject of thought is not itself an 
object, it is rather the mark of a function of thought, the unifying function. That this 
underlies the argument of the paralogisms is even clearer in the case of the second 
paralogism. 
The second paralogism is a purported argument for the simplicity of the soul. Kant 
presents the argument as follows in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason: 
That thing whose action can never be regarded as the concurrence of many acting 
things, is simple. 
Now the soul, or the thinking I, is such a thing. 
Thus etc. (CPR A 351) 
As was the case with the first paralogism, here too the syllogism Kant offers does not 
easily reveal the structure and fallacious nature of the argument. Consequently, we 
must again look at his discussion of the argument to gain insight into these aspects: 
The so-called nervus probandi of this argument lies in the proposition that many 
representations have to be contained in the absolute unity of the thinking subject 
in order to constitute one thought. But no one can prove this proposition from 
concepts. For how could he set about to accomplish this? The proposition "A 
thought can be only the effect of the absolute unity of a thinking being" cannot be 
treated as analytic. For the unity of a thought consisting of many representations 
is collective, and, as far as mere concepts are concerned, it can be related to the 
collective unity of the substances cooperating in it (as the movement of a body is 
the composite movement of all its parts) just as easily as to the absolute unity of 
the subject. Thus there can be no insight into the necessity of presupposing a 
simple substance for a composite thought according to the rule of identity. But 
that this same proposition should be cognized synthetically and fully a priori from 
sheer concepts - that answer no one will trust himself to give when he has insight 
into the ground of the possibility of synthetic propositions as we have established 
it above. (CPR A 352-353) 
Kant interestingly remarks here that the idea of the unity of thought does not 
analytically entail the absolute unity, i.e. simplicity, of the thing in which thought 
inheres. He argues for this by remarking that thought, though it is a unity, can (and 
does) consist of a multiplicity of representations that are united in one whole. He then 
suggests that this collective unity can be just as easily due to the cooperation of the 
different substances bearing those different representations as it can be due to the fact 
that they all inhere in the same simple substance. This first stage of Kant’s argument is 
interesting in light of the debate on the unity of the faculties. Both Wolff and Crusius 
adhered to the theory that the soul is immaterial because it exhibits a specific kind of 
unity. Yet, Wolff deduced from this that, being a simple substance, the soul must also be 
simple in terms of its fundamental forces. Crusius argued instead that, although the soul 
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is immaterial and simple, it can nevertheless be the bearer of multiple forces. These 
forces compose in the way that the movements of the different parts of an extended 
body compose. I therefore submit that Kant is attacking the doctrine of the simplicity of 
the soul not in order to disprove immaterialism (which he arguably himself prefers as a 
position), but in order to make room for the possibility that thought, although it 
exhibits a characteristic unity, can nevertheless be due to the cooperation of a 
multiplicity of forces, rather than due to a single unitary principle.  
Further evidence for this is the long discussion on the connection between 
immateriality and simplicity Kant appends to his treatment of the second paralogism. 
There, he first notes that the simplicity of the soul is usually adduced as a premise for 
the argument that the soul is immaterial (CPR A 356). He then notes that, even if we 
were to concede that premise, the conclusion would not follow (CPR A 357). I will abstain 
from offering a full interpretation of the argument for this, because it would lead us too 
far into the murky swamp that is the debate on the nature and value of transcendental 
idealism. It is in itself important, however, that Kant seeks to dissociate his argument 
for the simplicity of the soul from that of its immateriality. This may mean that his 
purported adherence to immaterialism does not condemn him to accept simplicity as 
well. 
Kant dismisses the argument for the simplicity of the soul on the familiar ground that 
it includes an equivocation on the unity of thought: 
Here, therefore, as in the previous paralogism, the formal proposition of 
apperception, I think, remains the entire ground on which rational psychology 
ventures to extend its cognitions; this proposition is of course obviously not an 
experience, but rather the form of apperception, on which every experience 
depends and which precedes it, yet it must nevertheless always be regarded only 
in regard to a possible cognition in general, as its merely subjective condition, 
which we unjustly make into a condition of possibility of the cognition of objects, 
namely into a concept of a thinking being in general, because we are unable to 
represent this being without positing ourselves along with the formula of our 
consciousness, in place of every other intelligent being. (CPR A 354) 
Here, the equivocation is yet again between the transcendental apperception as a 
function of thought and the soul as the thinking thing. The former exhibits a formal 
unity, which is a condition for the possibility of thought, whereas the latter is supposed 
to be a substantial unity, a simplicity, and thus a property of an object of thought. Kant’s 
fundamental point of the paralogisms is thus that, although the apperception is 
necessary for the possibility of thought, it cannot itself be the object of thought. We can 
understand this better by returning to the debate on the concept of a transcendental. As 
I explained above, Kant criticized metaphysicians for making material and constitutive 
use of terms that supposedly transcend the categories. His transcendental deduction is 
meant as an argument that material use can only be made of concepts under the 
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categories, and then only when these categories are applied to intuitions, i.e. to sensibly 
mediated objects. So, instead of dealing with what transcends the categories, 
metaphysicians actually apply the categories in cases where they are not applicable. 
This does not mean that Kant refuses the idea of that which “transcends” the categories 
altogether; on the contrary, the transcendental apperception is indeed such a category-
transcending concept. But it is not transcendent to the categories because it 
metaphysically underlies them – it transcends them because it first makes them 
possible. From this perspective, we can understand Kant’s insistence in the B-deduction 
that the unity of the apperception should not be conflated with the kind of unity 
thought under the category of unity, since the latter is only applicable if the former has 
already been effected. The unity of thought is a function of thought, not the structure of 
the thinking thing (res cogitans), and our thinking is a unity to us because a distinct 
function has unified our representations, not because it was always already a single 
simple substance. And yet, Kant believes that we are constantly seduced to this 
conflation, which needn’t be harmful of itself. In the next subsection we will see which 
positive use can be made of the concept of the soul. 
6.3.3 The Disunity of the Faculties and the Regulative Ideas 
It is well known that Kant, for all his misgivings regarding the nature of the soul and the 
possibility of meaningfully speaking of it, thought that the concept has definite use in 
philosophy. Usually, however, we are directed to his practical philosophy, where the 
postulate of the immortality of the soul plays a role, for this positive employment of the 
idea. This is not entirely adequate, since Kant attributes to the idea of the soul a 
legitimate theoretical use as well, specifically in the Appendix to the Transcendental 
Dialectic. 
As we saw in chapter 5, Kant believes that reason, although it leads us into illusion 
and temptation, nevertheless has a legitimate employment in theoretical philosophy, 
through the idea of systematicity. It is for the same reason that he accords the idea of 
the soul a legitimate employment: 
The first object of such an idea is myself considered as thinking nature (soul). If I 
want to seek out the properties with which a thinking thing exists in itself, then I 
have to ask experience, and I cannot even apply any of the categories to this 
object except insofar as its schema is given in sensible intuition. By this means, 
however, I will never attain to a systematic unity of all the appearances of inner 
sense. Thus instead of the concept of experience (of that which the soul actually 
is), which cannot lead us very far, reason takes the concept of the empirical unity 
of all thought, and, by thinking this unity unconditionally and originally, it makes 
out of it a concept of reason (an idea) of a simple substance, unchangeable in itself 
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(identical in personality), standing in community with other real things outside it 
– in a word, the concept of a simple self-sufficient intelligence. With this, 
however, reason has nothing before its eyes except a principle of the systematic 
unity in explaining the appearances of the soul, namely by considering all 
determinations as in one subject, all powers, as far as possible, as derived from one 
unique fundamental power, all change as belonging to the states of one and the 
same persisting being, and by representing all appearances in space as entirely 
distinct from the acts of thinking. That simplicity of substance, etc., ought to be 
only the schema for this regulative principle, and it is not presupposed as if it 
were the real ground of properties of the soul. For these properties could rest on 
entirely different grounds, with which we are not acquainted at all, just as we 
might not really be able to cognize the soul at all through these assumed 
predicates even if we let them hold of it absolutely, since they constitute a mere 
idea that cannot be represented in concreto at all. Now nothing but advantage can 
arise from such a psychological idea, if only one guards against letting it hold as 
something more than a mere idea, i.e., if one lets it hold merely relative to the 
systematic use of reason in respect of the appearances of our soul. (CPR A 682-683 
/ B 710-711) 
I will focus specifically on Kant’s claim that the idea of the simplicity of the soul, when 
taken merely regulatively, can aid us in the investigation of the powers of the soul. It 
would do so by supposing that the many powers of the soul are all in some way 
specifications of a single fundamental power, which would add systematicity to the idea 
of the soul. This theory can help us understand Kant’s relation to Wolff, Crusius and 
Tetens respectively. Kant criticizes Wolff for using the idea of the simplicity of the soul 
determinately, thereby merely postulating that the many powers of the soul must 
ultimately reduce to a single fundamental power. No such determinate claims can be 
made, and hence it cannot be ruled out that the many powers of the soul relate in a 
different manner. Yet, by allowing the regulative use of the idea, Kant is equally 
criticizing Crusius’ approach, which allowed for the multiplicity of the powers. This 
risks terminating in a proliferation of powers, all of which are qualitatively distinct, and 
perhaps even the postulation of different powers for each different representation in 
the mind. Kant realizes that this is unsatisfactory, and probably realizes that Crusius 
would agree with this. He therefore encourages Tetens’ attempt to reduce the powers of 
the mind as far as possible without doing injustice to the phenomena.10 
Some care is to be taken in interpreting this principle in Kant, for it has led many to 
believe that, deep down, Kant adhered to the doctrine of the unique fundamental force, 
even though he did not believe it could be proven. The Hegelian and Heideggerian 
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 Hessbrüggen-Walter (2004: 161) has also suggested that this passage is directly addressed to Tetens. 
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readings discussed in the first section of this chapter are precisely such attempts of 
ascribing to Kant a determinate employment of the idea of a fundamental force. This 
would miss, however, the importance of the shift of context: Kant is no longer 
discussing unity as such, but systematic unity. Earlier in the Appendix, Kant had already 
introduced the debate on the unity and disunity of the faculties as an example of a 
debate where systematicity operates: 
Among the different kinds of unity according to concepts of the understanding 
belongs the causality of a substance, which is called "power." At first glance the 
various appearances of one and the same substance show such diversity that one 
must assume almost as many powers as there are effects, as in the human mind 
there are sensation, consciousness, imagination, memory, wit, the power to 
distinguish, pleasure, desire, etc. Initially a logical maxim bids us to reduce this 
apparent variety as far as possible by discovering hidden identity through 
comparison, and seeing if imagination combined with consciousness may not be 
memory, wit, the power to distinguish, or perhaps even understanding and 
reason. The idea of a fundamental power - though logic does not at all ascertain 
whether there is such a thing - is at least the problem set by a systematic 
representation of the manifoldness of powers. The logical principle of reason 
demands this unity as far as it is possible to bring it about, and the more 
appearances of this power and that power are found to be identical, the more 
probable it becomes that they are nothing but various expressions of one and the 
same power, which can be called (comparatively) their fundamental power. One 
proceeds in just the same way with the rest of the powers. 
These comparatively fundamental powers must once again be compared with one 
another, so as to discover their unanimity and thereby bring them close to a single 
radical, i.e., absolutely fundamental, power. But this unity of reason is merely 
hypothetical. One asserts not that such a power must in fact be found, but rather 
that one must seek it for the benefit of reason, namely for setting up certain 
principles for the many rules with which experience may furnish us, and that 
where it can be done, one must in such a way bring systematic unity into 
cognition. (CPR A 649-650 / B 677-678) 
Kant acknowledges that the striving for unity is indeed demanded by the systematic 
drive of reason, and that we are therefore rightly and understandably engaged in 
systematizing the various powers of the mind. It thus seems that the idea of an 
absolutely fundamental power is a regulative idea of reason in its theoretical 
employment. But when we look to the passage to see for which science it is a regulative 
idea, we find that it is logic, since Kant states that it is up to logic to ascertain whether 
there is such a thing as a fundamental power. This comment can admittedly be read in 
two ways. On the first reading, Kant is saying that the idea of an absolute power is 
dictated by the logical use of reason, but the logical use itself cannot determinately (and 
only regulatively) posit such an absolute power. Although this reading makes some 
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sense, it squares less with the text than another. On this reading, the logical use of 
reason sets, within each science, a regulative ideal, which this science itself cannot 
reach, i.e. determinately use or prove. In logic, the idea of absolutely fundamental 
power is such an idea. Although this idea gives guidance to the proper systematization 
and classification of epistemic functions and activities, it cannot be proven as such and 
can never be determinately used. 
If this latter reading is correct, we see the following peculiarity: for Kant, the doctrine 
of the faculties is not the business of psychology, but rather that of logic, i.e. not of a 
descriptive science but of a normative science. Hessbrüggen-Walter (2004: 185) has 
shown that, in Kant’s many writings, the doctrine of faculties is often a topic of logic 
rather than of psychology, and that in this respect Kant is in line with the tradition. The 
reason for this is that, for example, the three higher or discursive faculties correspond 
with the three major divisions of Early Modern textbooks on logic, which were thought 
to correspond with works from Aristotle’s Organon. 
Traditionally, Categories, On Interpretation and the Analytics were taken to deal with 
single terms, propositions and syllogisms respectively. Early Modern textbooks like the 
Port-Royal logic therefore usually consist of a part on terms, one on propositions and 
one on syllogisms. As Hessbrüggen-Walter (2004: 194-200) indicates, the same division is 
to be found in German textbooks on logic, and there the division corresponds with a 
division between three mental operations: the grasping of a single term by the 
understanding, the relating of two terms by the faculty of judgment and the relating of 
judgments and propositions through a syllogism by reason. Kant’s tripartite division of 
the higher faculties neatly corresponds with these three mental operations: 
General logic is constructed on a plan that corresponds quite precisely with the 
division of the higher faculties of cognition. These are: understanding, the power 
of judgment, and reason. In its analytic that doctrine accordingly deals with 
concepts, judgments, and inferences, corresponding exactly to the functions and 
the order of those powers of mind, which are comprehended under the broad 
designation of understanding in general. (CPR A 130-131 / B 169) 
If the faculties are indeed best understood not as psychological properties, but rather as 
epistemic functions, then we can understand why Kant deals with them more as a topic 
of epistemology than as  one of psychology. Moreoever, it bears witness to a certain 
anti-psychologism in Kant. To see why this is so, just observe that anti-psychologistic 
authors of the late 20th century like Cohen, Frege and Husserl all used the word “logic” 
to refer to what we would now call pure epistemology, even though only Frege actively 
engaged in what we would now consider logic proper. This is because they found the 
term “epistemology” or “theory of knowledge” irreparably tainted by the psychologism 
of their predecessors. Logic being considered a normative rather than a descriptive 
science, was found to be a better term, even though it was obviously used in a broader 
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sense than the one usually accorded to it. The same move is recognizable in Kant, who 
had a word for the extended logic with which he was engaged, namely transcendental 
logic (in contrast with formal logic).11 
This shows that the doctrine of faculties is improperly taken as a psychological topic 
in Kant; it is actually a logical and epistemological topic, concerned with the basic kinds 
of epistemic functions. Logic and epistemology are guided by a regulative ideal in their 
search for such basic kinds, namely that of an absolutely fundamental power. Yet, Kant 
warns us that this idea cannot be used constitutively, as determining an object, and 
hence warns against employing the metaphysical idea of a soul as a simple substance in 
order to legitimate this constitutive usage: 
[I]f one attends to the transcendental use of the understanding, it is evident that 
this idea of a fundamental power in general does not function merely as a problem 
for hypothetical use, but pretends to objective reality, so that the systematic unity 
of a substance’s many powers are postulated and an apodictic principle of reason 
is erected. For even without our having attempted to find the unanimity among 
the many powers, or indeed even when all such attempts to discover it have 
failed, we nevertheless presuppose that such a thing will be found; and it is not 
only, as in the case cited, on account of the unity of substance that reason 
presupposes systematic unity among the manifold powers, but rather reason does 
so even where many powers, though to a certain degree of the same kind, are 
found, as with matter in general, where particular natural laws stand under more 
general ones; and the parsimony of principles is not merely a principle of 
economy for reason, but becomes an inner law of its nature. (CPR A 650 / B 678) 
Kant is obviously referring to the Wolffian position when he speaks of the 
presupposition of the unity of the faculties as required by the unity of the substance 
that is the soul. As we saw in the previous subsection, he denied that we could 
determinately claim of the soul that it is such a unity. But here, he says that the idea 
nevertheless has a legitimate employment, namely as a regulative ideal for the 
investigation of the faculties. Does this mean that Kant, in spite of his many misgivings 
regarding the premisses of such a position, ultimately does prefer and embrace he 
theory of the unity of the faculties? This would be a precipitous conclusion, for two 
reasons. First of all, Kant does not claim that unification is the only goal of 
systematicity, and secondly, he claims that the project of unification is a failure. 
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 This does not mean that there can be no reasonable questions regarding what such an anti-psychologistic 
theory of the faculties would look like, and whether it is a coherent position. These questions, however, lie 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
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As regards the first reason, we need to remind the reader of the conclusions of the 
previous chapter. There, we saw that Kant’s concept of systematicity is not guided solely 
by the demand for unity, to the detriment of variety. In the context of the soul, this is 
easily forgotten, for the simple reason that the idea of the soul is, according to Kant, 
suggested by the idea of absolute unity (CPR A 334 / B 391). I interpret this as meaning 
that, as far as the soul is concerned, there is an internal metaphysical tendency of 
reason to regard it predominantly under the idea of absolute unity. But this would 
involve a culpable negligence towards the idea of variety. For Kant, we need to focus as 
much on the variety as on the unity of the faculties, if we want to do justice to the 
demand of reason. As Heßbrüggen-Walter (2004: 225) has noted, the two maxims are 
clearly balanced in Kant’s reflections on the faculties, where unity is strived for, but the 
distinctness of several faculties is nevertheless maintained. 
One important place where Kant rejects the idea of the unity of the faculties is in the 
first Introduction to the Critique of the Power of Judgment: 
We can trace all faculties of the human mind without exception back to these 
three: the faculty of cognition, the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and the 
faculty of desire. To be sure, philosophers who otherwise deserve nothing but 
praise for the thoroughness of their way of thinking have sought to explain this 
distinction as merely illusory and to reduce all faculties to the mere faculty of 
cognition. But it can easily be demonstrated, and has already been understood for 
some time, that this attempt to bring unity into the multiplicity of faculties, 
although undertaken in a genuinely philosophical spirit, is futile. (AA XX: 205-206) 
Although this passage contains an explicit rejection of the idea of the unity of the 
faculties, which squares with the fact that Kant never explicitly adopts that idea except 
regulatively, it does raise further issues. After all, Kant is not speaking of any of the 
familiar faculties, namely sensibility, imagination, understanding, judgement and 
reason. Are we to understand this passage as claiming that the faculties are not unified, 
but that the latter five faculties are all reducible to the three faculties mentioned in the 
quote? Here again, a terminological peculiarity of Kant’s system threatens to mislead us, 
since the word “faculty” is used equivocally here. Kant discerned two meanings of the 
word faculty. The first is the familiar one from our discussions, namely that of an 
epistemic function. The two lower and the three higher faculties are all such faculties. 
The second sense of faculty is the one invoked in the quoted passage, and is best 
understood as a specific orientation and internal alignment of all the faculties taken 
together. In a table offered by Kant at the end of the published introduction to the 
Critique of the Power of Judgment, these two “kinds” of faculties are represented as 





faculty of cognition 
feeling of pleasure and 
displeasure 
faculty of desire 
Sensibility Sensibility Sensibility 
Imagination Imagination Imagination 
Understanding Understanding Understanding 
Judgment Judgment Judgment 
Reason Reason Reason 
 
In this table, the faculties in the second sense are represented above the double line. 
Each faculty is an employment of the whole soul or Gemüt, and thus involves all the 
faculties in the first sense. For that reason, all five faculties1 are represented under each 
faculty2. Sensibility and Imagination are separated from Understanding, Judgment and 
Reason by a line because they differ from the latter in being intuitive rather than 
discursive. Kant expresses this by calling them the “lower” faculties. Sensibility is 
distinct from Imagination for being receptive rather than spontaneous. The three 
higher faculties are each individuated by the distinct logical and epistemic functions for 
which they are considered to be responsible. According to Kant, the understanding is 
the faculty of concepts or of rules. I suggest we understand this, in line with the 
discussion of the three mental operations above, as the faculty for grasping concepts. To 
be sure, a concept is only grasped if it is already relatable to other concepts. Thus, the 
understanding is the capacity to deal with concepts alone. The power of judgment is 
distinct not because it can relate two terms, in casu concepts, but because it can 
subsume something under a concept. Judgment is thus the capacity to subsume 
particulars under concepts. In the next chapter, we will see more implications of this 
idea. For now, it is important to see that, since Kant believes (as I argued in 6.3.1) the 
understanding to be incapable of grasping particulars, another faculty is necessary to 
relate concepts and particulars. Finally, reason is not just the capacity for syllogism, it is 
the capacity for systematicity (as we saw in 5.3.1). Kant believes that no concept or 
judgment of itself need be considered as located in a general system of concepts. 
Nevertheless, he believed that it is a logical requirement that all concepts are 
thoroughly connected. This idea is represented in the idea of the absolute or that of 
systematicity, which belong to reason alone. Because of this capacity, when we subsume 
an object under a concept, we ipso facto assign it a place in a whole system of concepts, 
i.e. subsume it, indirectly, under the system of concepts. 
In 6.3.1, we saw that Kant is unlikely to regard the lower and the higher faculties as 
reducible to each other or to a common ground. Moreover, that Kant insists on the 
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spontaneity of the imagination, and at times calls it a fundamental power, suggests that 
this faculty is not reducible to sensibility and understanding. Finally, Kant seems to 
believe that the three higher faculties are not unifiable either. The first reason is the 
distinctness of their objects and operations, and the second is the fact that the faculties2 
are not unifiable. Kant claims that the faculties2 are distinct because, in each of them, a 
different higher faculty is legislative for the whole of the soul or Gemüt (AA V: 196-197). 
In my table above, this is represented by the fact that, under each faculty2, a different 
higher faculty1 is set in boldface. Thus, the understanding is legislative for the faculty of 
cognition, i.e. for the theoretical usage of reason, the power of judgment is legislative 
for the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and reason is legislative for the faculty of 
desire, i.e. reason in its practical usage. The three faculties2 could thus not be distinct if 
their governing faculties1 were not distinct. As a result, the mutual distinctness of the 
three higher faculties follows from the mutual distinctness of the three faculties in the 
sense of the quote from the unpublished introduction to the Critique of the Power of 
Judgment. 
All of this suggests that, although Kant believed that there is definite benefit in 
reducing various epistemic functions to a limited number of general functions, he did 
not believe we could in fact reduce them to a single fundamental power, as Wolff would 
have liked. Considered from a logical or epistemological point of view, the soul consists 
of several qualitatively distinct faculties which have to work in concert to achieve their 
goal. For each general goal that the “soul” in this sense can set itself, one faculty is 
assigned a position of leadership among equals, and its claims are constrained by the 
fact that different faculties have this leadership in different engagements. This kind of 
unity, distinct as it is from the one attributed to the soul by Kant’s rationalist 
predecessors, is one that we must now try to characterize. 
6.4 The System of Faculties as an Organic Unity 
In the preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant makes a thought-
provoking comment on the nature of the soul as it is considered in the critical 
philosophy:  
pure speculative reason is, in respect of principles of cognition, a unity entirely 
separate and subsisting for itself, in which, as in an organized body, every part 
exists for the sake of all the others as all the others exist for its sake, and no 
principle can be taken with certainty in one relation unless it has at the same time 
been investigated in its thoroughgoing relation to the entire use of pure reason. 
(CPR B xxiii) 
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It is thought-provoking because it gives us a clue as to the kind of unity exhibited by the 
soul, namely as an organic unity. Two objections might immediately be raised against 
taking this passage in such a manner. The first is that it does not speak about the unity 
of the soul, but rather of the unity of speculative reason. This is merely a terminological 
confusion, since Kant often uses the term “speculative reason” to refer to the soul in its 
theoretical use, in the sense of what the Critique of the Power of Judgment called the 
“faculty of cognition”, and he often uses “reason” as synonymous for the whole of what 
rationalists prefer to call the soul, at least when he consideres it from an 
epistemological point of view.  
The other objection is that of the scope of the metaphor. Here, Kant aims to show 
that we can arrive at a complete and non-redundant list of all the principles of 
knowledge because these principles are thoroughly interrelated. The feature of an 
organized body that he is capitalizing on is its functional coherence. If we adhere to a 
functional perspective on an organism, as Kant does, then the organism consists of a 
number of functions, each of which contributes to the whole, and none of which are 
redundant. Moroever, taken together, these various functions suffice for the 
functioning of the organism. Kant thus seems to claim, first of all, that the principles of 
cognition are complete and non-redundant just like the various functions of a 
functioning organism are. 
But Kant’s comment goes further than this. He not only states that we can arrive at a 
complete list of such principles in this way, he also warns us that this means that we 
cannot consider any of the functions in isolation. This claim is tantamount to Kant’s 
famous architectonic demand, that of the systematic coherence of his philosophy. Here, 
this architectonic unity is clearly understood in terms of an organic unity. We may 
wonder what further implications this has for his theory. 
The employment of the organic metaphor in the context of the architectonic 
provides us with a further analogy between an organism and the system of faculties and 
principles, namely that of the specificity arising in it. As we saw in chapter 4, the 
different functions of an organism do not solely come together in a coordinated whole – 
they specify and produce each other. Taken in isolation, none of the functional parts of 
an organism would be functional, or would even have or maintain the specific structure 
it requires in order to function in the way they do. I therefore suggest that we 
understand the organic coherence of speculative reason also as one of reciprocal 
production and specification of the many functions. At least in one context does this 
become apparent, namely in that of the schematization of the categories. Without 
sensibility and imagination, the categories would never acquire their specific 
schematized forms, and would remain empty and general. I believe many such cases of 
interspecification can be given, and that the table of categories is probably better 
understood in this manner. 
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The idea of interspecification indicates a certain departure of Kant’s from Crusius’ 
faculty pluralism. As we saw in 6.2.2, Crusius conceived of the interrelation of the many 
powers of the soul on analogy with the interrelation of powers in dynamics. This means 
that vivification and composition are the primary mechanisms leading to the 
complexity of the system of cognition. When Kant departs from the physical and 
dynamic language in favour of the organic, this may indicate a fundamental change in 
the conception of the interrelation and interanimation of mental powers. In chapter 4, 
we saw that Kant believed the complexity and reciprocal causation at work in an 
organism to be principally irreducible to the interrelation of mechanic and dynamic 
forces. This is because the latter already enter into the complex fully specified, and 
simply compose their various specificities. Organic parts and powers, instead, acquire 
new specificity in and are even produced and reproduced by the organic whole in which 
they figure. This suggests that, where Crusius was still content to speak of faculties that 
are specifiable in isolation, Kant regards the faculties as conceivable only within the 
whole of the Gemüt. 
We can find even further interesting consequences of the analogy between an 
organism and the system of faculties when we consider that Kant explicitly calls the 
faculty of reason an “organ” (CPR B xxxvii). He does so in the context of his criticism of 
Christian Wolff, whom he charges with neglecting to engage in a critique of pure reason 
itself. Now of course, the word “organ” might be meant in the general sense of 
“instrument”, but, taken together with the already quoted passage from the same 
preface, it is likely to mean more. In fact, taking it more literally might even add to our 
understanding of Kant’s criticism of Wolff. I suggest that Kant may be criticizing Wolff 
for not understanding that reason is but one organ amongst many. If this is true, the 
problem is that Wolff attributed to reason capacities that it does not itself have, such as 
that of presenting us with particulars without the mediation of other faculties, and of 
conflating the various distinct epistemic functions of the mind. This criticism would be 
understandable in the light of Kant’s refusal of the Wolffian theory of an absolutely 
fundamental power. 
This relation between the organic metaphor and the doctrine of faculties has yet 
another benefit. In the last subsection, I argued that Kant preferred to think of the mind 
or the soul, in so far as epistemology and logic are concerned, as a unity that is different 
from the unity of a simple substance. The Wolffian theory was that, in order to act as a 
unity, the faculties must themselves reduce to a single faculty, to a single governing and 
individuating principle, namely the representative power. Kant seems to envisage a 
unity of coordination and cooperation that is not grounded in such a grounding 
principle. In chapter 4, we saw that the unity of a natural purpose unity should not be 
thought of as apart from, or over and above, the multiplicity of parts of which it 
consists. It is rather a teleological, i.e. functional, i.e. normative unity of the diversity. 
Kant’s picture of the system of faculties seems to have a similar structure. In 6.3.2, I 
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argued that Kant wished to dissociate the idea of the unity of thought from that of the 
simplicity and substantial unity of that which does the thinking. This is an 
understandable move if he was indeed trying to reconceive the unity of thought as an 
organic unity, a functional unity of diverse, interspecifying parts. 
This raises an important question, however. In the case of an organism, its unity was 
considered normative because it could fail to obtain. That is to say, an organism can be 
diseased, hurt and even killed. I argued that the normative unity of an organism should 
not just be understood as the wonderful adaptedness of its parts, but also as the ability 
to overcome some distortions of the general functionality, and even to alter its 
normative unity to deal with recalcitrant situations. In other words, I have argued that 
it is essential to an organism that it is epigenetic, i.e. productive and adaptive. We 
should therefore inquire whether Kant also thought of the system of faculties in this 
latter way, or whether he instead thought that the soul, being immaterial and 
transcendent, is immune to the vicissitudes that organized bodies are constantly 
prompted to overcome. In other words, we must inquire whether the unity of the 
system of faculties can fail to obtain, or is rather eternally and perfectly adapted to its 
task: that of knowing. This question will be dealt with in the next and last chapter of 
this dissertation. 
6.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that Kant sought to defend, against Christian Wolff and his 
followers, the idea that we need to accept a multiplicity of faculties that are not 
reducible to each other. In doing so, Kant sided with Crusius, although he also heeded 
Tetens’ attempt to maximize the unity of the faculties. In doing so, he ended up with 
five distinct faculties, two that are intuitive and three that are discursive. I have 
provided reasons for the irreducibility of these faculties, and have specifically discussed 
the distinction between the discursive and the intuitive at great length. In that context, 
I have argued that the specific and irreducible contribution of sensibility to knowledge 
is due to its intuitive nature, and not its receptive nature. The upshot is that the major 
opposition in Kant’s epistemology is not that between the given and the thought, but 
rather that between the particular and the general. I have also argued that the unity of 
the mind in Kant’s critical philosophy is best understood as an organic unity. The 









Chapter 7 The Epigenesis of the Faculties 
Kant beschränkt sich mit Vorsatz in einen gewissen Kreis 
und deutet ironisch darüber hinaus. 
- Goethe 
In this chapter, I will answer the two questions with which I closed part 2 by showing 
how the Critique of the Power of Judgment elaborates on the organic conception of the 
Gemüt. Before doing so, I offer, in 7.1, a brief discussion of some major figures and trends 
in 18th century aesthetics. This discussion is meant to clarify the goal of the “Critique of 
the aesthetic power of judgment”, where Kant offers his theory of the harmony of the 
faculties. It is to this latter theory that I devote 7.2. In 7.2.1, I discuss reflective 
judgment, and show that it is primarily concerned with the relation between the 
faculties. In 7.2.3, I then introduce the notion of the harmony of the faculties, and argue 
that we need to read it as the purposive unity of the Gemüt. In 7.2.3, I argue that this 
purposive unity is contingent, and that it is strived after by the Gemüt. This answers the 
first question of part 2: the system of faculties is indeed also like an organism because its 
normative unity is contingent. In 7.3, I then answer the second question, arguing that 
the system of faculties is indeed epigenetic because the sublime opens the system up to 
history and change. In 7.4, I then try to bring together the main lines of dissertation and 
offer a picture of Kant’s epigenesis and historicity of the a priori. 
7.1 Aesthetics and Cognition in the Eighteenth Century 
It is one of the lasting commonplaces of the historiography of philosophy that the 
discipline of aesthetics emerged in the eighteenth century. Even though it is ludicrous 
to say that there was no philosophical reflection on the nature of beauty or the 
experience thereof before the age of Enlightenment, it is arguable that this reflection 
acquired not one, but many new impetus during that time. In two distinct traditions, the 
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issue of the aesthetic came to be a central concern, namely in the Scottish 
Enlightenment and in German Schulphilosophie. In Kant, we see a confluence of these two 
influences, specifically in his attempt to answer the question as to the nature and source 
of aesthetic experience. In this section, I will provide a brief overview of some major 
positions in the debate that are likely to have been in Kant’s mind. I will present them 
with a specific issue in mind, namely that of whether beauty is experienced through the 
senses or through cognition. 
On this issue, it is tempting to immediately suggest that, in general, British authors 
inspired by John Locke took aesthetic experience to be an experience of the senses, 
whereas German authors working in the tradition of Leibnizian rationalism had an 
intellectualist perspective on beauty. This suggestion may aid us in unterstanding how 
Kant’s solution to the problem is an application of his more general tendency to 
overcome the empiricist-rationalist divide. It does so, however, at the expense of the 
complexity of the debate. As we will see, although some positions can easily be read 
through this stark opposition, the more interesting ones that Kant engaged with were 
more nuanced. In this section, I will therefore present both the extreme and the more 
complex position of both traditions. 
Leibniz has often been regarded as the major source for the intellectualist strand in 
German aesthetics, given his belief “that fundamentally pleasure is a sense of 
perfection, and pain a sense of imperfection, each being notable enough for one to 
become aware of it.” (G V: 180; Leibniz 1996: 194) Pleasure can be gained from the 
perception or awareness of perfection in an object, as is the case in music: 
Music charms us, even though its beauty consists only in the harmonies of 
numbers and in a calculation that we are not aware of, but which the soul 
nevertheless carries out, a calculation concerning the beats or vibrations of 
sounding bodies, which are encountered at certain intervals. The pleasures that 
sight finds in proportions are of the same nature, and those caused by the other 
senses amount to something similar, even though we might not be able to explain 
it so distinctly. (G VI: 605-606; Leibniz 1989: 212) 
Leibniz suggests that aesthetic pleasure is an awareness of a feature that can be 
cognized by the intellect, namely the perfection and harmony of the perceived 
structure or entity, but that this awareness needn’t include awareness of the precise 
nature of this perfection. In the language of Leibniz’s version of the theory of ideas, the 
pleasure we take in perfection requires that our perception of this perfection be clear, 
but not that it be distinct. Thus, the pleasure in the perception of beauty is analogous to 
a secondary quality. According to Leibniz, secondary qualities are confused ideas of the 
primary qualities with which they correspond, and if we were to fully analyze, i.e. make 
distinct, that perception, we would see how the secondary qualities are due to the 
primary ones. Similarly, if we were to fully analyze our pleasure in the beauty of an 
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object, we would arrive at the distinct perception of the harmony and perfection of that 
object. 
The same opinion is to be found in Christian Wolff’s writings, for instance in the 
German Metaphysics, where Wolff defines pleasure (Lust) as an intuitive knowledge of 
perfection (Wolff 1747: 247). All three terms indicate the specificity of the Leibnizian-
Wolffian perspective on the aesthetic experience. First of all, pleasure is a form of 
knowledge, and therefore cognitive. Moreover, it is a cognition of a feature of the 
perceived object, namely its perfection. The latter notion is central to Wolff’s 
philosophy, and he defines it as the harmony of the diverse (Wolff 1747: 78). The 
pleasure we take in perceiving such an object thus consists in the cognition of the 
harmony or organization of the object. Of course, Wolff admits that we can take 
pleasure in objects that fail to have such perfection, because the mere illusion of 
perfection can constitute pleasure as well (Wolff 1747: 248). The cognitive nature of 
aesthetic pleasure has two important consequences in Wolff”s account. First of all, it 
means that our appreciation is not only proportionate to the degree of perception of the 
object, but also to our knowledge of that perception (Wolff 1747: 250). Secondly, it 
means that such pleasure occurs as well in the cognitive pursuits of science and 
discovery (Wolff 1747: 251-252). 
Wolff specifies, however, that pleasure is a specific kind of cognition of the perfection 
of an object, namely an intuitive (anschauende) one. As we saw in 6.2.1, he believed that 
ultimately there is only one fundamental mental power, namely the representative 
force, and that ideas differ only in their degree of clarity and distinctness. Intuitions are 
therefore ideas just like concepts, but they are confused ideas. This is why Wolff argues 
that pleasure does not require that we have distinct knowledge of the object, and only 
that we have clear knowledge of it – it suffices that we have an intuition of the 
perfection (Wolff 1747: 252). It is also why Wolff believes we can have pleasure in the 
absence of perfection, namely because we may be confused. His opinion is then that our 
pleasure in the perfection of things becomes more adequate to the extent that our 
knowledge of those things becomes more distinct (Wolff 1747: 254-255). 
The Leibnizian-Wolffian view is thus that aesthetic pleasure is a cognitive state: it is 
an awareness of a feature of the object. Our sense of pleasure corresponds with an 
objective feature of the object, namely its degree of perfection, and is moreover a 
recognition of that feature.1 We can have both intellectual and sensible knowledge of 
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 Some qualification is required with regard to the status of the concept of beauty. Wolff defines beauty as “the 
perfection of a thing, insofar [quatenus] as with this force it is apt to produce pleasure in us” (Wolff 1738: 420; 
my translation). The second part of the sentence implies that Wolff does not directly identify beauty with 
perfection, but rather with an aptitude of perfection to produce some things in us. It may seem as if he 




that feature, but the more intellectual this knowledge is, the higher the chances that it 
is also adequate. The adequacy of an aesthetic feeling is the degree to which it 
corresponds with the feature of the object rather than with a confusion regarding 
whether that object has the feature. This strikes us as an intellectualist theory of 
aesthetic experience, since it degrades sensibility as a lower, less trustworthy form of 
cognition, and stresses the similarity between the pleasure we take in a work of art and 
the one we take in the elegance of a mathematical theorem or scientific theory. 
It is common to note that the highly rationalist and cognitivist nature of German 
aesthetics was somewhat mitigated by Alexander Gottieb Baumgarten, as Frederick 
Beiser does: 
Within the rationalist tradition, Baumgarten occupies the middle ground. His core 
values are fundamentally rationalist. His ideal of knowledge is entirely 
intellectual: we know best what we clearly and distinctly conceive, or what we can 
demonstrate through reason alone. Reason always remains for him the higher 
faculty of cognition, the senses the lower faculty. Nevertheless, Baumgarten gives a 
much greater value than Wolff or Gottsched to the distinctive qualities of sensible 
cognition. (Beiser 2009: 122) 
This claim is made because, although Baumgarten adopts many typically Wolffian 
standpoints, he does depart from his great example in one major aspect, namely that of 
the status of sensibility. When Baumgarten coined the idea of a separate science of 
aesthetics, he defined it as “the science of sensible knowledge” (Baumgarten 1750: 1) 
What is considered revolutionary about this is that Baumgarten felt the need to defend 
a separate science of knowledge gathered through the lower faculties, whereas it is 
considered a core tenet of rationalism that only the higher faculties can be trusted with 
the acquisition of knowledge. In Leibnizo-Wolffianism, this is a fortiori the case, because 
sensibility is considered to deliver ideas that are not different in kind from those of the 
higher faculties, and only differ from them in their degree of distinctness. If this is true, 
there does not seem to be any specific benefit to be reaped from pursuing the specific 
kinds of knowledge delivered by sensibility. Thus, although Baumgarten ultimately 
agrees on the lower status of the lower faculties and the confused nature of the 
representations of sensibility (Baumgarten 1779: 180-181), and remains a rationalist in 
the sense of the present debate, he did seek to mitigate this rationalism. What remains 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
noted that in Leibnizian and Wolffian metaphysics, the latter kinds of properties are strictly grounded in non-
dispositional and non-relational properties such as perfection. My conjecture is that beauty is not real, but 
rather a well-founded phenomenon – well-founded because it is founded in the perfection of the thing. 
Indeed, the “quatenus” formula is a typical Leibnizian tool of expressing relational properties as grounded in 
non-relational properties (cf. Parkinson 1965: 49).   
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unchanged, however, is the cognitivist aspect of his aesthetics: beauty is still the intuitive 
cognition of the perfection of the object. 
Like the tradition of 18th century German aesthetics, British, and most certainly 
Scottish Enlightenment thought on the topic is notoriously rich, and can therefore not 
be treated here in full. I will only briefly discuss the contributions of two figures, namely 
Francis Hutcheson and Edmund Burke, because they have visibly informed Kant’s 
reflections on the subject, as we will see. A comparison between their differing views 
will yield a better picture of just how difficult it is to speak of a straightforwardly 
empiricist theory of aesthetics. Above, I have described the German aesthetic tradition 
of the Schulphilosophie as deeply rationalist and cognitivist. By this I meant that it 
preferred reason as a faculty of knowledge, and that it regarded the aesthetic 
experience as a cognition of a feature of an object. I will argue here that Hutcheson and 
Burke are both sensualist/empiricist and non-cognitivist in their aesthetics, despite 
their differing conceptions on the nature of beauty. 
Francis Hutcheson is perhaps best known for his suggestion that Taste is not only a 
sense, rather than an intellectual faculty such as judgment, but that it is actually an 
internal sense. He gives two reasons for contrasting this sense with the external senses. 
The first reason is that having a particular external sense does not automatically make 
one fit to appreciate the associated arts (Hutcheson 2004: 23). The mere capacity to hear, 
for instance, does not make one apt to properly appreciate the harmonies of music. In 
making this comment, Hutcheson suggests that the appreciation of beauty does not 
simply accompany our basic senses. The second reason for contrasting inner and outer 
sense is that the feeling of beauty can occur in situations where the senses are not really 
concerned, like in the sciences (Hutcheson 2004: 24).  
Nevertheless, Hutcheson insists that the sense of beauty is a sense rather than an 
intellectual judgment. The first reason for this is that  
the Ideas of Beauty and Harmony, like other sensible Ideas, are necessarily 
pleasant to us, as well as immediately so; neither can any Resolution of our own, 
nor any Prospect of Advantage or Disadvantage, vary the Beauty or Deformity of 
an Object. (Hutcheson 2004: 25) 
This conclusion follows from Hutcheson’s opening premise that  
Those Ideas which are rais’d in the Mind upon the presence of external Objects, 
and their acting upon our Bodys, are call’d Sensations. We find that the Mind in 
such Cases is passive, and has not Power directly to prevent the Perception or 
Idea, or to vary it at its Reception, as long as we continue our Bodys in a state fit to 
be acted upon by the external Object. (Hutcheson 2004: 19) 
The first reason for the sensible nature of taste is, then, that in an aesthetic experience, 
our feeling of beauty does not depend on our free will, and is an involuntary response to 
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the perceived object rather than a feeling that we can conjure in ourselves at will. In 
this, taste most closely resembles our sensations in being passive and receptive rather 
than active and spontaneous. 
The second reason why Hutcheson believes taste to be a sense rather than an 
intellectual faculty is that it is immediate rather than mediated by knowledge or concepts: 
This superior Power of Perception is justly called a Sense, because of its Affinity to 
the other Senses in this, that the Pleasure does not arise from any Knowledge of 
Principles, Proportions, Causes, or of the Usefulness of the Object; but strikes us at 
first with the Idea of Beauty: nor does the most accurate Knowledge increase this 
Pleasure of Beauty, however it may super-add a distinct rational Pleasure from 
prospects of Advantage, or from the Increase of Knowledge. (Hutcheson 2004: 25) 
Hutcheson thus argues that the pleasure we have in the beauty of a thing is strictly 
distinct from the theoretical or practical interests we may have in it, although it may 
accompany the specific pleasures connected to those latter interests. This is an 
important comment because it urges for the autonomy of the aesthetic from practice 
and theory alike – important because, but not just because, it would also become a tenet 
of Kant’s aesthetics in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. 
But there is another aspect to the distinction from rational interest that reveals a 
clear contrast with Wolff’s position in the Deutsche Metaphysik. As we saw above, Wolff 
believed that the degree of aesthetic appreciation does not just vary with its degree of 
perfection, but also with the distinctness of our knowledge of this perfection. He thus 
believed that our pleasure in the beautiful is increased by our knowledge. According to 
Hutcheson, the pleasure of beauty cannot be increased in this way except perhaps 
indirectly. Our sense of beauty is an involuntary and immediate response, and it cannot 
be changed by our knowledge. It can, however, be counteracted by it in various ways. 
This is why Hutcheson argues in a later section that Education and Custom can do fairly 
little for our sense of taste, except perhaps by removing the prejudice which distorts 
our appreciation. This too marks a distinct difference with Wolff, who believed that we 
can be mistaken about the beauty of an object by the confusion of our idea of that 
object. According to Hutcheson, such error is strictly speaking impossible, and our 
errors in aesthetic judgment are entirely due to the fact that we are wrongly tempted to 
associate another idea, which bears on our judgment of value, with the idea of the object 
proper (Hutcheson 2004: 67). Thus, it is not the nature of our idea of the object that 
leads us into error, but rather the web of ideas and prejudice within which it soon finds 
itself embedded, and our reasonings on the object’s pertinence to other objects and 
aims. 
If we can label Edmund Burke a sensualist in aesthetics, it is certainly not on the 
ground that he believed taste to be a sense, as Hutcheson obviously did. In fact, Burke 
believed taste did not pertain to one faculty alone: 
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On the whole it appears to me, that what is called Taste, in its most general 
acceptation, is not a simple idea, but is partly made up of a perception of the 
primary pleasures of sense, of the secondary pleasures of the imagination, and of 
the conclusions of the reasoning faculty, concerning the various relations of these, 
and concerning the human passions, manners and actions. All this is requisite to 
form Taste, and the ground-work of all these is the same in the human mind; for 
as the senses are the great originals of all our ideas, and consequently of all our 
pleasures, if they are not uncertain and arbitrary, the whole of Taste is common to 
all, and therefore there is sufficient foundation for a conclusive reasoning on 
these matters. (Burke 1764: 30-31) 
However, this passage already contains important hints about the general empiricist 
and sensualist bend of Burke’s thought. First of all, there is the idea that taste has 
universal principles because the senses of different men are usually similarly 
constituted. This means that Burke believes our senses to be functionally identical or 
sufficiently similar as they operate normally, and that they diverge only in cases of 
abnormality such as disease or injury. Such stability is not to be found in reasoning, 
Burke believes, and is specific to the senses (Burke 1764: 33-34). This leads to the good 
empiricist maxim that men agree insofar as they are sensible, and disagree insofar as 
they are reasoners, and contradicts the rationalist assumption, which we saw at work in 
Wolff’s aesthetics, that men disagree insofar as they are sensible, and agree insofar as 
they are reasoners. 
The second indicator of Burke’s empiricism is the related idea that the pleasure of 
beauty comes from the lower, and not the higher faculties. Indeed, Burke states in the 
quoted passage that taste is concerned with the primary pleasures of the senses and the 
secondary senses of the imagination. The former are the pleasures brought about in us 
by the perception of certain objects, and the latter are brought about by our noticing of 
similarities between objects. It is for this reason that imagination is more properly and 
commonly a source of pleasure than judgment: 
But in the imagination, besides the pain or pleasure arising from the properties of 
the natural object, a pleasure is perceived from the resemblance, which the 
imitation has to the original; the imagination, I conceive, can have no pleasure but 
what results from one or other of these causes. And these causes operate pretty 
uniformly upon all men, because they operate by principles of nature, and which 
are not derived from any particular habits or advantages. Mr. Locke very justly 
and finely observes of wit, that it is chiefly conversant in tracing resemblances; he 
remarks at the same time; that the business of judgment is rather in finding 
differences. It may perhaps appear, on this supposition, that there is no material 
distinction between the wit and judgment, as they both seem to result from 
different operations of the same faculty of comparing. But in reality, whether they 
are or are not dependent on the same power of the mind, they differ so very 
materially in many respects, that a perfect union of wit and judgment is one of the 
 
344 
rarest things in the world. When two distinct objects are unlike to each other, it is 
only what we expect; things are in their common way; and therefore they make 
no impression on the imagination: but when two distinct objects have a 
resemblance, we are struck, we attend to them, and we are pleased. The mind of 
man naturally has a far greater alacrity and satisfaction in tracing resemblances 
than in searching for differences; because by making resemblances we produce 
new images, we unite, we create, we enlarge our stock; but in making distinctions 
we offer no food at all to the imagination; the talk itself is more severe and 
irksome, and what pleasure we derive from it is something of a negative and 
indirect nature. (Burke 1764: 17-19) 
Here, Burke argues for the real distinctness of the faculties of imagination and 
understanding by indicating their different effects in aesthetics: the noticing of 
similarities, which is the proper business of imagination, is productive of pleasures, 
whereas the noticing of distinctions, judgment’s function, does not contribute to the 
aesthetic feeling except in a negative way. Both Burke and Hutcheson therefore believe 
that, although the higher faculties can make contributions to taste, these contributions 
are mostly negative. 
Burke and Hutcheson also agree in their non-cognitivism in aesthetics, despite their 
widely differing conceptions of beauty. In Hutcheson, we find a theory of beauty that is 
remarkably similar to the one we saw in Wolff and Baumgarten, namely the idea that 
beauty consists in what Wolff called “perfection”: 
what we call Beautiful in Objects, to speak in the Mathematical Style, seems to be 
in a compound Ratio of Uniformity and Variety: so that where the Uniformity of 
Bodys is equal, the Beauty is as the Variety; and where the Variety is equal, the 
Beauty is as the Uniformity. (Hutcheson 2004: 29) 
What prompts in us the aesthetic appreciation of an object is its high degree of 
uniformity amid variety, of harmony, of proportion, at least insofar as it is considered in 
itself and not as an imitation of another object. Mind however that Hutcheson did not 
believe beauty to consist in perfection; he rather takes beauty to be the analogue of a 
secondary quality in the inner sense corresponding to the primary quality of uniformity 
amidst variety (Hutcheson 2004: 27). This already marks a major distinction with the 
rationalist tradition: according to Hutcheson, the experience of beauty does not consist 
in, and does not even require, the cognition or recognition of the uniformity amidst 
variety, however confused: 
But in all these Instances of Beauty let it be observ’d, That the Pleasure is 
communicated to those who never reflected on this general Foundation; and that 
all here alledg’d is this, “That the pleasant Sensation arises only from Objects, in 
which there is Uniformity amidst Variety:” We may have the Sensation without 
knowing what is the Occasion of it; as a Man’s Taste may suggest Ideas of Sweets, 
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Acids, Bitters, tho he be ignorant of the Forms of the small Bodys, or their 
Motions, which excite these Perceptions in him. (Hutcheson 2004: 35) 
The idea is that beauty is not experienced as a cognition, but rather that is simply a fact 
about our inner sense that it is prompted to produce the idea of beauty when it is 
confronted with an object displaying uniformity amidst variety. This connection 
between beauty and uniformity is not a priori or cognitive, it is a contingent fact 
decided by the author of our nature, God: 
There seems to be no necessary Connection of our pleasing Ideas of Beauty with 
the Uniformity or Regularity of the Objects, from the Nature of things, antecedent 
to some Constitution of the Author of our Nature, which has made such Forms 
pleasant to us. Other Minds may be so fram’d as to receive no Pleasure from 
Uniformity; and we actually find that the same regular Forms seem not equally to 
please all the Animals known to us, as shall probably appear afterwards. 
(Hutcheson 2004: 46) 
This marks a further difference with rationalism, which becomes clear if we relate this 
discussion with my treatment of the debate on antisystematicity in 5.2. There, we saw 
that rationalists tend to regard systematicity as an a priori virtue of the world, i.e regard 
uniformity amidst variety as a maxim by which God himself operates. On this 
assumption it is natural to suppose that we are automatically pleased when we 
recognize uniformity amidst variety, because the latter is inherently pleasing. 
According to empiricists, there is no a priori reason why God would have to abide by the 
rule of uniformity amidst variety, and would not be tempted to create a world that is 
inconceivable in its richness. If this is true, the desirability of uniformity amidst variety 
is decided by God, and not a ground of God’s decisions. Hutcheson here embodies the 
empiricist tradition by noting that it is neither necessary that the world exhibit 
uniformity amidst variety, nor that we take pleasure in uniformity amidst variety. He 
does reveal himself to be profoundly theistic by suggesting that the fact that we, who 
are contingently appreciate uniformity amidst variety, find ourselves in a world, or a 
stretch of the world, which greatly exhibits uniformity amidst variety, implies that a 
wise intentional artificer has created both our natures and the world in which we live 
with an eye towards their mutual conformity (Hutcheson 2004: 46-47). This idea 
manifests itself even more clearly in his discussion of the “final causes” of inner sense, 
by which he means the divine intentions for inner sense2:  
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 Remember from 4.1 that these two statements are only synonymous in a very specific programme, which we 
can associate with that of the Boyle lectures and the general tendency to interpret teleology as design, and 
design as a mechanical structure intended and disposed by God. 
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That supposing the Deity so kind as to connect sensible Pleasure with certain 
Actions or Contemplations, beside the rational Advantage perceivable in them; 
there is a great moral Necessity, from his Goodness, that the internal Sense of Men 
should be constituted as it is at present, so as to make Uniformity amidst Variety 
the Occasion of Pleasure.” For were it not so, but on the contrary, if irregular 
Objects, particular Truths, and Operations pleased us, beside the endless Toil this 
would involve us in, there must arise a perpetual Dissatisfaction in all rational 
Agents with themselves; since Reason and Interest would lead us to simple general 
Causes, while a contrary Sense of Beauty would make us disapprove them: 
Universal Theorems would appear to our Understanding the best Means of 
increasing our Knowledge of what might be useful; while a contrary Sense would 
set us on the search after particular Truths: Thought and Reflection would 
recommend Objects with Uniformity amidst Variety, and yet this perverse Instinct 
would involve us in Labyrinths of Confusion and Dissimilitude. And hence we see 
“how suitable it is to the sagacious Bounty which we suppose in the Deity, to 
constitute our internal Senses in the manner in which they are; by which Pleasure 
is join’d to the Contemplation of those Objects which a finite Mind can best 
imprint and retain the Ideas of with the least Distraction; to those Actions which 
are most efficacious, and fruitful in useful Effects; and to those Theorems which 
most enlarge our Minds.” (Hutcheson 2004: 80-81) 
Hutcheson argues here that, were we not naturally inclined to seek unity and similarity, 
and take pleasure in disunity and variety alone, we would constantly be dissatisfied with 
our rational labours. The theism here consists in the idea that God has been merciful in 
making our aesthetic desires match our rational natures and the rational structure of 
the world. In other words, God has disposed our inner sense thus that, although it does 
not consist in cognition, it best matches our cognitive needs. 
It is this last connection with cognitivism in aesthetics that Burke attacks when he 
proposes his own theory of the beautiful and the sublime. When reading Burke’s 
discussion of what beauty is not, it is hard not to think that it is a direct criticism of 
Hutcheson, since he argues there that beauty consists neither in proportion nor in 
perfection (Burke 1764: 202-204). Instead, Burke believes “that beauty is, for the greater 
part, some quality in bodies, acting mechanically upon the human mind by the 
intervention of the senses” (Burke 1764: 210). At first, this may seem not to differ that 
greatly from Hutcheson’s account, since the latter too implied that beauty is a 
secondary quality produced by some primary qualities. But for Hutcheson, this 
connection was one between a clearly delineated property of the object and an idea of a 
specific internal sense. Burke’s account is much more physiologistic, as he is not content 
to merely state that God has installed a contingent connection between a property and 
an idea. What Burke wants to understand is how our physiology and anatomy are 
responsible for our taking aesthetic pleasure in certain things rather than others. The 
difference in view becomes all the more clear in Burke’s discussion of the sublime. 
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There, the sublime is characterized as connected to pain rather than pleasure, and pain 
and pleasure as connected to the sense of self-preservation in man (Burke 1764: 160). 
The specifically aesthetic nature of the feeling of the sublime is that we take delight in 
the feelings of pain and terror prompted in us by the dangerous in absence of real 
danger (Burke 1764: 84-85). This is important because it allows Burke both to explain 
aesthetic feelings as parasitic upon physiological effects and biological responses, and to 
stress that they are not themselves biologically interested in the way that “more base” 
pleasures and delights are. 
I have provided this overview in order to indicate some major issues which inform 
Kant’s discussion of the aesthetic and the harmony of the faculties, issues like the 
questions whether taste is better understood as intellectual or as sensual, cognitive or 
non-cognitive, as connected to objective features of the world or not, as a physiological 
or a specifically aesthetic response, etc… In the rest of this chapter, we will see Kant’s 
peculiar way of responding to these various questions, and how he thereby lays the 
basis for understanding the system of faculties as an organic whole that is genuinely 
normative and epigenetic.3 
7.2  The Functional Unity of the Faculties 
7.2.1 Reflective Judgment 
If we want to understand the specificity of Kant’s position in the Critique of the Power of 
Judgment, we need to gain a better understanding of the faculty of which it is the 
Critique. As I showed in 6.3.3, Kant believed that there were ultimately three distinct 
global orientations of the Gemüt, which he called the faculty of cognition, the faculty of 
desire and the feeling of pleasure and pain, and that in each of these faculties one of the 
three higher faculties was dominant. The Critique of the Power of Judgment is devoted to 
the feeling of pleasure and pain, in which the power of judgment is dominant. Hence, 
 
                                                     
3
 My discussion here has thus been motivated by my general concern with the nature of the system of 
faculties, rather than with philosophical aesthetics. This is the reason for my ommission of a historical setting 
that is essential to the proper understanding of Kant’s contributions to the latter, namely the debate on the 
standard of taste. In these matters, David Hume and Henry Home, Lord Kames, deserve extensive treatment. 
Since I will not be focusing on the issues of the sensus communis and the deduction of taste, I have ommitted 
such discussions, and focused on the relation between aesthetics and epistemology and with teleology. 
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the third Critique is an inquiry into the competences and the a priori principles of 
judgment. 
Kant had already introduced the idea of a specific faculty of judgment in the first 
Critique, although there he still understandably considered it from the perspective of its 
specific contribution to the theoretical use of reason under the guidance of the 
understanding. As a result, the doctrine of the power of judgment there was merely a 
discussion of the principles of the understanding (CPR A 132 / B 171). Nevertheless, he 
did contrast understanding and judgment there: 
If the understanding in general is explained as the faculty of rules, then the power 
of judgment is the faculty of subsuming under rules, i.e. of determining whether 
something stands under a given rule (casus legis) or not. General logic contains no 
precepts at all for the power of judgment, and moreover cannot contain them. For 
since it abstracts from all content of cognition, nothing remains to it but the 
business of analytically dividing the mere form of cognition into concepts, 
judgments and inferences, and thereby achieving formal rules for all use of the 
understanding. Now if it wanted to show generally how one ought to subsume 
under those rules, i.e. distinguish whether something stands under them or not, 
this could not happen except once again through a rule. But just as this is a rule, it 
would demand another instruction for the power of judgment, and so it becomes 
clear that although the understanding is certainly capable of being instructed and 
equipped through rules, the power of judgment is a special talent that cannot be 
taught but only practiced. (CPR A 132-133 / B 171-172) 
Kant thus distinguishes judgment and understanding in that the former is the capacity 
to reason through and with rules, the latter is the capacity to subsume a given case 
under a rule. We should probably understand this as follows: logic allows us to 
determine general laws that govern the relations between concepts, provided that these 
relations are analytic. But the capacity to subsume a given case under a rule cannot be 
grasped under rules. The argument he gives here is that this would constitute a regress, 
for if there were rules for the application of rules, then there would have to be rules for 
the application of the rules for the application of rules. 
It is difficult to see how we should interpret this argument to make it effective. Is 
Kant saying that the problem is that of the application of logical rules alone? In that 
case, the problem might be the following: we know that a subordinate concept contains 
its superordinate concept; what we do not know is whether two given concepts actually 
relate in this way. The issue with judgment then seems to be that, although the relations 
between concepts are governed by strict rules, we can never establish a rule to see in 
what relation two concepts stand. I find this argument unconvincing, because it is 
supposed that logic regards concepts insofar as they exhibit marks. If we therefore want 
to ask whether a given concept contains a given mark, then we are in a way asking 
whether that concept is that concept. Given Kant’s conception of analyticity, it is 
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doubtful whether the question: “is that bachelor unmarried” requires a distinct 
contribution of judgment just to grasp that the concept of a bachelor contains that of 
being unmarried and that therefore we are dealing with a case of analytic truth. 
I think it is better to understand the problem here through the definition of the 
power of judgment from the Critique of the Power of Judgment, namely as the power of 
subsuming the particular under the universal (AA V: 179). I suggest we read this in light 
of the discussion of 6.3.1, and see it as the power to subsume the particulars insofar as 
they are presented through the lower faculties to the universals, i.e. the concepts of the 
understanding. This allows us to make better sense of why subsumption is so 
problematic: we can easily relate two concepts because we can compare them in terms 
of the marks they contain. But we cannot compare a particular and a universal in this 
way because particulars are thought through intuitions, which are not concepts. This 
also appears to from Kant’s discussion of “the logical use of the understanding in 
general” in the Critique of Pure Reason: 
Now the understanding can make no other use of […] concepts than that of 
judging by means of them. Since no representation pertains to the object 
immediately except intuition alone, a concept is thus never immediately related 
to an object, but is always related to some other representation of it whether that 
be an intuition or itself already a concept). Judgment is therefore the mediate 
cognition of an object, hence the representation of representation of it. In every 
judgment there is a concept that holds of many, and that among this many also 
comprehends a given representation, which is then related immediately to the 
object. (CPR A 68 / B 93) 
Kant is saying here that judgments always contain concepts, and that concepts never 
relate directly to objects, but that only intuitions do. This implies that there are two 
kinds of judgments: a judgment in which a concept is related to a concept, and one in 
which it is related to an intuition. In the first case, there is no real problem of 
subsumption, since all that is at stake is whether the two concepts relate, a question we 
can solve by analyzing the concepts. In the second case, however, there is a problem, 
since the relation between a concept and an intuition is one between two 
heterogeneous principles. An object can thus be subsumed under a concept if a property 
is intuited in it that is also thought of in the concept. The problem is that of relating 
“what is intuited in it” with “what is thought of it”, given that these two aspects are not 
clearly related. 
There is a passage which seems to contradict this interpretation at first sight, namely 
the one from the opening of the Schematism chapter in the Critique of the Power of 
Judgment: “In all subsumptions of an object under a concept the representations of the 
former must be homogeneous with the latter, i.e. the concept must contain that which 
is represented in the object that is to be subsumed under it, for that is just what is 
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meant by the expression “an object is contained under a concept” (CPR A 137 / B 176). 
This seems to say that intuitions and concepts can  be homogeneous after all. But this is 
based on a misunderstanding. As the rest of the chapter reveals, the homogeneity is not 
in fact between the intuition or object and the concept, but rather between the intuition 
or object and the schema of the concept. In fact, Kant argues that concepts and objects 
or images only ever relate through the mediation of a schema (CPR A 141 / B 180), which 
is a rule for determining the intuition in accordance with the concept. The reason why 
Kant believes intuitions and empirical concepts to be “homogeneous” is because he 
believes that the schemata of empirical  concepts are homogeneous to intuitions. But 
much like there cannot be a rule for subsuming particulars and universals, so too we 
have no insight in the capacity to generate schemata. 
All in all, I find it plausible that Kant thought of the power of judgment as the 
capacity to subsume intuitions under concepts by means of schemata, and that it is the 
difference in kind between intuitions and concepts that is the cause of the problem of 
subsumption. In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, however, Kant distinguishes 
between two different kinds of such subsumption of particulars under universals: 
If the universal (the rule, the principle, the law) is given, then the power of 
judgment, which subsumes the particular under it (even when, as a 
transcendental power of judgment, it provides the conditions a priori in 
accordance with which alone anything can be subsumed under that universal), is 
determining. If, however, only the particular is given, for which the universal is to 
be found, then the power of judgment is merely reflecting. 
The determining power of judgment under universal transcendental laws, given 
by the understanding, merely subsumes; the law is sketched out for it a priori, and 
it is therefore unnecessary for it to think of a law for itself in order to be able to 
subordinate the particular in nature to the universal. (AA V: 179) 
The idea of a reflective judgment seems to be that of judging an object in absence of a 
concept for that object. Straightforward though this may sound, it raises serious 
interpretative difficulties when one dwells upon it. After all, it is a main tenet of the 
Kantian philosophy that we are never presented objects without concepts: each object-
representation requires an intuitive and a conceptual element. It cannot be the case 
that in reflective judgment, we are considering a brute empirical given in search for a 
concept with which to grasp it, since we are never presented with such brute empirical 
givens. Or do we need to take this as evidence that Kant did succumb to the Myth of the 
Given when he introduced the idea of reflective judgment? A passage from the Dohna 
Wundlacken-Logic concerned with Kant’s third Critique doctrine of taste is explicit about 
this:  
All our cognitions involve the following two things {two elements, one of which 
without the other yields no cognition}: 1. intuition (the interpretation" of the 
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concept, of thought); 2. concept. A pure concept like a pure rule does not yet yield 
any distinctness of cognition[;] this requires intuition, too. Conversely, intuition 
without concept is likewise nothing. For without [a concept] it would be as if it 
had seen nothing. (AA XXIV: 706) 
As a result, we cannot simply claim that Kant forgot about this crucial piece of doctrine 
when he considered aesthetics. 
An initial response to this is suggested by the fact that Kant connects the issue of 
reflective judgment with that of systematicity in the passages immediately following 
the one I just quoted. This initially suggests the following reading: in reflective 
judgment, we are considering not a brute empirical given, but rather an object as 
conceived under a highly specific empirical concept, and search for a more general 
concept under which to subsume it. The goal of reflective judgment is then that of 
unification: we attempt to find more general concepts through which to understand the 
particular in the universe, and try to unify our various specific concepts. 
Plausible though such a reading might seem at first, it cannot be made to square with 
the general thrust of the third Critique, for later on, Kant speaks of reflective judgments 
in which only a single object is concerned. It does not seem fruitful to seek unificatory 
concepts and theories empirically by reflecting on a single instance or concept. 
Moreover, this interpretation makes the whole idea of aesthetic judgment impossible, as 
we will see further on. 
In light of the above considerations, I will suggest the following reading: what we are 
trying to do in a reflective judgment is to come up with a concept that grasps an 
individual in its particularity, i.e. to think the particular (object) through the general 
(concept). This need not mean that we are presented with that object otherwise than 
through concepts: all that is required is that none of the various concepts with which 
we grasp it capture it adequately. In 5.4.1, I already suggested that we not read Kant’s 
conception of the adequacy of a concept to an intuition or object as a correspondence 
between that concept and the representation. Instead, we may take a concept to be 
adequate if, in using it to grasp an object, our usage of that concept aligns with our uses 
of the other concepts through which we grasp that object or with other uses of the same 
concept in grasping other objects. On such a reading, we can be said to have no concept 
of an object if there is an incongruence between the various concepts through which we 
grasp it initially. 
This makes the issue of reflective judgment not one of finding the general features of 
nature, but rather one of finding concepts that are ever better at grasping the specificity 
in nature. At first sight, this may conflict with the immediate context of the quoted 
passage, namely that of the concern with systematicity, which appears to be a concern 
with finding a coherent, unified picture of nature. In the light of 5.3.1, my response to 
this issue is to be expected, since I showed there that the Critique of the Power of Judgment 
attempts to find a conception of systematicity that allows us to square uniformity with 
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diversity. Moroever, in that section I characterized the principle of reflective judgment 
as a principle warranting analogical reasoning. In the present context, this means the 
following. Without the assumption of systematicity, the fact that none of the concepts 
through which we are grasping an object match up in applying them to this particular, 
suggests we need a different concept to grasp it. Unfortunately, we have no idea of 
where to start looking for such a concept, and what form it may take. With the 
assumption of systematicity, however, we may take the fact that these concepts at least 
seem adequate in some respects as a clue. That is to say we may assume that the object 
is at least partially grasped through these concepts, whereas in absence of the principle, 
we cannot be sure that these concepts are not completely inadequate. The assumption 
that the initial similarities can be used as clues for devising a new concept is, as we saw, 
valid only on the assumption that nature is amenable to uniformities. In this way, the 
assumption of uniformity is not only, or even primarily, a warrant for unification, but 
rather a basis for finding concepts to grasp the specificity and particularity of nature. 
In focusing on reflective judgment rather than determinative judgment, Kant is 
dedictating his third Critique to the question of the relation between the particular and 
the universal, between object or intuition and concept, and thus between the lower and 
the higher faculties. As we will see in the following two subsections, this translates into 
a theory of the relation between the faculties that holds their mutual harmony to be a 
contingent occurrence rather than a universally guaranteed state. This is why we will 
now turn to the doctrine of the harmony of the faculties. 
7.2.2 The Harmony of the Faculties and the Harmony of the Beautiful 
Given that the Critique of the Power of Judgment is supposed to be a Critique of the feeling 
of pleasure and displeasure, which is the Gemüt insofar as the power of judgment is 
legislative in it, Kant needs to somehow connect judgment and pleasure. He does this in 
two seemingly separate manners. The first connection has to with our intellectual 
pleasure in the attainment of our cognitive end of systematization: 
The attainment of every aim is combined with the feeling of pleasure; and, if the 
condition of the former is an a priori representation, as in this case a principle for 
the reflecting power of judgment in general, then the feeling of pleasure is also 
determined through a ground that is a priori and valid for everyone; and indeed 
merely through the relation of the object to the faculty of cognition, without the 
concept of purposiveness in this case having the least regard to the faculty of 
desire, and thus being entirely distinct from any practical purposiveness of 
nature. (AA V: 187) 
Here, the pleasure felt in attaining such a cognitive aim is supposed to be universal and 
a priori valid for everyone because the cognitive aim belongs to all those who have the 
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faculty of reason and are divided between sensibility and understanding. 
Unsurprisingly, Kant insists that what we experience here is the purposiveness of 
nature for our understanding, which is merely a relation of the object to the faculty of 
cognition, rather than a property of the object. This is important because Kant insists 
that we do not take the purposiveness in this sense to be an indicator for purposiveness 
insofar as it is considered in practical reason, i.e. as intentional. This corresponds with 
our analysis of chapter 4 and of 5.4.1, where the purposiveness of nature is in the first 
place not necessarily intentional, and in the second place appears intentional only to 
our cognitive capacities. 
Kant insists that we feel such intellectual pleasure only if the task contains 
intentional effort and if it strikes us as non-obvious: 
In fact, although in the concurrence of perceptions with laws in accordance with 
universal concepts of nature (the categories) we do not encounter the least effect 
on the feeling of pleasure in us nor can  encounter it, because here the 
understanding proceeds unintentionally, in accordance with its nature, by 
contrast the discovered unifiability of two or more empirically heterogeneous 
laws of nature under a principle that comprehends them both is the ground of a 
very noticeable pleasure, often indeed of admiration, even of one which does not 
cease though one is already sufficiently familiar with its object. To be sure, we no 
longer detect any noticeable pleasure in the comprehensibility of nature and the 
unity of its division into genera and species, by means of which alone empirical 
concepts are possible through which we cognize it in its particular laws; but it 
must certainly have been there in its time, and only because the most common 
experience would not be possible without it has it gradually become mixed up 
with mere cognition and is no longer specially noticed. – It thus requires study to 
make us attentive to the purposiveness of nature for our understanding in our 
judging of it, where possible bringing heterogeneous laws of nature under higher 
though always still empirical ones, so that if we succeed in this accord of such laws 
for our faculty of cognition, which we regard as merely contingent, pleasure will 
be felt. Conversely, a representation of nature that foretold that even in the most 
minor investigation of the most common experience we would stumble on a 
heterogeneity in its laws that would make the unification of its particular laws 
under universal empirical ones impossible for our understanding would 
thoroughly displease us; because this would contradict the principle of the 
subjective-purposive specification of nature in its genera and our reflecting power 
of judgment with respect to the latter. (AA V: 187-188) 
Kant states that there needs to be some sense of expectance that the process can go 
awry if we are to feel real intellectual pleasure in realizing our cognitive aims. That we 
do not usually feel such pleasure, is because we have either lost sight of the expectation 
of systematicity, or because we have lost sight of the contingency of the rational order 
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of nature. If we were to be reminded of that contingency, we would again marvel at the 
harmony of the empirical world. 
Notoriously, though, Kant introduces a feeling of pleasure that has the same 
universal and a priori validity as that of intellectual pleasure, but does not stem from 
the satisfaction of a cognitive aim: 
If pleasure is connected with the mere apprehension (apprehensio) of the form of 
an object of intuition without a relation of this to a concept for a determinate 
cognition, then the representation is thereby related not to the object, but solely 
to the subject, and the pleasure can express nothing but its suitability to the 
cognitive faculties that are in play in the reflecting power of judgment, insofar as 
they are in play, and thus merely a subjective formal purposiveness of the object. 
For that apprehension of forms in the imagination can never take place without 
the reflecting power of judgment, even if unintentionally, at least comparing 
them to its faculty for relating intuitions to concepts. Now if in this comparison 
the imagination (as the faculty of a priori intuitions) is unintentionally brought 
into accord with the understanding, as the faculty of concepts, through a given 
representation and a feeling of pleasure is thereby aroused, then the object must 
be regarded as purposive for the reflecting power of judgment. (AA V: 189-190) 
Kant speaks here of a distinct feeling of pleasure that corresponds with the 
purposiveness  of an object for the reflective power of judgment without there being a 
concept that is attained in reflection. There is thus a contrast with the abovementioned 
intellectual pleasure, which arises from our satisfaction in meeting a cognitive aim. In 
this case, however, no such cognitive aim is realized, and still we experience the object 
as purposive for the faculty of judgment. Kant states that this is possible because, in 
reflecting on such an object, an accord between the imagination and the understanding 
is unintentionally brought about. In this manner, Kant introduces his famous theory of 
the harmony of the faculties, which he characterizes in many ways throughout his 
work. In the first Introduction, the way in which the theory of the harmony of the 
faculties relates to that of aesthetic experience and that of reflective judgment is, as 
often, even more clearly put: 
in the power of judgment understanding and imagination are considered in 
relation to each other, and this can, to be sure, first be considered objectively, as 
belonging to cognition (as happened in the transcendental schematism of the 
power of judgment); but one can also consider this relation of two faculties of 
cognition merely subjectively, insofar as one helps or hinders the other in the 
very same representation and thereby affects the state of mind, and [is] therefore 
a relation which is sensitive (which is not the case in the separate use of any other 
faculty of cognition). Now although this sensation is not a sensible representation 
of an object, still, because it is subjectively connected with the process of making 
the concepts of the understanding sensible by means of the power of judgment, it 
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can, as a sensible representation of the state of the subject who is affected by an 
act of that faculty, be reckoned to sensibility, and a judgment can be called 
aesthetic, i.e., sensible (as far as its subjective effect, not its determining ground is 
concerned), although judging (that is, objectively) is an action of the 
understanding (as the higher cognitive faculty in general) and not of sensibility. 
(AA XX: 223) 
This passage is clearer because it immediately suggests how Kant believes to be able to 
solve the deadlock between rationalist and empiricist and between intellectualist and 
sensualist theories of aesthetic experience. In the first place, aesthetic experience can 
be a sensitive state rather than a cognitive one, because it is subjectively related to a 
state of the subject rather than objectively related to an object and the cognition 
thereof. But it has a clear connection with cognition, because it is connected with 
judgment rather than with sensations or inner senses, and is thus connected to an 
activity that is, strictly speaking cognitive. What is of interest to this cognitive activity 
is, however, not that or whether it attains its cognitive ends, but rather whether its 
subjective conditions are met, namely a mutual assistance, an accord, a harmony 
between the imagination and the understanding. In the official introduction, Kant also 
already suggests that this is enough to indicate why the feeling of pleasure felt on such 
an occasion is universal rather than merely particular: 
someone who feels pleasure in mere reflection on the form of an object, without 
regard to a concept, rightly makes claim to the assent of everyone else, even 
though this judgment is empirical and is an individual judgment, since the ground 
for this pleasure is to be found in the universal though subjective condition of 
reflecting judgments, namely the purposive correspondence of an object (be it a 
product of nature or of art) with the relationship of the cognitive faculties among 
themselves (of the imagination and the understanding) that is required for every 
empirical cognition. The pleasure in the judgment of taste is therefore certainly 
dependent on an empirical representation, and cannot be associated a priori with 
any concept (one cannot determine a priori which object will or will not suit taste, 
one must try it out); but it is nevertheless the determining ground of this 
judgment only in virtue of the fact that one is aware that it rests merely on 
reflection and on the general although only subjective conditions of its 
correspondence for the cognition of objects in general, for which the form of the 
object is purposive. (AA V: 191) 
Kant states here that this feeling is universal because it does not refer to some 
particularity about the constitution of the judging subject, but instead refers to the 
necessary subjective condition for all judging, namely the relation between the 
faculties. This means that we must now gain a better understanding of this relation 
between the faculties (in this subsection) and of the way in which that can be the 
ground for a feeling of pleasure (in the next subsection). The former task requires that 
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we not only explicitate the kind of relation between the faculties that is involved, but 
also how it can occur in the case of the judgment of a single object. 
Kant’s doctrine of the faculties departs from a central idea, namely that of a possible 
disharmony of the faculties – possible because of the conflict-admitting nature of their 
relation: 
{Taste is art. The understanding and imagination, which have to unite in this, are 
like two friends, who cannot stand each other and yet cannot part from each 
other - for they live in perpetual strife and yet are mutually indispensable. […] 
Imagination and understanding are two friends who cannot do without one 
another but cannot stand one another either, for one always harms the other. The 
more universal the understanding is in its rules, the more perfect it is, but if it 
wants to consider things in concreto then it absolutely cannot do without the 
imagination. (AA XXIV: 708-710) 
In commenting on this passage, Henry Allison clearly recognizes the main thrust of 
Kant’s doctrine: 
the “friendship” between imagination and understanding is not without a certain 
tension, which results from the fact that they pull in opposite directions: the 
understanding toward universality and the imagination toward specificity. 
Accordingly, though the understanding requires the imagination to exhibit 
intuitively what is thought in its concept, and the imagination presumably needs 
the understanding to give it direction so that it can know what to exhibit, they 
nevertheless often work at cross purposes (and therefore “harm” one another). 
Although Kant does not spell it out, this presumably occurs either when the 
understanding in its endemic quest for universality produces a concept that is too 
general and indeterminate to be represented adequately in concreto by any 
particular instance, for example, the concept of a living thing, or when the 
particular imaginatively apprehended is too idiosyncratic or atypical to represent 
adequately what is thought in the concept, for example, the image of a three-
legged dog. (Allison 2001: 48) 
This reading is perfectly in line with the results of my previous two chapters. There, I 
claimed that reason allows for conflict because it has two distinct strivings, namely that 
towards generality and that towards particularity. In 6.3.1, I argued that, for Kant, 
understanding and sensibility, and more generally the higher and the lower faculties 
are distinct because they are the faculties for generality and particularity respectively. I 
have also already suggested that the faculties for generality and those for particularity 
are sanctioned by reason’s drive for unity and for specificity respectively. All of this is 
reflected in the above-quoted passage, and in the general doctrine of the harmony of 




First however, we must turn to the experience that occasions our feeling of harmony 
amongst the faculties: aesthetic experience. According to Kant, in aesthetic experience, 
we are judging an object without the intention of deriving a concept from it. At some 
points, however, Kant insists that, in order for aesthetic appreciation to be distinct from 
sensual, moral or cognitive appreciation, no determinate concept may be used in 
aesthetic judgment (AA V: 229). This has puzzled interpreters because it is not clear 
whether Kant can accommodate such reasoning. After all, concepts need to be in play if 
judgment is to occur at all. However, it seems that Kant never goes so far as to deny that 
concepts can be at work in aesthetic experience: what he says is that we should have no 
determinate concept of the internal end of that object, of “the internal purpose that 
determines its possibility” (AA V: 230). This means that concepts may be employed, but 
not the concept that is meant to grasp the object in its individuality according to a 
principle. This corresponds with the analysis of reflective judgment in the previous 
subsection, where I proposed we read Kant as majorly concerned with devising an 
individuating concept, a concept with which to grasp the specificity of an object 
through conceptual means. The problem there was not that we cannot grasp the object 
with concepts, for we grasp the many features and properties it exhibits through 
concepts. But these concepts are not sufficient to see how these many properties unite 
into a individual in this case. 
This reading also suggests itself from an analysis of Kant’s conception of what it is in 
the object that we perceive as beautiful, namely the “merely formal purposiveness”. In 
order to understand this, we need to contrast this formal purposivenes with material  
purpose. From the context of Kant’s discussion, the latter appears to correspond with 
the concept of perfection: 
Objective purposiveness is either external, i.e., the utility of the object, or internal, 
i.e., its perfection. That the satisfaction in an object on account of which we call it 
beautiful could not rest on the representation of its utility is sufficiently obvious 
from the two preceding main sections, since in that case it would not be an 
immediate satisfaction in the object, which latter is the essential condition of the 
judgment about beauty. But an objective inner purposiveness, i.e., perfection, 
already comes closer to the predicate of beauty, and has therefore been held to be 
identical with beauty even by philosophers of repute, though with the proviso if it 
is thought confusedly. It is of the greatest importance in a critique of taste to 
decide whether beauty is really reducible to the concept of perfection.  (AA V: 226-
227) 
In the light of my discussion from 7.1, it is clear whom Kant is targeting here: the 
Wolffian tradition and their conception of beauty as a sensible –and thus confused- 
cognition of the perfection of the object. In the previous chapter (6.3.2), we already saw 
that Kant took issue with the metaphysical concept of perfection as internal unity of 
diversity. This also resonates with Hutcheson, who similarly believed that the sense of 
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beauty is the inner sensation corresponding with the perfection of the object. Given this 
definition of perfection as unity of the diverse, we can see that Kant sought to repudiate 
the idea of an aesthetic experience as a recognition, however confusedly or indirectly, 
of how an object, in all its specificity and unity, exhibits a clear conceptual unity: 
To judge objective purposiveness we always require the concept of an end, and [if 
that purposiveness is not to be an external one (utility), but an internal one], we 
require the concept of an internal end, which contains the ground of the internal 
possibility of the object. Now as an end in general is that the concept of which can 
be regarded as the ground of the possibility of the object itself, thus in order to 
represent an objective purposiveness in a thing the concept of what sort of thing 
it is supposed to be must come first; and the agreement of the manifold in the 
thing with this concept (which supplies the rule for the combination of the 
manifold in it) is the qualitative perfection of a thing. (AA V: 227)  
In understanding an object as objectively purposive, we understand through the 
concept of what it is supposed to be, i.e. through the rule that governs the unity of the 
manifold. In such a judgment, both the kind and the individuality of the object are 
understood as unified in a specific manner, as constituting, I submit, something like an 
essence, rather than a mere aggregate of properties. We already encountered one form 
of thinking on objective purposiveness, namely in the case of teleology: Kant believed 
that natural purposes are those objects which need to be understood through their 
internal purpose, through the unified kind or individuality that makes them what they 
are and properly grasp their peculiar unification in diversity. But throughout the 
Critique, as we already saw in 4.2.1, Kant sought to strictly separate objective and 
subjective purposiveness. 
This raises the question regarding the nature of subjective or formal purposiveness, a 
question that is all the more vexing because Kant seems to waver between two opinions. 
The first opinion is that formal or subjective purposiveness has little or nothing to do 
with the structure of the object itself, and only with its relation to the subject: 
What is formal in the representation of a thing, i.e., the agreement of the manifold 
with a unity (leaving undetermined what it is supposed to be) does not by itself 
allow any cognition of objective purposiveness at all, because since abstraction is 
made from this unity, as an end (what the thing is supposed to be), nothing 
remains but the subjective purposiveness of representations in the mind of the 
beholder, which indicates a certain purposiveness of the representational state of 
the subject, and in this an ease in apprehending a given form in the imagination, 
but not the perfection of any object, which is here not conceived through any 
concept of an end. (AA V: 227) 
In the Dohna Wundlacken-Logic, this idea is condensed into the contrast between 
logical and aesthetic purposiveness: 
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1. logical perfection in the agreement of the faculty of cognition with the object, 
2. aesthetic perfection[;] it consists in the subject's faculty of cognition. (AA XXIV: 
705) 
These passages suggest that beauty is not in the object, but in the mental state of the 
beholder, or rather judge. However, on other occasions Kant does seem intent on 
identifying the formal purposiveness of the beautiful object as a property of the 
representation of that object, and not just as a representation of a state of the subject. 
This raises the following question: what would it mean for an object to be judged 
without a concept and yet appear as having certain, albeit formal characteristics. If we 
want to overcome this difficulty, we need to see what properties a representation of an 
object would have to exhibit if it were to prompt the state in which its aesthetic 
appreciation consists.  
A first important clue can be gathered from the following passage from the “General 
remark on the first section of the Analytic”: 
If one draws the conclusion from the above analyses, it turns out that everything 
flows from the concept of taste as a faculty for judging an object in relation to the 
free lawfulness of the imagination. But if in the judgment of taste the imagination 
must be considered in its freedom, then it is in the first instance taken not as 
reproductive, as subjected to the laws of association, but as productive and self-
active (as the authoress of voluntary forms of possible intuitions);  and although 
in the apprehension of a given object of the senses it is of course bound to a 
determinate form of this object and to this extent has no free play (as in 
invention), nevertheless it is still quite conceivable that the object can provide it 
with a form that contains precisely such a composition of the manifold as the 
imagination would design in harmony with the lawfulness of the understanding in 
general if it were left free by itself. Yet for the imagination to be free and yet 
lawful by itself, i.e., that it carry autonomy with it, is a contradiction. The 
understanding alone gives the law. But when the imagination is compelled to 
proceed in accordance with a determinate law, then how its product should be, as 
far as its form is concerned, is determined through concepts; but then, as was said 
above, the satisfaction is not that in the beautiful, but in the good (of perfection, 
in any case merely the formal kind), and the judgment is not a judgment by means 
of taste. Thus only a lawfulness without law and a subjective correspondence of 
the imagination to the understanding without an objective one – where the 
representation is related to a determinate concept of an object – are consistent 
with the free lawfulness of the understanding (which is also called purposiveness 
without an end) and with the peculiarity of a judgment of taste. (AA V: 240-241) 
Like so many passages in Kant, this one is enlightening because it of its negative 
content: it tells us what aesthetic experience does not consist in. Kant insists that we 
experience beauty in an object when, in the act of judging it, imagination exhibits a free 
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lawfulness. Imagination is thus to exhibit some lawfulness, point to some unity, 
although it may not be constrained to exhibit this unity. This gives us an important clue 
as to the nature of the object that we experience as beautiful: it needs to appear to us, in 
judging, as a unity without there being a concept that determines this unity. As we saw 
above, perfection is a judgment that an object’s diversity is conceptually integrated in 
an intimate way, i.e. that there seems to be a ruling principle governing that object. In 
the case of an organism, such an object seemed to instantiate a concept as a rule or 
norm for its functional integration. An aesthetically perfect object, I submit, shows 
formal integration rather than material integration, i.e. shows a unity of diversity that is 
not recognized through or reducible to a governing principle or rule. I will abstain here 
from an elaboration of Kant’s theory of beauty and art, and explaining my own 
conviction that art is to be considered as non-conceptual integration, but will simply 
show how this reading allows us to understand and qualify some central tenets of Kant’s 
philosophy, namely his formalism and his anti-classicism. 
Kant is known as an unflinching formalist in aesthetics, since he defends the idea that 
only the form of the object is concerned in aesthetic experience. We have already seen 
what this means in one sense, namely that its logical perfection should not be 
concerned. But Kant’s theory of “disinterestedness” also entails that, besides objective 
internal purposiveness, external purposiveness like that of the sensually agreeable and 
the morally desirable are not at stake. The reason why he stresses this is because he 
wants to discuss aesthetic experience as autonomous from other kinds of experience. 
The objective internal purposiveness is the proper concern of the faculty of cognition, 
and the external purposiveness is the concern for the faculty of desire. Kant’s question 
regarding the possibility of aesthetic judgment is thus also a question as to the 
possibility of a level of appreciation autonomous from the cognitive and the moral. He 
thereby betrays his dissatisfaction with those accounts which sought to assimilate the 
aesthetic to one of these other functions –not because in doing so they are 
straightforwardly mistaken, but rather because they ultimately deny the possibility of 
aesthetic experience. 
Many readers have suggested that this commitment to the autonomy and purity of 
the aesthetic led Kant astray in his theory, because it led him to unduly restrict the 
scope of the aesthetic. This judgment, however, may be unfair to Kant. First of all, it 
needn’t be so that Kant does not allow for such “material” elements to enter into 
consideration – he merely requires that they are not the basis for the aesthetic 
judgment. In its turn, this needn’t imply, as some seem to suggest, that the material 
elements should be left out of consideration in aesthetic judgment completely. On such 
a reading, however, it is not clear of what the form is the form. By the merely formal, 
Kant needn’t mean shape in the straightforward spatial sense. After all, Kant denies that 
it is spatial configuration with which we are primarily concerned in  aesthetic judgment, 
spatial configuration being primarily understood through mathematics. 
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I suggest that what Kant means when he speaks of the merely formal, is the manner 
of interrelation and integration of the material elements. Their mutual relation might 
be understood on the basis of their cognitive, agreeable or moral features, but the 
pleasure in the aesthetic does not consist in these features: it consists in how they 
relate, contrast, meet and merge into a complex whole, and that these relations are not 
themselves grasped as agreeable, morally desirable or cognitively adequate. Rachel 
Zuckert has offered a similar interpretation: 
Thus, I have argued, Kant’s aesthetic formalism comprises the claim that in 
appreciating an object as beautiful, we represent it as an individual, as a unity of 
diverse properties, reciprocally contrasting and complementary, or as formally 
purposive without a purpose. This representation is merely subjective(ly 
purposive) because it is not unified in accord with a concept, indeed cannot be 
characterized by discursive conceptualization; it cannot be or ground an objective 
judgment. (Zuckert 2007: 330) 
I believe Kant insists that we do not think of beautiful objects as conceptually unified in 
another way as well. He insists, time and time again, that in aesthetics the imagination 
is to be free, and cannot simply be following an external rule. In the text, he is most 
concerned with stressing its independence from the lawfulness and the rules of the 
understanding. In his aesthetic theory, this first translates into his distaste of the 
classicist observance of rules in composition, disposition and execution of artworks: 
In a thing that is possible only through an intention, in a building, even in an 
animal, the regularity that consists in symmetry must express the unity of the 
intuition, which accompanies the concept of the end and belongs to the cognition. 
But where only a free play of the powers of representation (although under the 
condition that the understanding does not thereby suffer any offense) is to be 
maintained, in pleasure gardens, in the decoration of rooms, in all sorts of tasteful 
utensils and the like, regularity that comes across as constraint is to be avoided as 
far as possible; hence the English taste in gardens or the baroque taste in furniture 
pushes the freedom of the imagination almost to the point of the grotesque, and 
makes this abstraction from all constraint by rules the very case in which the taste 
can demonstrate its greatest perfection in projects of the imagination. 
All stiff regularity (whatever approaches mathematical regularity) is of itself 
contrary to taste: the consideration of it affords no lasting entertainment, but  
rather, insofar as it does not expressly have cognition or a determinate practical 
end as its aim, it induces boredom. (AA V: 242-243) 
Kant thus insists that art governed by concepts, by rules, by considerations of 
regularity, fails to please precisely because of its clear unity. In such works, the unity is 
seen as too laboured, as smelling of the lamp, and moreover it is seen as lacking in 
 
362 
novelty and originality. This judgment on the formulaic equally lies behind Kant’s 
theory of genius: 
genius 1) is a talent for producing that for which no determinate rule can be 
given, not a predisposition of skill for that which can be learned in accordance 
with some rule, consequently that originality must be its primary characteristic. 
2) That since there can also be original nonsense, its products must at the same 
time be models, i.e., exemplary, hence, while not themselves the result of 
imitation, they must yet serve others in that way, i.e., as a standard or a rule for 
judging.a 3) That it cannot itself describe or indicate scientifically how it brings its 
product into being, but rather that it gives the rule as nature, and hence the 
author of a product that he owes to his genius does not know himself how the 
ideas for it come to him, and also does not have it in his power to think up such 
things at will or according to plan, and to communicate to others precepts that 
would put them in a position to produce similar products. (For that is also 
presumably how the word “genius” is derived from genius, in the sense of the 
particular spirit given to a person at birth, which protects and guides him, and 
from whose inspiration those original ideas stem.) 4) That by means of genius 
nature does not prescribe the rule to science but to art, and even to the latter only 
insofar as it is to be beautiful art. (AA V: 307 – 308) 
Genius is thus that which allows one to create wonderfully integrated wholes without 
explicitly considering the integrating relations, without at each time seeking them out 
on the basis of unified concept. This does not mean that no awareness can be present in 
the activity of the genius, but only that, in the end, the harmony and integration 
escapes even him. Furthermore, the integration of a work of genius can later be 
conceptually articulated, can be studied, i.e. can be study of what we now call criticism. 
But the goal of criticism is not to understand what makes something beautiful: it is to 
understand what made this beautiful, and what new options, what new free creations 
can be inspired by it. The connection with this theory and that of the free harmony of 
the faculties wherein the imagination is freely active is explicit in the third Critique: 
The mental powers, then, whose union (in a certain relation) constitutes genius, 
are imagination and understanding. Only in the use of the imagination for 
cognition, the imagination is under the constraint of the understanding and is 
subject to the limitation of being adequate to its concept; in an aesthetic respect, 
however, the imagination is free to provide, beyond that concord with the 
concept, unsought extensive undeveloped material for the understanding, of 
which the latter took no regard in its concept, but which it applies, not so much 
objectively, for cognition, as subjectively, for the animation of the cognitive 
powers, and thus also indirectly to cognitions[.] (AA V: 316-317) 
But this brings us back to the harmony of the faculties. In the passage where Kant 
speaks of the freedom of the imagination, he is not just saying that imagination should 
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be free from the understanding – he also insists that it must be independent from the 
senses and from the law of association. This is more important than may seem at first, 
because Kant does believe that we cannot a priori determine whether a given object will 
be perfect: we need to experience it, judge it, in order to appreciate it. This suggests that 
in experiencing an object, it is the receptive element that plays the important role. But 
this is not what Kant says – he insists that what is at stake is the power of the 
imagination, not the givenness of sensibility. 
An initial answer might be suggested by remembering Edmund Burke’s Lockean 
distinction between imagination and reasoning: imagination seeks and suggests 
similiarities through association. Reasoning is primarily concerned with differentiating. 
This picture has initial plausibility as a framework for understanding Kant, because it 
describes the imagination and the understanding as engaged in opposite activities. The 
harmony of the faculties would then consist in the correspondence between the 
associations suggested by the imagination and the conceptual distinctions introduced 
by the understanding. This interpretation cannot stand, however, since Kant insists that 
the power of the imagination that it freely employs in its play is not that of association: 
for Kant, association is not free at all, since it is based on the reproductive aspect of 
imagination. Moreover, this picture inverts Kant’s division of labour between the two 
faculties: for him, it is understanding that insists on similarities, whereas imagination 
serves variety and specificity. Thus, the associative use of the imagination is in service 
of the understanding, and not a free action of the imagination itself. 
This might all raise questions as to what talk of the harmony of the faculties is meant 
to express. In the face of Kant’s tendency to express his ideas in terms of faculties rather 
than in terms of the objects to which they are related, has frustrated many readers. 
Their frustration, however, might simply be the result from their unwilligness to take 
the talk of the harmony of the faculties as more informative, namely by taking the 
various concepts to be not vague suggestions, but real conceptual articulations. 
In the passage on which I have been elaborating, Kant suggests that, in the 
experience of the beautiful, the imagination, taken as a distinct, active faculty of the 
mind, with its own proper contributions to knowledge, reveals itself as in harmony 
rather than in tension with another faculty, namely the understanding. It stands in this 
harmony not because there is a transcendent or external principle which causes it to 
work in this way. On the contrary, its own “productive and self-active” is already, of 
itself, functioning so as to maximally service the understanding. The aesthetic 
experience, thus seems to indeed be of a state of the subject: it is, as I will argue in the 




7.2.3 The Pleasure in Harmony 
In the previous subsection, I mentioned that Kant usually speaks of the experience of 
the beautiful as concerning a state of the subject rather than a property of an object. I 
have tried to indicate how this is compatible with the idea that a beautiful object 
nonetheless exhibits some features which entitle it to be called beautiful, and that 
beauty is not in any straightforward sense merely in the eye of the beholder. 
Nevertheless, the beauty of the object plays a peculiarly peripheral role in Kant’s 
aesthetics. Many readers have been frustrated by this, since instead of accounts of what 
he means by the “form” of the object insofar as it is aesthetically relevant, Kant keeps 
insisting on a peculiar doctrine of the harmony of the faculties. In this study, however, 
it is the theory of the faculties that is of more interest than the theory of art, and hence 
we should look whether there is some convergence between the various metaphorical 
expressions of the doctrine of harmony. I will of course argue that there is such a 
convergence, namely in that they all refer to the organic picture of the mind first 
introduced in 3.4, and that they indicate how this organic unity is normative in the sense 
of chapter 4. 
One of the most crucial and most puzzling characterizations of the harmony of the 
faculties is from §35 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment: 
The subjective condition of all judgments is the faculty for judging itself, or the 
power of judgment. This, employed with regard to a representation by means of 
which an object is given, requires the agreement of two powers of representation: 
namely, the imagination (for the intuition and the composition of the manifold of 
intuition), and the understanding (for the concept as representation of the unity 
of this composition). Now since no concept of the object is here the ground of the 
judgment, it can consist only in the subsumption of the imagination itself (in the 
case of a representation by means of which an object is given) under the condition 
that the understanding in general advance from intuitions to concepts. I.e., since 
the freedom  of the imagination consists precisely in the fact that it schematizes 
without a concept, the judgment of taste must rest on a mere sensation of the 
reciprocally animating imagination in its freedom and the understanding with its 
lawfulness, thus on a feeling that allows the object to be judged in accordance 
with the purposiveness of the representation (by means of which an object is 
given) for the promotion of the faculty of cognition in its free play; and taste, as a 
subjective power of judgment, contains a principle of subsumption, not of 
intuitions under concepts, but of the faculty of intuitions or presentations (i.e., of 
the imagination) under the faculty of concepts (i.e., the understanding), insofar as 




What Kant expresses here is that the aesthetic feeling is more concerned with the act of 
judging than with the judged object, and that the subjective state to which the 
experience of beauty refers is the state of the faculties such that the act of judgment is 
facilitated. Moreover, the passage is explicit in noting that the judged object is only 
relevant as occasioning such an accord or harmony. The harmony of the faculties is 
therefore characterized as an act of judgment, i.e. an act of subsumption, but not of a 
particular under a concept, but rather of the capacity for presenting particulars under 
the capacity to think through concepts. Unfortunately, this talk of subsumption is of 
course even more metaphorical, since two faculties cannot be subsumed under each 
other in the strict sense: imagination is not itself an intuition, and understanding is not 
itself a concept. Therefore, it is best to read Kant as saying that the faculties are in 
harmony when imagination is felt to generally present particulars of its own accord in 
such a way that they lend themselves to being conceptually grasped without belaboured 
and undue abstractions. What we experience in the harmony is, then, not the success of 
our judgment in this case, but rather a state in which judgment would generally be 
succesful. 
This reveals why Kant introduces a second characterizing of pleasure when he starts 
dealing with aesthetic judgment. In the previous subsection, we saw that the 
accomplishment of an aim prompts pleasure. Now, he also introduces the following:  
The consciousness of the causality of a representation with respect to the state of 
the subject, for maintaining it in that state, can here designate in general what is 
called pleasure; in contrast to which displeasure is that representation that 
contains the ground for determining the state of the representations to their own 
opposite (hindering or getting rid of them). (AA V: 220) 
This general contrast between pleasure and pain (Lust und Unlust) reveals that pleasure 
prompts us to retain a given state, whereas pain prompts us to leave it. In the case of the 
agreeable, the sensually pleasurable, we are prompted to keep enjoying that state, for 
instance by seeking renewed contact with the pleasurable object. In aesthetic judgment, 
we are prompted to maintain the specific alignment of faculties realized in the act of 
judging a particular object. A definition of pleasure from the Critique of Practical Reason 
allows us to better understand the connection between these two kind of pleasure, and 
why we are prompted, in both cases, to maintain our state:  
The faculty of desire is a being's faculty to be by means of its representations the cause 
of the reality of the objects of these representations. Pleasure is the representation of the 
agreement of an object or of an action with the subjective conditions of life, i.e., with the 
faculty of the causality of a representation with respect to the reality of its object (or with 
respect to the determination of the powers of the subject to action in order to 
produce the object). (AA V: 9) 
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Here, Kant defines pleasure as “the representation of the agreement of an object or of 
an action with the subjective conditions of life”. We cannot straightforwardly transpose 
this to the case of the third Critique, however, since Kant is here mainly concerned with 
the pleasurable as the agreeable, and as considered by the faculty of desire. But it is 
possible to see what changed between the Critique of Practical Reason and the Critique of 
the Power of Judgment. In the second Critique, the assumption is still that the object is 
connected so intensely with the state of the subject that we are interested in its reality 
and its realization. In the third Critique, however, Kant introduces a kind of 
purposiveness of the object for the subject that is less strictly connected, such that it is 
the subjective conditions that are the primary concern. In aesthetic judgment, we do 
not mean to preserve our state by preserving the object, we mean to preserve our state 
by preserving our subjective conditions directly. 
In offering this reading, I may be taken to overlook another major difference between 
the two cases, namely that in the second Critique passage, Kant is speaking of the 
subjective conditions of life, whereas in the third Critique, he is speaking of the 
subjective conditions of judgment, i.e. cognitive activity. However, this is not an oversight, 
since I precisely mean to suggest that there is a greater parallel here as well. At the close 
of the previous chapter, I argued that Kant saw the system of faculties as somehow 
analogous to an organism in  its complex functional unity. This means that the system 
of faculties has an analogue of life, its primary function being cognitive activity. If we 
accept this, Kant’s doctrine of the harmony of the faculties becomes more readily 
understandable: the agreeable is pleasurable because it promotes or agrees with the 
subjective conditions of our empirical, biological life, whereas the beautiful is 
pleasurable because it promotes or agrees with the subjective conditions of our 
cognitive activity, the proper arrangement and alignment of the faculties cooperating in 
judgment.   
This makes sense of much of the peculiarities of Kant’s account of aesthetics, namely 
of how it can postulate a principle which is subjective and universally valid. According 
to Kant, this is only possible if the aesthetic judgment is somehow pure. However, it is 
difficult to understand how a state involving pleasure can be pure. We can understand 
this if we make a distinction between two kinds of pleasure, namely the pleasure that 
we find in the agreeable, and that flows from our biological and psychological needs, 
and the pure pleasures and feelings that stem from, and concern, the cognitive and 
moral needs of the Gemüt. However, although Kant makes such a distinction, he does not 
locate aesthetic pleasure in either of these categories: 
That pleasure which is necessarily connected with desire (for an object whose 
representation affects feeling in this way) can be called practical pleasure, whether 
it is the cause or the effect of the desire. On the other hand, that pleasure which is 
not necessarily connected with desire for an object, and so is not at bottom a 
pleasure in the existence of the object of a representation but is attached only to 
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the representation by itself, can be called merely contemplative pleasure or 
inactive delight. We call feeling of the latter kind of pleasure taste. Practical 
philosophy, accordingly, speaks of contemplative pleasure only in passing, not as if 
the concept belonged within it. As for practical pleasure, that determination of the 
faculty of desire which is caused and therefore necessarily preceded by such 
pleasure is called desire in the narrow sense; habitual desire is called inclination; 
and a connection of pleasure with the faculty of desire that the understanding 
judges to hold as a general rule (though only for the subject) is called an interest. 
So if a pleasure necessarily precedes a desire, the practical pleasure must be called 
an interest of inclination. But if a pleasure can only follow upon an antecedent 
determination of the faculty of desire it is an intellectual pleasure, and the 
interest in the object must be called an interest of reason; for if the interest were 
based on the senses and not on pure rational principles alone, sensation would 
then have to have pleasure connected with it and in this way be able to determine 
the faculty of desire. Although where a merely pure interest of reason must be 
assumed no interest of inclination can be substituted for it, yet in order to 
conform to ordinary speech we can speak of an inclination for what can be an 
object only of an intellectual pleasure as a habitual desire from a pure interest of 
reason; but an inclination of this sort would not be the cause but rather the effect 
of this pure interest of reason, and we could call it a sense-free inclination (propensio 
intellectualis). (AA VI: 212-213) 
In this passage from the preface of the Metaphysics of Morals, a work published many 
years after the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant distinguishes sensual and 
intellectual pleasures. Presumably he needs the latter category to explain why the 
moral law can be action-motivational, through the pure feeling of awe, without making 
moral action impure by the admixture of a feeling. Note, however, that Kant does not 
locate aesthetic pleasure in either of these categories: he suggests that it properly 
belongs to neither, because it is not connected with practical, in other words, with the 
capacity to act in accordance with ends. This may make it troubling to understand 
exactly how the feeling of the beautiful can be connected with a striving to maintain a 
state, since no intentional action is involved. The organic analogy, however, allows us to 
avoid this conclusion. In chapter 4, we saw that Kant did not believe that organisms 
strive according to ends – their striving should thus properly be understood as non-
intentional. I submit therefore that the striving involved in the harmony of the faculties 
is analogous to that of the unintentional striving that we see at work in plants and other 
non-animal life. This reading also makes sense of the following passage, because it 
suggests that aesthetic feeling is like moral and intellectual pleasure in being pure and 
stemming from an interest of reason rather than from a biological or psychological 
need, but unlike it in that it is practical-intentional: 
To establish a priori the connection of the feeling of a pleasure or displeasure as an 
effect with some representation (sensation or concept) as its cause is absolutely 
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impossible, for that would be a causal relation, which (among objects of 
experience) can only ever be cognized a posteriori and by means of experience 
itself. To be sure, in the critique of practical reason we actually derived the feeling 
of respect (as a special and peculiar modification of this feeling, which will not 
coincide exactly either with the pleasure or with the displeasure that we obtain 
from empirical objects) from universal moral concepts a priori. But there we could 
also step beyond the bounds of experience and appeal to a causality that rests on a 
supersensible property of the subject, namely that of freedom. But even there we 
did not actually derive this feeling from the idea of the moral as a cause, rather it 
was merely the determination of the will that was derived from the latter. The 
state of mind of a will determined by something, however, is in itself already a 
feeling of pleasure and is identical with it, thus it does not follow from it as an 
effect: the latter would only have to be assumed if the concept of the moral as a 
good preceded the determination of the will by the law, for in that case it would 
be pointless for the pleasure that would be connected with the concept to be 
derived from it as a mere cognition. 
Now it is similar with the pleasure in the aesthetic judgment, except that here it is 
merely contemplative and does not produce an interest in the object, while in the 
moral judgment it is practical. The consciousness of the merely formal 
purposiveness in the play of the cognitive powers of the subject in the case of a 
representation through which an object is given is the pleasure itself, because it 
contains a determining ground of the activity of the subject with regard to the 
animation of its cognitive powers, thus an internal causality (which is purposive) 
with regard to cognition in general, but without being restricted to a particular 
cognition, hence it contains a mere form of the subjective purposiveness of a 
representation in an aesthetic judgment. (AA V: 221-222) 
This passage is also interesting for two other reasons. The first is that Kant clarifies his 
causal language in his aesthetic theory. Paul Guyer (1997: 93-97) has argued that we 
need to take this causal language literally, and therefore assume that the aesthetic 
feeling is a matter of psychological mechanisms proper to the minds of men. In such a 
case, the dynamics of the faculties described here is not between the faculties as 
considered by epistemology (as in the first Critique), but between the faculties 
considered as psychological and empirical. This conclusion does not need to follow 
however, since in the passage Kant quoted above he denies that the sense in which the 
moral law determines the finite agent to act morally is properly causal in the sense of 
the empirical category. Instead, this determination is to be regarded as some internal 
determination that is analogous to what we would improperly call a causality. I suggest 
that, when Kant says in that passage that the aesthetic feeling is similar to the moral, it 
is also in being determined suprasensibly rather than causally. This does not quell the 
problems of transcendental idealism, but it also does not raise problems that were not 
already contained in the idea of moral determination. 
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The second interesting aspect about the passage is its characterization of the 
harmony of the faculties as an “animation” (Belebung) of the faculties. The same 
characterization is also to be found elsewhere, for instance in the following passages: 
The animation (Belebung) of both faculties (the imagination and the 
understanding) to an activity that is indeterminate but yet, through the stimulus 
of the given representation, in unison… (AA V: 219) 
 
the facilitated play of both powers of the mind (imagination and understanding), 
enlivened (belebt) through mutual agreement. (AA V: 219) 
For readers like Guyer (1997: 97), this language of animation and livening is too 
figurative. I agree that, given the fact that Kant is speaking of transcendental faculties 
rather than of psychological or biological faculties, the language is to a certain extent 
figurative. I do not agree, however, that it is therefore devoid of conceptual portent. If 
we read Kant as conceiving of the Gemüt as an organic unity of distinct and possibly 
uncooperative faculties, then we can gain a better understanding of the way in which 
the faculties “animate” each other. In 6.2.2, we saw that Crusius explicitly spoke of the 
vivification or animation of faculties by other faculties. This meant that certain faculties 
were further developed or activated by a corresponding activity of another fundamental 
faculty. A similar picture seems to lie behind Kant’s use of that language here. This 
would mean that Kant saw the harmony of the faculties as one which is desirable for the 
system of the faculties because in it the different capacities are strengthened and led to 
express themselves. But, as I suggested already in 5.4, in the mature Kant, the dynamical 
metaphor of “life” as in “living force” yields to that of “life” as in “living system”. This 
results in the following reading: in the harmony of the faculties, the different faculties 
of the mind, which are like the different activities of different organs, influence each 
other, strengthen each other and specify in such a way that the unity of the Gemüt is 
thereby reinforced. It is because in such a state the Gemüt, like an organism, appears as 
apt to its primary function, namely cognition, without there having to be a leading or 
transcendent principle to make it apt in this way, that there is a striving to maintain 
this functional state. 
If we take all this together, we can answer one of the two questions with which I 
ended chapter 6.4. There, I inquired whether the system of faculties is like an organism 
not only because it is a unity of diversity in the relevant sense, but also because it is 
equally open to contingency. In offering his theory of the harmony of the faculties, Kant 
seems to be saying that the maximal unity of the system of faculties is not always 
guaranteed, and is in fact contingent upon certain experiences, certain concrete and 
contingent cases of judgment. Whether our system of faculties is internally aligned in 
such a way that it allows us to judge almost effortlessly, is something which only 
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experience can teach us. When, in our experiencing or judging, this maximal unity is 
felt or realized, the system of faculties is determined to maintain this state. 
What remains now is to answer the other question, namely whether besides being 
truly normative and open to contingency, the system of faculties is also plastic and 
epigenetic. This question will be dealt with in the following section. 
7.3 The Sublime Vocation of Man 
Kant does not limit his aesthetics to a discussion of the beautiful, for he also speaks of 
the sublime. In this, he is most likely inspired by Burke. According to Burke, the 
beautiful is correlated with pleasure, whereas the sublime is correlated with some 
displeasure, which nonetheless prompts some delight. Kant offers the same general 
picture: 
the latter pleasure is very different in kind from the former, in that the former 
(the beautiful) directly brings with it a feeling of the promotion of life, and hence 
is compatible with charms and an imagination at play, while the latter (the feeling 
of the sublime) is a pleasure that arises only indirectly, being generated, namely, 
by the feeling of a momentary inhibition of the vital powers and the immediately 
following and all the more powerful outpouring of them; hence as an emotion it 
seems to be not play but something serious in the activity of the imagination. 
Hence it is also incompatible with charms, and, since the mind is not merely 
attracted by the object, but is also always reciprocally repelled by it, the 
satisfaction in the sublime does not so much contain positive pleasure as it does 
admiration or respect, i.e., it deserves to be called negative pleasure. (AA V: 244-
245) 
Kant’s doctrine of the sublime is interesting for several reasons. First of all, it is of 
course tantamount to the claim that not everything that is not beautiful is thereby 
either ugly or aesthetically uninteresting. Even a negative feeling, Kant seems to say, 
can be the basis of a pleasure, in which case “it deserves to be called negative pleasure”. 
The second reason is that Kant again connects the feeling of the sublime with the 
organic and vital metaphors which were so dominant in his account of the beautiful. 
Here too, Burke lies in the background. On Burke’s physiological aesthetics, the sublime 
originates in experiences of fear, prompted by that which threatens our life, but which 
turns out to be harmless in spite of its terribleness. In light of the analysis of 6.4 and 
 
 371 
7.2.3, we can read Kant’s theory of the sublime as a transcendentalization of Burke’s 
merely physiological account.4 On such a reading, the sublime is the experience of an 
object which is in the first order harmful to the harmony of the faculties, but in the 
second order introduces another sense of adaptedness. In this section, I will attempt to 
articulate such a reading, rather than give a complete account of Kant’s theory of the 
sublime 
Kant continues to contrast the beautiful and the sublime as follows: 
The most important and intrinsic difference between the sublime and the 
beautiful, however, is this: that if, as is appropriate, we here consider first only the 
sublime in objects of nature (that in art is, after all, always restricted to the 
conditions of agreement with nature), natural beauty (the self-sufficient kind) 
carries with it a purposiveness in its form, through which the object seems as it 
were to be predetermined for our power of judgment, and thus constitutes an 
object of satisfaction in itself, whereas that which, without any rationalizing, 
merely in apprehension, excites in us the feeling of the sublime, may to be sure 
appear in its form to be contrapurposive for our power of judgment, unsuitable 
for our faculty of presentation, and as it were doing violence to our imagination, 
but is nevertheless judged all the more sublime for that. (AA V: 245) 
The first-order displeasure of the sublime is thus due to the fact that the “object” is 
unpurposive for our faculty of judgment because it is “doing violence to our 
imagination”. The discussion of the beautiful allows us to understand why Kant singles 
out imagination as the primary victim. In the case of the beautiful, the imagination 
succeeds in schematizing and presenting the manifold in such a way that it suggests an 
integrated unity without having to employ the concept or principle of such a unity. We 
can thus expect that in the case of the sublime, the manifold is presented in such a way 
that the imagination seems to be in principle incapable of presenting it as unified: 
in that which we are accustomed to call sublime in nature there is so little that 
leads to particular objective principles and forms of nature corresponding to these 
that it is mostly rather in its chaos or in its wildest and most unruly disorder and 
devastation, if only it allows a glimpse of magnitude and might, that it excites the 
ideas of the sublime. (AA V: 246) 
But if this is true, then why do we nevertheless take some delight in the sublime? Why 
do we choose to revel so in the limitations, the inaptitude of our own cognitive 
organization? In order to answer this, Kant first insists that we are never presented with 
the sublime. This should be unsurprising, since he believes that we can only ever be 
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 Kant himself suggests this on AA V: 277. 
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presented with something if there is some conceptual grasp on it. If the sublime is that 
which is in principle resistant to such a conceptual grasp, then it is impossible for us to 
recognize something as sublime. Kant admits that much and therefore advances the 
following bold claim: “That is sublime which even to be able to think of demonstrates a 
faculty of the mind that surpasses every measure of the senses”. (AA V: 250) 
Kant’s theory of the sublime is thus that, in experiencing, in aesthetic judgment, the 
inaptness of our imagination, we thereby nonetheless discover our own capacity to 
think that which lies beyond the limits of our capacities. This capacity is, of course, 
reason. For that reason, Kant describes the sublime as pertaining not to the relation 
between imagination and understanding, but rather between imagination and reason. 
What we discover, however, is not the infinite capacity of reason, but rather reason’s 
demand that the other faculties seek to overcome their limitations: 
The feeling of the inadequacy of our capacity for the attainment of an idea that is 
a law for us is respect. Now the idea of the comprehension of every appearance 
that may be given to us into the intuition of a whole is one enjoined on us by a law 
of reason, which recognizes no other determinate measure, valid for everyone and 
inalterable, than the absolute whole. But our imagination, even in its greatest 
effort with regard to the comprehension of a given object in a whole of intuition 
(hence for the presentation of the idea of reason) that is demanded of it, 
demonstrates its limits and inadequacy, but at the same time its vocation for 
adequately realizing that idea as a law. Thus the feeling of the sublime in nature is 
respect for our own vocation, which we show to an object in nature through a 
certain subreption (substitution of a respect for the object instead of for the idea 
of humanity in our subject), which as it were makes intuitable the superiority of 
the rational vocation of our cognitive faculty over the greatest faculty of 
sensibility. (AA V: 257) 
As mentioned above, Kant denies that any object can be truly presented as sublime. Now 
he explains how we nevertheless come to judge it as sublime, namely through a 
subreption. Strictly speaking, he says, it is not the object that is experienced and judged 
as sublime: it is the idea of humanity in ourselves. In his treatment of the sublime, Kant 
Kant systematically refers to the idea of humanity as a vocation. As a result, it is the 
vocation of man more then anything else which is sublime, i.e. the most awesome and 
the most terrible5: 
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 This resonates with Heidegger’s famous characterization of man as to deinotaton in Introduction to 




No idea so elevates the human mind and animates it even to inspiration as that of 
a pure moral disposition, revering duty above all else, struggling with the 
countless ills of life and even with its most seductive allurements and yet 
overcoming them (as we may rightly assume that one is capable of doing). That 
the human being is aware that he can do this because he ought to discloses within 
him a depth of divine predispositions and lets him feel, as it were, a holy awe at 
the greatness and sublimity of his true vocation. (AA VIII: 287) 
We have already encountered the idea of man as vocation earlier on in this dissertation, 
namely in the third chapter, where I discussed Kant’s theory of history. By integrating 
my conclusions from section 3.2 into the present context, we can arrive at the 
conclusion that the experience of the sublime opens man up to his historicity and his 
perfectibility. 
In 3.2, I argued that Kant introduced his conception of humanity as a vocation as an 
attack on Rousseau’s idea of faculty fixism. I characterized faculty fixism as the doctrine 
that man has well-defined epistemic capacities, which correspond to his essence, and 
that he can make no coherent attempt to change himself. Kant wished to oppose this 
idea and defend the cultural perfectibility and the historical malleability of man. The 
faculty that allows us to be so historically malleable and perfectible, Kant believed, is 
reason: the capacity to think the absolute, to think the extension beyond the current 
limitation, and to act morally. In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant now argues 
that what allows us to experience man as a vocation rather than as a brute given is the 
experience of the sublime.  
The idea that the “vocation” of man is to be read as the alterability, the perfectibility, 
the plasticity of human nature is further supported by the fact that, on two occasions 
(AA V: 247; AA V: 258) Kant states that the beautiful brings about a state of calm, 
whereas the sublime brings about movement. That the beautiful leads to calm, is to be 
expected, because it prompts a state which the Gemüt wants to maintain. The sublime, 
however, brings about a specific kind of movement that Kant calls a vibration, because 
we are at once repelled and attracted to the object. I suggest we read this as follows: in 
the second order, the sublime puts us in a state of displeasure, i.e. of wanting to leave 
the current state. But because we are at the same time attracted to the object, we cannot 
leave the state by avoiding the object. Hence, the only way to leave the state is to 
recalibrate, reallign and expand our faculties. 
That Kant is primarily concerned, in his discussion of the sublime, with the 
perfectibility of man, and with not accepting brute limits on our capacities, appears also 
from a tirade included in the “general remark on the exposition of aesthetic reflective 
judgments”: 
a religious sermon that preaches a groveling, base currying of favor and self-
ingratiation, which abandons all confidence in our own capacity for resistance 
against evil, instead of the energetic determination to seek out the powers that 
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still remain in us, despite all our frailty, for overcoming inclinations; the false 
humility that finds the only way to be pleasing to the supreme being in self-
contempt, in whimpering, feigned remorse and a merely passive attitude of mind 
– none of these have anything to do with that which can be counted as the beauty, 
let alone the sublimity, of a mentality. (AA V: 273) 
This is a clear rejection of what I have called faculty-fixism, since it is hard not to 
recognize in these passages Rousseau’s admonition that we remain in our limitations 
and do not seek to overcome them. For Kant, the goal is to overcome these limitations, 
even if they may ultimately be there, and “seek out the powers that still remain in us”. 
We can recognize here the idea, presented in 6.2 as well, that we cannot tell in advance 
which are the powers of man, and that only a historical attempt to cultivate and develop 
our powers can reveal this. 
Kant’s theory of the sublime, then, resonates with his historical works in that the 
experience of the sublime opens to us the idea of man, not as what he is, but as what he 
could be, as Kant put it in his preface to the Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view: 
A doctrine of the knowledge of the human being, systematically formulated 
(anthropology), can exist either in a physiological or in a pragmatic point of view. 
Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what 
nature makes of the human being; pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a 
free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself. (AA VII: 
119) 
And yet, Kant’s discussion also indicates that there is an upper bound to the malleability 
of man: for the distinction between the lower and the higher faculties, and the fact that 
our cognition is discursive, will never be overcome. We can hope to expand and 
harmonize our capacities further and further, but we will never acquire a single 
intellectual nature, will never become so as to have direct conceptual contact with the 
particular. Since for Kant, it is the discursivity of our knowledge that marks us as finite, 
he believes that although we may be indefinitely malleable, we will never lose our finite 
nature. As Kant famously said: “out of such crooked wood as the human being is made, 
nothing entirely straight can be fabricated” (AA VIII: 23) 
The whole idea of the vocation of man thus points towards the idea of epigenesis by 
resonating with the historical writings where, as we saw, an epigenesist picture of the 
nature of man was at stake. But there is of course another connection. In 6.2.3, I 
discussed Tetens’ implicit connection of the perfectibility of man with the epigenesis of 
the faculties. That Kant was influenced by Tetens, that he spoke of epigenesis of 
faculties in the historical writings and that his Critique of the Power of Judgment both 
elaborates on the organic conception of the system of faculties and connects it with the 
idea of the vocation of man, all suggest that behind the Critical writings lay a genuine 
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idea of the epigenesis of the faculties. In the next section, I will try to extract such a 
theory. 
7.4 The Epigenesis of the Faculties 
At the close of the first part of this dissertation, I listed some features that a historicized 
transcendental idealism would need, and argued that these features matched up with 
the crucial features of Kant’s conception of epigenesis identified in chapter 2. I then 
bracketed that issue in order to investigate Kant’s conception of systematicity in part 2. 
I closed that part with the question of whether the system of faculties can be considered 
to be epigenetic in the same way that organisms can be. In the previous subsection, I 
have argued that this may very well be so. Now, we can put the pieces together and see 
what the epigenetic nature of the faculties might entail. 
In the first place, we can see how Reason is the capacity for historicity as such: it 
confronts us with the limitations of our own capacities in such a way as to prompt us to 
overcome these limitations. In Kant’s theory, it is through the experience of the sublime 
that the Gemüt is so prompted. Reason thus does not appear here as a transhistorical 
given, but rather as the ground for us to enter into history, to change, to become 
dynamic. 
The third Critique thereby also identifies the productive or epigenetic power. 
Contrary to what one might expect, this power is not reason itself, but judgment. It is 
through judgment that the faculties are related to each other, and it is in judgment that 
the general function of the system of faculties is realized, namely cognition. In order to 
be able to cognize properly, the subjective condition for judgment must obtain, and this 
condition is the proper alignment of the faculties. 
In chapter 4, we saw that, according to Kant, an organism is properly understood as a 
functional, normative unity of diverse interproducing and interspecifying parts. Its 
unity does not consist in a transcendent principle, but rather in a norm governing the 
unity of the organism. An organism is to be understood as acting in accordance with this 
norm, i.e. as striving to instantiate it. The third Critique revealed to us that there such a 
norm equally governs the unity of the faculties, and that this unity is not guaranteed by 
a leading or transcendent principle. It is in judging that it is revealed whether this norm 
obtains. 
We have seen in this chapter that the norm does not automatically obtain, and that is 
contingent whether it obtains. The fact that we feel aesthetic pleasure or displeasure at 
all is, according to Kant, a sign that the different faculties are not eternally ajusted to 
each other, and the unity of the faculties can be “threatened” by some experiences. In 
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fact, in the sublime, we experience such a threat to that unity, since imagination is 
revealed as incapable of delivering or presenting something that can be grasped by 
conceptual means. 
In chapter 3, I indicated that a historicized transcendental idealism needs to show 
how the transcendental is itself open to contingency. Now we see a way in which it is so, 
since the system of faculties itself is open to contingency in the described way. It is 
important to see, however, that its openness to contingency is not direct, but rather 
internal. It is not really so that aesthetic judgment reveals the mutual adaptedness 
between an object and our system of faculties. In fact, the object does not really figure 
in this judgment at all, although it is properly regarded as the contingent occasion for 
that judgment. What is judged is the mutual adaptedness of our faculties, i.e. the 
internal interadaptedness of our epistemic capacities, of our system of cognition. 
The internal ground of the system of faculties’ openness to cognition is thus the 
distinctness of the faculties, most importantly their division between intuitive and 
disjunctive. According to Kant, we are necessarily divided between the capacity for 
particularity and the capacity for generality. These two capacities are always only 
contingently in harmony – only in an intuitive intellect would they necessarily 
harmonize, precisely because they are not distinct at all. 
This allows us to see the reason for what many have taken to be Kant’s concessions to 
preformationism, namely his doctrine of germs and dispositions and his concomitant 
denial of a single generative force. In chapter 2, I argued that Kant introduced these 
concepts not to insist on preformation, but rather to suggest that epigenesis requires 
constraints. In chapter 3, I argued that Kant regarded the fixed germs and 
predispositions as those capacities which are required for historicity and epigenesis to 
be possible at all. In the current context, it is revealed that the distinctness of sensibility 
and understanding, or of lower and higher faculties, is such a constraint. Kant wants to 
deny that sensibility and understanding can originate from a same stem, not because he 
believes all capacities must be fully present at the onset, but rather because it is the 
division between the two that makes the Gemüt open to contingency at all. If there were 
not at least some distinction or articulation in the initial phases of an epigenetic 
process, then no such process would be prompted, since there would be no openness to 
contingency, and for Kant the contingent is required to prompt epigenetic processes. 
Kant’s insistence on the impossibility to ever overcome this distinction also indicates 
that we will never enter into a state where no further change is possible. That is to say, 
there can be no end of history, after which our system of faculties will no longer 
meaningfully change. Such an end of history is possible only if we fully overcome the 
division, and acquire an intuitive intellect, which is an impossibility for us. This reveals 
a major difference between Kant and Hegel: for Hegel, the intuitive intellect is possible, 
and hence there is a determinate teleological end-point to history. For Kant, such an 
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end-point will for ever remain impossible, and hence we cannot even in advance know 
in which direction we are going. 
We can also better understand how exactly the contingent occasions the epigenesis 
of the faculties in Kant through the contrast with Hegel. For Hegel, there is a specific 
internal contradiction in each phase, and the contingent merely provides the occasion 
for this internal contradiction to come to the fore. For Kant, there need be no single or 
determinate tension that is then triggered by the contingent. What specific change is 
prompted is determined by the structure of the contingency triggering it. This contrasts 
with Hegel, for whom it is the specific change that can be prompted that determines 
what kind of contingency can trigger it. Moroever, for Kant there will usually not be 
change unless there are many tensions operating, up to a point where a readjustment or 
realignment of the faculties. 
We must now, however, try to understand the nature of that change. Like Tetens, 
Kant seems to have taken the epigenetic process to be prompted by the relations 
between the (more) fundamental faculties rather than as an internal self-development 
of a single faculty. Like with Tetens, this does not need to mean that these fundamental 
faculties are entirely fixed or that no new faculties are possible. In fact, in Tetens’ 
“epigenesis through evolution”, the mutual interaction of the faculties can change the 
existing faculties and create new ones that are dependent upon their interactions. We 
can thus take quite seriously Kant’s claim that we do not know what faculties we can 
have, and how far our faculties can be perfected. Moreover, we can see why the existing 
faculties are the predispositions to future ones: it is because of their structure and 
interrelations that future faculties are possible at all. 
I believe we can also understand how there can be an epigenesis of the a priori in 
Kant’s system if we keep in mind his organic conception. As we saw in 6.4, Kant seems to 
have regarded the a priori as a system of organically interadapted principles – 
interadapted to the general aim of cognition. This is because the different a priori 
principles are the principles of the different faculties. Now, if it is true that the a priori 
principles are to be understood through the other principles and the relations obtaining 
between them, then the principles can change if these relations change. In altering our 
faculties, their principles may ultimately undergo change as well. 
It is important to realize, however, that the principles, such as the intuitions of space 
and time and the categories, can never be directly at stake in an adjustment, since 
within a given configuration they cannot fail. What may happen, however, is that 
concrete judging on the empirical and the contingent may ultimately provoke such 
changes in the system of faculties that the a priori itself becomes altered. It is thus only 
in the third degree that the a priori is open to contingency – but this does not mean that 




In this chapter, I have attempted to show how Kant may have thought of the epigenesis 
of reason by discussing the way in which he articulated his organic conception of the 
system of faculties in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. I have shown that he there 
conceives of the Gemüt as fundamentally open to contingency, and that he thereby 
tightens the analogy between it and an organism. I have also tried to show how the 
sublime can prompt change of the faculties, and open the Gemüt to historicity. All this is 
meant to show how the analyses of the previous chapters, mostly chapter 3 and chapter 
6, converge upon a picture of Kantian epigenesis of reason as the historicity of the a 
priori. 
In this dissertation, I have attempted to argue that Kant’s epigenesis of reason could 
have implied more historicity than is traditionally assumed. I have done this by arguing 
that, according to Kant, the system of faculties is, like an organism, a plastic, i.e. 
epigenetic normative unity of a diversity of distinct and irreducible powers, and that 
the a priori depends on this interrelation. I will not here return to the many arguments 
of the dissertation, but instead indicate some future lines of research, and then briefly 
comment on the nature and scope of my claim. 
In the first place, the present dissertation calls for a reappraisal of Kant’s system of a 
priori principles. We need to understand two things, namely 1) how they are dependent 
upon the nature of the faculty to which they belong, and 2) how they mutually specificy 
each other in the way suggested by Kant. If we can answer these questions, we can 
properly assess how other systems of a priori principles are possible. 
Secondly, this dissertation suggests that reflective judgment plays a much more 
central role in Kant’s thought than has traditionally been assumed. We should thus 
reappraise this theory. For instance, judgment seems to be peculiar in Kant’s system 
because it has no principle. We may wonder what this means for epistemology and logic 
as conceived within the transcendental tradition. 
Thirdly, there is the question of transcendental idealism. Throughout this 
dissertation, I have avoided dealing with the doctrine of transcendental idealism 
directly. I have, however, given several indications of how this doctrine should be 
understood. For instance, I have invariably refused to characterize it as a metaphysical 
position, and presented as a position on metaphysics, namely as impossible. I have 
indicated instead that I think of transcendental idealism as the theory that obligation, 
ought, or the deontological is more fundamental than causation, is, or the ontological. 
Additionally, I have suggested that any transcendental idealist needs to accept that the 
particular and the general need to be regarded as fundamentally distinct. What this 
entails for a complete picture of transcendental idealism, remains to be seen. 
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In this dissertation, however, I have attempt to argue that transcendental idealism 
should in any case not be conflated with Platonic Idealism. According to platonic 
idealism, the a priori and that from which the epistemic derives its normative thrust are 
eternal and unchanging. On more metaphysical versions, it sees it as eternal and 
unchanging because it is situated in some distinct ontological realm, be it the Fregean 
dritte Reich or the Leibnizian divine mind. I have tried to defend the idea that, for Kant, 
the transcendentally ideal is more open to contingency than is traditionally assumed. In 
this, I have tried to vindicate him, and transcendental idealism in general, from the 
criticisms of 20th century philosophers who believe that everything that is not 
straightforwardly natural is supernatural. In chapters 4 and 5, there are hints of an 
interpretation of Kant that reveals this inference to be a non-sequitur. These hints, of 
course, await articulation. For now, I can dismiss as a petitio principii the most obvious 
criticism that may be raised against my reading, namely that it conflates the 
transcendental and the psychological. My response to this is simple: it assumes precisely 
what needs to be proven, namely that transcendental idealism is akin to platonic 
idealism in that it insists that the ideal is not open to contingency, which means that 
whereever we are concerned with contingency, we must be speaking of the 
psychological or of the messy concrete empirical interactions of natural entities. In this 
dissertation, I have argued that Kant sought to escape this dualism. One may ultimately 
come to the conclusion that no such third position can be coherent. But what one may 
not do is dismiss it before assessing it, and insist that those who arguably hold it cannot 
conceivably hold it. 
There is of course another straightforward question that one may ask concerning the 
picture of Kantian epigenesis I offered in 7.4, namely whether Kant really held it. This, 
however, is a wrong question. Kant himself stated that the originator of a science or a 
system does not yet see all that it contains or entails, and that it is up to later thinkers to 
articulate what lies in its purview. All that I have wanted to show is that this too lies 
within the purview of Kant’s transcendental idealism. Like all Kantians, I intend to go 
beyond Kant in a direction somehow indicated by Kant himself. I have simply tried to 
uncover one such direction: a radical perspective allowing for revolutions in the a 
priori. This Jacobin thrust of Kant’s philosophy, however, has in the past centuries been 
expertly neutralized by the Thermidorian attempt to separate the fickleness of the 
natural from the stability of the transcendent, and the many ploys to restore, in 
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